

Britannia Waives the Rules

Whither the United Kingdom? What are the options — and more importantly, what are the strategic priorities — for the Government of Boris Johnson? Can the UK recover from its several decades of strategic decline as a result of its European Union membership. Would a further delay in Brexit spell the end of the UK as a global influence? If so, would it matter?

BORIS JOHNSON ON JULY 24, 2019, accepted the request of his Sovereign to form a new Government of the United Kingdom¹, knowing that the future of Britain as a united and independent nation-state was in the balance in a way rarely seen through history.

Geopolitically, the fate of Britain as a pivotal anchor of “the West” as the globally-dominant influence was also at stake — as it was during the three years of uncertainty since the UK voted in 2016 to leave the European Union — and the actions of the Johnson Government to rebuild the UK’s economy, military, and diplomatic reach would be critical to determining whether “the West” as an entire geo-civilizational concept could remain viable. This was particularly the case given the gradual decline of Western Europe as a global strategic factor — despite the collective economic wealth of the region — over the past two decades.

Absent a robust and truly sovereign United Kingdom, a major strategic gap would appear in the framework of the ill-defined Western framework of global power. This is not something which can be defined in statistical economic or battle order terms, but in terms of geopolitics, historical influence, and, ultimately in language. In some respects, the UK is the West’s strategic information dominance (SID) card, made more critical by the

withering away of geopolitical influence of the European Union.

Boris Johnson’s first speech as Prime Minister — on July 24, 2019, as he arrived at 10 Downing Street after leaving the Queen — showed a broad commitment to rebuilding the UK’s economic and social strength as it prepared to leave the European Union. But Prime Minister Johnson did not address the UK’s commitment to rebuilding strategic influence globally, other than to reassert that it would build free trade arrangements around the world, and would rebuild innovative British industry and science.

Indeed, if anything, Mr Johnson’s seeming relegation of defense to a secondary tier in his policy priorities may not reflect his thinking, or it may be, as with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-90), that defense would not be considered a priority until an international challenge to the UK made it so. The recent degradation of British defense capabilities since the Thatcher era, when defense was already at an historically low ebb, would, however, make it even more difficult for the UK to respond in a timely fashion to

greater defense commitments.

It should not be forgotten, however, that then-Foreign Secretary Johnson, speaking in July 2017 in Sydney, Australia, committed the UK’s two new 70,600 tonne displacement *Queen Elizabeth*-class aircraft carriers to freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Seas. This was a move which pointed to his willingness (a) to counterbalance the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and (b) to increase the re-deployment of British defense assets “east of Suez”.

Significantly, and despite the widespread belief that the UK economy had been damaged by the Brexit process, the Johnson Government may have some leeway to improve defense spending and to restore the UK’s global deployment capabilities and effectiveness. What was regarded, however, as a possible blow to a Johnson Government’s commitment to strengthening UK defense was the news, immediately after Mr Johnson became Prime Minister, that the Secretary of State for Defence, Penny Mordaunt, would leave the Cabinet and return to the back benches of Parliament, despite the fact that she was a strenuous proponent of Brexit in support of Johnson. But she did back Jeremy Hunt in the leadership contest. She had only held the Defence portfolio for 85 days. Foreign Secretary — and rival to the Johnson campaign for leader-

¹ Outgoing UK Prime Minister Theresa May, as promised, effectively resigned her office as Prime Minister on July 24, 2019, after a final debate at Prime Minister’s Question Time in the House of Commons. She left Parliament after a standing ovation from members of the House of Commons to return to the official residence of the Prime Minister, 10 Downing Street. She later traveled to Buckingham Palace to formally resign to the Sovereign, Queen Elizabeth II. The Queen subsequently called the new leader of the Conservative Party, former Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, and asked him to form a new Government. But before Mr Johnson was called to Buckingham Palace, a number of Cabinet secretaries who opposed him on Brexit, formally also resigned. These included the Chancellor of the Exchequer — effectively the most senior Cabinet posts — Philip Hammond. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (and, as Cabinet Office Secretary, effectively deputy Prime Minister) David Lidington, Secretary of State for Justice David Gauke, and Secretary of State for International Development Rory Stewart also resigned ahead of the appointment of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister.



HMS *Queen Elizabeth* launching an F-35B STOVL fighter. A revived naval air power projection capability for the UK, but is a force imbalance caused by legacy approaches to nuclear capabilities distorting defense spending, quite apart from the inadequacies of the British defense budget?

ship — Jeremy Hunt returned to the back benches, too.

Her departure from Defence was initially thought to be to allow Prime Minister Johnson to reinstate former UK Defence Secretary (2017-19) Gavin Williamson to the post, which would, in fact, restore a sense of continuity to the post. However, in a surprise move, he appointed outgoing the Minister of State for Security and Economic Crime (at the Home Department) since 2016, Ben Wallace (Robert Ben Lobban Wallace), 49, to the post.

Wallace had graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst into the Scots Guards, serving for eight years until 1998 in Northern Ireland, Germany, Cyprus, and Central America. He left as Company Commander of F Company, Scots Guards. He was also, from 2003 to 2005, overseas director of QinetiQ, the corporatized version of what had been the UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA). He had been Mentioned in Despatches (MiD) for his leadership in Northern Ireland operations. [See biography, page six.]

What became evident in the first hours of the Johnson Government was the fact that the Prime Minister would be pointedly disruptive, and was not interested in “continuity-oriented” members of Parliament, or, indeed, in those who had publicly opposed him or the concept of a strenuous delivery of Brexit. This meant that the promise in his first speech as Prime Minister that he would seek to be Prime Minister of all the residents of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland may be more difficult for him to achieve in practice.

But his first mission was to break any sense of equivocation on the issue of Brexit. While he “hit the ground running” on domestic issues — increased police manpower, a greater commitment to hospital modernization and medical treatment, and so on, as well as to spreading electronic and other infrastructure to every corner of the UK — his clear and overriding priority was to get the UK out of the European Union with a favorable deal or, if necessary, no deal at all.

How much time, then, would he

have to devote to longer-term strategic issues in the 99 days he had before the Brexit deadline of October 31, 2019? Moreover, his secondary — or perhaps equal — priority was to be ready to fight a new general election in the event that a vote of no-confidence pulled down his Government. The two goals — Brexit and election readiness — have some mutually contradictory aspects: he needed unity and loyalty within his Cabinet to deliver Brexit, but to do that he had to relegate key Conservative members of Parliament to the back benches and to possible opposition to his continued leadership.

There were, however, numerous “urgent” priorities — as opposed to long-term needs — in the global strategic framework which Prime Minister Johnson could not avoid.

First among these was the confrontation with Iran, exacerbated by the seizure by Iranian *Pasdaran* forces of the small (30,000 ton disp.) British-flagged tanker, the MV *Stena Impero*, on July 19, 2019. The seizure of the *Stena Impero* was clearly part of a pro-

Ben Wallace

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE,
UNITED KINGDOM

Robert Ben Lobban Wallace — known as Ben Wallace — was named as Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom by Prime Minister Boris Johnson, the day Mr Johnson's Government took office, July 24, 2019. He succeeded Penny Mordaunt in the post. As a full member of the Cabinet, Secretary Wallace is also a member of Her Majesty's Privy Council, so is entitled to either be styled "The Right Honourable" or to use the post-nominals "PC" after his name. As it transpired, however, Mr Wallace had already been appointed to the Privy Council for his rôle in coordinating the government response to the March 22, 2017, terrorist attack near Parliament, on Westminster Bridge.

Mr Wallace had served as Conservative Party Member of Parliament for the electorate of Wyre and Preston North in Lancashire, in the north-west of England, since the 2010 UK general election, but had served as the MP for Lancaster and Wyre (which was split into two electorates in 2006) since 2005. He had earlier (1999-2003) served as a member of the Scottish Parliament for North-East Scotland, when that electorate was created.

He held two earlier Government ministries: Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Northern Ireland (May 12, 2015, to July 17, 2016); and then was promoted to Minister of State for Security in the Home Department (July 17, 2016, to July 24, 2019). He had been, from 2005 to 2010, a member of the Scottish Affairs Select Committee in Parliament, and from 2006 to 2010 been the Shadow Minister of State for Scotland. He was Chairman of the British-Iran Parliamentary Group from 2006 to 2014. He also served as Parliamentary Private Secretary to three ministers before being made a parliamentary whip.

Ben Wallace was born on May 15, 1970, in Farborough, England.

He had left school at the age of 18, and undertaken a brief period as a ski instructor in Austria before successfully applying for (Army) officer training at Sandhurst Military Academy. He was commissioned in 1990 into the Scots Guards, where he served until 1998, retiring with the rank of captain. He served with distinction in Northern Ireland during "the Troubles", and was Mentioned in Despatches, and also served in Cyprus, Belize, and on "public duties" in London. Capt. Wallace carried out a range of rôles including intelligence officer and company commander.

He served, after his service with the Household Regiment, in the aerospace industry, from 2003 to 2005 as overseas director of State-owned QinetiQ, the UK's former Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA).

Significantly, he had originally voted for the UK to remain in the European Union during the 2016 referendum, but committed after to "honoring the wishes of the electorate".

He married the former Liza Cooke, and the couple have three children.

cess of Iranian negotiation with the UK for the release of the Panamanian-flagged, but Iranian-owned tanker, MV *Grace 1*, seized off Gibraltar on July 4, 2019, by the Royal Marines and Royal Navy. The *Grace 1* was arrested on suspicion that it was transporting Iranian oil to Syria, in violation of European Union embargoes (and nothing to do with the US sanctions against Iran).²

The *Stena Impero*, which is owned by a Finnish company, was taken to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.

There was no coincidence in the announcement on July 24, 2019, by the Iranian Government that it was prepared to negotiate a swap of the two tankers. The Iranian Government almost certainly felt that it could set the tone of bilateral Iranian-UK relations with the new UK Government. That may be tactically beneficial for both the UK and Iran, but what it indicated for the longer term was that the UK defense capability was no long sufficiently credible as to deter opportunistic behavior by an adversary. That was an indication of the decline not only in the UK's defense capability, but in its prestige, particularly in Iran, where there has been for more than a century that the UK could determine political outcomes in Iran.

Regardless of the short-term settlement of the Iran-UK tanker dispute, the implication was clear: Iran felt that it could now directly challenge the UK at all levels with relative impunity. Britain's prestige had been severely compromised, something in evidence in the Middle East long before the incident. Clearly, the Iranian Government was taking advantage of the political preoccupation in the UK with the change of leadership, but the question as to whether the UK had lost an unprecedented degree of strategic authority is something which the incoming Government of Prime Minister Johnson could no longer ignore.

The belief by Prime Minister Johnson — assuming this is the case — that

addressing the UK's consistent decline in defense capability and international prestige could be postponed until after Brexit or after the next UK general election would see British strategic prestige, defense preparedness, and the UK defense industrial base decline still further, perhaps irreparably. The question now was whether incoming Defense Secretary Ben Wallace would have any mandate to begin planning the restoration of British national security capabilities.

So within the UK defense establishment there is hope that a concurrent commitment to revived British strategic prestige would assist not only in beginning to overcome the damage of the current tanker humiliation, but also would assist in undertaking meaningful negotiations for partnership with the European powers (particularly France) and the European Union itself.

Incoming European Commission Pres. Ursula von der Leyen, who secured European Parliamentary approval on July 15, 2019, for accession to the post, said on July 24, 2019, that Prime Minister Johnson faced "challenging" times, but hinted at possible maneuvering room in the talks with the UK over its withdrawal from the EU. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in congratulating Mr Johnson on his appointment, said she would keep pursuing a "strong friendship" with the UK. All around, there seemed to be signs of modulation on all sides, including Mr Johnson's, on what might see something negotiated between Whitehall and Brussels which might resemble both a "deal" and a "no-deal". Pres. Emmanuel Macron of France noted: "I am looking forward to working with him, not only on European topics and the ongoing Brexit negotiations, but also on important international topics ... such as Iran and international security."

Overall, it seemed, by July 24, 2019, that what the hard-line Brexit "no deal" politicians had been saying all along was correct: that Brussels would

2 The UK-flagged (Red Ensign) *Stena Impera*, owned by Stena Bulk, of Finland, was contacted by radio as it was transiting Iranian waters in the Strait of Hormuz on July 19, 2019. Some media sources said that the radio contact was from the Iranian Navy, although it seemed likely that it was from the maritime wing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the *Pasdaran*. The Iranian radio communication demanded that the *Stena Impera* change course toward Bandar Abbas. "If you obey, you will be safe," the Iranian communication said. The IRGC later claimed that the ship had violated international regulations, which was unsubstantiated. During the diversion, the radio traffic was clearly being monitored by UK naval communications in Bahrain and aboard the Royal Navy frigate based there, HMS *Montrose* (F236: Type 23). HMS *Montrose*' communication to the *Stena Impera* spoke also to the Iranians, noting: "Please confirm that you are not intending to violate international law by unlawfully attempting to board."

begin to modify its position once it became clear that the UK under Johnson would be just as happy to “crash out” of the EU with no deal at all. EU Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier tweeted on July 23: “We look forward to working constructively w/PM Boris Johnson when he takes office to facilitate the Withdrawal Agreement and achieve and orderly Brexit. We are ready also to rework the agreed Declaration on a new partnership in line with EUCO [European Council] guidelines.”

But where must the UK begin if it is to restore its global strategic prestige and reach?

► **A greater budgetary commitment to the Ministry of Defence:** Although the UK defense budget for 2019 nominally equates to some 2.1 percent of the gross domestic product, it has declined from £37.4-billion in 2007-08 to £36.9-billion in 2017-18. And 2017-18 was a nominal increase of £1.6-billion over 2016-17. A budget of £37.6-billion (\$46.94-billion) was planned for 2019-20, an increase of 1.1 percent over the previous year, but a decline when taking inflation into account. In other

words, defense spending has been flat for more than a decade, while costs and commitments have risen. *The Indian defense budget for 2019-20 is \$61.96-billion, 25 percent more than the UK's.* The UK GDP for 2018 was \$2.825-trillion; India's was only \$2.726-trillion. The UK has global strategic commitments; India, Britain's former colony, does not.

► **Re-evaluate the UK Force Structure:** Why does the UK do so poorly with its defense budget? It is now committed to its two aircraft carriers as cornerstones of its power projection, even though these come at a time of increasing vulnerability for carriers. The US, for example, used a carrier strike group into the Persian Gulf in 2019 to intimidate Iran into negotiations, but rapidly withdrew it when the Iranian Supreme Leader hinted that Iran would not shrink from escalating to direct kinetic confrontation. The utility of carriers is being increasingly constrained. Although they have some utility. But is the UK too locked in to legacy structures, such as SSBNs — fleet ballistic missile nuclear strategic systems — at the expense of more practical and

cost-effective blue water frigates and destroyers?³ And to what extent is the UK committed to next-generation systems, such as cyber and hypersonic weapons? It was only in July 2019 that the UK committed some funding to hypersonic propulsion systems. Given the declining efficacy of some legacy systems — such as the *Trident* nuclear-warhead submarine-launched ballistic missile aboard the strategic submarines — would the UK benefit more from developing tube-launched land-attack weapons (even nuclear) which could be used from SSN platforms? The UK is currently getting little strategic prestige from its SSBN fleet, and the warfighting utility of SSBNs is declining because of a transformed technological environment. The bottom line is that if the UK is to rebuild its global projection, then it must be with cost-effective surface combatants and tactically (as well as strategically) useable fleet submarines, not SSBNs.⁴

► **Re-focus the UK Defense Industrial Base:** The UK had transformed from one of the world's leading developers, producers, and exporters of defense systems into becoming a partner in

- 3 The Royal Navy at present has 13 Type 23 *Duke*-class frigates (to be replaced with eight — and presumably more later — new Type 26 Global Combat Frigates. It has six Type 45 D-class destroyers. Its strategic submarine fleet includes one (abuilding) (plus three more planned) *Dreadnaught*-class SSBNs, which will start, in 2028, replacing the four *Vanguard*-class SSBNs; and in the tactical attack submarine fleet (all nuclear) the RN has four *Astute*-class SSNs with three more abuilding; and three remaining (of the original seven) *Trafalgar*-class SSNs (which will be replaced by the *Astute*-class). By comparison, former UK colony Australia, with a defense budget in 2019-20 of \$27.51-billion (just under 60 percent of the UK's), has a fleet of three *Aegis*-type air warfare destroyers, eight ANZAC-class frigates, five *Adelaide*-class (FFG-7) frigates, and nine (ordered) Type 26 *Hunter*-class frigates. It lacks full carrier capability, but has two F-35B-capable *Canberra*-class 27,000 ton assault ships (LHDs).
- 4 See also: “The United Kingdom, Giving the Conservative Party a Clear Electoral Mandate, Enters a Decisive Era of History”, in *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, 4-2015. That report noted, in part: [Prime Minister David] Cameron has yet to exhibit any enthusiasm to rebuild Britain's rapidly-declining defense capabilities. His Government, five years earlier, inherited two budget-distorting defense sectors which have been described as critical to the UK's retention of a “place at the top table”: firstly, its submarine-based nuclear strike capability (its *Tridents* as well as its nuclear-armed cruise missiles); and secondly, its two new c70,000 ton disp. *Queen Elizabeth*-class aircraft carriers. Arguably, the sea-based nuclear capability is indispensable to the UK's retention of first power status, even though the likelihood of nuclear weapons use for any war-winning purpose is negligible. The capability exists for psychological purposes. Real strategic warfighting at counter-city levels would be done with cyber capabilities. The acquisition of carrier battle groups, however, is strategically questionable because of the extent to which they distort the overall UK defense capabilities, particularly at a time when — despite the UK's optimistic economic performance under the Conservatives — defense spending is down from 3.8 percent of GDP in 1990 to less than two percent today. ...With a fleet of 19 major surface combatants (destroyers and frigates) and six attack submarines, it is evident that the UK could not deploy carrier battle groups (which include the surface and underwater escorts) in serious conflict and still undertake other essential maritime tasks. As well, as the UK moves toward in-service capability for the two carriers in 2018 and 2020 (with aircraft due to come into service later), the vulnerability of carriers in serious conflict situations becomes pronounced. Despite the unrealistic shape of the RN — the senior service for a reason for an island trading nation — it has dragged down spending for the Army, Royal Air Force, and Royal Marines: services indispensable, also, for a global rôle for Britain. Mr Cameron, then, has to make key decisions on defense within the coming two years if the British Armed Forces are to retain any meaningful global viability. And yet it is unlikely that defense will rise to become, once again, a priority for his Government, if recent performance is anything to go by. The current Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Fallon, who only assumed the portfolio on July 15, 2014, would probably retain his post in the new Government. If he did not, then it would definitely indicate that Prime Minister Cameron had little interest in continuity at Defence. And despite the decline in the size and capability of the UK Armed Forces, the size of the Ministry of Defence establishment has remained bloated. It is not insignificant that the Ministry's Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) facility at Abbey Wood, in Bristol, in the West of England, is the biggest defense facility in the UK, with an estimated 12,000 employees. This is defense procurement headquarters, for an Armed Forces strength of less than 157,000 uniformed personnel. Total Ministry of Defence civilian personnel number more than 60,000. To put it mildly, Britain's “tooth-to-tail ratio” is declining rapidly. Army regiments are cut and cut in an atmosphere of proportionately declining budget availability, but the bureaucracy does not also diminish proportionately. Today, the UK has some 64-million people. In 1813, toward the end of the Napoleonic and Peninsula wars and just after the War of 1812 with the US, Britain's population was around 19-million, it had an Army of a quarter-million men under arms. The Royal Navy had some 950 ships in 1805. What was clear was that Britain, when it considered itself a world power, considered its military as a greater priority, and as a more central aspect of political and social life. There is little evidence that Prime Minister Cameron, in 2015, would seek to rekindle even a small revival in that thinking.

The UK, as it plans to withdraw from the EU in 2019, is strategically weakened to a degree unseen for perhaps 200 years.

major platform development and production. With independence from the EU, it will need — for economic as well as political reasons — to re-focus on taking project leadership in key defense areas. The UK, under the Thatcher Government (1979-90), focused heavily on selling off or closing down its world-leading shipbuilding capacity to the point where today it has limited capacity and high costs. At the same time, innovation in the marine sector showed that UK yards could build ships to the world's highest standards at costs which (in the 1990s) rivaled the cost-per-ton of South Korean shipyards. The Thatcher Government led the UK out of being a manufacturing economy in order to become a service economy. Strategic independence — sovereignty — cannot be sustained without control over the mechanisms of defense and relative self-sufficiency in all essentials (including, particularly, food). It has been a long time since the UK Government has actually thought in terms of planning for Britain to be in control of the elements of its own survival.

► **Overhaul and Re-structure the UK Intelligence Community:** the UK Intelligence Community (IC) has historically been one of the most accomplished and professional in the world. Recent activities, presumably with the complicity of the governments of the day, have seen some of the community's activities become politicized, and some of its senior personnel exposed as being of limited capability and without the ability to see their activities and responsibilities in the light of a balanced strategic context. But quite apart from the exposure of the poor judgment the UK IC showed with regard to (presumably Prime Ministerially-approved) cooperation

with political and intelligence officials in the US in inappropriate activities, the UK IC has become entrapped by the massive volume of so-called intelligence “product” — usually electronic or other non-HUMINT product — it must process within the UKUSA Accord agreements (the “Five Eyes” community of the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).

In other words, strategic-level management of the UK IC is in need of serious review, along with a review of the Government's tasking expectations. At the same time measures need to be introduced to ensure that quality of product and analysis are not overwhelmed by the avalanche of raw sewage down the pipeline to and from the Five Eyes community. As well, significant numbers of UK ministerial open comments in recent years have indicated that quality analysis has not reached the Government from the IC. Perhaps it is time to re-view, too, the hierarchy by which intelligence is able to proceed from collection to user.

► **Strategic Policy:** There are concerns that UK foreign policy remains mired in outdated perspectives, guided by an oriental romanticism that it can seek friendship with the People's Republic of China and Turkey, and maintain Crimean War views on Russia. There seems little willingness to embrace history but also to see that the world is at a watershed.

THese are just a few, incomplete highlights of some of the challenges urgently facing the UK in the national security realm, and areas where the UK would need to move quickly if it is to regain some measure of control over its strategic future.

What is significant is the reality that the UK, as it plans to withdraw from the EU in 2019, is strategically weakened to a degree unseen for perhaps 200 years. Counterbalancing that is that there may not be an imminent threat of a direct military nature to the UK, which could, in theory, give it time to gradually rebuild its strength.

The problem with that approach — which may be unavoidable — is that the damage to British prestige has declined to a point where every event,

such as the Iranian “tanker contretemps”, makes the decline more profound, and recovery more costly in time and economic terms.

There is also the reality that no matter how well incoming Defence Secretary Ben Wallace performs, he is unlikely to get a substantial improvement in his budget as long as the Prime Minister needs to dispense social relief to the voters in the run-up to (and recovery from) Brexit. So UK defense spending for the coming year or so is likely to remain flat. At the same time, even a policy decision to find alternatives to the core fleet of SSBNs as a cost-saving measure would take several years to work through.

Parliament's Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, chaired by Labour's Margaret Beckett, issued a report in late July 2019 noting: “If the Government wants to turn the ‘Global Britain’ concept into a meaningful strategy for a positive and self-assured rôle for the UK after its departure from the EU, then it needs to be more honest about how it proposes to address these challenges.” Significantly, there was no indication from the opposition Labour Party that it had a coherent plan to improve defense spending. But the report came soon after the former Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. (rtd.) Lord Richards, had said that the Royal Navy was “just too small to have a significant effect without being with allies”.

The Joint Committee's report noted: “Strong arguments have been advanced that it is not enough to spend two percent of GDP on defense, in light of both the scale and range of threats to the UK and the costs involved in keeping pace with rapid technological change. Yet a recent Defence Committee report found that Ministry of Defence expenditure fell from 2.4 percent of GDP in 2010-11 to 1.8 percent in 2017/18.”

What can be done, however, is for Defence Secretary Wallace to gain the Prime Minister's blessing for a total review of the UK's strategic position and outlook, with a view to developing viable plans which can then be matched to a budget. Because, as I said in *The Art of Victory*, in 2006: “If you don't know where you're going, every road will lead to disaster.” ★