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Special Reports



ISSA's Libya Policy Group (LPG) has hundreds of reports on the Libyan political and security issues, and WMD research programs, prepared over the past decade. A selection of these appear on this site. Please check regularly for the addition of important archival reports and new studie

March 25, 2011: Obama Approach to Libya Polarizes NATO, and Further Pushes Turkey into the anti-US Camp/Albania Government Selling Weapons to Qadhafi/Libya’s Tribal Complexity Drives the 2011 Civil War

March 21, 2011: Wider Strategic Factors Emerge as UN-backed “No-Fly Zone” Begins to Take Effect in Libya

February 25, 2011: The Mediterranean, Africa, and the Middle East, Post-Qadhafi: Awakening to a Diverse Landscape, Unimagined in the West

February 23, 2011: Musings of an Heretic: Where the Middle East is Going, and Why the West Fails to Grasp the Many Realities

February 3, 2011: Libya’s Qadhafi Moves Toward Transition, Avoiding Succession Problems, and Resisting Radical Islamists

January 30, 2004: Iraqi WMD Debate and Intelligence Failed to View Total Picture: the Libya Links
January 30, 2004:
Qadhafi’s Health Deteriorates as Opposition Mounts
January 26, 2004:
New Evidence of Ongoing Qadhafi Involvement in Terrorism, Support for Sudanese Rebels
January 22, 2004:
Qadhafi “Rear Guard” Action Attempts to Halt US Discovery of WMD Link With Iraq
December 23, 2003:
Evidence of Libyan Involvement in Mauritania Coup Attempt Highlights Qadhafi’s Strategic Direction
December 22, 2003:
Libyan WMD Programs, Long Cited by GIS, Admitted as Qadhafi Begins Rear-Guard Action to Stave Off US Attack
December 17, 2003:
Libya’s Saif al-Islam Moves Further Away From Reconciliation With US, EU
December 10, 2003:
Qadhafi Seen as Listless at Tunis Summit
December 4, 2003:
New Evidence Illustrates Libyan Leadership Preparing for Qadhafi’s Death
September 5, 2003:
Qadhafi Denies Responsibility for Lockerbie; Calls US Leaders “Prostitutes” and Privately Alleges He Has Bribed Key US Officials to Achieve Closure on Case 
September 4, 2003:
Libya, Iran, DPRK Discuss New Strategic Missile Procurement  
July 29, 2003:
Niger-Iraq Uranium Reports Involve Ongoing Libyan Deception Ops 
March 12, 2003: Libya Grasps at “Normalization” of Relations With US, UK as Saudi Arabia Reverses Relations With Tripoli
March 3, 2003:
Outburst by Crown Prince ‘Abdullah Acknowledges Possible Saudi Role in Libyan 1969 Coup and Highlights Qadhafi’s Illness

February 27, 2003: US Bush Administration Looking Beyond Iraq to Promote Change in Iran, Libya and Syria
December 11, 2002:
Fresh Coup Attempt Against Qadhafi Involves Family; Highlights Confusion 
October 1, 2002:
Weapons Grade Uranium Moving in Middle East; Iraqi WMD and Delivery Development Being Undertaken in Libya
August 14, 2002: UK Promises Qadhafi Support in Exchange for IRA Data 
August 7, 2002:
UK Begins Direct Negotiations With Libya “On Flawed Premise” 
July 30, 2002:
Time to End the Hypocrisy Over Qadhafi
July 29, 2002: Qadhafi Claims That US Attempting to Replace Him With the Sanusi Monarchy

July 12, 2002:
Qadhafi Orders Killing of Occupants of Entire Libyan Army Base, Then Tells CNN He Opposes Terrorism
May 17, 2002:
New Round of Libya-US-UK Talks Getting Underway, But No Settlement Anticipated
May 9, 2002:
Saif al-Islam, in Bid to Move Into Libyan Decisionmaking, Focuses on Libyan al-Qaida Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay 
May 8, 2002:
US Now Focuses Attention on Libya as Hostile State, While Libya Moves Rapidly to Bolster Strategic Ties With Iran  
April 29, 2002:
Mubarak Flies to Libya to Seek Funds from Qadhafi
March 27, 2002:
Libya’s Saif al-Islam Admits Prospect of Assuming Leadership; Qadhafi Refuses to Participate in Arab League Summit 
March 15, 2002: Libya Expected to Resume More Overtly Radical Approach With Rejection of al-Megrahi Appeal on PA103 
March 11, 2002: Libya Continues to Escalate Anti-US, Anti-Israeli Stance Following Breakdown of Talks  
March 5, 2002:
US Pressure Expected on Egyptian Pres. Mubarak Over Libya, WMD

February 19, 2002:
Libya's Succession Preparations Continue as Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi Adds al-Qaida and Radicals to His Militia
February 15, 2002:
Libya Wins State Department Approval to Deal With US Oil Leases, and Then Takes in al-Qaida Captives
February 4, 2002:
Major Changes Continue to Move Libya Into the Forefront of Strategic Focus 
February 1, 2002:
The Sanusi and Wahhabi Movements of Islam: Born of the Same Man and Products of Their Culture 
January 24, 2002:
False Reports of an Impending Libyan Deal to Compensate PA103 Victims Designed to Cool US Pressures on Qadhafi 
January 16, 2002:
Qadhafi's Problems Persist, Fueling Belief That Compromise Solutions for the Future May be Possible 
January 8, 2002:
Reports of New Coup Attempt Against Qadhafi;  Militia of Qadhafi's Renegade Son Disbanded 
January 7, 2002:
Libya at a Watershed as Qadhafi Attempts to Re-Define His Leadership 
December 10, 2001:
Qadhafi’s Health at Issue as Libyan Future Debated
November 8, 2001:
Qadhafi Seizes Opportunity to Move Out of Isolation While Expanding Radical Activities, Including CBW Development 
January 12, 2001:
Collapse of Lockerbie PA103 Case Changes Strategic Disposition of Libya 
November 8, 2000:
Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel 
May 1, 2000:
An Unstable Qadhafi Seen Ready to Use Window to Pursue Strategic Agenda 
September 8, 1999:
Libyan Leader, 30 Years Into His Rule, is Given New Lease of Life


March 25, 2011

Obama Approach to Libya Polarizes NATO, and Further Pushes Turkey into the anti-US Camp

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs. The US Obama Administration’s lack of leadership in helping to resolve the Libyan civil war has, among other things, widened the rift between the US and European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and has made the US increasingly less influential in global strategic issues.

The confused and reluctant approach of the Obama White House has also clearly exacerbated the rift — which official Washington chooses not to see — between Turkey and the US, and has hastened the move of Turkey into a strategic camp which is hostile to the US.

See: Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, March 6, 2009: Turkey Makes its Strategic Choice: Russia.

US Pres. Barack Obama specifically set back international efforts to restrain Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi when he telegraphed to Qadhafi the fact that the US would not sustain a protracted military campaign against him; that the air and missile operations of Operation Odyssey Dawn would be of limited duration; and that the US would under no account use ground forces against Qadhafi.

The Obama approach — despite the clear, professional, and comprehensive accomplishment by the US Armed Forces of those tasks assigned to them for the brief engagement — reflected Pres. Obama’s belief that he must be clear of foreign military operations to successfully win a second term in the White House. However, it also reflected the very real knowledge that he and many of his friends and associates have been compromised by funds which had been made available to them by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in recent years. This is now an open secret in Washington policy circles.

The US lack of leadership on the Libya question — after Pres. Obama had recently so notably encouraged protestors against the governments of Tunisia and Egypt, and the Government of Bahrain in the face of Iranian-backed protestors — coupled with the military intervention by a number of external governments in the Libyan civil war during March 2011 (as a result of the March 17, 2011, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 of 2011), has served to accelerate growing divisions between European powers: between some European states and the US; and within NATO.

One of the most significant developments has been the growing polarization between Western European states and Turkey, which has become increasingly aligned with Russia and Iran, and which has clearly aligned itself with outgoing Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi.

The emerging alignments on the Libyan question are marrying with other trends which have effectively now ended the fiction that Turkey can become a member of the European Union (EU). Indeed, there is increasingly a view in much of the EU that Turkey is positioning itself as the major problem for the Union and for NATO, but one which still has a significant “gatekeeper” role in affecting the oil and gas traffic from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Western Europe.

Turkey remains a critical transit region, too, for the airlift of non-combat support to US troops in Afghanistan, and is home to a number of US Air Force units and to US nuclear weapons. As a result, many US decisionmakers do not want to face the issue of what a Turkish “defection” from its six decades of alliance with the US would mean. US global strategic doctrine would have to be re-written to reflect the move of Turkey out of the Western camp. Indeed, even the Cold War and post-Cold War concept of “the Western camp” needs to be reconsidered.

It is ironic, then, that the Turkish leadership and US Pres. Obama fundamentally agree in their support for Qadhafi. Turkey has gained commercial success in Libya under Qadhafi, but there is no reason why it could not also prosper if Libya had its democratic and constitutional government restored. But the Turkish Prime Minister has — like so many Washington officials — prospered at the direct or indirect hand of Qadhafi.

See Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, March 21, 2011: Wider Strategic Factors Emerge as UN-backed “No-Fly Zone” Begins to Take Effect in Libya.

Meanwhile, the US withdrew on March 25, 2011, from its temporary operational leadership of the 12-country coalition — which includes Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Qatar, Spain, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates — and allowed NATO as an organization to assume coordination (on March 26, 2011) of the “no-fly zone”. The Turkish Government immediately contested this, and NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen suggested that NATO would resolve this internal NATO challenge over the weekend of March 26-27, 2011. The US military would continue to participate as a supporting member of the enforcement coalition over Libya.

The Obama Administration has portrayed its keenness to minimize US military involvement against Qadhafi as a result of pressures from the US Republican Party majority in the House of Representatives to stop the Administration from entering another conflict without clear objectives or endgame. In reality, Pres. Obama has resisted US military participation against Qadhafi in large part because of his long history of association with Qadhafi, who has financed many around Pres. Obama over the past years. Qadhafi, in a number of his broadcasts during February and March 2011, issued veiled warnings to Obama, saying that Obama would know where his duty lay.

But while US political influence has moved into a period of precipitous decline, including declining influence in Europe, Operation Odyssey Dawn has demonstrated — yet again — the reality that states cannot acquire true, world-class military capabilities merely by buying advanced weapons systems. The Libyan Armed Forces, never trusted by Qadhafi, were consistently denied training, true operational experience, and even the ability undertake live-fire exercises or training in exercises alongside advanced partner forces. This was demonstrated in the UK-Argentine war over the Falkland Islands in 1982.

In that conflict, the only force which operated well for Argentina was the Air Force, which had consistently exercised with the US Air Force. The Argentine, Army, Navy, and Marines had not had recent exposure to any equivalent or superior military force, and thus failed to compete adequately with British forces.

In Libya today, the forces still loyal to Qadhafi have only been able to perform at all against the Constitutional forces opposed to Qadhafi because of better access to weapons and communications, and — more importantly — because the Constitutionalist forces have equally had no training or experience. When Qadhafi’s forces came against first-rate military forces, they have failed to perform even at a basic level. The question facing the Constitutionalist forces in Libya, then, is whether they can now use the breathing spaces the international community has bought for them to build some viable command and control capability to confront Qadhafi’s forces.

This lesson cannot be ignored by other military leaders in Africa and the Middle East. The lesson is that advanced military capabilities cannot be acquired merely by buying advanced military systems.

If that is the case, then second- and third-tier military forces must consider what, indeed, they can do to ensure that they can provide the capabilities required to fulfill their missions. One of the first steps, clearly, is the appropriate selection of adversaries, which requires an emphasis on diplomacy, psychological strategy, and sound strategic intelligence. Another is to ensure that forces are developed to utilize local cultural attributes and then enhanced through adequate adoption of technologies which must become inherent to the logic of those forces.

Qadhafi did not ensure that his armed forces were geared to any goal other than to intimidate his own population. Significantly, as well, the anti-Qadhafi forces — those who have been suppressed since 1969 — failed to prepare for the eventuality which they knew must come: the collapse of Qadhafi’s Government, or his death or flight. The opposition forces talked incessantly for four decades, but failed to make any plans for what has occurred in 2011, and that failure is also showing now.


Albania Government Selling Weapons to Qadhafi

From GIS South-East Europe Station, Thessaloniki. In January 2010, MEICO, a company owned by the Ministry of Defense of Albania, engaged in a complex operation of exporting 150,000 82mm mortar shells to Libya. Two Serbian arms smugglers made this export possible. One of them was Slobodan Tesic, who violated the UN weapons embargo to provide weapons to Pres. Charles Taylor in Liberia; the other was Zoran Damianovic, who in July 2005 spent a short time in prison in Montenegro for attempted smuggling of a thousand M70 and M72 Zastava assault rifles. [The Zastava is a reverse-engineered AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle variant.]

The export order to Libya for the 150,000 82mm mortar rounds was made to a Montenegrin company, Yugoimport, a subsidiary of the Serbian weapons company Yugoimport SDPR according to the EUC (end user certificate) and the cargo manifest and the bill of lading of the vessel which transported them. The payment was made through Niksicka Banka of Montenegro, a bank with long ties to the weapons trade of the Ministry of Defense of Albania.

Significantly, Montenegro, a small country of 600,000 inhabitants, was shown as importing 150,000 82mm mortar shells at a time when its military, by 2009, had phased out the 82mm mortar from its military inventory.

According to the records of Harbor Master Office of Durres Port (the main port of Albania) and the Center for the Surveillance of Sea Space situated at Plepa, five miles away from Durres Port (the center there is run by the Albanian Navy), the vessel loaded with the containers full of mortar shells followed a south-south-west course in the Adriatic Sea. Montenegro, ostensibly the intended destination, lies on the Adriatic shore, north of Albania.

This riddle of a vessel with a northerly destination sailing south can be solved thanks to the Port Clearance document issued by the office of the Harbor Master of Libyan port of Ras Lanuf, proving that the vessel left Ras Lanuf port empty after unloading the cargo there. This Port Clearance of Ras Lanuf was handed over to the Albanian Port authorities after the vessel returned to Durres Port.

The Niksicka Banka paid for the purchase of the 150,000 mortar rounds with funds from a Libyan company, LAFIC (Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company). On February 23, 2011, insurgents and defecting soldiers stormed the SA-5 (NATO designation; Russian designation is S-200) surface-to-air missile (SAM) air defense base near Tobruk. They filmed seized caches of weapons and ammunition there, verifying — in the process — the Albanian sale.


Libya’s Tribal Complexity Drives the 2011 Civil War

Analysis. By GIS Staff. Libya has some 140 major tribes, most broken into clans, and it was this complexity of tribes — which vary in culture and religious approach based on their geography and history — which drove the creation of the 1951 Constitution and cemented the national acceptance of the Senussiyyah movement as the natural leadership group for Libya.

The Senussi family, the doyen of which — Seyyid Mohamed ibn Ali al-Senussi, known as al-Senussi al-Kabir — formed the Senussi sect of Islam in the late 18th Century, and this exceptionally moderate sect of Islam was adopted across much of Libya and other communities in North and West Africa and the Middle East. As a result, the Senussi family was able to be accepted in a leadership capacity in Libya, given that it did not represent a single Libyan tribe.

See Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, February 1, 2002: The Sanusi and Wahhabi Movements of Islam, Born of the Same Man and Products of Their Culture.

The present Libyan crisis represents the inevitable resurrection of the concept that none of the Libyan tribes wishes to be dominated by another. The September 1969 coup by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi — it was a junior officer coup, not a revolution — eventually meant that the Qadhadhfa tribe placed itself over the others. The sudden appearance in February 2011 throughout Libya of the flag of the 1951 Senussi Constitution indicated the pent-up frustration over the four decades of Qadhadhfa domination.

It also showed how corrupt the Qadhafi Administration had become compared with the elected leadership of King Idris I, and the democratic parliamentary system he instituted, before Lt. Qadhafi seized power while the King was abroad for medical treatment in 1969.

Transliteration of tribal names varies according to the translator, but the predominant Libyan tribes and ethnic groups include:

Tripoli Region:

Warfalla

Awlad Busayf

Al-Zintan

Al-Rijban

Al- Zawiya

Al-Magarha

Maslata

Cyrenaica Region

Al-Awagir

Al-Abaydat

Drasa

Al-Barasa

Al-Fawakhir

Al-Zuwayya

Al-Majabra

Kargala

Ramla

Sirte Region

Al-Gadhadhfa

Al-Magarha

Al-Magharba

Al-Riyyah

Al-Haraba

Al-Zuwaid

Al-Guwaid

Farjan

Fezzan

Al-Hutman

Al-Hassawna

Tibbu

Tuareg

Al-Kufra

Al-Zuwayya

Tibbu


March 21, 2011

Wider Strategic Factors Emerge as UN-backed “No-Fly Zone” Begins to Take Effect in Libya

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs. The major Western players — the US, the UK, and France — have begun, as they escalate their militarily-coordinated air and missile attacks on the forces of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in Libya, to compete over who they need to support for leadership in a post-Qadhafi state. The competition for influence over the next Libyan Administration, and the oil and gas production coming mainly out of Eastern Libya, also highlights shifts within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other international institutions, such as the African Union (AU) and the Arab League.

Significantly, although the key Western players are coming to essentially the same conclusions as to the next Libyan leadership, the process of finding who to back has highlighted the great strategic divisions and distrust which are emerging between the three NATO states, highlighting the differences between them even as they coordinate well at an operational level in the enforcement of the United Nations Security Council-mandated “no-fly zone” over Libya.

Some of the basics emerging as the Libyan fighting continues are:

  1. The anti-Qadhafi National Libyan Council (NLC), under former Qadhafi Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel Jalil, is seen as representative only of Cyrenaican interests, and still does not address the overall Libyan tribes’ needs to find representation which transcends the interests of a single, or few, tribes or a single region. As a result, it is shaping up that the NLC and its leader could remain relevant only as a regional body, ultimately not becoming a “national” entity or government.

  2. The US, UK, and France are indeed all looking to the 1951 Libyan Constitution and to the provision that a member of the Senussiyyah sect, and Senussi family, be elected as a national leader, a move which would transcend the possibility of a single tribe, or tribal leader, taking power, as Qadhafi did with his 1969 coup, which empowered the Qadadhfa tribe. There are two Senussi family members who have been considered: the first is Seyyid Idris bin Abdullah al-Senussi, based in Rome, who has been acknowledged for two decades as the secular leader of the movement (the Senussi movement is a moderate Islamic sect); and the second is the self-styled “Crown Prince” of Libya, Muhammad al-Senussi, who had been based in London, and who has now moved to Cairo. Prince Muhammad was the son of the former Crown Prince, who had abdicated his claim to the throne after the 1969 coup against King Idris I by Qadhafi. In any event, the Libyan Constitution calls for the election by the tribal leaders of a leader from the Senussi family; there is no succession by primogeniture. Moreover, Qadhafi also recognized that Seyyid Idris was his main adversary, and lobbied the Hosni Mubarak Government in Egypt to have Egypt ban Idris from entering Egypt, from where he could effectively mount a campaign against Qadhafi. The Libya court system also in 2010 recognized that Idris and his part of the Senussi family were the heirs to the property of the late King Idris.

  3. Senior US Government officials at the State Department and Congress in the run-up to the start of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the multinational air denial campaign over Libya which began on March 19, 2011, met with Seyyid Idris in Washington, DC (his second visit to Washington in the space of a few weeks), and French and British officials were now discussing Idris’ prospects as leader of the anti-Qadhafi faction of Libyan politics. French and Saudi officials were known also to have initiated moves to contact Idris.

  4. The French Air Force was the first to initiate air strikes against Qadhafi air and air defense systems on March 19, 2011, identifying just how committed the French Government has become to moving toward support of a new Libyan leadership. Earlier, France had recognized the NLC as representative of the Libyan people, and French officials have now been working to make contact with the Senussi leadership and, to some extent, have been coordinating with the UK Government of Prime Minister David Cameron. The French Government of Pres. Nicholas Sarkozy is keen to transition away from Qadhafi to secure French oil and gas supplies from North Africa and to move toward a more stable Mediterranean trading basin, linking in with France and the EU. Prime Minister Cameron, in the UK, shares this sentiment, but also clearly wishes to highlight the questionable behavior of the former UK governments of Labour leaders Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, which compromised massively with Qadhafi, in moves which involved large sums of cash moving to UK political, academic, and other “influence” figures.

  5. US Pres. Barack Obama has essentially been forced into a corner on the question of supporting the Security Council-authorized military action in Libya. Going against all military strategic logic, Obama has been openly saying — telling Qadhafi — that US military operations would not include ground forces. While this has been an important message from Obama to his political base in the US, which opposes any additional US military adventures abroad, it is also a very strong message which he hopes Qadhafi will understand. Qadhafi has been issuing veiled warnings in his own statements, aimed at letting Obama know that he expects the Obama White House to honor its friendship with him, friendship which has been sealed through extensive payments over recent years to Obama allies and — reportedly — close family. As a result of this, Obama has already faced explicit attacks from his close friend and longtime political supporter, Louis Farrakhan, a US “black Muslim” leader, who has taken large sums from Qadhafi, either directly or indirectly. Farrakhan on March 20, 2011, issued a public attack on Obama for approving the US involvement in the “no-fly zone” activities, asking “who do you think you are?” to approve the strikes. The Obama team in Washington is by no means the only group in the US capital to have benefited financially from Qadhafi. The settlement of the Lockerbie (Pan Am 103) terrorist incident put almost a billion dollars into the hands of lawyers in the US and UK to spread around for a settlement favorable to Qadhafi. As a result, there are now a number of officials concerned that their current wealth might be subject to scrutiny if Qadhafi should decide to reveal how his money has gone around the Washington and London policy circuits. As a result, Pres. Obama has held his hand as much as he has dared in authorizing US military action against Qadhafi.

  6. The African Union (AU) has attempted to avoid taking a definitive stand on Qadhafi’s explicit actions against his own population in recent months — while taking strong stands on issues such as the contest for power and issues of “democracy” in Cote d’Ivoire, for example — largely because of the amount of funding which Qadhafi has made privately available to many African leaders in recent years. Indeed, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), which had been functioning well, was supplanted by the AU specifically at Qadhafi’s insistence so that he could gain political dominance on the Continent. The AU has therefore lost enormous credibility in the current situation, but in a post-Qadhafi world the organization can be expected to work gradually toward a more meaningful rôle. To an extent, however, the distortion in the AU — and in the approaches of other leaders around the world — will reflect the distortions which Qadhafi’s private funds have created.

  7. Just as the AU has been essentially silent on the Libya situation — except for a statement by the AU Peace and Security Committee calling for the protection of civilians — the Arab League’s position on Qadhafi has reflected the fact that Qadhafi has worked against so many of the League’s leadership, particularly Saudi Arabian King ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud, who Qadhafi had once attempted to have killed. Nonetheless, the decision by the Arab League Secretary-General, Egyptian Amr Moussa, to question the UN-backed “no-fly zone” approach post-facto reflects his own Egyptian political aspirations, and his general antipathy to the US.

  8. The anti-Qadhafi forces, mainly centered on Cyrenaica in Eastern Libya, had, by March 21, 2011, failed to take real advantage of the resources available to them to develop a credible defense capability, despite the fact that many military units, commanders, and resources have been captured from the Qadhafi Administration since late February 2011. The relative success thus far by the anti-Qadhafi forces — the Constitutionalists who have begun to restore the country to the original Senussi Constitution — has been based on fighting spirit rather than effective planning, and on the lack of real military capabilities of the well-equipped Qadhafi forces. The UN-supported international operations have given the Constitutionalists a further breathing space to re-group, and it is now clear that the international forces (particularly France and the UK) cannot now afford to let them fail. This will imply deep support in terms of humanitarian aid, equipment, and possibly trainers/advisors for the Constitutionalist forces.

  9. Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) opposed the UN Security Council resolution to allow the prosecution of the no-fly zone in Libya, with valid objections based on the fact that the resolution implied interference in the internal affairs of a member nation. The objection of Turkey, however, on March 21, 2011, to the operations under a NATO banner are based, however, on the closeness of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, who in 2010 gave the Turkish Prime Minister a $250,000 “prize”, the Qadhafi International Prize for Human Rights. However, the Turkish Government had earlier mooted that Turkey should dispatch combined air, naval, and ground forces to Libya to resolve the internal conflict there, and be rewarded immediately with membership in the European Union (EU). The French President, then visiting Turkey, rejected the idea outright, and the Turkish Government then became hostile to any other intervention plans. Nonetheless, the Turkish position now aligns it with two of its most important strategic allies, Russia and the PRC, and the Turkish opposition to a NATO involvement, per se, in the “no-fly zone” in Libya will move the Erdoğan Government further away from the European Union, the US, and NATO. The question then would be whether the rift also portends the start of the breakdown in NATO itself, especially given the fact that the excellent military cooperation between the US, UK, and France on the current military operation comes at a time of growing political distrust between key European NATO states and the US.

  10. The estimates as at March 21, 2011, showed that Qadhafi’s tenure, even as ruler of a small part of Libya, was unlikely to last long. The reunification of Libya may take longer. It seems likely that the three major states — Fezzan, Tripolitania, and Cyrenaica — will rebuild their regional governments along lines suitable to each region, but endorsing a variation of the 1951 Senussi Constitution, which guarantees that national government will be under an elected leader who would act as guardian of the Constitution and Armed Forces.


February 25, 2011

The Mediterranean, Africa, and the Middle East, Post-Qadhafi: Awakening to a Diverse Landscape, Unimagined in the West

By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs. The transformation of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi from internationally-accepted ruler of Libya back into merely a rebel fighting the (new or revived) state is gradually becoming clear.

By February 25, 2011, Qadhafi and his family had lost effective control over two of the three Libyan provinces, particularly Cyrenaica, from whence the oil and gas flows. Qadhafi was using the remnants of the forces available to him to strike with decreasing ferocity at targets in Cyrenaica and Fezzan — which he had lost to those who have returned already to the Constitution of the Senussi era — and was randomly killing all opponents he could find in his own province of Tripolitania.

He was, in other words, reduced to being a rebel, unsupported by the mass of the national population, fighting against a re-asserted Constitutionalist population. Moreover, his war against Libyans was actually a war of some of the al-Qadhadhfa tribe against the other tribes of Libya, which is why the bulk of the population was seeking to return to the Senussiyyah-led Constitutional rule to avoid a return to the domination of one tribe over others.

The Libyan situation was clearly, then, particularly tribal and non-religious. Despite attempts by the Muslim Brothers — the Ikhwan al-Muslimin — to project from their Cairo stronghold to create an understanding with Qadhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, the bulk of Libyan society has rejected Islamism, and has remained loyal to the Senussi sect of Islam (which transcends tribalism), and sees the current conflict as tribal. Qadhafi, in a bid to appeal to Western sympathies, claimed that the uprising was supported by al-Qaida, the neo-salafist/Wahhabist extreme jihadist/terrorist group. In making this claim, Qadhafi was hoping that nobody would remember that the Sanussiyyah movement is the diametric opposite of the al-Qaida philosophy: it is moderate, pro-Western, democratic, and anti-terrorist in nature.

It is this movement which, with the support of most of the 140 tribes of Libya, is taking over.

The localized peculiarities of the Libyan conflict show that the “uprising” against Qadhafi was not — as it was portrayed in the West and even in Israel — a spillover of popular unrest which mirrored activities in Egypt or Tunisia. The Libyan population had long been awaiting an opportunity, a weakness, to exploit. Qadhafi’s failing health and failing grasp provided that opportunity. Where the regional examples came to play was in the fact that the international community at large essentially “gave permission” for protests to unleash.

The Libyan example, then, should serve as a wake-up call for analysts and policymakers to review blanket generalizations, just as experience in recent years has taught US and NATO officials that Iraq is vastly different to Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is vastly different to Pakistan, in cultural and strategic terms. The predominant “similarity” between all of the current expressions of popular frustration is the unique and localized complexity of their situations. Is there “foreign involvement”, or influence, in some or all of these situations? Yes, in varying degrees. Some of it is merely the example of hope which one popular outburst can give to neighbors in another country. Another is the direct engagement of foreign movements or intelligence services, such as the Iranian intelligence involvement in the current unrest in Bahrain, where some elements of the local Shi’a majority population can be persuaded to push for the removal of a Sunni monarchy.

In line with this, Iran is warning officially and un-officially (through intelligence links) that it “will not permit any foreign rôle” (ie: other than its own) and intervention in the “popular uprisings” engulfing the greater Middle East. The Iranian line is that the West is trying to suppress the Islamist-jihadist character of the intifadas in order to install pro-Western puppet governments. Significantly, the Iranian warning does not include the mention of grievances by Shi’ite (against the clerics in Iran, for example), or other sectarian issues. The Iranian Government is promoting the fiction of a pan-Islamist totality, a unified Ummah.

No wonder — if a Muslim state is promoting this line — that the West believes in the existence of a unified Muslim world.

At first, the West believed for much of the 20th Century in monolithic communism, and believed, too, in the “inevitability” of a globally-spreading communism as it was promoted by the Soviet Union. The myth was destroyed by various realities of human historical patterns of behavior, including the reality that geographically-determined cultures and logic patterns always preclude the emergence of a “universal man”. Thus, “New Soviet Man” disappeared as the Sino-Soviet rift became apparent, and the Sino-Vietnam rift, and so on.

Then the West believed in the myth of monolithic Islam and the inevitability of the “decline of the West”.

It is significant that the Islamist-jihadist uppermost leadership, particularly Ayman al-Zawahiri and his coterie, recognized the diversity of the Muslim world and the Islamist-jihadist movement already in 2004. Consequently, there emerged in quick succession the regional “branches” commonly called in the West “Al-Qaida of the Mesopotamia”, “Al-Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula”, “Al-Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb”, etc. (there are the lesser known but politically important “Al-Qaida of the Greater Syria” and “Al-Qaida of the Greater Egypt”). Significantly, these regional “Al-Qaida” entities are named after the historic non-state regional entities and not the modern states against which they operate. It took the US and the West until the eruptions of 2010-11 to discover — if indeed the Western publics have — that Islam and Islamism are not monolithic.

That myth of universal and inevitable Islam has been shattered by the diversity of aspirations which enabled Muslim societies across North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Northern Tier to vent their frustrations — particularly during late 2010 and early 2011 — in ways which demonstrated, once again, the dominant importance of geographically-determined (and geographically linked) cultures over any “universality” of Islam. It goes without saying that just as there is no inevitability in any simplistically-defined trend, so there is no “universality” in “the West”, or any inevitability in its universal decline.

It is fair to say that through much of the 20th Century, too, people in Muslim societies believed — despite two world wars which were essentially internecine Western conflicts, with the exception of the involvement of Japan and China — that there was a universality and cohesion among Western nations which were culturally Christian. Thus, just as German political and social logic differs from, say, Canadian political and social logic, it is even more true that differences exist between various societies in the Muslim world.

The social restructurings — events portending seismic cratometamorphosis (the transformation of society) — which have taken place separately in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Morocco (in a very limited and relatively polite sense of protests), and Libya in January and February 2011, and the transformation of Turkey during the past two years in particular, highlight the diversity and disparity of the goals of each of these societies more than they reflect a common tsunami of vented anger against established and rigid forms of government.

The frustrations of each of these Muslim societies are different, but there are transnational/trans-societal movements which attempt to make common cause through each of them, and governments which quietly attempt to exploit these trends. This is the essence of political and psychological warfare. It is especially the case when the fundamental weakness of some governments means that — as their main weapon — they support transnational social movements — such as the Ikhwan — as proxy warriors. The Sunni Ikhwan’s links to various jihadist and Islamist movements — even those which are ideologically incompatible — means that it has benefited ultimately from the support of the Shi’a clerical government of Iran.

Libya’s Qadhafi, who greatly fears the Islamists such as the Ikhwan (which his son Saif embraced in a marriage of convenience), has nonetheless himself supported jihadist movements and front groups operating in Africa so that he might inconvenience his adversaries. Qadhafi, even after he renounced terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, et al, as a measure of his own fear following the US-led destruction of the rule of Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein in 2003-04, secretly reverted to funding and arming rebel groups in Somalia and Ethiopia, in Nigeria, and elsewhere.

Now, essentially, Qadhafi is reduced to fighting for his survival. If he continues to hold onto power within part of Tripolitania, it is possible that Cyrenaica could create a “new Libya” while they await Qadhafi’s eventual demise. Cyrenaica would be wealthy with the resumption of oil and gas sales; Tripolitania would go into decline, absent a source of revenue.

US and European — and even Israeli — politicians and pundits meanwhile ponder the “power vacuum” in Libya, and debate who could possibly assume power. The names of such people as former Interior Minister Gen. Abdel Fatah Younis al-Obeidi and former Justice Minister Mustafa Muhammad Abd-al-Jalil are raised as potential leaders of the “new Libya”. There was, by late February 2011, more than passing interest in them in the absence — or rather, the lack of any Western or even Egyptian or Israeli knowledge — of viable alternatives. The fact that the two former ministers in question formerly oversaw the system of abuse and torture does not rattle the EU's liberals. After all, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi has just denounced them ...

Have these external pundits not been watching the wave — literally — of old Senussi flags which have engulfed most towns of Libya, and the concurrent all for the restoration of the (Senussi) Constitution? Have they read the Constitution, which demands that a Senussi family member be the seyyid — not the King, as the British dubbed him after World War II — to act as constitutional leader?

The man calling himself the Crown Prince of Libya in exile in London, Muhammad ar-Rida, 49, is a member of the Senussi family, but on February 24, 2011, alienated the tribes by talking of the restoration of the monarchy. Significantly, the tribes want a restoration of the Senussi seyyid, because this is how the bedouin, in particular, referred to the late King Idris (who was given the title of King by the British) as as-Seyyid Idris. To the tribes, the title of King smacks of Western interference.

So the Constitutionalist movement in Libya is not “monarchist” in the Western sense. Indeed, the man calling himself “Crown Prince” of Libya ignores the fact that (a) the Libyan Senussi leadership of Libya was never hereditary, but was always elected by the tribes through a consensus-reaching consultative council, and (b) his father, who was designated as Crown Prince during the rule of As-Seyyid Idris (King Idris I), actually abdicated the position when Qadhafi seized power in the coup of September 1969. As a result, there is no legitimacy for Muhammad’s claim for the supposed restoration of a monarchy with him as pretender to the throne.

The Senussiyyah will elect or embrace a formal leader soon through the traditional consultative process; that much is clear. There are a number of contenders. Of key importance will be which Senussi works best with the tribal leaders. One who has for decades been doing this is Seyyid Idris bin Abdullah al-Senussi, 54, who is currently wrapping up a week of meetings in Washington to secure humanitarian aid for the victims of the unrest in Libya. His father, known in the West as “the Black Prince”, Seyyid Abdullah al-Senussi, was given command of the movement, by King (As-Seyyid) Idris I, to restore the Constitution of Libya. On his death, his son, Idris, took over the task, and has been in contact with key tribal leaders for the subsequent decades until this time. This writer has, during the past week, seen evidence that his word is heeded.

Indeed, the Libyan courts in 2010 restored the Libyan properties and assets of As-Seyyid Idris to the current Seyyid (Prince, in the West) Idris and his siblings, giving the present Idris a significant economic base within Libya, and his native Cyrenaica in particular.

In the end, the various moves can be seen as natural to their regions, and more evolutionary than revolutionary. There is, of course, strategic impact in the changes, in particular with Libya, where the vacuum created by four decades of stagnation under Qadhafi can be reversed. In Bahrain, the competing and secret hands of Iran and Saudi Arabia — and the overt pressures of the US White House on the Bahraini Royal Family — will have an impact on genuine local activities.

In the wings, the Turkish Prime Minister, Reçep Tayyip Erdogan, had, by February 25, 2011, been lobbying heavily with US Pres. Barack Obama and French Pres. Nicolas Sarkozy (and, no doubt, others) to have Turkey intervene militarily in Libya with US and EU blessing. This blessing was denied him.

Is the broad Middle East region (from the Atlantic to Pakistan) changing, and is the influence of the US and NATO waning? Without question. But, within the Mediterranean context, could the North African states stabilize and become more productive and integrated with Europe’s economic pattern? Very likely.

See also:

Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, February 23, 2011: Musings of an Heretic: Where the Middle East is Going, and Why the West Fails to Grasp the Many Realities.


February 23, 2011

Musings of an Heretic: Where the Middle East is Going, and Why the West Fails to Grasp the Many Realities

Analysis. By Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs. On December 17, 2010, a 45-year-old policewoman slapped an agitated vegetable vendor in his early-twenties who was creating a disturbance in a police station after his cart had been confiscated for lack of a license. The vendor was a university graduate ensnared in Tunisia’s economic catastrophe and thus compelled to seek meager income as an unlicensed street vendor. Now, humiliated by having a female slap him on the face in public, he set himself aflame. The next day, many of his friends and relatives rioted in protest of the police’s heavy-handedness which had led to the self-immolation. Police stood by and let the aggrieved vent their frustration.

On its own, this incident in remote Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, would have been forgotten within days and ignored by all outside the vendor’s immediate circle of family and friends. However, this was not to be. Alerted by the Hizb ut-Tahrir leadership in France, a group of Islamist clerics quickly issued a series of fatwas regarding the incident. The self-immolation was aimed to alert the world about the suppression of Islam in Tunisia, they explained. As such, it was not suicide (which is forbidden by Islam) but an act of self-inflicted martyrdom (which is endorsed and encouraged by the Islamists-jihadists).

These widely-circulated fatwas — rather than the incident in Sidi Bouzid — excited the frustrated and despaired — sending a couple of dozen youth from Morocco to Indonesia to self-immolate themselves. Numerous Islamist-affiliated electronic media venues — from the formidable Al-Jazeera to the authoritative jihadist websites — carried the self-immolation stories with emphasis on the Islamist self-inflicted martyrdom interpretation. It was they — the Islamist media venues — which both sparked, and created the context for, the grassroots intifadas which followed. It would be the established veteran Islamist-jihadist organizations which subsequently sustained the rage and exploited it for their own political and strategic gains.

Although Western politicians and media remain enamored with the “Jasmine Revolution” — as representing the reincarnation of the “color revolutions” of the middle of the past decade — the Arab and Muslim worlds have a different name for the violence which erupted in Tunisia: The Intifada of the Starved. Theirs is a theologically/politically loaded term. Intifada means shaking off alien and harming things, the way a dog shakes off ticks, bugs or water. The starved — like the oppressed or dispossessed — is a term used by the Islamists to describe the grassroots victims of pro-Western governments.

The escalating violence was therefore not a revolution against a government, but an upsurge against a social order and a way of life, albeit ones imposed by state-governments. Hence, the ensuing wave of violence still sweeping the Arab World is not a revolution — that is, an effort to remove the old and usher in the new — but an Islamist intifada: that is, getting rid of the current in order to restore the traditional old order represented by the time-honored rallying cry “Islam is the Solution!” Little wonder the Muslim Brothers and their off-shoots and spin-offs have already emerged as the dominant powers and winners.

In Tunisia, the intifada sought to overthrow a government which purveyed westernization and secularization reforms which in turn heralded equal rights and empowerment for women, and separation between mosque and state. Then-Pres. Zine El Abidine Ben ‘Ali’s was the most drastic effort to secularize and westernize a Muslim country since the days of Turkey’s Kemal Atatürk. Alas, only the harsh authoritarian reign of Ben ‘Ali made the imposition and sustenance of his drastic reforms possible. The Islamist opposition — led by Rached Ghannouchi and the al-Nahdah Party, and the Ikhwani adherents of Hizb ut-Tahrir — fled the country for safe exile in Western Europe.

There, protected by the infidels’ democracy and sustained by their generous state welfare, the Islamists plotted and prepared for the inevitable grassroots eruption. They patiently organized underground cells and networks, recruited activists and operatives, and cultivated Western progressive-liberal media outlets. Thus, when the riots first broke, clean-shaven jeans-wearing youth were put in the front lines facing the media’s cameras. But the tanks were stopped by mass street-prayers which blocked all the main streets (a practice that was forbidden under Ben ‘Ali). The military’s subsequent effort to remove large numbers of youth from the streets by calling up all reserves was immediately reversed once the extent of their Islamicization and adverse impact on the secularized professional troops became apparent to the high command.

Ghannouchi’s disciples are now the key civilian members of Tunisia’s interim Government.

In Egypt, the Ikhwan al-Muslimin tacitly but firmly controlled the grassroots in al-Tahrir Square and throughout the country during the entire intifada. The Ikhwan were responsible for all the advance preparations (including preparing and disseminating the guidebooks), for sustaining the crowd with food, drinks, instructions (by kids waving placards with instructions), for delivering localized alliances with the military which prevented bloodshed (which were negotiated and reached in Ikhwani mosques), for running a field-hospital, for activating the fall-back sat-phone communication system. The extent of the Ikhwani dominance was flagrantly displayed during Sheikh Yussuf al-Qaradawi’s sermon at al-Tahrir Square and the humiliating banishment of Google’s executive Wael Ghonim, who was in Western eyes the “symbol” of the techno-savvy new Egypt. The mere fact that the return of the octogenarian Sheikh al-Qaradawi symbolized the enduring success of the Egyptian intifada attests to the extent of the significance of youth and vigor in its message.

And the Egyptian military also underwent its own profound intifada. Ever since the late-1940s — the aftermath of the defeat in the Naqba (or Israel’s War of Independence) — the Egyptian Military has rallied behind a small group, or council, of dynamic officers who jointly made decisions and who nominated one of their own to front for their group policy and interest. This group took over Egypt in 1953. They made their front-men — first Gen. Muhammad Naguib and then Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser — Egypt’s presidents, and rallied behind as the source of power and legitimacy for the administration.

The officers’ council has continued to function over the years and held Egypt together through the subsequent military defeats, social and economic crises, and traumatic changes of presidents (the sudden death of Nasser and the assassination of Sadat). In both cases (the deaths of Nasser and Sadat), the officers’ council nominated the replacements (Sadat and Mubarak, respectively), consolidated their hold onto power, and sustained their leadership. Adopting Pharaohnic leadership style, Mubarak sought to profoundly break this age-old crux of power by sidelining Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi (the military’s choice for successor) and instead nominated his own son, Gamal, as his successor. This was the real revolution in Egypt. It failed.

Capitalizing on the first opportunity which came their way — the Ikhwani intifada — the military council recaptured power and nominated their original front-man — Tantawi — as the de facto president. It was the threat of a military coup and arrest made by the supreme military council — not the street riots — which made Mubarak resign and leave Cairo a couple of hours after making a defiant speech on TV.

Now, the military won’t let go of their power.

These officers are not stupid or oblivious to reality in Egypt: that is, the dominant grassroots influence of the Ikhwan. Therefore, the officers’ council will make deals with the Ikhwan. But, at the end of the day, elections or no elections, the group, or council, of dynamic military officers is back in power as they have been for nearly 60 years now. Hence the new Government will reach a compromise with the Ikhwan over the character of society where the Ikhwan will continue to dominate. But the policy and strategy issues vis-à-vis the rest of the world will remain in military hands. As was the case since the 1950s, this will be a tenuous, mistrustful relationship, where both sides will continue to kill the other side’s leaders when they feel threatened.

But modern Egyptian society knows no better alternative.

The same general principles guide and dominate the less-dramatic Intifada’s in Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, and Iraq. In all these countries, the traditional social structures — dominated by tribes, nationalities, the Ikhwan, and segments of the military — join hands in tenuous alliances to answer the demands of the grassroots to restore traditional and Islamic social order at the expense of the modern state. In Jordan and Yemen, the essence of their intifadas is the ascent of a coalition of Islamist-jihadist organs and the key tribes at the expense of other segments of the population and society. In Algeria, it is the ascent of the hitherto disenfranchised Islamist youth of the urban slums and remote villages against the military-dominated Government. And Iraq keeps fracturing into Iran-dominated regional entities, at times through immense violence and fratricidal terrorism with sectarian and religious character.

In Bahrain, the intifada is a direct outcome of the rapidly-evolving population tapestry. Most striking is the fact that 54 percent of the 1.25-million population of Bahrain are non-nationals: mainly Iranians and South Asians. About 81 percent of the entire population are Muslims. Of these, some 70 percent are Shi’ites and 30 percent are Sunnis. However, most of the Sunnis are non-nationals from South Asia. Among Bahrain’s Muslim nationals, the Shiites constitute an 85 percent majority. And the majority of these Shi’ite nationals have family roots in Iran. The Bahraini Shi’ites want to get rid of the Sunni al-Khalifa monarchy (although the al-Khalifa dynasty has ruled Bahrain in one form or another since 1783). Tehran has always wanted to return Bahrain to the Iranian fold, and since the Islamic “revolution” in Iran, Iranian intelligence has invested huge efforts and inordinate amounts of money in gradually consolidating vast networks of operatives and supporters.

Once upheaval started spreading in the Middle East, the Iranians activated their networks under the guise of an indigenous intifada in each location, and particularly Bahrain. Indeed, the Bahraini security services discovered a major support effort from Iranian Intelligence and the HizbAllah Special Operations (with the latter operatives arriving from Damascus and carrying Syrian passports). Presently, the Bahraini intifada leadership is calling for the overthrow of the al-Khalifa dynasty and the establishment of a Shi’ite-dominated state in its stead as the first step toward the attainment of genuine self-determination: an indication of possible closer ties with Iran.

After four decades under the repressive and chaotic “Jamahiriyah”, the Libyan population was supposed to be docile and passive. However, it took the heavy-handed crackdown of a single youth demonstration to have the accumulating frustration and hostility to burst into the open. Libya is an amalgam of three distinct tribal zones: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. Hence, the grassroots intifada quickly evolved into a tribal and regional war with the traditional Sanussiyyah and the tribal structure desperately trying to wrestle control from the usurpers of the al-Qadhadhfa tribe. Behind the Sanussiyah movement there exists the grassroots clamor for the restoration of the traditional Sanussi Constitution as clearly seen by the widespread hoisting of the pre-revolution tri-color flag of Libya. Meanwhile, Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi ordered the release from jail of all the jihadists, in order to gain their cooperation, as well as increase the fratricidal violence against the tribes in Cyrenaica who, as devout followers of the Sanussiyyah, are implacable nemeses of the neo-salafite jihadists.

Ultimately, there is an urgent imperative for the emergence of a discernable legitimate leadership capable of offering interim governance and laying the foundations for the lengthy and complex rebuilding of a democratic constitutional monarchy ruling over a federated Libya where the three tribal groupings can realize their quest for self-determination. Alas, one of the primary outcomes of the four decades of Qadhafi’s rule has been the emaciation of the indigenous élites. Hence, the intifada remains spontaneous, determined, and brave … but leaderless. It will take a coalition of military senior officers (many of whom have already defected to the intifada) and tribal leaders to formulate such interim leadership. Under the current conditions of escalating and spreading fratricidal fighting and repression, such gathering is simply inconceivable. And this enduring chaos thus provides the Qadhafi clan with the possibility of ultimately remaining in power.

More than anything, Morocco is the exception which proves the rule. Morocco has been ruled by the Alaouite Dynasty since the early-17th century. Being a direct descendant of both Prophet Mohammed and Imam Ali, the King of Morocco has unassailable legitimacy under the most traditionalist and orthodox Islamic terms. At the same time, free and fair parliamentary and local/regional elections give the public venues to express their political opinions and affect both national and local issues as is the case in all Western democracies. Moreover, the emergence of fringe groups and interests as a result of the accelerated modernization and urbanization — some legitimate and some burning nonetheless — led King Mohammed VI to order the organization of the Economic and Social Council. On February 21, 2011, Chakib Benmoussa, who as Interior Minister oversaw the beginning of the implementation of the King’s regionalization and democratization reforms, was nominated by the King to be Chairman of the Council.

Hence, the vast majority of Moroccans have no reason to take to the streets, and the few who did on February 20, 2011, rushed to precede the establishment of the Council which in effect addresses their concerns. Moreover, the original organizing committee of the February 20 movement withdrew its participation from the demonstrations once the extreme political character of some of the participating fringe-entities became clear. Simply put, Morocco has a combination of a traditionally-legitimate form of government with modern individual and political freedoms enabling all citizens to express their regional and localized traditions. Hence, there is no grassroots interest in launching an intifada in Morocco and the ongoing incitement of Al-Jazeera and other pan-Arab media could only bring minuscule crowds to the streets.

Ultimately, the Western media’s infatuation with the facebook and tweeter aspects of the “revolution” aptly demonstrated just how little the West comprehends the historic drama unfolding in front of their eyes. These media reports must be put in context. The very disparaging and despairing picture of the real posture of the Arab World can be found in the UN annual reports about the Arab World. The UN’s Arab Human Development Report of 2009 (the latest) observes that “the most evident and challenging aspect of the region’s demographic profile is its ‘youth bulge’. Young people are the fastest growing segment of Arab countries’ populations. Some 60 percent of the population is under 25 years old, making this one of the most youthful regions in the world, with a median age of 22 years compared to a global average of 28.”

However, the Arab world has failed to either educate or employ these youths. The high unemployment rates in the Arab world are twice the West’s average. This state of affairs contributes to the persisting poverty which further slows down regional development and progress. The UN’s Arab Knowledge Report of 2009 (also the latest) warns of the growing backwardness of “an Arab world most of which still suffers from knowledge and digital illiteracy”. This comes on top the fact that in virtually all Arab countries “universal education is yet to be achieved” and “illiteracy rates for adults, children, and young people remain a challenge”.

Thus, the high illiteracy rates and immense poverty make owning and using of laptops and smart-phones a near-impossibility. Hence, their impact on society at large is a marginal phenomenon at best. People do talk on mobile phones, but these are monitored by the mukhabarats and thus are useless for conspiracies and organizing. Young people do frequent Internet cafés, but the most visited sites are Islamist-jihadist sites, match-making, and pornography. And these have nothing to do with the agitation and organizational power claimed by the Western media. Alas, most intifada plans were hatched in the mosques and underground prayer and study halls, all of which are dominated by the Ikhwan. And most instructions were delivered by kids holding cardboard signs, and activists shouting into bullhorns, frequently using the minarets of mosques.

Hence, the Arab world is experiencing the beginning of a wave of intifadas which constitutes grassroots rejection of the Arab modern state — that is, the education, modernity, and repression which the state purveys — in favor of return to the confidence in the traditional ways of Ikhwan-style Islamism and tribal and ethno-centric structures. Since these dynamics cannot coexist within the framework of a Westernized state and cannot cope with the modernity necessitating economic development, these intifadas and the grassroots sentiments behind them do not bode well for the West. At best, the mounting crises will encourage militaries and mukhabarats to crack down and revive militant dictatorial governments. At worse, sooner or later, the Ikhwan-affiliated populist administrations will vent their growing frustration and despair by sponsoring jihadist terrorism against both their own peoples and the hated West.

The crisis that is still escalating and spreading throughout in the Muslim World is not new. This crisis has been intensifying for a quarter of a millennium now as Islamdom’s isolation turned into subjugation when the West penetrated the Hub of Islam — the area between Morocco in the west and India in the east, between Central Asia in the north and Central Africa in the south — where Muslims not only constitute the overwhelming majority of the population but also determine the socio-political and civilizational way of life.

The process began with Napoleon’s arrival in Egypt in 1798. Then came in the 19th Century, both the Russian wars with Turkey and Iran, and the conquest of Central Asia, and the concurrent British and French occupation of vast Muslim lands in South Asia and north and central Africa. This surge was followed by the defeat and collapse of the Turkish Caliphate, the occupation of its Arab domains by Britain in World War I, and the ensuing artificial redrawing of the Middle East’s map by the imperialist powers.

None of the Middle Eastern states which emerged from this partition has yet to gain grassroots legitimacy and function properly. The aggregate experience has been a trauma from which the Muslim world, particularly the Hub of Islam, has yet to emerge. The still-spreading and escalating wave of grassroots intifadas is the most indigenous and desperate outburst in this quest to rid Islamdom from the vestiges of Western political structures and the civilizational values that come with them. The earth is shaking in the region of Islamdom. The tsunami is yet to come.


February 3, 2011

Libya’s Qadhafi Moves Toward Transition, Avoiding Succession Problems, and Resisting Radical Islamists

New Statement on February 4, 2011, Likely to Become a Significant Catalyst

Exclusive. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs. Moves are underway in Libya which are significantly against what the Western media perceives is a trend toward a “domino effect” of Islamist-inspired street movements to topple secularist Middle Eastern leaders. These moves show a trend which is pointedly against radical Islamism but which also moves to resolve the question of “republican dynasties” which have come to a head as Middle Eastern republican leaders are coming to the ends of their lives without a mechanism to transfer power.

Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has been moving quietly for some months to head off potential problems in the succession of power to the next generation of leadership, and to confront Islamist extremism in Libya. His moves, significantly, pre-date the unrest and street opposition which burst into the open in Tunisia and Egypt in January 2011, and Yemen in February 2011. Significantly, too, sources indicate, he has long abandoned any thought of — or desire for — a transition of power to his son and once-named heir, Saif al-Islam.

He has, in essence, turned back to Libyan traditions so that he could leave a heritage which does not brand his 42 years (thus far) in office as a mere radical interregnum in Libyan history. He took steps in late 2010 to begin handing back the personal property of the late King Idris I, who he overthrew in the coup of 1969, to the King's designated heirs. In one of his few formal decrees — referred to inside the Libyan hierarchy as “Decree Four” — he has handed back many properties in Libya to the children of Prince Abdallah al-Abid al-Senussi, the King’s nephew to whom the King turned, in exile after the coup, when the then-Crown Prince abdicated his claim to the Libyan throne.

This moved the physical leadership of the Senussiyyah movement — one of the great sects of Islam, and the one which is most tolerant to non-Muslim societies, and to modernism — over to Prince Abdallah, and then to one of his sons, Prince Idris al-Senussi, a sayyid or sharif — a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed — now living in exile, in Rome, with his family. Col. Qadhafi was anxious, in his return of all the assets of King Idris I, to ensure that he followed the late King’s wishes. He anticipated a legal challenge to the decision, and wanted to ensure that it would be met legally. The challenge came from a member of the al-Senussi family who has long claimed to be the “Crown Prince”, Prince Muhammed, but who is actually the son of the late Crown Prince (who died in 1992) who had abdicated any claim to the throne, the move which had caused King Idris to turn to his nephew, Prince Abdallah, who mounted a relentless campaign against Qadhafi until the Prince’s death.

Prince Muhammad, who has been living in the UK and portraying himself as "the Crown Prince" since the death of his father, did, indeed, make a legal challenge in the Libyan courts to Qadhafi’s move to find the legitimate heir to King Idris. The court was shown the document in which King Idris, having been betrayed by the abdication of his Crown Prince, Prince Hasan ar-Rida al-Senussi, specifically designated Prince Abdallah as his heir. Prince Abdallah mounted the famous “Hilton Assignment” attempt to overthrow Qadhafi shortly after the 1969 coup, but the attempt was thwarted when Italian intelligence services leaked details of the plan to Qadhafi. As a result of the document, the Libyan courts threw out the claims by Muhammad and his side of the family, in favor of Prince Idris and his siblings, who have consistently mounted a campaign to return Libya to the constitutional position created by the late King Idris.

Coincidentally, Prince Muhammed and his side of the family had gone specifically against the tenets of the moderate, modernist Senussiyya movement, and had begun talking with another great enemy of Qadhafi: the Egyptian-originating Ikhwan, the Muslim Brotherhood. This should have placed Muhammed outside the bounds of his great-grandfather’s Senussi movement — a movement with the second-largest mosque in Mecca — but it went unnoticed as much of the momentum in the Muslim Ummah was captured by the radical Islamist movements of the Ikhwan and the neo-salafists. Significantly, from Qadhafi’s standpoint, his son and one-time heir, Saif al-Islam, had also begun talking with the Ikhwan, and Qadhafi was enough of a Libyan traditionalist — and a secularist who supported Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser — to find this unacceptable.

Now, in order to help show that this process of transition in Libya is moving to a calm transfer of power from Qadhafi — much in the manner of Generalissimo Francisco Franco’s handover of power in Spain, back to a Constitutional Monarchy, in 1975 — the man now accepted as the head of the Senussi movement, Prince Idris al-Senussi, has prepared a statement which is due to be released in Rome on February 4, 2011. GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs, which has followed the Senussi movement and Prince Idris’ activities for decades, was able to obtain an advance copy of the document, which speaks for itself.

A Statement on the Current Frustrations of North Africa,
by HRH Prince Idris al-Senussi, Leader of the Senussiyya Movement

February 4, 2011

Each of the peoples of the Arab states is profoundly unique, and it cannot be expected that they will react in the same way to events, such as the unrest which struck Tunisia and Egypt during January 2011. Until now, the people of Libya have shown that they are the most patient and forbearing, as they are inspired by our moderate and compassionate form of Islam, the Senussiyya movement. 

All societies become frustrated when they realize that their path has too long been blocked, that their hopes have began to fade, and their aspirations are denied them.

For 42 years the People of Libya have been led by the same man, and history tells us that longevity of rule will produce either a climate of freedom and hope with development of elected governments, or gradually lose its impetus and deliver only increasing stagnation and frustration.

Libya, under my great-uncle, the late King Idris I, flourished because the nation was stimulated to think and act freely. He was an inspiring figure as leader of the Senussiyya Movement that offered enormous hope because of its openness towards modernity, collaboration with non-Muslim societies, and its broadmindedness and belief in free thinking.  King Idris was one of the founders of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) and began the process of a democratic Parliament for Lybia. It was no surprise that the Muslim world saw the possibility of a renaissance of the great contribution of the individual while the Senussi approach to Islam flourished, encouraging secular life to advance while retaining the ethics, reverence, and honor which religion demands.

The People of Libya acted calmly and patiently, even as their prosperity and freedoms were lost over the 42 years of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s rule. His greatest mistake was to suppress the Senussiyya and the creativity and hope that the movement gave to the nation and the world. Now, radical distortions of Islam are threatening Libya — and, indeed, Colonel Qadhafi himself — as he begins to look to the future of the nation, with no credible line of immediate succession apparent within his existing structure. As with other examples of autocratic republicanism, there are no natural processes of progression from one generation to another, and there is no legitimate heir to Colonel Qadhafi himself.

The Senussiyya people have remained patient, and yet inside and outside the country we have retained our sense of duty and our readiness to serve the People of Libya, and the societies beyond our immediate lands.

Colonel Qadhafi is aware of this, and of what he needs to do. He is becoming aware, too, that he and his family and retainers need not fear the return of the Senussi leadership, with its legitimate and historical duties in Libya. We do not come to focus on old scores neither to seek vengeance. We come to offer our assistance and to help foster such an opportunity for Libyans so that they might seize the future for themselves; find an outlet for their skills and fulfill their aspirations.

I am honored that for the decades of my exile, my Family and the broad Families of Senussi and Libyan Peoples have remained as loyal to me as I have to them. I have never wavered in carrying the torch and mandate of the late King Idris and my late Father, Prince Abdallah al-Abid al-Senussi, to whom the King entrusted the task of restoring the freedom and authority of the Senussi Peoples.

Colonel Qadhafi knows that he has one last great task to fulfill as frustrations engulf the Arab world, and as radicals posing as true Muslims attempt to seize his age and infirmity as an opportunity to take control of Libya. He must find a way to ensure that a legitimate leader succeeds him, or else his 42 years in power will be left as a footnote on history. King Idris was well on his way to achieving noble humanitarian goals and universal freedom. Colonel Qadhafi has been unable to bring these to fruition. It is time now to achieve these objectives, so that Libya may serve as the example for Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Islamic world.

I will return home when the time is right, and I pray that this time is near. My own role and that which I have encouraged in my children, has been to find a solution that will be a bridge between the secular and religious aspects of Libyan society. I will continue to serve as long as requested.

There is no conflict. There is only the search for the path that brings hope to us all in a peaceful and orderly manner.


January 30, 2004

Iraqi WMD Debate and Intelligence Failed to View Total Picture: the Libya Links

Anaysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS. Discussion and analysis of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs relating to the former Iraqi Administration of Pres. Saddam Hussein has seriously — and virtually from the beginning — missed the point. By focusing entirely on Iraqi WMD programs within the physical borders of Iraq, and by refusing to discuss contextual issues, the arguments missed the point that the bulk of the Iraqi WMD work since 1991 was conducted outside the borders of the country, this being a result of the lesson which Saddam derived from the 1991 Coalition war against him.

There is a very substantial, historical chain of intelligence — much of which has been cited and verified by Global Information System (GIS) HUMINT sources over the past 14 years and some of which has been verified by external sources — resoundingly confirming this position, which can be summarized as follows:

1. Documents Moved to Syria: In essence, documentation of that small portion of the WMD program which was administered directly in Iraq was moved, along with other sensitive material and resources, to the Hshishi Compound at al-Qamishli (Kamishli) in Syria, just near the Iraqi border, in August-September 2002. This was noted by GIS at that time.1

2. R&D Conducted in Libya: The great bulk of the work on WMD and on associated missile delivery systems, however, was conducted since 1991 in a partnership with Libya, and also with Egypt, at facilities in Libya, in order to keep the programs away from US and United Nations (UN) probes. That, too, was noted by GIS.2

Assuming that these two points can be demonstrated, does this, then, constitute a failure of US, British and other foreign intelligence? Or does it constitute a failure not just of intelligence, but also a failure of policymakers and policy-level managers of the intelligence communities in the West to allow or encourage an examination of the Iraq situation within a broader strategic context?

From 1991 onwards, Saddam was principally focused on the fact that the UN had a mandate — a search warrant — to inspect all of the physical territory of Iraq. That meant that maintaining any meaningful research and development (R&D) facilities or test capabilities on prohibited weapons within the borders of the country would be virtually impossible. But, given that the “search warrant” extended only within the confines of Iraq, it was logical and expedient that any WMD R&D should be conducted under Iraqi control, but outside the country’s borders.

Moreover, once this decision was taken, and implemented, it was important to sustain the focus of UN inspections on Iraqi territory and to discourage inspections or analysis on weapons programs elsewhere. This meant that Iraqi weapons programs — or hints about them — within Iraq had to be sufficiently enigmatic as to attract attention; the game had to be drawn out, and no suspicion should be allowed to fall on external programs.

Given the billions of dollars which Saddam had invested in WMD, and the fact that WMD and associated delivery systems represented his only chance at strategic independence, it was inconceivable that he would not have engaged in massive strategic deception operations in the hope that, as partially demonstrated in 1991, once the US/West/UN had gone through Iraq as comprehensively as possible, he would then be free to re-import his strategic capacity, by that time at a proven and operational level. This option was lost, however, not because the US George W. Bush Administration was aware — at the White House level — of the specifics of the deception and re-deployment of WMD programs, but because of the intuitive belief by the White House that Pres. Saddam was engaged in a strategic-level build-up which threatened the region and Western interests.

Saddam utilized his best efforts and international contacts and alliances to limit the scope of debate and UN inspections to an extremely finite set of conditions, all of which focused solely on the Iraqi territory. In this, he was almost totally successful.

However, there were numerous failures to maintain the total secrecy of his actions at an operational intelligence level. This may have been inevitable, given the scope of the WMD programs being conducted in Libya, for example, where an estimated Iraqi workforce of up to 20,000 scientists, engineers and workers were engaged in WMD and missile development, and in other countries, such as Mauritania (intended as a launch site for ballistic missiles to threaten the US), where Iraqi intelligence officials were conducting aspects of the strategy.3

What has emerged from the pattern of intelligence available is that Pres. Saddam took the opportunity, possibly shortly after the 1991 defeat of his Armed Forces in the first US-led Coalition war against Iraq in 1990-91, to move his WMD programs to one or more safe havens abroad. It was known, even at that point, that Iraq maintained extensive deployments of forces and some basing inside Sudan, and that Saddam and Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi were closely aligned in that they perceived threats from the same quarters: (a) the United States, and (b) radical Islamists. Equally, they increasingly came to the same view that they needed to work with the Islamists because the various Islamist groups — ranging from Osama bin Laden’s organization to the Iranian-led Shi’a groups — also felt threatened by, and hostile to, the United States.

The thread of a common enemy has historically woven groups together, and this has been consistently evident in Iraqi relations with radical Islamist militant groups, including those of Iraq’s geopolitical rival, Iran. Significantly, Libyan leader Qadhafi, although concerned about the threats to himself from Islamism, had consistently maintained strong relations with the Iranian clerical leadership, again based on the concept that they both faced a mutual and overwhelming enemy in the US. Libya’s supporting rôle in the bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, was directly at the request of Iran (and Iran’s proxy, Syria), for example, something which has gradually been acknowledged by the US Intelligence Community.

On November 8, 2000, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted:

“The Libyan acquisition of NoDong-1 SSMs is the result of a joint Egyptian-Iraqi-Libyan crash program to overcome delays in production of indigenous SSMs. Initially, the Egyptians and the Iraqis wanted to expedite the production of their own missile in Libya. Cairo arranged for Tripoli to provide cover for the revival of the Bad’r/Condor program which could no longer take place in Iraq and now also not in Egypt because of the exposure by the US of the North Korean (DPRK) rôle and a consequent US pressure to stop the program. Therefore, the Libyans initiated their relations with the DPRK on behalf of Cairo and Baghdad.”

That report, by GIS Senior Editor Yossef Bodansky, and based on known and reliable intelligence sources, continued:

“... [I]n the late Summer of 1999, Cairo and Baghdad urged Tripoli to purchase North Korean NoDong-1 SSMs on their behalf with the idea that Libya would keep a few of them for its own use. At the behest of Pres. Mubarak and Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein, Col. Qadhafi instructed General Abu-Bakr Jabir, the Libyan Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff — who also holds overall responsibility for the Libyan missile program — to personally devise a more direct way to acquire these missiles. Desperate for hard currency, Pyongyang expressed willingness to deliver numerous NoDong-1 SSMs the moment hard currency was delivered in a ‘safe laundered method’. A North Korean delegation arrived in Tripoli to discuss the operational requirements and, in October 1999, General Abu-Bakr Jabir signed a deal with them for the supply of NoDong-1s and related technological expertise. In the Tripoli negotiations, the Libyans stressed the imperative to have the missiles deployed operationally immediately after their arrival in Libya.”

What is significant about the flow of intelligence which GIS has obtained on Libya, Iraq, Egypt and other regional states on this matter over more than a decade is that most of it derives from GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs’ own human intelligence (HUMINT) networks, which have been developed privately since the beginning of the 1970s. This has been coupled with reporting from other intelligence agencies which has often confirmed aspects of the total picture. What is also significant is that the US intelligence services in particular, and, to a lesser extent, the UK, have failed to sustain any continuity or depth of HUMINT collection in Libya. As well, US HUMINT with regard to Iraq has been patchy at best, varying from non-existent to massive and sudden build-ups. The result has been a lack of historical knowledge and a lack of broader contextual appreciation. Most specialists brought by US services onto the Iraq problem, when it periodically re-emerged, were either not experienced in Libyan issues, and were — most importantly — told strictly to confine their activities to the territory of Iraq or to Iraqi officials visibly able to be identified abroad.

During the Cold War, US intelligence and policy officials and diplomats vied to work on the “main threat”: the Soviet Union. The intelligence, diplomatic and threat assessment community remains in the same mode: career paths are associated with participation in the “main threat”. After September 11, 2001, this became perceived as Islamist-based terrorism and Iraq. All other areas, even when they related to the “main threat”, were dismissed or ignored, unless a policy directive from the highest levels explicitly demanded investigation of a link.

This remained particularly true of intelligence relating to Libya, which was considered by the US intelligence community to be a dead issue, largely based on two criteria: the fact that the White House ignored it, and the fact that Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi said that he had renounced terrorism and radical strategic ambitions. In fact, evidence shows that Qadhafi’s ongoing — and unrealistic — belief that the US would repeat its military attacks of the Reagan era (April 14,-15, 1986) led him to make constant “gestures” of rapprochement and reconciliation with the US and UK while he continued, with as much secrecy as possible, on the path of strategic weapons development and in the conduct of destabilizing political actions in a wide range of countries, from South Africa and the Philippines to Ethiopia, Somaliland, Mauritania, and so on.

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs carried extensive intelligence, based on reporting from within the Libyan leadership and Qadhafi’s family circles as well as other Libyan sources, repeatedly detailing the Libyan strategic weapons programs, including the missile developments involving Iraq, Egypt, Iran and North Korea (DPRK), and WMD programs (particularly chemical and biological weapons) conducted with Iraq and Egypt. These were consistently ignored by the US intelligence and diplomatic community, despite very specific references which should have triggered a verification process, and particularly as the US State Dept. and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) committed themselves to a rapprochement and normalization of ties with the Qadhafi Administration based on an admission of responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing.

[Significantly, on January 28, 2004, The Washington Post, quoting unnamed Pakistani intelligence officials, named Dr Abdul Qadir Khan and Mohammad Farooq as the two men who acted as middlemen to supply nuclear weapons technology to Iran and Libya. One of the officials involved in the current investigation said that while the “money trail’ provided some of the evidence against Dr Khan and Mr Farooq, the most damaging information was given by Iran and Libya to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), which then passed it along to Pakistani authorities.]

Only a refusal by the US Congress and the White House to accept the State and CIA approach on forgiveness of Qadhafi for the Lockerbie bombing stopped the Lockerbie settlement from leading to a normalization of US-Libya relations. This led to the belief by Qadhafi — by now, in 2003, seriously ill with cancer — that the Bush Administration had targeted Libya for military action. By this point, as well, Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein had ceased to be a factor. It was clear that, despite the presence of numerous Saddam family members in Libya,4 Saddam’s capture by US forces meant that the alliance on strategic weapons would now come to nothing.

Significantly, as long as Saddam Hussein had eluded capture by US forces, Qadhafi did nothing to reveal, or to stop, the missile and WMD programs which were underway inside Libya, and which were supported by a major core of Iraqi and Egyptian scientists. Even well after the defeat of Iraqi military forces — but while the Arab world continued to believe, to some extent, that Iraqi guerilla forces would rise up and expel the Coalition occupying forces, the plan which Saddam himself had put in place in November 20025 and conveyed to his close associates, presumably including Qadhafi — Libya persisted with plans designed to make the WMD programs strategically effective.

One such ongoing plan was the attempt to overthrow the Government of Mauritania. Pres. Saddam had long realized that Iraqi technology would not, in the foreseeable future, be able to lengthen the range and payload — to the point where they could credibly threaten US and European targets — of the family of ballistic missiles which Iraq had developed based on original Soviet Scud ballistic missile technology and on Scud-derived NoDong missiles. In order to achieve a viable platform from which to reach the US, he planned to subvert Mauritania. To that end, he had begun the process of winning over the Mauritanian Armed Forces, initially through gifts of old tanks, and then through training programs in Iraq, under which Mauritanian military officers were brought into the Ba’ath Party ideology.

Saddam, however, needed the help as well of Libya and Libyan-linked Islamists to attempt the coup. Libya had a long history of attempting to overthrow the Mauritanian Government. [See History section, GIS Mauritania country study.] But with the conventional war in Iraq over by April 2003, and the value of the multi-billion dollar investments by Iraq, Libya and others in the Libya-based WMD/missile programs now open to question, Qadhafi, using his management of the Mauritania coup planning, caused the pro-Iraqi Ba’athists in the Mauritanian Army to work with Libyan and Islamist figures to utilize this last opportunity to seize power in Mauritania.6

The last-ditch coup attempt in Mauritania failed, and details of Ba’athist and Libyan involvement were to gradually emerge as the Government of Mauritanian Pres. Col. Ma’aouiya Ould Sid’ Ahmed Taya tracked down, arrested and prosecuted the coup plotters through 2003. By late 2003, then, Qadhafi was faced with the fact that the WMD program had lost its principal sponsor, and he was faced with the fact that many thousands of Iraqi employees in Libya were now not being paid; and that the WMD program had lost its potential to achieve strategic leverage and that, in fact, the linkage between Saddam and Qadhafi was now a major liability and an actual cassus belli for the US to use to attack Libya militarily.

The Egyptian Government came to the same conclusion and may have already withdrawn its officials engaged in the Bad’r/Condor missile program aspects of the project at al-Kufrah, in Libya near the Egyptian border. Indeed, it may have been an Egyptian withdrawal which triggered Qadhafi, in 2003, to seek support and to enquire about acquisition of new, longer-range ballistic missiles — Shahab-3s — from Iran rather than persist in attempting to improve the range of the NoDong-1s which Libya acquired for the coalition of Iraq, Egypt and Libya from the DPRK in 2000.7

By late 2003, there was no chance that the WMD program could be successfully implemented by Libya alone. Qadhafi, as well was terminally ill, and there was increasing infighting among his family over the succession, particularly challenging for Saif al-Islam, the son who was named heir, and who lacked a power base at home. Saif al-Islam knew that the only chance of a stable succession lay in convincing the US, UK and EU states that Libya would, under him, move to a new era of conventional government, so that the major foreign powers would provide him with the power base and protection which he lacked at home. Older members of the “revolutionary” clique around Qadhafi complained that Saif al-Islam persuaded Qadhafi to make the statement on November 19, 2003, in which he renounced WMD.

It is critical to bear in mind that for the preceding decade and more, Qadhafi had consistently denied that he was engaged in WMD programs, denying also any links with Islamist terrorists or terrorists of any kind. This lie was accepted by the international policy community, and yet when Qadhafi admitted what GIS had long said was the case — that such Libyan WMD programs did, in fact, exist8 — he was greeted as a reformer by the UK Government of Prime Minister Tony Blair, and also by some US politicians. Equally significant is the fact that Qadhafi had ensured that, through the Lockerbie settlement, significant funds (up to $900-million) were to go to Washington and New York law firms, providing a pressure point on Washington policymakers of almost unprecedented levels. For many politicians, there was more to be gained by carefully assisting Qadhafi than in exposing him.

Qadhafi’s sole remaining option, by the end of 2003, if he was to avoid the risk of a US attack and if he wished to see Saif al-Islam succeed him, was to abandon the decades of work and billions of dollars he had poured into WMD and missile programs and into his links with radical Islamist groups. In so doing, he could (and it appears has been successful to) pre-empt US political investigations which would ultimately have tied Libyan WMD programs into those of Iraq (and Egypt). He has not, however, abandoned other work with many African radical groups, including insurgent groups in Darfor, Sudan, terrorists and insurgents in Ethiopia and aimed at Somaliland (which dominates the egress of the Red Sea).9

Among the additional intelligence which began to point in recent years to the fact that Iraq had moved its WMD and missile programs offshore was the involvement of officers of the Iraqi Navy in the strategic weapons programs in Iraq, despite the fact that the Iraqi Navy, to all intents, effectively ceased to exist as a result of the Coalition’s actions against it in 1991.10 It became clear that these naval officers were engaged in the clandestine movement of personnel, equipment and other resources to and possibly from Libya in the years following the 1991 Gulf War, and perhaps earlier.

The fact that some significant strategic matériel, including weapons, documents and other matter, had gone to Syria before the Coalition began military operations in Iraq had, by late 2003, become accepted, and had, as well, been confirmed by a high-level Syrian defector. But apart from the initial note of the transfers of this material by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of October 28, 2002, footnoted [1] below, the physical presence of theater ballistic weapons — which may or may not have had chemical and/or biological warheads — was noted by Australian Special Forces troops during the war. The mobile ballistic systems had been moved into Syria before hostilities began, and had moved back into Western Iraq on the night of March 27-28, 2003, in order to assume firing positions against Israel. The actions of the Australian Special Forces drove the missile batteries back into Syria.11

GIS reports in 2003 also questioned the rôle of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency leader, Mohamed el-Baradei, in suppressing or manipulating intelligence and perceptions relating to the Iraqi and Libyan WMD programs. Significantly, el-Baradei attempted to interpose himself into the Libyan situation following Qadhafi’s December 19, 2003, announcement that he was “relinquishing” his WMD programs. This appeared to be an attempt to stage-manage the closure of the Libyan WMD programs in such a way that Egyptian and Iraqi involvement was denied. [Dr el-Baradei is himself an Egyptian.]

Dr el-Baradei and others claimed, following the announcement by Qadhafi, that the WMD programs were at least five years away from being able to produce a nuclear weapon. The truth is that nuclear weapons capability, while not imminent, was — when the Iraqi and Egyptian scientific and financial backing were engaged — significantly closer than five years. However, it is true that the jointly-owned (Iraqi, Egyptian, Libyan) NoDong-1 missile batteries were already capable of strategically threatening southern European targets with chemical, and possibly biological weapons. Libyan and Iraqi scientists had already shown a significant capability to weaponize chemicals and possibly biological agents. As of 2000, they had a longer-range ballistic delivery system available to them than they had ever before possessed.

It is significant that Israeli intelligence sources pointed out that when the batteries of NoDong-1s became active in 2000, they were targeted at Southern European cities, not at Israel. This may have been out of concern that knowledge of targeting of Israel by the systems would have provoked a pre-emptive Israeli strike.

The clear, and now mounting, evidence that Iraq and Libya had sought to seize power indirectly in Mauritania so that they could use it as a launch site to threaten the US — once longer-range missiles were developed from the basic NoDong-1s, as was being attempted — and that this indicated a readiness date which was sooner, rather than later. The evidence suggests that while Qadhafi and Saddam may not have contemplated a war with the US, they did, however, believe that having a viable nuclear capability would buy them protection and invulnerability to US interference in their activities. There is clear evidence, as well, that the DPRK Administration of Kim Jong-Il and the Iranian clerical leadership today also accepts this logic: nuclear weapons and an intercontinental ballistic missile delivery system guarantees invulnerability from US attack. In the case of Iraq and Libya, the move to Mauritania was meant to compensate for the fact that true ICBM capability would take too long to develop, and therefore a launch facility closer to the US was required.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that earlier, contextual analysis and a broader understanding of underlying issues and relationships of Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein and his peers in the region (as well as in the DPRK) could have assisted in providing better operational intelligence which could have enabled a more efficient conduct of the war. In this, there was a clear failure of intelligence, but more particularly of intelligence direction at a political and policy level, both in the US and in the UK. The ongoing refusal to acknowledge the rôle of Libya and Col. Qadhafi in the broader picture was also partly attributable to financial and commercial incentives being offered to the UK and US (as had earlier been successfully undertaken by Libya with regard to Italy, France and Germany).

The current refusal to acknowledge the regional linkages which tie the Saddam Administration in closely with the actions of Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt and the Palestinian and other subsidiary subnational or transnational groups (including al-Qaida) is, to a large extent, governed in the US by the fact that there is strong pressure, not least from the US State Dept. and Secretary of State Colin Powell, not to “widen the war” in the face of international and domestic pressures. However, this position significantly hurts the incumbent US Bush Administration, which took a major political gamble by taking the war to Iraq based on an “intuitive” understanding of the threat which Saddam Hussein posed to regional and Western interests.

For many career intelligence and diplomatic officials, acknowledgement of the Iraq-Libya-Egypt-Iran-DPRK linkages (but particularly Iraq-Libya), at this stage, would be embarrassing. These officials have chosen the approach that, if all goes well, the Libya “problem” will now go away, albeit leaving a considerable gap in the public knowledge which could be politically beneficial to the re-election of US Pres. George W. Bush.

Footnotes:

1. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, October 28, 2002: Iraq Moves WMD Matériel to Syrian Safe-Havens. This report noted, in part:

“Highly-authoritative, experienced GIS sources have reported that the Iraqi Government and Armed Forces have moved substantial caches of chemical weapons and related materials to safe-havens across the border into Syria, to avoid any chance of discovery by United Nations (UN) inspectors. 

“Iraq moved stockpiles of chemical weapons and nuclear matériel as well as key production machinery and key experts to the Hsishi compound near Kamishli [al-Qamishli], in Syria, along with strategic weapons, ammunition, military fuels and other defense matériel, gold reserves, national archival records and national art treasures. It is believed that the moves took place in late August and early September 2002.

“It is also understood that some of the matériel, production machinery and experts moved into Hsishi compound were from the al-Qaim facility, which had been based near the H-3 base area in Western Iraq. The al-Qaim facility had been involved, before 1991, almost exclusively in uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons, but since it was reconstituted after the bombings of the 1991 Gulf War it was engaged in chemical and biological weapons development work, along with some nuclear-related activity. It is believed that some of the warhead materials for the chemical and biological weapons were at the al-Qaim facility, and that this is now in Hsishi.

“The move reflects the earlier breakthroughs in strategic relations between Iraq and Syria, given the fact that Syria is strategically dependent on Iran, which has traditional rivalries and hostility with Iraq. The movement of Iraqi strategic combat matériel into Syria is the first tangible evidence of the accords which have been struck between Baghdad, Tehran and Damascus in the escalation of the war against Israel and the US. The evidence provided a pointed reminder to those US White House security policy officials who had decried suggestions by some other White House staffers that Iran could be persuaded to help the US in its war against Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein.”

The report — drawn from GIS HUMINT sources in the area — also noted: “Significantly, Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Asad visited Kamishli and, reportedly, Hsishi Compound, in early September 2002, presumably to check on the Iraqi deployment.”

2. This assertion was noted in a wide range of GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reports. On November 19, 2002, for example, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted: “The strategic, as well as the physical and commercial, linkages between the DPRK, Iraq and Iran — as well as Libya — on nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems has now become clear and of sufficient consistency as to imply a degree of coordinated political activity.” Among the many other such reports by GIS, the Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of June 2, 2003, was headlined: Reports Place Saddam, Scientists in Libya, But GIS Sources Believe Only Qusay in Libya; Uday in Belarus.

3. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report of June 10, 2003.

4. On April 11, 2003, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, in a report entitled Libyan Aircraft Collects “VIP Group” From Syria; Flies Back to Libya, gave details of the movement by a Libyan Air Force Il-76 transport of Iraqi leadership figures to Libya from a Syrian military airfield, al-Mazah, near Damascus on April 10, 2003. On April 15, 2003, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reported that “a second Libyan Air Force transport aircraft flew into, and out of, al-Mazah AB [Damascus] on Sunday, April 13, 2003, collecting an Iraq-related cargo of people and baggage”.

5. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, November 8, 2002: Iraqi War Planning and Strategy Show Detailed Preparations for a Geographically Wide and Multi-Layered Conflict.

6. In reporting on the attempted coup on June 8-9, 2003, in Mauritania, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on June 10, 2003, noted: “[T]he Ba’athists, mostly in the Army, had been brought under Iraqi Ba’athist influence when the Iraqi Government of Pres. Saddam Hussein donated 34 T-54/55 main battle tanks to the Mauritanian Army some years ago” (in the 1990s, after Saddam had begun moving Iraqi WMD work outside of Iraq).  See also Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, December 23, 2003: Evidence of Libyan Involvement in Mauritania Coup Attempt Highlights Qadhafi’s Strategic Direction. Apart from discussing Libyan involvement in the attempted coup in Mauritania (which entailed tracked Libyan payments to at least one Mauritanian Islamist leader), the report said: “...[E]ven following the collapse of the Iraqi Administration of Saddam Hussein, Libya was, with Iran, negotiating for longer-range missiles, Iranian-built or modified Shahab-3s, apart from the NoDong-1s which were delivered to Libya from the DPRK and paid-for by Libya, Iraq, Egypt and possibly Iran.”

7. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, November 8, 2000: Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel. See also the Daily reports of December 23, 2003, and September 4, 2003: Libya, Iran, DPRK Discuss New Strategic Missile Procurement. See also Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of May 8, 2002: US Now Focuses Attention on Libya as Hostile State, While Libya Moves Rapidly to Bolster Strategic Ties With Iran.

8. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, December 22, 2003: Libyan WMD Programs, Long Cited by GIS, Admitted as Qadhafi Begins Rear-Guard Action to Stave Off US Attack. And Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, January 22, 2004: Qadhafi “Rear Guard” Action Attempts to Halt US Discovery of WMD Link With Iraq.

9. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, January 28, 2004: Eritrea Recruiting Mercenary Special Forces as Preparations Mount for Resumption of War With Ethiopia. And the Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of January 27, 2004: Puntland Warlord Preparing for Attacks on Somaliland. Both reports highlight Qadhafi’s involvement in Horn of Africa insurgency. Indeed, his “settlement” with the US on Lockerbie was only for show; he immediately, in private circles and at the 2003 Revolution Day celebrations, recanted his accord with the US. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, September 5, 2003: Qadhafi Denies Responsibility for Lockerbie; Calls US Leaders “Prostitutes” and Privately Alleges He Has Bribed Key US Officials to Achieve Closure on Case .

10. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, October 2, 2002: Iraq Believed Using Riverine Barges, Vessels, for WMD Storage, Development and Possible Launch.

11. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, March 31, 2003: Iraq Signifies Readiness to Engage Israel; Tests SSM Deployments in Western Desert. As the report noted, “On March 30, 2003, Israeli Military Intelligence Director Maj.-Gen. Aaron Ze’evi-Farkash briefed the Knesset on the conflict and singled out ‘the unique, sacred work’ of the Australian special forces in preventing missile attacks on Israel.”


January 30, 2004

Qadhafi’s Health Deteriorates as Opposition Mounts

Exclusive. From GIS Stations Tripoli and Riyadh. Very reliable sources, close to Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, who left Tripoli on January 28, 2004, told GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on January 29, 2004, that Col. Qadhafi had collapsed 10 days earlier for a period of some four hours. This was the latest, and apparently one of the most serious, collapses which the Colonel has experienced for some time as he battles the terminal stages of his throat cancer.

He revived sufficiently to meet for two hours with some visiting US Congressmen on January 26, 2004. Libyan sources have told GIS that Qadhafi conserves his energy so that he can be active for several hours a day, but was becoming increasingly tired.

His latest severe collapse, on or around January 18, 2004, was of such concern that his family began procedures to have him airlifted to a clinic in Russia for treatment. This had already been planned. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, December 4, 2003: New Evidence Illustrates Libyan Leadership Preparing for Qadhafi’s Death.] However, Qadhafi revived and the planned emergency airlift was called off.

Meanwhile, GIS sources in Riyadh confirmed on January 29, 2004, that a further Libyan Embassy official in Riyadh had been arrested on January 28, 2004, in connection with the Islamist/al-Qaida terrorist bombing incident in Riyadh on November 8-9, 2003. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, January 26, 2004: New Evidence of Ongoing Qadhafi Involvement in Terrorism, Support for Sudanese Rebels.]

GIS reported on January 26, 2004, that the Saudi security authorities had arrested three individuals from the Libyan People’s Bureau in Riyadh, after they had fled to Egypt in an attempt to return to Saudi Arabia. They had reportedly financed the November 2003 bombing and had paid the terrorists to conduct it. GIS sources at that time named two of the three individuals said to have been arrested. However, it is not sure whether the latest arrest is a fourth individual, or whether the third man was only now arrested (but identified earlier). The January 28, 2004, arrest, however, occurred in Saudi Arabia and in defiance of the man’s diplomatic status.

The man arrested inside Saudi Arabia on January 28, 2004, was Maj. Mahdi Abd el-Aziz al-Salah, the Security Officer for the Embassy. He reported directly to Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) chief Moussa Koussa, the key Libyan intelligence official who negotiated the rapprochement with the US and UK. Maj. Mahdi al-Salah was a very senior and experienced Libyan intelligence officer, who had previously worked in Russia and Algeria (at Libyan missions), and had worked for the Libyan Ministry of Interior on a mission in Tunis in 1996.

At the same time, while Libyan officials around Qadhafi (including his son and heir, Saif al-Islam) work hard to ensure Western support so that Saif al-Islam can assume the national leadership, a wide range of other Libyan officials are now known to be working closely — for the first time since the “revolution” (putsch) in 1969 — to remove Qadhafi and Saif al-Islam. As a result, more and more information is being leaked about Qadhafi’s ongoing involvement in WMD programs and terrorism. Col. Qadhafi and Saif al-Islam are trying to ensure that they can normalize relations with the US before the tidal wave of leaks and opposition swamps them.

On January 29, 2004, as well, the Iraqi daily newspaper, al-Mada, published details of a list of 270 companies, organizations, and individuals awarded allocations (vouchers) of crude oil by the former Administration of Pres. Saddam Hussein. What was significant is that the list identified Libyan Prime Minister Shukri Ghanem as having received received one-million barrels of oil allocated to him, despite the fact that he was nominally head-of-government of a major oil-producing state. The payment indicated an ongoing strategic relationship between Libya and Iraq, as outlined in the above report.


January 26, 2004

New Evidence of Ongoing Qadhafi Involvement in Terrorism, Support for Sudanese Rebels

Exclusive. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS. With input from GIS Stations Tripoli and Riyadh. GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily has received significant new evidence of ongoing Libyan involvement in international terrorism, even as ailing Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi attempts to portray Libya as having abandoned both terrorism and weapons of mass destruction programs in order to forestall what he believes would be possible US political and military attacks on his Administration.

At present, the new evidence points to:

  • 1. Direct Libyan involvement in organizing, paying for and planning terrorist attacks as recently as November 2003 against the Government of Saudi Arabia;

  • 2. A break in the Libya-Egypt alliance;

  • 3. Continued Libyan sponsorship of one Sudanese rebel group, attempting to break the Sudan peace accord;

  • 4. Collapse of trust between the old “revolutionaries” around Qadhafi and Qadhafi’s chosen heir and son, Saif al-Islam, the Qadhafi family, the Gadadfa tribe, and the Armed Forces;

  • 5. The terminal stages of Qadhafi’s cancer.

Even as a US bipartisan Congressional delegation — which pointedly was told not to represent itself as an official US contingent — arrived in Tripoli on January 24 and 25, 2004, reports from senior sources in Qadhafi’s household indicated that the Libyan leader may already be too ill to meet them. Representative Tom Lantos (Democrat, California) became the first elected US official to set foot in Libya for 38 years when he arrived on January 24, 2004.

For the first time, as well, a significant, respected newspaper — Scotland on Sunday — confirmed reports only previously carried by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs about Qadhafi’s illness. The newspaper said on January 25, 2004: “If Qadhafi is not seen in public it will further fuel speculation that he is in the advanced stages of throat cancer. Qadhafi has had treatment in an Egyptian civilian hospital, and might attend a Russian military hospital. If Qadhafi were to die before the lifting of US sanctions a smooth take-over by his son Saif could be in jeopardy. Saif told a French journalist: ‘Obviously, I would be lying if I told you there was no chance I might become leader one day.’ There is said to be much hostility to Seif even within the Qadhafi family and in the armed forces.”

See elsewhere in GIS Libya Special Reports over the past several years on Qadhafi’s health and succession issues, but, on the matter of the special arrangements made for the Russian medical treatment, see Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, December 4, 2003: New Evidence Illustrates Libyan Leadership Preparing for Qadhafi’s Death.

In the latest incident, three Libyan diplomatically-accredited officials have been arrested by the Government of Saudi Arabia for involvement in the terrorist bombing in Riyadh on the weekend of November 8-9, 2003. The three, who had been stationed as representatives of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) at the Libyan Embassy (“People’s Bureau”) in Riyadh, fled Saudi Arabia through the port city of Jeddah when it became clear that Saudi security officials had discovered their involvement in the bombing, going to Egypt, through which they hoped to travel to Libya. They were, however, arrested in Egypt following a request to Egyptian authorities by Saudi officials.

Two of the Libyans arrested were about 30 years of age: Abdulsatah al-Ghjish (as transliterated by GIS source in Riyadh) and Ahmed Ismail. The identity of the third Libyan was not disclosed to the GIS source.

As soon as the three were arrested in Egypt, ESO head Moussa Koussa, who was in London at the time, flew to Cairo where he pleaded with Egyptian officials not to return the three to Saudi Arabia. As soon as this attempt failed — and the three were handed over to Saudi officials — Moussa Koussa traveled by road to Libya from Cairo.

The three Libyan ESO officers reportedly gave the terrorists, including the suicide bombers, $300,000 to help arrange the November bombings, which killed 17 people. Reports at the time linked the bombing to al-Qaida-related terrorist groups inside Saudi Arabia, and officials arrested an estimated some 300 people very quickly after the bombing. It remained likely that the bombers were, in fact, radical Islamists, probably connected with al-Qaida, but also with Libya. Significantly, Libyan ESO officials have for the past dozen years and more been associating with radical Islamists — including individuals now referred to as al-Qaida and with Iranian Islamist terror managers — in Bosnia, as reported earlier by GIS.

See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, October 15, 2003: Strong Warning Indicators for New Surge in European Islamist Terrorism.

The failure of the Egyptian Security Police to hand the three Libyans over to Moussa Koussa marked a dramatic signal to Qadhafi that the strategic relationship between him and Egyptian Pres. Hosnia Mubarak was at an end, after many years of intimate cooperation, particularly involving Egyptian scientific and technical cooperation with the Libyan-Iraqi strategic weapons (WMD and missile) programs and in the “special relationship” in which Pres. Mubarak undertook (for cash) to help keep the US from attacking Qadhafi and in which Pres. Mubarak undertook to help the US by keeping Qadhafi in line.

The December 19, 2003, announcement by Qadhafi that Libya had, despite all earlier denials, been engaged in WMD programs but would now unilaterally abandon them was designed to protect Qadhafi from disclosure of the Libya-Iraq links on these programs, but, in fact, also spelled an end to more than a decade of Egyptian participation in those programs, particularly throwing the entire resources of the Egyptian Condor strategic missile program into the joint effort. The December 19, 2003, move by Qadhafi spelled an end to any meaningful beneficial relationship between him and Pres. Mubarak. The arrest of the Libyan ESO officials by the Egyptians, and their return to Saudi Arabia, about mid-January 2004, served notice of this fact to Qadhafi.

As a result, Libya unilaterally virtually closed the Egypt-Libya border, something which has major ramifications, given the extent of cross-border traffic because of Egyptian workers traveling to jobs in Libya, quite apart from the links with the joint Iraq-Libya WMD programs, particularly at al-Kufra [aka al-Kafra], in Libya, close to the Egyptian border.

Libyan sources in the Qadhafi entourage told GIS that the decision by Qadhafi to support the al-Qaida groups inside Saudi Arabia began with the big Saudi-Libya rift which occurred as a result of a bitter exchange between Saudi Crown Prince ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud and Qadhafi at the Arab League Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on March 1, 2003.

See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, March 12, 2003: Libya Grasps at “Normalization” of Relations With US, UK as Saudi Arabia Reverses Relations With Tripoli.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, March 3, 2003: Outburst by Crown Prince ‘Abdullah Acknowledges Possible Saudi Rôle in Libyan 1969 Coup and Highlights Qadhafi’s Illness.

The clear evidence of Libyan involvement with radical Islamists in Saudi Arabia once again gave the lie to Qadhafi’s claims that he had abandoned all links with terrorism. But GIS sources within the Libyan leadership structure also indicated that Qadhafi had personally authorized ongoing help for Sudanese rebels based in the Darfour region of Sudan, on the Chad-Sudan border. Sudanese officials had long said that internal opposition forces had aligned with Chad to support these forces, but the GIS sources in the Qadhafi leadership said that the support for the group — known as Sudan’s Liberation Group — was continuing and that it was coming from Libya. The group had signed a 45-day ceasefire with the Sudanese Government on September 3, 2003, in Abishi, following Chadian mediation, and on November 10, 2003, or thereabouts, had agreed to extend that ceasefire into January 2004.

The Sudan’s Liberation Movement started in February 2003 — well after the time that Qadhafi had said that he had abandoned support for terrorist and “national liberation” groups, and after the US had made it clear that a peace accord for Sudan was a major priority — and since then the fighting resulted in the deaths of 3,000 people and hundreds thousands more displaced in Sudan, with thousands of refugees fleeing into Chad.

Meanwhile, there is growing contact and confidence within members of the Qadhafi family, the Gadadfa tribe (of Qadhafi), and the Armed Forces of Libya — as well as other tribal groups and the Sanussiyyah moderate Muslim movement — that they are opposed to Qadhafi’s continued rule and his intentions to hand power over to his son, Saif al-Islam, who is opposed by several of his siblings. The “revolutionary” traditionalists around Qadhafi also oppose the shift of power to Saif al-Islam, largely because he was believed responsible for the “panic move” to abandon Libya’s WMD programs as a gesture to appease the West, throwing away decades of work and billions of dollars of investment in weapons research and missiles.

They also oppose his move to “end” the revolution by restoring Qadhafi from the position of “leader of the revolution” to President of Libya, a post which could be transferred to Saif al-Islam.

GIS has considerable insight into, and information on, the cooperation which is now underway between what had once been opposing forces inside Libya, some of which cannot at this stage be divulged because its disclosure would jeopardize the security of sources. It should be stressed, however, that the extensive and unique intelligence on Libya produced by GIS, particularly over the past four years or more, has begun to be proven, despite the fact that it had been rejected by major Western intelligence services. This particularly applies to the reporting by GIS on Libyan WMD and missile programs, which Qadhafi had now publicly acknowledged.

See also Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, January 22, 2004: Qadhafi “Rear Guard” Action Attempts to Halt US Discovery of WMD Link With Iraq, and

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, December 23, 2003: Evidence of Libyan Involvement in Mauritania Coup Attempt Highlights Qadhafi’s Strategic Direction.


January 22, 2004

Qadhafi “Rear Guard” Action Attempts to Halt US Discovery of WMD Link With Iraq

Exclusive. Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS. With input from GIS Station Tripoli. Very senior Libyan sources have confirmed that embattled Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi was attempting to circumvent the possibility that US intelligence officials would discover the linkages between Libya and Iraq on the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by his aggressive program to publicly “abandon” Libya’s WMD programs.

The sources said that his December 19, 2003, announcement about abandoning Libyan WMD programs — about which he had consistently lied for more than a decade — were designed to protect the “core secret”, the longstanding Libyan cooperation programs with Iraq, Iran, the DPRK and even Egypt, on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and strategic missile development. By openly admitting the WMD programs and then abandoning them, the sources said, he hoped to avert deeper investigation. In this regard, he was helped considerably by the readiness of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed al-Baradei and UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to accept his comments at face value, rather than to ask why he had made the decision to change, after consistently lying for so long, and after a massive expenditure of Libyan resources.

Qadhafi had consistently denied any Libyan involvement in WMD programs and had disavowed links to international terrorism. However, on December 19, 2003, Qadhafi suddenly confirmed the existence of these programs and said that Libya would now abandon them. His decision followed a statement by US Under-Secretary of State John Bolton, threatening Iran, North Korea (DPRK), Syria, Libya and Cuba with “adverse consequences” if they persisted with their WMD programs.

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily has consistently noted the ongoing nature of the Libyan WMD programs and the Libyan partnership with the Iraqi Government of former Pres. Saddam Hussein on these projects. See, among other reports, the Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report of October 1, 2002, entitled Weapons Grade Uranium Moving in Middle East; Iraqi WMD and Delivery Development Being Undertaken in Libya. This Service also highlighted the direct involvement of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) in producing the disinformation — in the form of a forged dossier — provided through the Italian military intelligence service, SISMI, to the US, attempting to obfuscate the movement of uranium from Niger to the Iraqi WMD program being conducted inside Libya.

See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report of July 29, 2003: Niger-Iraq Uranium Reports Involve Ongoing Libyan Deception Ops.

Family sources close to Qadhafi said that the ailing leader — now in the advanced stages of terminal cancer — had become convinced that the US had targeted him for attack, and particularly because the US had now come closer to understanding the true nature of the Libya-Iraq WMD links which had matured following the 1991 US-led Gulf War against Iraq. The attempt to obfuscate the movement of uranium from Niger into the joint Libya-Iraq WMD programs had included the ESO preparation of the forged dossier, which became the basis of statements made by US Pres. George W. Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address.

However, the Libyan sources said that Qadhafi remained concerned that deeper investigation by the US would reveal the fact that the Niger uranium had, in fact, gone to Libya, for use by both Libya and Iraq. As a result, on December 29, 2003, Libyan officials, ostensibly engaged in both security and immigration, met in Niamey, the Niger capital, with their Niger counterparts and began two days of consultations, allegedly on security including illegal immigration, drug trafficking, proliferation of small arms and ammunition, as well as robberies. However, it was understood that the “routine” nature of the talks masked the real intent of the Libyan officials, which was to ensure that there would be no leaks from Niamey about the uranium exports to Libya.

Meanwhile, on January 19, 2004, five scientists associated with Pakistan's premier nuclear facility A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), including its Director-General, Mansoor Ahmad, were arrested for allegedly leaking nuclear secrets to “foreign countries”. Among those held were Major Muhammad Islam (retd.), a close aide of KRL founder Abdul Qadeer Khan, considered the architect of Pakistan’s nuclear program. There had been reports that Abdul Qadeer Khan might himself be questioned or arrested by investigators probing the leakage of Pakistan’s nuclear secrets to countries such as Iran and Libya. In fact, Pakistani sources said that Dr Khan had long been sidelined from nuclear research because of questions about his loyalties. Reports surfaced in late 2003, however, noting his cooperation in a private capacity with Iran on the development of nuclear weapons for that country.1

And although there is no known links on nuclear weapons between Iran and Libya on nuclear weapons development — indeed, the Libya-Iraq link on warhead development was in some senses a potential threat to Iran because of Iran-Iraq rivalries — there was cooperation between Iran and Libya on delivery systems.

See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, September 4, 2003: Libya, Iran, DPRK Discuss New Strategic Missile Procurement, in which it was noted:

“[S]ources confirmed that, since late August 2003, the Libyan Government had been involved in serious negotiations with Iran about the procurement of an unspecified number of Shahab-3 road-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). Significantly, North Korean (DPRK) officials played a key rôle in promoting and facilitating the negotiations, largely because of the extent of DPRK involvement in the missile program.”

“The sources said that Libya sought a promise from Tehran to build a Shahab-3 development site in Libya to allow the subsequent autonomous production of the Shahab-3 following the initial purchase. While no deal had been concluded by September 3, 2003 , and it appeared that such an agreement was still far off, GIS sources believed that there existed a real possibility that this exchange would eventually be finalized.”

US officials were quoted in January 2004 as saying that Libya had obtained centrifuge design technology from Pakistan and experts suggested that many of the parts had been manufactured in Malaysia. Centrifuges can be used for enriching uranium used in nuclear reactors or weapons. And, on December 30, 2003, 150 Pakistanis were sent back to Pakistan from Libya through a special charter flight. While there are understood to be about 700 Pakistanis in Libyan prisons, it has been clear that the Libyan Government had recruited a wide range of Pakistani specialists to come to Libya. Much of this was reportedly managed by Qadhafi’s heir and son, Saif al-Islam. Concern over the private recruitment of Pakistani scientists and specialists by Libya for WMD programs, missile development and terrorist activities is not misplaced.

Meanwhile, on January 17, 2004, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was accused — as outlined in an article in The Daily Telegraph of January 18, 2004 — of a “diplomatic cover-up” over Col. Qadhafi after refusing to answer questions about the seizure of uranium-enrichment equipment bound for Libya in October 2003. The capture by the US of thousands of centrifuges on board a German-owned vessel en route to Libya had raised suspicions that Qadhafi had offered to abandon his weapons program only after threats from the US, rather than the lengthy UK and US diplomacy claimed by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair.

Indeed, the entire “avalanche” of Western support for Qadhafi’s decision to admit to the WMD programs and to agree to their disbandment has completely taken the edge off US attempts to unveil the full extent of the Libya-Iraq-DPRK (and Egyptian) WMD cooperation, as Qadhafi had intended. In this regard, there have been many US and European policymakers, anxious for a “victory”, who have been prepared to buy the Qadhafi position, as stated.

At the end of December 2003, UN IAEA chief Mohamed el-Baradei met Qadhafi and praised him for cooperating with teams conducting the first-ever inspections of Libya’s nuclear weapons program, noting: “Libya has shown a good deal of cooperation, a good deal of openness. ... This is a country that appears fully committed to cooperating.” It should be noted, however, that el-Baradei was a key element of Libya’s planned program to introduce, and then unveil, the disinformation which made its way into the January 2003 Bush State of the Union address. It was el-Baradei who claimed — without any intelligence capability to support his allegation — that the papers used by Pres. Bush were forged. It is clear that he only knew that fact because he was told by the Qadhafi Administration.

There is, therefore, a questionable historical relationship between Qadhafi and el-Baradei, not to mention el-Baradei’s known antipathy toward having the US control the disarmament programs of either Iraq or Libya. As well, el-Baradei is Egyptian, and the involvement of Egypt in the Libya-Iraq missile programs has not been insignificant. GIS noted, on September 4, 2003, and earlier, “Iraqi-Libyan WMD cooperation at a site near the Egyptian border called al-Kufra [aka al-Kafra] and the presence of some 20,000 Iraqi technicians and scientists in Libya to help with these efforts”. 

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of November 8, 2000, reported: 

“The Libyan acquisition of NoDong-1 SSMs is the result of a joint Egyptian-Iraqi-Libyan crash program to overcome delays in production of indigenous SSMs. Initially, the Egyptians and the Iraqis wanted to expedite the production of their own missile in Libya. Cairo arranged for Tripoli to provide cover for the revival of the Bad’r/Condor program which could no longer take place in Iraq and now also not in Egypt because of the exposure by the US of the North Korean (DPRK) rôle and a consequent US pressure to stop the program. Therefore, the Libyans initiated their relations with the DPRK on behalf of Cairo and Baghdad.”

Meanwhile, a report from Vienna on January 20, 2004, based on IAEA sources indicated that “Teams from the United Nations, the United States and Britain are secretly setting up bases in Libya for the purpose of scrapping Tripoli's weapons of mass destruction”. The wire service report said that diplomats had said on condition of anonymity that US and British weapons experts — including specialists on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons — began arriving “this past weekend” [ie: January 17-18, 2004].. They also said that members of a separate team from the International Atomic Energy Agency were gathering in Tripoli.

One of the principal drivers in the current process was the fact that the leaderships of most European states and the US wanted to see a “victory”, and a Libyan renunciation of WMD and therefore a foreseeable end to a major weapons threat in a potential Arab-Israeli dispute was removed. As a result, even when the European and US players viewed the Qadhafi move cynically, there was no pressure to “open a can of worms” by digging into Qadhafi’s motivation, or the linkages with Egyptian, Iranian, DPRK and Iraqi WMD programs. As a result, however, this meant that the linkages to Syria — a major conduit in Libyan dealings with Iraq during the 2003 War, and with Iran — remained uninvestigated. It also encouraged the Iranian clerical leadership, and Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak, to embrace the view that they had not been detected in their WMD programs.

Significantly, neither US Under-Secretary of State Bolton nor the Bush White House have yet signed off on the Qadhafi ploy. On January 20, 2004, it was announced that six US Congressmen would travel to Tripoli on January 24-25, 2004, to meet Qadhafi, and probably visit facilities where his Government claimed it had begun programs to make WMDs. The trip would be the first by elected US officials to Libya in almost four decades. Rep. Curt Weldon (Republican, Pennsylvania), who would lead the bipartisan congressional delegation said the Libya trip was born out of a recent dinner meeting in London with Qadhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, whom he had met through a contact from Ukraine. The initiative validated earlier GIS reports as to Saif al-Islam’s central rôle in the current strategic moves by Libya. However, the White House gave only a tepid endorsement of the trip of the Congressmen, noting that it would not prevent lawmakers from visiting Libya but would not provide military aircraft to fly them into Tripoli.

On balance, however, Qadhafi and Saif al-Islam had recovered from the collapse of the 2002-2003 program to normalize Libya’s position by attempting to settle the PA103 terrorist bombing case, with a settlement to families of the victims of that incident. However, the latest Qadhafi ploy was at the expense of billions of dollars of investment in missile and WMD programs over the past decade. Significantly, the collapse of the Saddam Administration in Iraq, and the ongoing pressure on Iran’s clerics, along with the failure of the Ba’athist/Libyan attempt to overthrow the Mauritanian Government on June 8, 2003, meant that the massive WMD and missile programs in Libya were unlikely to proceed much further, anyway.

One Libyan source said: “Qadhafi has handed Bush and Blair an easy victory in order to deny them a more meaningful victory.”

Footnote:

1. Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of October 22, 2003, noted: “Prince Sultan’s visit to Pakistan was followed by a visit to Saudi Arabia in mid-September 2000 by a Pakistani strategic policy and nuclear delegation led by Dr Abdul Qadir Khan, Dr Ijaz Shafi Ghilani and Dr M. Younus But. They were guests of Prince Sultan, and at a speech on about September 20, 2000, Dr Abdul Qadir Khan thanked the Saudi Government for contributing to the success of the Pakistani nuclear weapons tests on May 28, 1998. That indicated a Saudi involvement in the Pakistani nuclear weapons program much earlier than Pakistani officials have generally acknowledged. [Saudi financial support for Pakistani nuclear research was, however, assumed even during the Zia ul-Haq era of the 1980s, but without any known understanding of a direct quid pro quo for Saudi Arabia.]”


December 23, 2003

Evidence of Libyan Involvement in Mauritania Coup Attempt Highlights Qadhafi’s Strategic Direction

Newly-emerging evidence of financial backing from Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi for Mauritanian opposition elements supports earlier GIS analysis which indicated that Libyan and Iraqi joint involvement in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range missile programs was linked to attempts to help Ba’athist elements seize power in Mauritania with a view to using the country as a platform to threaten European states and the US with strategic weapons. To this point, GIS is the only service to have raised questions regarding the involvement of Iraqi Ba’athists and transnational Islamists in the June 8, 2003, coup attempt in Mauritania.

GIS analysis was that the attempt was directly linked to joint Iraqi-Libyan plans to suborn Mauritania, which provided a closer launch position for long-range missiles to threaten US cities than either Iraq or Libya. Both states were, with Egypt, Iran and the DPRK, engaged in programs to extend the range of NoDong-1 ballistic missiles which had been delivered to Libya. Moreover, even following the collapse of the Iraqi Administration of Saddam Hussein, Libya was, with Iran, negotiating for longer-range missiles, Iranian-built or modified Shahab-3s, apart from the NoDong-1s which were delivered to Libya from the DPRK and paid-for by Libya, Iraq, Egypt and possibly Iran.

The new evidence of Libyan complicity in the Mauritania subornation emerged during the treason trial of former Mauritanian president Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla and 14 co-defendants, which resumed in Nouakchott on December 22, 2003. However, the State prosecutor failed earlier to produce two key witnesses to support his argument that Ould Haidalla, the main challenger to Pres. Maaouiya Ould Sid’ Ahmed Taya in the November 2003 presidential election, was plotting a coup. Defense lawyers continued pressing the judge on Monday to release Ould Haidalla and his supporters for lack of evidence.

Ould Haidalla led a military government in Mauritania from 1980 to 1984, when he was overthrown by Ould Taya in a coup. He re-emerged from obscurity in August 2003 to announce that he would try to regain power through the elections. However, Ould Haidalla and 14 of his supporters were arrested soon after incumbent Pres. Ould Taya was officially declared the winner of the November 7, 2003, election. They face a variety of charges of plotting against the government in collusion with a foreign power.

The Mauritanian Government said openly for the first time on December 19, 2003, that this was Libya. A police statement said the government in Tripoli had contributed about US$1-million towards Ould Haidalla’s election campaign.

The Government had earlier hinted that Libya was harboring the ringleaders of the Ba’athist-led coup attempt against Pres. Ould Taya on June 8, 2003.

Not surprisingly, the Libyan Foreign Ministry denied the accusations, saying it had no link with Haidalla and had never plotted to overthrow Pres. Ould Taya, who has close ties with the US, Morocco and Israel.

If found guilty, Ould Haidalla and his co-accused could face anything from 20 years of forced labor to life in prison.


December 22, 2003

Libyan WMD Programs, Long Cited by GIS, Admitted as Qadhafi Begins Rear-Guard Action to Stave Off US Attack

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS. The Libyan Administration of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi on December 18, 2003, admitted that it had weapons of mass destruction programs as well as programs to build long-range strategic missiles, but that it would now abandon these programs and become a model leader in adherence to nuclear non-proliferation. GIS has, uniquely, been reporting on these WMD and missile programs for many years, despite the fact that these reports were consistently denied or overlooked.

However, in the US and UK governments’ enthusiastic support for the new Libyan position, a critical element has been overlooked: the fact that the Libyan WMD programs have been conducted with consistent and extensive integration with the WMD and missile programs of the (then) Iraqi Government of Saddam Hussein, as well as those of Egypt and Iran, and drawing on considerable North Korean (DPRK) technology.

Libyan sources have told GIS that the Col. Qadhafi still feared US military attacks on Libya once the Iraq connection became known.

Despite that, however, Qadhafi had worked until this point toward not abandoning but strengthening his WMD and missile programs and toward a resumption of covert hostile action against US interests, in particular. His son, and designated heir, Saif al-Islam, has also given interviews recently supporting the Iraqi resistance in killing Coalition forces in Iraq.

The sudden volte face by Qadhafi reflects his mercurial behavior, and cannot be taken at face value, but rather as a “rear guard” action in the face of evidence that he was now becoming the target of the US Bush Administration’s interest. It seems clear that he felt that a pre-emptive move to acknowledge, and then abandon, WMD and strategic missiles would forestall the linkage which Libya has had with Iraqi WMD and missile programs. GIS has consistently noted the linkages, and also noted Libya’s expensive and extensive program during late 2002 and early 2003 to build a smokescreen on this issue. The supply of a dossier of forged documents to SISMI, for on-passing to the US intelligence community, relating to alleged Niger-Iraq nuclear transactions was clear evidence that Qadhafi felt committed to covering the Iraq-Libya linkage on strategic weapons. [See the July 29, 2003, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report, in particular.]

Libyan linkages with Iraq in the attempted coup d’etat in Mauritania on June 8, 2003 [see Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reports of June 9 and 10, 2003] also demonstrated the fact that Iraq intended to use Mauritania-based strategic weapons to threaten European and US targets.

The London Daily Telegraph on December 21, 2003, in a report entitled Revealed: the real reason for Gaddafi’s WMD surrender, by Julian Coman and Colin Brown, claimed that “Libya’s promise to surrender its weapons of mass destruction was forced by Britain and America’s seizure of physical evidence of Col Mu’ammar Gaddafi’s [Qadhafi’s] illegal weapons program. ... United States officials say that America’s hand was strengthened in negotiations with Col Gaddafi after a successful operation, previously undisclosed, to intercept transport suspected of carrying banned weapons.”

However, this operation was mounted after several years during which GIS presented mounting evidence of Libyan WMD and missile activity, despite a concurrent Libyan attempt to woo the US and UK into abandoning sanctions against the country.

The Daily Telegraph report noted: “The operation is said to have been carried out under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an international, American-led scheme to halt the spread of WMD by seizing them in transit. The PSI was first mooted by President George W Bush in May but was not officially launched until September [2003]. Last week, a senior official from the US State Department confirmed that the PSI had ‘netted several seizures’, although he refused to give further details.”

Publicly, however, both the US and UK lauded Qadhafi’s decision to abandon WMD and missiles, and to allow international inspectors into Libya to oversee their destruction, as a major step forward. Significantly, Israel has been quiet on the matter, although a significant portion of the Israeli strategic triad of forces had been committed to pre-emptive strikes against Libyan missile and WMD installations in the event of an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities.

Although the latest Libyan decision appeared to be far-reaching and irreversible, it seems highly likely that, having removed the immediate US and UK pressure, Qadhafi would attempt to hedge the decision and to retain some strategic capabilities away from the eyes of international inspectors. Indeed, it seems likely that the international inspectors themselves would be subject to obfuscation by Libyan authorities, given the pattern of Libyan behavior in the past.

US Pres. George W. Bush described Libya’s new posture as a “wise and responsible choice”. The Libyan Foreign Ministry said that the country had agreed “of its own free will” to destroy its unconventional weapons, rather than be perceived to have given in to external pressure. A UK Cabinet minister was quoted by The Daily Telegraph as saying: “It demonstrates that change can be brought about by standing tough. There is no question that this change of heart by Gaddafi was brought about by the fact that the US and Britain were seen to be standing up to and called Saddam Hussein’s bluff.”

The newspaper also said: “The Travellers Club in Pall Mall, beloved of spy novelists and frequented by senior officers in the intelligence services, was the venue last week for the final breakthrough talks between MI6 and Libyan intelligence officials. ... British immigration rules were discreetly changed to allow the Libyans to enter the country on visas. Three Libyan officials met a four-strong British team led by William Ehrman, the Director-General of Defence and Intelligence at the Foreign Office, and including two MI6 officers, to agree the text that would be read out on Libyan television on Friday night [December 19, 2003].”

Adding to the pressure on Libya, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said at a PSI conference in Washington in mid-December that the threat to global security extended beyond the DPRK and Iran,noting: “"While PSI participants agree that North Korea and Iran are of particular concern, we know that our efforts cannot be confined to just any one or two countries alone.”

In June 2003, US Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton said that Qadhafi had been exploiting the suspension of United Nations sanctions after the Lockerbie trial, and noted then: “Since the sanctions were lifted, Libya has been able to be more aggressive in pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Libyan agents are trying to acquire dual-use technology.”

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair said in a televised broadcast on December 21, 2003: “This evening Colonel [Qadhafi] has confirmed that Libya has in the past sought to develop WMD capabilities, as well as longer range missiles. As a result, Libya has now declared its intention to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction completely.”

US and British officials visited Libyan weapons production sites in October and December 2003, and viewed chemical weapons and signs of a relatively advanced nuclear program.

Qadhafi’s own statement said on December 19, 2003: “Libya will henceforth lead countries working towards ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction”, noting that the move marked “a key role [for Libya] in building a world free of terrorism, of all these weapons, a world at peace and in development.”


December 17, 2003

Libya’s Saif al-Islam Moves Further Away From Reconciliation With US, EU

Analysis. With input from GIS sources in Libya and other locations. Anger at the collapse of the Libya-US Lockerbie settlement — by which Libya would be removed from US sanctions in return for the payment of a settlement for the Libyan involvement in the terrorist downing of Pan Am Flight PA103 — has led the designated heir to the Libyan leadership, Saif al-Islam, the son of leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, to make increasingly hostile statements about the US and Coalition activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sources in Washington, DC, as well as in some European capitals, have taken note of the positions as an indication that Saif al-Islam had abandoned hope of bringing Libya back into the political mainstream after the departure of Col. Qadhafi.

On December 9, 2003, the al-Qadhafi Foundation strongly criticized the killing of nine children during a US air attack in south-east Afghanistan, promising to adopt their families and seek compensation. Saif al-Islam, who runs the foundation, issued the statement. The foundation said that it would “assign lawyers to the families to make a case against those responsible for the operations and compensate their families”.

Significantly, reports from Libya indicate that Qadhafi’s health continues to deteriorate, as noted in earlier GIS reports. The growing wave of statements by Qadhafi and Saif al-Islam, hostile to the US and Italy (which has troops in Iraq), in particular, were indicative of a breakdown also in the careful preparations which had been made for Saif al-Islam’s assumption of power on the death of his father. In Washington, there has been almost total silence from the State Department on the issue, following the strenuous efforts undertaken by Assistant Secretary of State William Burns to achieve the accord with Libya on the Lockerbie settlement, despite the fact that Congressional leaders had informed State that the accord would not work, given Libya’s failure to meet the criteria to remove it from the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA).


December 10, 2003

Qadhafi Seen as Listless at Tunis Summit

Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi appeared listless and disoriented at the December 6-7, 2003, “5+5” Summit in Tunis, although international observers merely interpreted his behavior as “sulking”. The Libyan leader is known to be in the terminal stages of cancer, which has not been acknowledged officially by Libyan officials.

It was noted by observers at the Tunis summit that Col. Qadhafi “mostly sulked, refusing to give an opening speech or even to clap after French President [Jacques] Chirac delivered closing remarks” on December 6, 2003. The summit was designed to promote trans-Mediterranean economic cooperation, and some Western observers, unaware of Qadhafi’s health problems, had thought it would have been a venue for the Libyan leader to build on moves toward normalization of relations with Libya.

Sources close to Qadhafi told GIS on December 9, 2003, that plans for Qadhafi to go to a Russian military clinic for treatment remained on  track.


December 4, 2003

New Evidence Illustrates Libyan Leadership Preparing for Qadhafi’s Death

Exclusive. From GIS Station Tripoli, and other sources. Highly-reliable sources within the Qadhafi family circle in Libya have reported that Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi was now critically ill, and preparations were being made for intensive medical attention and transition to new leadership.

The sources have reported that, during the first days of December 2003, Qadhafi, in south-eastern Libya, had lost the sight in both eyes for approximately an hour. He had, increasingly, during the preceding two months also had incidents during which he lost consciousness altogether for up to an hour at a time. Doctors indicated that his cancer, originally operated-on in the area of his throat, was now reaching a terminal stage.

He was secretly taken to Egypt during the past two months for medical treatment, but nothing could be done for his condition. His doctors made arrangements for Qadhafi to be taken to either the American Hospital of Paris or a [as received] a US-staffed Hospital in Vienna for treatment. Qadhafi reportedly rejected this option and has insisted on going to a Russian military clinic for treatment. To this end, he withdrew his youngest son, Hamis, a military officer, from the Russian military academy where he was studying and put him in charge of making the necessary arrangements and ensuring his security.

Qadhafi’s cousin and long-time confidante, I‘ajajj Hamid Bu Maniar, was tasked by Qadhafi with maintaining a constant contact with the Colonel’s sons so that they could be brought to his side in the event that his health deteriorated suddenly.

The timing of the reports coincides with intelligence received by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs early in 2002, corroborating reports from late 2001, that Qadhafi’s health was threatened by cancer, and that he had been given only about two years to live.

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily had reported, exclusively, on December 10, 2001: “Highly-reliable sources inside the Libyan leadership indicate that there are growing concerns over the health of Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi who has now undergone several collapses which have left him in comas lasting up to five hours. No medical explanations have yet been found for the illnesses.” On May 31, 2002, it also reported, again exclusively: “Saif al-Islam has been working for the past six months — basically since the time, in November 2001, when Egyptian doctors operated on Col. Qadhafi’s cancer and said that he had only 18 months to two years to live — to raise his stature and power base.” Significantly, since that time, GIS sources have continued to report on Qadhafi’s illness, and at the same time the major Western intelligence services have consistently denied it.

Significantly, efforts by Qadhafi to resolve differences with the US, by achieving a settlement of the Pan Am 103 terrorist bombing issue, fell apart in the past few months as it became clear that the financial settlement agreed by Qadhafi did not reflect any change of attitude by the Qadhafi Administration toward terrorism. As well, Qadhafi’s son and designated heir, Saif al-Islam, who had been groomed to present a moderate image to the West, himself caused US officials concern when, in a recent interview with the Italian daily newspaper Corriere della Sera, he had said that Iraqi attacks on US forces in Iraq were justified.

The situation now appeared to be that Qadhafi could die in the near future without the resolution of the US hostility toward Libya which Qadhafi had hoped to engineer before his death. This meant that the a takeover by Saif al-Islam could be unstable. Libyan sources, including those within the Qadhafi family and the Gadadfa tribe of Qadhafi, as well as the Armed Forces, have said that there was considerable hostility toward Saif al-Islam and that he could not expect the support of any power base within the country.

Several foreign governments (France, Italy and Germany, as well as Egypt) had strong interest in seeing a continuation of the Qadhafi dynasty, but the critical support expected from the US State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) now appeared to be disappearing.


September 5, 2003

Qadhafi Denies Responsibility for Lockerbie; Calls US Leaders “Prostitutes” and Privately Alleges He Has Bribed Key US Officials to Achieve Closure on Case

Exclusive. Analysis. From GIS sources in Tripoli, Sirte and elsewhere. US State Dept. officials have, through late August 2003, attempted to portray an agreement between Libya and the US on compensation for the victims of the 1988 Pan Am 103 Lockerbie bombing as ending US-Libyan strategic problems and marking an end to Libya’s involvement in radical, anti-Western activities and terrorism. However, Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi went on record on September 1, 2003 — in a speech which attracted no political attention in Washington — to deny any Libyan involvement in the terrorist bombings of PA103, a UTA airliner shot down over Niger and the bombing of a Berlin nightclub, all of which were known to have a Libyan component.

Qadhafi, in his Revolution Day speech — which marked the 34th anniversary of his seizure of the Libyan Government while King Idris al-Sanussi was abroad for medical treatment — called the US leadership prostitutes, interested only in money, and noted that Libya did not accept responsibility for the terrorist incidents but paid money merely to resolve the problem. But, more significantly, in private, Qadhafi told close associates that he had, in addition to agreeing to pay the $2.7-billion in compensation to the PA103 families, paid bribes to senior US officials, including Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Sources close to Qadhafi told GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs that they believed Qadhafi’s understanding of some of the payments he authorized in association with the official PA103 compensation was to pay bribes to the US Secretary of State and other officials. It was understood that Qadhafi had been told, by intermediaries in the transaction, that funds were required for this purpose. There was no evidence that such bribes were ever demanded or paid, but, the Libyan sources said, they believed that the intermediaries had merely taken this money.

Significantly, the Lockerbie settlement question has, over several years, included Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, and former South African Pres. Nelson Mandela, and individuals associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan). It was not known, at this point, whether any of these individuals, or some others, had said that they were “paying off” US officials in order to achieve the closure of the PA103 case. GIS could find no evidence whatsoever to indicate that US officials were, in fact, being bribed, despite Qadhafi’s private allegations.

However, Qadhafi’s apparent belief that he had “bought and paid” for Washington’s leadership approval of the PA103 closure could account for his openly defiant speech against the US, in which he consistently patronized the US leadership, calling its members prostitutes, interested in nothing but money. Significantly, the full text of his speech has not been made available in English, but has circulated widely in Arabic.

At the same time, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs intelligence has noted that Libya has continued with its weapons of mass destruction programs to the point of ongoing negotiations with Iran and North Korea (DPRK) to acquire advanced Shahab-3 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs).

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, September 4, 2003: Libya , Iran, DPRK Discuss New Strategic Missile Procurement .]

In his speech, Qadhafi also said that the US, France and other powers had clamored with him to resolve the dispute, whereas, in reality, Qadhafi’s officials, particularly External Security Organization head Musa Kusa, had actively lobbied Britain, the US and others to achieve settlement, particularly so that the succession of political power to his son, Saif al-Islam, could be achieved while Qadhafi — now in the latter stages of what was diagnosed as terminal cancer in the throat — was still alive.

Sources in Washington indicated that the State Department was expected to attempt to suppress details of the Qadhafi speech because of concern that the direct, repeated and blatant insults to the US and its leadership would jeopardize US Congressional validation of the accord which the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had orchestrated. Congress is required to lift the provisions of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) before sanctions could, in fact, be lifted against Libya (quite apart from UN sanctions). Such Congressional action is by no means guaranteed. Indeed, the State Department and CIA had reportedly guaranteed to the Libyans that, as part of the deal, no further lawsuits would be filed against Libya as a result of the PA103 incident. In fact, the State Dept. and CIA (nor indeed any other part of the US Government) can guarantee to stop victims of Libyan terrorist actions from filing suit in US courts against the Libyan state and/or Col. Qadhafi.

It was understood that some victims of Libyan terrorism, resident in the US, were, in fact, planning such law suits, specifically to highlight the flawed nature of the PA103 settlement.

In his speech, Qadhafi said that the US “with all its might and forces and all colonialist and reactionary states and Zionism could not change the regime in Libya”. He said the “dirty alliance [between the US and Zionism] could not change the regime in Libya”. In discussing Lockerbie, he also said that the US “brought a mentally retarded person and asked him to testify in return for a million dollars that the Libyans have bombed the plane”, and indicated that all the judges in the Lockerbie trial had resigned because they were forced to denounce one of the accused. 

In the speech, Qadhafi questioned why Libya was accused of bombing the Berlin night club even though no investigations had confirmed that as yet. [This is not the case; Libya was identified as the sponsor of the bombing of La Belle discotheque in April 1986. When evidence linked Libya to the bombing of the discotheque, which was patronized by US servicemen, the US struck back on the night of April 14-15, 1986, with air strikes against Libyan targets. Libya still denies culpability.] Qadhafi said in his speech to “people’s activists” in Tripoli that “the former American President, Reagan, who lost his mind as a result of Alzheimer’s [disease] was aware that the saga of downing Libyan planes, missiles of war on Libya, the striking of a Libyan coast guard and the bombing of Sirte has to be responded to by Libya and the Libyans had to avenge”.

In statements to the international media, however, Libya has taken a more moderate line, noting that Libya regarded compensation for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing as a thing of the past, and it now looks forward to the lifting of UN sanctions. Libyan Prime Minister Shokri Mohammed Ghanem said in an interview on BBC radio on September 4, 2003, that the question of compensation for relatives of Lockerbie victims had been “a subject for a long discussion, legal and political, between the different teams ... I think it has been explained and the whole matter now is put behind us. ... What we are saying now (is that) we would like to once again be part of the world economic system.”

But the urgency of the PA103 deal which Libya structured with the US and UK brought out a rash of claims by France — to upgrade the settlement it achieved for the 1989 UTA airliner bombing — as well as from Germany (the La Belle incident) and as well from the families of Egyptians and Libyan passengers of a Libyan airliner shot down by Israel 30 years ago who on September 3, 2003, noted that they had plans to sue for Lockerbie-style compensation. al-Ahram daily, in Cairo, quoted Mohammed Sherif as saying: “Egyptian blood is no cheaper than American, British or French blood.”  Sherif is the son of Egyptian TV presenter Salwa Hegazi, one of the 106 passengers and crew who perished on Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114 in February 1973. The aircraft, bound for Cairo from Tripoli, lost its way and was intercepted by Israeli jets over the Sinai peninsula, then under Israeli occupation. Sherif said the lawsuit was prepared by Hegazi’s family “in solidarity with 32 other families of Egyptian and Libyan victims”, even though this was not the result of Libyan Government terrorism.

The German Foreign Ministry said on September 1, 2003, that it was waiting to hear the details of a Libyan offer to pay compensation to relatives of people killed in the La Belle bombing, noting: “The exact modalities must be still worked out.” Significantly, the offer to pay compensation was made by the Qadhafi Foundation, which is headed by Qadhafi’s son and designated heir, Saif al-Islam, although the offer specifically does not accept Libyan responsibility for the act.


September 4, 2003

Libya, Iran, DPRK Discuss New Strategic Missile Procurement

Analysis. By Jason Fuchs, GIS UN Correspondent, and other GIS staff. GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily primary sources confirmed that, since late August 2003, the Libyan Government had been involved in serious negotiations with Iran about the procurement of an unspecified number of Shahab-3 road-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). Significantly, North Korean (DPRK) officials played a key rôle in promoting and facilitating the negotiations, largely because of the extent of DPRK involvement in the missile program.

The sources said that Libya sought a promise from Tehran to build a Shahab-3 development site in Libya to allow the subsequent autonomous production of the Shahab-3 following the initial purchase. While no deal had been concluded by September 3, 2003 , and it appeared that such an agreement was still far off, GIS sources believed that there existed a real possibility that this exchange would eventually be finalized.

North Korea had played a central rôle in facilitating these discussions and had apparently first raised the possibility of such a deal. There is evidence that the DPRK leadership believed that its exclusion from US military action — in spite of its inclusion on US Pres. George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” — was the result of two main factors:

  • The DPRK nuclear deterrent.

  • A proliferation of threats to the US, its interests, and its allies by states actively armed and supported by the DPRK.

Keeping US forces active outside North-East Asia, and “stretched thin” with an ever-increasing number of non-Korean threats [Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya] had for some time been critical to DPRK defense initiatives.

See, in particular, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily editions:

October 31, 2002: Iran’s Ballistic Missile and WMD Programs: The Links to the DPRK.
November 19, 2002: DPRK Acknowledges Possession of Nuclear Weapons, Confirming Consistent GIS/DFA Reporting. Possibility of Link to Saddam’s “Surprise Weapon”.
December 12, 2002: Iran’s Military Nuclear Capability, Highlighted by Exclusive 1992 Report, Now Critical Part of Persian Gulf Strategic Planning.
January 9, 2003:
Iraq, Iran, North Korea and WMD: Threat Activated.
January 28, 2003:
Iran Reported Considering Declaration on Nuclear Status as “Poison Pill” Against Possible US Intervention.
February 11, 2003: Iran, as Predicted by GIS, Announces its Nuclear “Poison Pill”: Acknowledges Domestic Nuclear Self-Sufficiency.
April 28, 2003: DPRK Declaration of Nuclear Weapons Capability and Will to Use Highlight Deliberate Cover-Up by US Clinton Administration and Also Directly Impacts Current Iran Situation.

The fact that the DPRK sought to facilitate the Iranian Shahab-3 sale to Libya evidenced that in spite of Libya’s recent diplomatic offensive, the Kim Jong-Il Administration still viewed the Qadhafi Government as inherently anti-US and anti-Western and worthy of acquiring this significant weapon. In that respect, the DPRK leadership appeared more cynical about Tripoli ’s ongoing public relations push than most of the West continued to be. The DPRK position was borne out by Col. Qadhafi’s strenuously anti-US remarks made in Libya on September 1, 2003, the Libyan “Revolution Day”, in which Qadhafi asserted that he had bought off the US with the Lockerbie settlement as one would, he said, pay off a prostitute.

[Full text of the Qadhafi statement plus other material will be issued in a later edition of Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily.]

Reports suggested that the preference of the Iranian Khamene‘i Government had been to sell Libya a less-advanced missile system, possibly an earlier version of the Shahab-series with a range of 965 km [approximately 600 miles] as opposed to the 1,300-1,500 km [808-932 mile] range of the Shahab-3, which remained the “crown jewel” of the Iranian ballistic missile arsenal. While strategic relations between Tehran and Tripoli continued to be warm, because of mutual concerns over the US (despite profound distrust at a religious level), the Iranian leadership would have to seriously consider the implications of allowing its most advanced missile to be sold to any state, even an ally.

While acknowledging these concerns, Tehran apparently remained interested in selling the Shahab-3 to Libya for a number of reasons. The fact that the DPRK was encouraging such a deal would have a significant effect on the Iranian leadership, which realizes that Iran remains greatly indebted to DPRK expertise and support in maintaining its own ballistic missile force. DPRK missiles experts and technicians are lodged all over Iran, most notably as of late August 2003 at locations east of Bafq and south of Yazd. The additional presence of DPRK mining experts at both these locations appeared related to the nearby presence of uranium deposits. Reports indicated that at least some of this work was linked to perfecting the Shahab-3’s ability to carry a nuclear warhead, as well as the construction of launch units designed to consist of 15 batteries capable of mounting 12 Shahab-3 type missiles each.

The Shahab-3 had been inaugurated by Iranian Supreme Leader, “Ayatollah” Ali Hoseini-Khamene‘i, on July 20, 2003, in a ceremony at which the Iranian Supreme Leader declared: “Today our people and our armed forces are ready to defend their goals anywhere.” This came on the heels of a June 2003 test of the Shahab-3 which Iran declared a success. Yet, a July 25, 2003, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report entitled “Iranian Clerical Leaders Continue to Defy Opposition, Causing Hardening of Position by its Allies” cited a credible internet report that contradicted the official Iranian announcement, noting:

“…the authoritative Middle Eastern web-based information service, Debka.com, which clearly has strong sources within the Israeli intelligence community, stated in a July 23, 2003, dispatch that the missile had, in fact, failed its most recent test. According to the Debka.com report, Iranian officials were, as of late July 2003, in North Korea attempting to expedite shipment plans for new engines in hopes of fixing the Shahab-3’s remaining defects. It remained unclear whether the July 23, 2003 , report of North Korean-Iranian missile shipments was linked to the arrival of a large Iranian cargo ship to a North Korean port at Haeju Harbor in the Yellow Sea during early July 2003.”

Regardless of questions about the missiles immediate viability, there were indications that Libya wanted Iran in any Shahab-3 missile deal to include a promise to set up a missile production facility in Libyq in addition to the actual sale of the yet-to-be-decided quantity of Shahab-3s. This should not have surprised Tehran. Tripoli’s earlier — and in some cases ongoing — joint-weapons development programs with Iraq and Egypt had both included the construction of weapons production facilities in Libya. GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily sources had long reported on the Iraqi-Libyan WMD cooperation at a site near the Egyptian border called al-Kufra [aka al-Kafra] and the presence of some 20,000 Iraqi technicians and scientists in Libya to help with these efforts. 

See also Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reports:

November 8, 2000: Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel.
July 28, 2003: Niger-Iraq Fissile Material Issue Escalates; More Expected.
July 29, 2003:
Niger-Iraq Uranium Reports Involve Ongoing Libyan Deception Ops.

Libya had earlier acquired the NoDong-1 surface-to-surface missile with an estimated 1,000 km-range and 1,000 kg payload directly from North Korea initially tasked for Egyptian use in a joint Iraqi-Egyptian-Libyan procurement effort. By November 2000, the NoDong-1 SSMs had been deployed in several sites along the Libyan coast controlled by a central HQ in Tripoli. As GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted in a November 6, 2000, report, the Israeli Mossad had at that time notified the governments of Spain, France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey that they were in range of the Libyan NoDong-1s.

The deployments made after Libya’s last significant missile acquisition seemed instructive as to Tripoli’s intentions if it were to now acquire the Shahab-3.

Central to Col. Qadhafi’s desire to acquire the Shahab-3, along with other advanced weapons systems including WMD and related delivery systems, was the Libyan leader’s ongoing preparations to ready the nation for his son Saif al-Islam’s ascension to leadership. Col. Qadhafi’s strategy in this effort saw the reentrance of Libya into the international community as paramount to the success of securing the Libyan succession process. Equally important to this veritable “sunshine policy” via the West was a consolidation of relations with distinctly anti-Western governments viewed as rogue or pariah states in particular by the US. It was the parallel pursuit of these two seemingly diametrically opposed policies that formed the core of Col. Qadhafi’s approach.


July 29, 2003

Niger-Iraq Uranium Reports Involve Ongoing Libyan Deception Ops 

1. Highly-reliable sources within the Italian intelligence community have confirmed to this Service that the documents — subsequently demonstrated to have been forgeries — introduced by the US and UK governments showing a contact between the Nigerien and the Iraqi governments for the export of uranium were, in fact, produced by the Libyan Government. The documents were used in the State of the Union Address by US Pres. George W. Bush on January 28, 2003, and were widely interpreted as part of the casus belli underwhich the US-led Coalition attacked Iraq in March-April 2003. 

2. The Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) passed on, in a single transaction and through a Libyan intermediary, a file of forged documents to Italy’s SISMI (Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare). According to Italian sources, the documents appeared to be part of a larger, ongoing Libyan double-deception operation designed to discredit US decisionmaking and the US leadership. The documents were designed to take issues which were in fact verifiable — or approximately verifiable — by US intelligence agencies and then provide seemingly valid collateral documentation. By then exposing the “valid collateral documentation” as fake, the premise of the intelligence — and the subsequent US policy — would then be undermined and discredited. 

3. US officials in December 2002 publicly claimed that Niger had signed an agreement in 2000 to sell Iraq 500 metric tons of a concentrated form of uranium known as yellowcake. The British Government also presented the IAEA with “Nigerien state documents” that were to prove Nigerien-Iraqi attempts to trade in uranium after the UN embargo on Iraq strictly forbade this. This “documentation” was seen as a key element in the US-UK quest to prove that Iraq was still trying to develop nuclear arms. Niger had supplied Iraq with yellowcake for its nuclear program in the 1980s, which at that time was legal. The British and US governments had tried to prove that Niger recently agreed to resume those shipments, illegal since 1991. US officials claim that Iraq imported uranium from Niger even after 1998 and that more shipments were planned in 2000.1 

4. On March 8, 2003, Mohamed El-Baradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN agency, declared that the documentation used by Pres. Bush in his January 28, 2003, speech was forged. The statement by Mr El-Baradei seemed to exonerate the Niger Government in the matter of alleged uranium sales to Iraq, and the Prime Minister of Niger, Hama Hamadou, in an interview with The Sunday Telegraph, of London, and published on July 27, 2003, explicitly denied the allegations. 

5. Libyan and other sources have told this Service that, in fact, yellowcake was being procured (or at least had been the subject of agreements) from Niger for Iraq during the embargo period, but by the Libyan Government. The yellowcake was being used for weapons development programs by Iraq and Libya (and possibly Egypt, one of the partners in the strategic weapons program) being conducted by joint teams in the Libyan facilities at Sabha and Kufra.2 When asked whether the ESO documentation was designed to cover up and distract from Libyan involvement in the Iraqi nuclear program, one key Libyan source told this Service that this was only part of the objective. This Service was told that it was part of a broader plan, involving other documents and deception operations, designed to more comprehensively discredit US decisionmaking. This Service, on November 8, 2000, discussed how Iraq and Egypt had agreed with Libya in 1999 that Libya should act on behalf of all three countries to procure NoDong-1 strategic weapons-capable ballistic missiles from North Korea. The pattern for Libya-Iraq strategic weapons cooperation — which had been evident even before that time — was thus clearly established in the current context. 

6. It seems clear that the Iraqi Government did not need to negotiate directly with the Government of Niger for the procurement of yellowcake. Had it done so, this fact would almost certainly have come to the attention of the Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA), given the closeness of Niger-Nigeria relations, and it apparently did not. However, Libyan procurement of fissile material on behalf of Iraq was less noticeable. 

7. Italian sources confirmed to this Service that significant sections of the Italian Intelligence Community (IC) had been, at one time or another (including in this latest episode), working in cooperation with the Libyan Government and ESO, usually on the basis of payments made by the Libyans “for services rendered”. 

8. The question, at this stage, remains whether the Government of Niger was aware of the onward destination of some of the yellowcake provided to Libyan buyers, and whether or not the Libyan buyers significantly obfuscated their own identities in the procurement process. This would significantly impact how the US would deal with the Government of Niger. It should be expected that the US Government would also request assistance from the Nigerian Government in resolving the matter. The UK Government said that it had confirmation of the supply of yellowcake from Niger to Iraq from “other African intelligence services”, independent of the Italian-routed false documentation. 

Footnotes:

1. In the early 1980s, Con Coughlin’s book, Saddam: King of Terror, noted, on p.188: “Before the war [Iran-Iraq] started, Saddam had been promised that the reactor would be ready to produce weapons grade material by July 1981. Although the French, responding to international pressure, were still dragging their feet on supplying Saddam with the enriched uranium necessary to power the Tammuz reactor cores … Iraq was also engaged in a worldwide search for uranium. 120 tons were acquired from Portugal in 1980, and a further 200 tons from Niger.”

2. Sabha, and the region around it, is home to the Libyan Strategic Industries complex and a variety of storage facilities for nuclear, chemical and biological material, laboratories and facilities. Global Information System (GIS) reported on January 7, 2002, that al-Kufra (aka al-Kafra) was the location of a warehouse on the road to Al-Sara military camp which included 1,800 barrels of chemical material and other biological materials which was transferred from Rabta and Tarhunah.

See Also:

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, November 8, 2000: Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel.
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily
, July 28, 2003: Niger-Iraq Fissile Material Issue Escalates; More Expected.


March 12, 2003

Libya Grasps at “Normalization” of Relations With US, UK as Saudi Arabia Reverses Relations With Tripoli

Analysis. With input from GIS Station Riyadh, and other sources. The effective leadership of Saudi Arabia, around Crown Prince ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud, has made a major policy decision to oppose Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, who had, for the past three decades, been protected by the Saudi leadership who may, in fact, have helped him to power. The move came just as Col. Qadhafi appeared to have reached an accord with the US State Department and UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office to strike a settlement on the Pan Am 103 terrorist bombing of 1988.

It is highly probable that the reports of a new agreement on settlement with the US and UK were merely the result of another “leak” from the Libyans to imply that they would settle on the PA103 case as a means of forestalling any US hostility at a critical time in the Libyan leadership succession process.

Significantly, at the same time that the Libyans were apparently offering a settlement to the US and UK on the PA103 issue, some US senior officials were puzzled by the apparent change of heart in Riyadh toward Qadhafi. The US had agreed to withhold support for anti-Qadhafi political groups and opposition leaders because Saudi officials had constantly urged them along this course. Now, according to very senior sources in Riyadh, Crown Prince ‘Abdullah was “even prepared to talk with Prince Idris al-Senussi”. Prince Idris, the grand-nephew of the late King Idris I, of Libya, had been specifically rejected by Crown Prince ‘Abdullah because the Saudi Crown Prince reportedly did not think Prince Idris — although a sharif, or descendant of the Prophet — was sufficiently serious as a Muslim leader. Other sources, however, attribute the Crown Prince’s earlier attitude to the fact that Prince Idris had specifically told Saudi emissaries on at least one occasion (in London in the 1990s) that he would make Libya a constitutional monarchy, and not an absolute monarchy such as Saudi Arabian leaders espoused.

Now, however, Crown Prince ‘Abdullah felt that even the charismatic Prince Idris, who is supported by the Sanussiyyah movement, a moderate Sunni sect almnost diametrically opposite to the Saudi Wahhabi sect, would be more in line with Saudi ideals that Col. Qadhafi.

The change of heart in Riyadh — where, because of King Fahd’s illness, Crown Prince ‘Abdullah is effectively head-of-government — followed a bitter exchange between the Crown Prince and Qadhafi at the Arab League Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on March 1, 2003.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, March 3, 2003: Outburst by Crown Prince ‘Abdullah Acknowledges Possible Saudi Rôle in Libyan 1969 Coup and Highlights Qadhafi’s Illness.]

Significantly, this bitter exchange followed a gesture from Qadhafi to the Saudi leadership earlier in February 2003: he used his private jet to fly the King of Swaziland, King Mswati III, to Saudi Arabia for a long audience with King Fahd and other Saudi officials. Col. Qadhafi had essentially promised that King Mswati would convert to Islam. However, King Mswati did not agree to convert from Christianity to Islam, and subsequently left, on Qadhafi’s aircraft, for a meeting with Qadhafi — who is terminally ill with cancer, heightening the need for a replacement in Libya — and then flying on to Paris.

The failure of the “Swazi initiative” — reported exclusively by GIS primary sources — followed by the significant exchange at Sharm el-Sheikh were seen as an embarrassment for Qadhafi, who was anxious to win some support in Riyadh while at the same time destabilizing Southern Africa, as a final gesture toward South African Pres. Thabo Mbeki, whom Qadhafi believes “stole” from him the initial leadership of the African Union (AU), which Qadhafi had hoped to make his lasting legacy.

See also:

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily,
February 13, 2003:
Swazi King Departs for Saudi Arabia, Libya; Major Changes Anticipated.
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily,
February 20, 2003: Swazi King Maneuvers, Resists Deal With Saudi Arabia, Libya;
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 28, 2003: Swazi King Distances Himself from Qadhafi Overtures.

Senior officials from the US State Department had agreed on March 12, 2003, with at least one reporter — from the French news agency, Agence France Presse — that the United States, Britain and Libya were “close to reaching agreement” on a multibillion-dollar compensation deal for the relatives of victims of the 1988 PA103 Lockerbie bombing. Some of the families of the 270 victims said they understood that a deal had been reached but the US officials, as well as the State Department, said reports of a final agreement were premature.

The US Government would only believe that an agreement was imminent if there had been some recent and sudden change of heart, or a hint of a change of heart, by the Qadhafi Administration. The Libyan team has used this tactic on several occasions in the past to forestall what it felt was imminent US hostile action against it. That US State Department official spoke as senior diplomats from the three nations met on March 11, 2003, in London to try to finalize the deal, which would see Libya freed from remaining UN sanctions and possibly dropped from the US list of “state sponsors of terrorism”. Significantly, while the State Department negotiators might tentatively agree to this as part of a settlement, other key US Bush Administration officials (in the White House, for example), and the bulk of the US Congress would not agree to dropping Libya from the terrorist list.

This was hinted at when the State Dept. official stressed to the AFP journalist that any agreement reached at the London meeting would have to be signed off on by numerous top authorities in the three nations as well as run by the families of the victims.

The United States has said that UN sanctions cannot be lifted until Libya satisfies all of its requirements under UN Security Council resolutions, including the payment of compensation, an admission of responsibility for the bombing, the disclosure of all relevant information about it and a renunciation of terrorism. US sanctions, imposed under different terms, would require those steps in addition to moves from Tripoli.

Given Col. Qadhafi’s declining health, his son and designated successor, Saif al-Islam, as well as their entourage, were now anxious to win a rapprochement with the US before the anticipated US-led war on Iraq, especially in light of US Administration hints that Libya (as well as Syria and Iran) would be the focus of US hostility after Iraq’s Pres. Saddam Hussein. Key US defense figure Richard Perle — Chairman of the US Defense Advisory Board, which reports directly to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld — told Arab journalists in London in late February 2003 that the US would seek to change the leaderships of Iran, Libya and Syria, following the war against Iraq.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 27, 2003: US Bush Administration Looking Beyond Iraq to Promote Change in Iran, Libya and Syria.]


March 3, 2003

Outburst by Crown Prince ‘Abdullah Acknowledges Possible Saudi Role in Libyan 1969 Coup and Highlights Qadhafi’s Illness

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the March 1, 2003, Arab League summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, was the angry exchange between Saudi Crown Prince 'Abdallah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz al Sa'ud and Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in which the de facto Saudi leader implied, for the first time, that Saudi Arabia had backed the 1969 coup by Qadhafi against then King Idris al-Senussi of Libya. He also implied that he knew what has been officially denied by the Libyan authorities and something which the US and UK authorities had also denied: that Qadhafi was terminally ill.

The angry exchange at the summit was partially televised before Egyptian authorities cut the live broadcast.

Prince 'Abdullah, in a retort to Qadhafi, said: "Who exactly brought you to power? ... You are a liar and your grave awaits you."

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs exclusively reported on Col. Qadhafi's terminal illness on February 15, 2002, noting:

“Saif al-Islam, who spearheaded the latest move to retrieve the al-Qaida members, has been increasingly thrust into the limelight in Libya, and as a Libyan representative abroad, in a move to strengthen his credentials to assume the leadership after his father, Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, left office. This has taken on an increasingly active and urgent nature, given the advice from doctors who operated in late 2001 on Qadhafi that he may not live more than 18 months to two years, due to the advanced nature of his cancer. He was operated on around the neck and throat area by Egyptian and Lebanese doctors. Col. Qadhafi is also known to have had leukemia since the 1970s.”

[See also Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 15, 2002: Libya Wins State Department Approval to Deal With US Oil Leases, and Then Takes in al-Qaida Captives.]

GIS has reported consistently on this aspect since that report. It has also reported on the fact that the Saudi Government had consistently worked to protect Col. Qadhafi's Administration from any move by the US to help a "regime change" in Libya. This was, in large part, because of the original reasons behind the Saudi support for Qadhafi's original coup in 1969 against King Idris I: the fact that the Sanussiyyah of Libya were, as a Muslim sect (under the leadership of King Idris al-Senussi) diametrically opposite to, and literally opposed to, the doctrine of the Wahhabis supported by the House of Sa'ud.

As GIS has also consistently reported, this historic alliance between Saudi Arabia and Qadhafi shaped Saudi pressures on US leaders, particularly US Secretary of State Colin Powell, with regard to Libya. This position has now become embedded in State Department policy, which, in any event, favors status quo -oriented solutions, rather than radical action. This has protected the Qadhafi Administration, at a time when Qadhafi's impending death means that one of his sons, Saif al-Islam, will attempt to take power. The US has not moved in any way to support the Libyan opposition, largely because it, in the words of one senior State Department source, "prefers the devil it knows than the devil it doesn't know".

Significantly, however, Saudi Crown Prince 'Abdullah has for some time been increasingly disenchanted with Qadhafi's mercurial radicalism, his lack of religious conviction and his arrogance toward Saudi Arabia, his original benefactor. As a result, at the Arab League summit on the Iraq problem, tensions for the first time boiled over, and Prince 'Abdullah revealed what had long been suspected as to the origins of the Libyan coup, and, at the same time, confirming what US State Department and UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office officials had been denying: Qadhafi's terminal illness. Some Western media reports, however, believed that the outburst by Prince 'Abdullah hinted that Qadhafi had come to power with the aid of the United States Government.

Sources close to Prince 'Abdullah report that while he is now sufficiently disenchanted with Qadhafi to welcome a successor from almost any area outside the Qadhafi family, he will not support either an Egyptian candidate or a de facto Egyptian control over Libya or the only acknowledged Libyan leader currently with support in the military and most of the tribes: Prince Idris al-Senussi, the grand-nephew of the late King Idris I, and the nominated political head of the Sanussiyyah . It is also known that Crown Prince 'Abdullah's feelings about Prince Idris — whom he reportedly dislikes because of the Libyan prince's strongly pro-Western attitudes, his "lack of seriousness" (he is a businessman, not a fulltime politician or sect leader, despite being a sharif, a descendant of the Prophet) and his past record of having rejected Saudi attempts to buy him off — have been conveyed to the US, coloring US White House and State Department views of Prince Idris.

However, the combined Libyan opposition has increasingly been rallying behind Prince Idris, who is currently in Europe. GIS has been told even by the leadership of Col. Qadhafi's own tribe, the Gadadfa, that Prince Idris was their preferred candidate to assume power; they have rejected absolutely supporting Saif al-Islam or any of the other Qadhafi children. Despite that, unless the US Government, Prince 'Abdullah and Prince Idris come to some kind of rapprochement, it seems likely that Saif al-Islam will, within months, assume some form of leadership in Libya. This may result in attempts at a coup d'etat, but it is believed that Egypt would support Saif al-Islam as its preferred surrogate in Libya.

GIS has received consistent reporting from inside Libya during January and February 2003 that the Qadhafi apparatus was purging its ranks of unreliable officers in the Armed Forces, and was attempting to "contain or constrain" senior officers by questioning them about the origins of their wealth, bank accounts, etc.

Meanwhile, on March 1, 2003, at the Arab League summit, the Saudi delegation briefly walked out of the summit after the exchange. Col. Qadhafi had claimed that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd had been ready to "strike an alliance with the devil" to defend the Kingdom after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Prince 'Abdullah then cut in, saying: "Saudi Arabia is not an agent of colonialism", referring to Saudi hosting of US military forces.

The summit "completely rejected" any US-led war on Iraq or the participation of any Arab state in the anticipated conflict. Kuwait, however, has allowed the deployment of more than 140,000 troops US and British troops on its soil, and Qatar was also hosting invasion forces. Bahrain had deployed air and ground units to Kuwait in advance of anticipated conflict with Iraq.

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, speaking to Al-Arabiya satellite TV from Sharm el-Sheikh, dismissed Western media reports that Saudi Arabia would provide logistical support to US forces, and said that Riyadh would have no part in a US-led war on Iraq.


February 27, 2003

US Bush Administration Looking Beyond Iraq to Promote Change in Iran, Libya and Syria

Analysis. Key US defense figure Richard Perle — Chairman of the US Defense Advisory Board, which reports directly to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld — has told Arab journalists in London that the US would seek to change the leaderships of Iran, Libya and Syria, following the war against Iraq.

The comment, which was not elaborated, was significant because it demonstrated that there was some consideration of future goals, beyond Iraq. Richard Perle is one of the few policy-level figures in Washington who is both influential, and sufficiently outside the day-to-day machinations of policy implementation that he can think in terms of post-Iraq strategies. At present, virtually no US Administration or Defense official will discuss broader issues, or, indeed, anything beyond the immediate military-political objectives with regard to Iraq.

There is no doubt that the comments will cause significant re-thinking in Tehran, Tripoli and Damascus, although the Iranian clerical Government was already convinced that the US Administration was committed to the overthrow of their rule. Libyan officials, on the other hand, have been hoping to put in place a successor leadership to Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi before his anticipated death from cancer within the coming months or year. Indeed, buoyed by the appearance of support from the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the US State Department, Libyan officials loyal to Col. Qadhafi and his designated heir and son, Saif al-Islam, have believed that they could put a change of face — but not a change of substance — on the Libyan Administration while the US and its allies were distracted over the Iraq issue.

Saif al-Islam and Col. Qadhafi, who now works only a few hours a day, have moved onto the offensive in attempting to move Libya away from its outlaw status.

For example, the embassy of Libya in The Gambia on February 25, 2003, released what it called “forward looking” proposals from Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi aimed at ensuring Iraq’s compliance with the international community and preventing a US-led invasion of Iraq. Col. Qadhafi’s proposals arose out of meetings he held with the Spanish Prime Minister Husey Maria Aznar and other world leaders the previous week to seek ways of preventing war with Saddam Hussein. Prime Minister Maria Aznar was quoted by the Libyan Embassy in Banjul as informing Col. Qadhafi of meetings held between NATO and the European Council and on going high-level talks between Spain and America aimed at finding a peaceful resolution of the Iraq crisis.

As well, the Libyan Government has used the offices of the Malaysian Government to propose mediation between Filipino Muslim rebels and the Philippine Government.

Libya also officially — and while attentions were drawn elsewhere — recently admitted that it had been engaged in the development of medium-range strategic ballistic missiles, for defensive purposes and not aimed at Israel. As with the North Korean and Iranian announcements of nuclear programs, the Libyan move was specifically designed to put its missile program on the table as a legitimate and, de facto, accepted factor. However, as outlined in a variety of GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs reports, the Libyan missile program is, in fact, intimately linked with the longer-range ballistic missile programs of Egypt and Iraq, and involved Libya taking delivery of North Korean No-Dong 1 MRBMs on behalf of Iraq and Egypt.

However, there have been no moves by Libya to stop its own chemical and biological warfare programs after having moved and hidden its laboratories and stockpiles during the period up to 1999.

Meanwhile, however, the Libyan opposition is beginning, for the first time in several decades, to work together and may soon meet to name a leader who could replace Qadhafi in the near future. Significantly at this time, the US motion picture studio, Twentieth Century Fox, is looking for partners to come aboard its expensive “Tripoli” project, which is slated to begin shooting on the coast of Morocco in the Summer of 2003. The film “Tripoli” tells the true story of William Eaton, an US citizen who helped the heir to the throne of Tripoli lead an overthrow of a corrupt ruler in the early 1800s. Today, the one Libyan leader who appears capable of representing a united face of the opposition and public is the designated political leader of the Sanusi movement, Prince Idris al-Senussi, who is currently in Rome.

At the same time, however, the State Department view is that Prince Idris represents a risk to the status quo, and as a result the State Dept. has advocated seeking some kind of accommodation with the Qadhafi Administration. The problem with this is the probability that the Libyan Armed Forces would not accept Saif al-Islam as a successor to his father, nor, indeed, any other of Qadhafi’s sons.

GIS sources have reported that there is now a growing program of “containment” of Libyan senior military officers. All the senior officers are being questioned as to how they obtained their assets, whether they have foreign bank accounts, and so on, in an effort to find any links to foreign sponsorship. Qadhafi has, in the past two years, consistently used allegations of “corruption” against senior officials to constrain, demote or imprison them.

In Syria, Libya and Iran, Richard Perle’s comments have caused significant reverberations. The question remains, however, as to what the comments mean. It is known that Mr Perle does not favor US military action against Iran, rather letting the Iranian public know that they have international support in removing the clerics from office without outside interference. Equally, given Mr Perle’s historic support for Israel and Turkey, his opposition to the Syrian leadership is, in fact, not new.

Was the comment by Mr Perle a statement of his own, or was it meant as a sounding board for post-Iraq actions?


December 11, 2002

Fresh Coup Attempt Against Qadhafi Involves Family; Highlights Confusion

Exclusive. From GIS Station Tripoli, and other sources. A serious, although unsuccessful, coup attempt was made against the Libyan leadership of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi on December 5-6, 2002. Absolutely reliable, first-hand sources confirmed to GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily that widespread arrests occurred beginning December 6, 2002, following the unsuccessful attempt. It was also understood that a number of Qadhafi family members were involved in the attempted coup, which was not only aimed at the ailing Col. Qadhafi — who is now well-advanced in his terminal cancer — but also against his “chosen heir” and son, Saif al-Islam.

Full specifics of the coup attempt were not available as at late December 11, 2002, other than the fact that there appeared to be a link between the coup and another son of Col. Qadhafi, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, who now lives in exile in Egypt, following a major disagreement with his father. Dr Moatasam, until the beginning of 2002, maintained a militia unit separate from that of Saif al-Islam, but this was forcibly disbanded after the disagreement in early 2002.1 Several “cousins” within the Qadhafi family were also reported by GIS sources to have been involved.

Sources close to Col. Qadhafi said that the Colonel’s response to the coup attempt was “confused”, and noted that his health was now deteriorating rapidly. This meant that the response to the coup was clearly in the hands of the loyalists within the security apparatus, almost certainly that run by Hannibal al-Qadhafi.

It was also understood that some of the coup organizers, apparently mostly within the Gadadfa tribe of Col. Qadhafi, were supportive of another son of Col. Qadhafi, Mohammed al-Qadhafi. Engineer Mohammed, who is from a different mother2 to Saif al-Islam, Moatasam, Sa’adi, Hannibal and Aisha (whose mother,3 Safiya, comes from the key Bara’asa tribe, near Beida), is regarded as the most conservative of Qadhafi’s sons, and is understood not to control his own militia. [Hannibal, the youngest son of Qadhafi, does not maintain his own militia, but essentially works directly with Col. Qadhafi, maintaining control over his immediate security.]

Sources said that it was possible that support and planning for the coup attempt could have come from Dr Moatasam in favor of a group within the Gadadfa supporting Eng. Mohammed, on the basis that he was the most capable of the Qadhafi children to succeed the Colonel.

However, it is known from close family sources that Col. Qadhafi’s wife, Safiya, had, in recent weeks, been lobbying hard to get her brother-in-law, Abdullah Senussi Megrahi, brought back into favor to help support the fortunes of her son, Saif al-Islam, in the succession process. It is not known how successful her attempts have been. Abdullah Senussi Megrahi — not a member of the Senusi clan which traditionally has ruled most of Libya — was the head of strategic intelligence before Moussa Koussa.

Saif al-Islam had, along with External Security Organization (ESO) chief Moussa Koussa, been working hard to win international support for Saif al-Islam’s succession of the Colonel. Moussa Koussa, largely regarded as one of the Colonel’s “old guard” had clearly thrown in his lot with Saif al-Islam as the most favored successor.

Analysis:

1. Qadhafi Family Issues: The internal power struggles between members of the Qadhafi family were predicted by GIS to be a possible result of the succession process which began in Libya when the illness of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi became known in late 2001. It is significant that the US State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the UK intelligence services and those of the Australian Government (which recently began entering into major diplomatic accords with Libya, pushing Australian energy companies into investments there) still have not acknowledged the terminal illness of Qadhafi, which was first reported by this Service. The health of Col. Qadhafi is central to the whole succession scramble.

On January 7, 2002, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted:

Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has for some years reportedly been suffering from what had been believed to have been an undiagnosed illness. In fact, it seems likely that the Colonel’s reported illness has been known for some time: Leukemia. The specific type of leukemia is, however, not known. He underwent a complete blood change in Germany in 1978, but has only in the past two years reportedly exhibited increasingly severe symptoms of the disease. He was reported to have suffered, during 2001, at least four or five major collapses, during which he went into comas lasting sometimes longer than five hours. During the latter months of 2001 he has been noticed by close family and colleagues to have been showing signs of constant fatigue, a symptom often associated with leukemia as white cell counts diminish energy levels. It has been reported that he faints regularly. His health outlook, based on these reports, seems at best uncertain, although he has gone to great lengths to disguise symptoms of his condition.

Earlier, on December 10, 2001, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, in an article entitled Qadhafi’s Health at Issue as Libyan Future Debated, noted: “Highly-reliable sources inside the Libyan leadership indicate that there are growing concerns over the health of Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi who has now undergone several collapses which have left him in comas lasting up to five hours. No medical explanations have yet been found for the illnesses.”

By early 2002, however, GIS received first-hand information from medical sources directly involved to the effect that Col. Qadhafi had undergone surgery for throat cancer in November 2001, and had been given less than two years to live.

On March 27, 2002, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted:

  • (i) The prospect of a middle-level or junior-level military coup if and when Qadhafi’s illness or death provides an opportunity. This would hold the most chance of success and durability, but may not have international acceptance, which may diminish its prospects;

  • (ii) The prospect of an attempted putsch by Saif al-Islam, perhaps in cooperation with one or more of his brothers, to pre-emptively retire Qadhafi before his illness removes their chances of succession;

  • (iii) The prospect that one or other military or family candidates could be assisted in forcing a transition (or capitalizing on the death of Qadhafi) by the Government and Armed Forces of Egypt. Egypt [see: Egypt, below] remains a key factor in the Libyan situation, and the Egyptian Government is clearly aware of Qadhafi’s health condition and the possibility of imminent change;

  • (iv) The prospect that Qadhafi, resisting any erosion of his power (which is currently the case) would himself pre-emptively attempt to remove potential suitors for succession. Qadhafi has already, in November 2001, undertaken purges of officials — particularly those from Benghazi, in Cyrenaica, the hotbed of the Sanussiyyah — on a variety of pretexts, almost all usually involved allegations of "corruption".

2. The Armed Forces and the Tribes: What was of particular significance in the December 5-6, 2002, coup attempt was the fact that the Armed Forces did not appear to interpose themselves in any way in support for, or in opposition to, the coup. Sources within the Gadadfa tribe have told GIS that they, and the Armed Forces leadership, were not prepared to support any of the Qadhafi family members achieve power, despite the fact that the Gadadfa tribe owed its wealth to the three decades of power of Qadhafi. The Gadadfa tribal leadership and the Armed Forces leadership reportedly remains committed to a solution which would involve the traditional Libyan leadership of the Sanusiyyah movement. [See Libya Special Report of February 1, 2002.]

The Sanusiyyah have named exiled Prince Idris al-Senusi as their political leader. He has been building a strong base of support inside and outside the country and has now reportedly assembled a “government in exile” in that he has identified and tasked individuals to be responsible for the various branches of government in the event that a Sunusi government could be formed. Key Armed Forces leaders have committed to support this, according to statements made privately to GIS.

3. Outlook: The Libyan power structure of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi is collapsing rapidly, with the predicted infighting among Qadhafi family members now erupting openly and the Armed Forces standing by, without supporting either Qadhafi or the fighting family members. The US and UK, in particular, have stood by also and made no major preparations, although it is believed that the Egyptian authorities have, indeed, taken steps to ensure their position. Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak regards Libya as an Egyptian sphere of influence, and it is possible — even probable — that Egyptian authorities were at least aware of the alleged involvement of Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi in the latest coup attempt. If that is the case, or even if it is not, Col. Qadhafi must now assume that Pres. Mubarak has decided to move against him.

Footnotes:

1. Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reported on January 7, 2002: There were, at the beginning of January 2002, disturbances around Benghazi which the Government attributed to the disbanding of the 77th Militia, the group which was the private militia of Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's son, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, who is currently in exile in Egypt. The militia resisted break-up and had to be forcibly disbanded, which did, in fact, lead to the establishment of road blocks around Benghazi. However, at about the same time, and totally separately, a group in Benghazi reportedly attempted a coup against Qadhafi. This apparently occurred in early January 2002, and failed. Arrests were subsequently made in Benghazi, Tobruq, Misratah, Tripoli and Tarquna.

2. Not long after the coup which put Qadhafi in power, Qadhafi forced the daughter of a key Royalist general, Kheidy Khaled, to marry him as a condition to release the general. This woman is the mother of Eng. Mohammed.

3. The mother of Saif al-Islam, Moatasam, Sa’adi, Hannibal and Aisha comes from the Bara’asa tribe, near Beida. This tribe was traditionally close to the late King Idris I. The sister of this key wife of Qadhafi is married to Abdullah Senussi Megrahi, who had been a key advisor to Qadhafi. There was, however, in 2001 a significant falling out between Qadhafi and this formerly powerful advisor.


October 1, 2002

Weapons Grade Uranium Moving in Middle East; Iraqi WMD and Delivery Development Being Undertaken in Libya

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor. The seizure at the end of September 2002 of weapons grade uranium on the Turkish-Syrian border, and the presence of some 20,000 Iraqi technicians and specialists in Libya, working on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile delivery systems, complicates the political posturing of the United States, the United Nations and other governments on the question of sending weapons inspectors to Iraq to verify compliance with UN resolutions and the terms under which the 1991 Gulf War was ended.

Turkish paramilitary police were reported on September 28, 2002, to have seized more than 15 kg (33 pounds) of weapons-grade uranium and detained two men accused of smuggling the material. Officers in the southern province of Sanliurfa, which borders Syria and is about 250km (155 miles) from the Iraqi border, were reportedly acting on information from an informant when they stopped a taxi cab and discovered the uranium in a lead container hidden beneath the vehicle’s seat. Authorities said that they believed the uranium came from an east European country and had a value of about $5-million. Israel Radio quoted Turkish police as saying that the uranium originally came from a former Soviet state. 

It was not immediately clear when the seizure operation was carried out. The Turkish Anatolian News Agency only gave the first names of the suspects, which appeared to be Turkish. Police in Turkey seized more than one kg of weapons-grade uranium in November 2001; that had been smuggled into Turkey from an east European nation. 

The movement of such large quantities of weapons grade fissionable material meant that evaluations of when countries such as Iraq could field viable nuclear weapons would have to be re-considered. Given the fact that Iraqi and other Arab scientists were now thoroughly familiar with the requirements for nuclear weapons, and had done all of the major engineering, only the production of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium was left as the major challenge. All estimates of the time it would take Iraq, for example, to produce a viable nuclear weapon were based on the local production of the fissionable material on a “milligram by milligram” scale. 

At the same time, Libyan sources have told GIS that they believed that it was possible that the bulk of the “heavy engineering” of Iraq’s strategic weapons programs had been undertaken for some years in Libya, rather than in Iraq itself. This included weaponizing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) payloads (biological, chemical and nuclear) for deployment on ballistic missiles, including the NoDong 1 systems acquired from North Korea (DPRK) in 2000.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of November 8, 2000, reported: 

“The Libyan acquisition of NoDong-1 SSMs is the result of a joint Egyptian-Iraqi-Libyan crash program to overcome delays in production of indigenous SSMs. Initially, the Egyptians and the Iraqis wanted to expedite the production of their own missile in Libya. Cairo arranged for Tripoli to provide cover for the revival of the Bad’r/Condor program which could no longer take place in Iraq and now also not in Egypt because of the exposure by the US of the North Korean (DPRK) rôle and a consequent US pressure to stop the program. Therefore, the Libyans initiated their relations with the DPRK on behalf of Cairo and Baghdad.”

With the bulk of the major strategic weapons program of Iraq being developed outside the country, UN weapons inspections inside Iraq become meaningless. Even before the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Libya and Iraq had maintained a close cooperation — reported on extensively at the time by Defense & Foreign Affairs publications — in the flow of defense matériel and technology, often using Sudan as the staging ground.

At the same time, Libya was itself developing its chemical and biological weapons programs on an unfettered basis, having moved its facilities away from those earlier discovered at such facilities as Rabta. These activities have also been documented extensively by GIS Libya sources in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, and can be found in the Libya Special Reports section of GIS.

Libyan opposition activists inside the country have said that they cannot understand why the US has ignored the Libya-Iraq connection for so long, and why it has toyed with the idea of normalizing relations with the present Libyan leader, Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi and his son, Saif al-Islam, given the continued commitment of Qadhafi to WMD and terrorism. Some Libyan opposition sources have said that, given Qadhafi’s known terminal illness — confirmed to GIS by Qadhafi’s doctors and by other African leaders close to Qadhafi — they may not be able to wait for US support to remove Qadhafi. It was possible, then, that a move against Qadhafi by internal opponents could come even before a US attack on Iraq. If so, this would materially impact Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s ability to utilize his strategic weapons.

What was significant about the November 8, 2000, reports was that the NoDong 1 missiles already operational in Libya were targeted at European cities. These were missiles reportedly partly paid for by Iraq.


August 14, 2002

UK Promises Qadhafi Support in Exchange for IRA Data

Exclusive. From GIS Stations London and Tripoli. The UK Government has agreed with the Libyan Administration of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi that Britain would “deliver” US support for Qadhafi and a transition of power to his son, Saif al-Islam, in exchange for a nominal agreement to compensate victims of the Pan Am PA103 airliner bombing of December 21, 1988, and complete details on the terrorist Irish Republican Army (IRA) operations in the UK. 

Highly-reliable sources in both governments on August 13, 2002, confirmed the essence of the arrangement, concluded during the August 2002 visit to Tripoli and Sirte by UK junior Minister of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), Mike O’Brien. Mr O’Brien arrived in Libya on August 6, 2002, and said that Libya had agreed to help the UK with intelligence for the “war on terror”. What has emerged is that the intelligence only applied to Britain’s own conflict with the IRA, which was now largely over.

The sources said that Libya had provided the UK with an initial “good faith” batch of intelligence, naming IRA terrorists trained in Libya, and on details of arms and explosives provided to the IRA by Libya. If this was found to be reliable, a more broadly-based exchange would occur, and the UK would “proceed at full speed” to see Qadhafi rehabilitated in the Western media and with the US Government. This would also entail some form of agreement under which the Libyan Government would accept responsibility for the PA 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, but Col. Qadhafi himself would be cleared of any involvement and would be free from prosecution or personal liability.

This did not meet the criteria which the US Congress sought, which was to have Libya detail the known connections on the PA103 bombing to Iran and Syria, the principal actors in the bombing.

It was known that the UK FCO had liaised with the US Department of State on the negotiations with Qadhafi, and State and the FCO were trying to sell the package to the US Bush Administration as a “victory” over terrorism, and to show that a leader of a Muslim state could be well-received by the West after having “renounced terrorism”. However, there was no indication that Qadhafi had in any way made meaningful gestures on renouncing support for Islamist radical movements, nor on the question of the destruction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) still held — and still being actively developed and deployed — by Libya.

Libyan sources said that Col. Qadhafi felt sufficiently confident about the deal with the UK that he had ordered a stop to attempted mediation through another country with the US on the question of normalizing relations. At the same time, Qadhafi Administration officials had stepped up their campaign to discredit moves among the Libyan expatriate community to gather behind the traditional — and moderate, pro-Western — Libyan Sanusiyyah movement to be ready to replace Qadhafi when he left office.

The Qadhafi Administration’s decision to betray its former colleagues in the IRA comes as the IRA’s cohesiveness in its own terrorist war in Britain has been winding down. The IRA had, in July 2002, issued a formal “sincere apology” to the families of those civilians killed by the IRA during a terrorist incident in Belfast known as “Bloody Friday”, 30 years before, when more than 20 IRA bombs were detonated. However, while it was clear that the IRA problem had not been eliminated in the UK, what appeared to be happening in 2002 — as the IRA through its political wing, Sinn Féin, attempted to legitimize its operations — was that IRA splinter groups were now pursuing separate terrorist operations.

Sinn Féin on August 12, 2002, meanwhile, called on Colombia’s chief prosecutor, Luis Camilo Osorio, to resign after further claims had been made of IRA links to FARC guerillas. The Colombian official alleged the IRA had been weapons testing in his country and sharing techniques used in recent FARC mortar attacks. Sr Camilo Osorio said that recent attacks by FARC guerillas had employed techniques similar to those used by the IRA. Three Irish republicans —Jim Monaghan, Martin McCauley and Niall Connolly — had been held in Colombian security for the past year, awaiting trial accused of training FARC terrorists. Sinn Féin chairman Mitchel McLaughlin said that the comments by Sr Osorio were a “disgrace”, claiming the men's chances of a fair trial in Colombia had been seriously damaged by the prosecutor-general’s remarks.

The Colombian incident gave credence to the UK Government’s claims that the IRA had not yet been eliminated as a terrorist threat to Britain. And given the importance of the Colombian war with FARC — which has, through its illegal narcotics operations, links with the Islamist terrorist groups — as far as the US was concerned, the UK Government was making headway in Washington with its attempts to get the US to support the rapprochement with Qadhafi. But this had still not addressed the fact that the Libyan WMD programs continued, and that Qadhafi was attempting to “buy off” Western governments so that his son could take power without resorting to valid elections.

One Libyan opposition leader said: “The Libyan people, who have always been pro-Western, are now being sold out, yet again, by Western governments. If they can let Qadhafi off, why not let Osama bin Laden off with a fine and a strict warning now?”


August 7, 2002

UK Begins Direct Negotiations With Libya “On Flawed Premise”

Analysis. By Gregory Copley, Editor, GIS. With input from GIS Station Tripoli, and other sources. The British Government began high-level discussions in Tripoli with the Libyan leadership in a move which many senior US Bush Administration and Congressional officials have privately condemned as damaging to efforts to end Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s radical and anti-Western activities. The UK Government has said that it has the support of the US Government in sending the ministerial delegation to Libya, but, according to Washington sources, this “stretched the truth”.

The US Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not protest the visit, but White House and Congressional leaders from both US major parties were skeptical about its purposes. One senior Washington source noted: “The British said that they were seeking Libya’s help in the war on terror, but this is laughable. We have certainly seen what the Libyans have offered in the way of intelligence on al-Qaida, for example, but we also know that Libya has both financed al-Qaida from time-to-time and has given operatives a safe-have in Libya. The UK is merely attempting to secure a trade advantage with Libya, which is very short-term, and which allows Qadhafi to continue as a problem for his own people and for everyone else.”

Junior UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office Minister Mike O’Brien became the first British minister to visit Libya since 1983 when he arrived in Tripoli on August 6, 2002. Minister O’Brien’s visit was, according to the UK Government, publicly aimed at securing the support of the Libyan Government in the “war on terror”.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, July 30, 2002: Time to End the Hypocrisy Over Qadhafi.]

The UK Government leaks said that Mr O’Brien was ask the Libyan leadership to help the West by providing intelligence on al-Qaida


July 30, 2002

Time to End the Hypocrisy Over Qadhafi

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS. Saif al-Islam, the son and designated heir to Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, spends much of his time in London, attempting to pursuade the world that things have changed in Libya. It has been his message that the “bad old days” have ended, and that the time has come for the international community to “normalize” relations with the government of the country which his father seized by force, and continues to hold, today, solely by force of arms.

But the “bad old days” have not ended. The killings not only have not stopped; they have once again escalated inside the country, as Saif al-Islam and other members of the Qadhafi entourage jockey for position as the time of transition draws near. It draws near not because the self-appointed “colonel” is about to retire from power, but because his illness — cancer — is terminal and he has, probably, less than two years to live. Significantly, Qadhafi claims that he holds no official position other than as “leader” of the “revolution”; now Saif al-Islam is vying for Western approval — he knows he will never get the approval of Libyans — to succeed his father.

The Australian Government in July 2002 normalized relations with Libya and sent a trade mission to the country. Australia has no vested hostility toward Qadhafi, other than the fact that Qadhafi has funded radical activity in Australia in the past. But in August 2002, the British Government has said that it would send a trade mission to Libya, and has alleged that it was doing so because the US Government “supported” the view of the UK’s Foreign & Commonwealth Office that Libya had turned away from terrorism.

Apart from the gross distortion of this statement — that the US Government “supported” the UK perception — it begs the question of whether governments are to be held accountable for their actions. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair has said that they should (when referring to former Yugoslav Pres. Slobodan Miloševic, Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein, etc.). Now, he wishes to deny the evidence of ongoing Qadhafi radical activity — acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs, including chemical and biological weapons, medium-range ballistic missiles) and supporting terrorism (funding of al-Qaida, stirring radicalism in Zimbabwe, etc.) — because of a perceived belief that he can win short-term gains, such as oil and gas concessions, in Libya.

The hypocrisy of Blair’s position, when Qadhafi was avowedly responsible for the death of a British policewoman in 1984 and for the December 1988 PA103 terrorist bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, equates to forgiving British multiple murderess Myra Hindley should she but pay enough money to the right people. Hindley, after all, has served more than 30 years in prison for the “Moors murders”, and UK public opinion is adament that she not be released. Blair has said that she will not be freed. But he forgives Qadhafi because he “has turned away from terrorism”. 

Can al-Qaida’s Osama bin Laden — recently praised to the hilt by Qadhafi — be forgiven and rehabilitated by Blair and the US Department of State if he but pays enough money and “turns away from terrorism”?

There are certain facts which are being ignored in this latest situation.

Firstly, “the US Government” does not support the position that Qadhafi has “turned away from terrorism”, or has ceased to be a problem. It is true that the US Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have supported this view. But it is not the view of the bulk of the US Congress, the White House and the Department of Defense. Indeed, the White House leadership is becoming further estranged from the State Department’s view on many things, and from Secretary of State Colin Powell, in large part because he has supported the Saudi Arabian Government’s view — and that of Egypt’s leadership — that Qadhafi was the best option in Libya.

Secondly, the relationship of the Saudi and Egyptian leadership to the Qadhafi question, and the relationship of US Secretary of State Powell to the Saudis, demands an explanation. The Saudis support Qadhafi largely because he overthrew King Idris I and the Sanusi movement. The Sanusi sect of Islam is moderate, progressive and democratic, and a direct confrontation and contrast to the Saudi Wahhabi sect which is the legitimizing prop of the House of al-Sa’ud. But Saudi and Egyptian officials are being paid large amounts of money by Qadhafi. And US Secretary of State Powell has an historic friendship with the Saudi leadership which needs greater discussion.

Thirdly, Qadhafi himself is moving rapidly, along with his sons (particularly “heir” Saif al-Islam), to consolidate a transition before the people of Libya can assert their own desire for leadership, which is generally regarded as the leader of the Sanusiyyah, Prince Idris al-Sanusi. Qadhafi even said, on Egyptian television on July 27, 2002, that the US Government was trying to put Prince Idris on the throne of his uncle. Prince Idris, in Washington with his family and many Sanusiyyah leaders, has only called for the restoration of democracy and accountable government, which Saif al-Islam and Qadhafi are trying to avoid. And despite the claims of the Saudi and Egyptian governments, the State Department and CIA, a viable plan to allow the Libyan public — aided by the Armed Forces who oppose Qadhafi — does indeed exist and does not require some massive military operation by the West.

For Tony Blair, the US State Dept. and CIA, and others to move to “normalize” relations with Qadhafi instead of with the Libyan people is shameful, hypocritical and short-termism which will lead to further international distrust of the motives of the West in its “war on terrorism”.


July 29, 2002

Qadhafi Claims That US Attempting to Replace Him With the Sanusi Monarchy

Analysis. With input from GIS Station Tripoli, and other sources. Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, speaking on Egyptian television on July 28, 2002, said that the US Government wanted to replace both himself and Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein with the restored monarchies of the respective countries. It was his first public reference, in the 33 years since he seized power in a coup from King Idris I, that he had referred to the Libyan Sanusiyyah monarchy, and sources in Tripoli said that this indicated his mounting concern over the political momentum of the Sanusiyyah movement — an exceptionally moderate, Sufic form of Islam which centers around the Sanusi leaders — and its leader, Prince Idris al-Senussi (Sanusi), now in Washington, DC.

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily sources said that Col. Qadhafi was trying to further pressure Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak to do more to rein in the US and to try to stop support from building for Prince Idris and the Sanusi movement. The reference about US support for the monarchy in Iraq was in regard to Sharif Ali, the heir to the Hashemite Throne of Iraq. Sharif Ali is now, with Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) opposition movement. 

[Sharif AlHussein bin Ali — more commonly known as Sharif Ali — whose father was Prince of Mecca until 1908 and uncle to King Faisal I, was cousin to the late King Faisal II, who was killed during the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy. Like Prince Idris al-Senussi, he is a sharif, a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed.]

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 1, 2002: The Sanusi and Wahhabi Movements of Islam: Born of the Same Man and Products of Their Culture.]

Highly-authoritative sources in Cairo and Tripoli have told GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs repeatedly over the past decade that a number of officials in the Egyptian and Saudi governments had been paid substantial amounts of money by Col. Qadhafi to maintain pressure on the US Government not to take any steps toward removing Qadhafi or his family from power. Indeed, Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak and key Saudi leaders had exerted maximum pressure on the US Government to keep it from taking decisive steps against Qadhafi. This campaign had now reached a crescendo.

The momentum within Libya by the Sanusi movement to reassert itself was also now moving to a more advanced stage, to the point where, in the past year, the Qadhafi Administration could no longer ignore the fact that the Sanusi sect of Islam had not been destroyed by the Revolution. The Saudi leadership, however, saw the continuation of the Sanusi movement — which also existed in Saudi Arabia (the second largest mosque in Saudi Arabia is a Sanusi mosque) — as a threat to the continued dominance of the Wahhabi sect of Islam, which was the foundation of the House of al-Sa’ud and its control of the Kingdom. It was for this reason that the Saudi Government continued to support Qadhafi, and to pressure US Secretary of State Colin Powell and other State Department officials to ensure that the US Bush Administration did not attempt to displace Qadhafi.

Significantly, Saif al-Islam, the son of Col. Qadhafi and his designated heir, had recruited a considerable number of Wahhabi fighters, many of them from al-Qaida terrorist group, into his personal militia because he knew that the Sanusiyyah regarded the Qadhafi family as their opponents. But publicly, Saif al-Islam now also had to acknowledge the growing reassertion of the Sanusi movement. 

Apart from dominating the religious scene in Libya, the Sanusi are spread across much of North and Central Africa — there are some four-million in Nigeria alone — and in the Arabian Peninsula, where the Sanusi sect began.

Clashes were reported during July 2002 between what were described as “Sufi” Muslims (ie: Sanusi) and militant Salafis in al-Zawia (az-Zawiya), a few miles West of Tripoli, with each group trying to impose its way of conducting prayers. The Salafis have fundamentalist views similar to those of the Taliban or the Saudi Arabian Wahhabi movement. News of the clashes was first revealed on July 25, 2002, in a statement denouncing Islamic extremism by Saif al-Islam. Police broke up the clashes then forced demonstrators who had beards to shave them off. Libyan Justice Minister Mohammad al-Misrati said on July 25, 2002: “Libyans like their mosques free from Muslim extremism.” While it was true that Col. Qadhafi saw Islamism as a threat to his rule, his overthrow of the Sanusi in 1969 removed a significant challenge to the Saudi ability to project its influence through Wahhabism. And Saif al-Islam had been a major instrument in liaising with, and using, Islamist terrorist movements.

The extent of Qadhafi’s concern for his security was clear when, before he attended the early July 2002 inaugural summit of the African Union in Durban, South Africa, he had a Libyan Army base — and hundreds of its occupants — destroyed in a rain of artillery rockets in order to destabilize any attempts for a coup during his absence. 

[Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, July 12, 2002: Qadhafi Orders Killing of Occupants of Entire Libyan Army Base, Then Tells CNN He Opposes Terrorism.]

Meanwhile, the Government of the United Kingdom on July 27, 2002, indicated that it was preparing to send a ministerial mission to Libya for the first time in nearly 20 years. This followed a visit in early July 2002 to Libya by a Ministerial mission from Australia. UK Foreign Office Minister Mike O'Brien said that he hoped to visit Tripoli as part of the campaign against international terrorism. The planned visit, in early August, came, the UK Blair Administration indicated, against the background of slowly improving relations between Col. Qadhafi’s Administration and the international community. The Foreign Office assessment was that Libya had turned away from supporting terrorism and claimed that this was a view supported by the United States. Not insignificantly, Saif al-Islam has spent much of his time during 2002 in London, attempting — often with substantial incentives — to influence British leaders to improve their ties with the Qadhafi Administration.

However, it was in fact not true that the US Government “supported” the view that Libya had turned away from terrorism. While the State Department and CIA did take this line, the White House, Congress and the Defense Department did not.

The battle lines were now being drawn within the US Government on the question of Libya. Very reliable sources in Washington indicated that the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were aggressively pushing the Saudi-Egyptian line of attempting to sustain Qadhafi in office. At the same time, key elements in the Defense Department, the Congress (both Republican and Democratic Party members) and the White House were increasingly moving in favor of removing Qadhafi. This further compounded the isolation of the State Department and CIA from White House strategic policy planning. Indeed, Secretary of State Powell’s closeness with the Saudis, which dated back to the 1990-91 Gulf War, was increasingly a cause of annoyance to some officials in the White House and in Congress.

One of the key tools being used by State Department and CIA officials was the claim that there was no time to build a campaign against Qadhafi, and, in any event, there was no plan or leadership in place to take over from Qadhafi. In fact, the Sanusi leadership was demonstrating repeatedly that it had the support within Libya — something the CIA, which basically had few, if any, HUMINT sources in Libya, had said was untrue — and the heads of the Sanusi movement and Sanusi family were now gathering in Washington to demonstrate solidarity for Prince Idris, the designated leader of the movement.

Prince Idris, who has had decades of experience in the oil and gas industry, has said that Libya should be restored to a constitutional democracy which could play a vital rôle in Mediterranean and European security, accessible to NATO. But, in a meeting at the Libya Policy Council, a study unit of the International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA), in the Washington, DC, area on July 28, 2002, he said that the first priority was to ensure that the Libyan economy began benefiting Libyans, who had been denied fundamental rights, healthcare, education and infrastructure for more than three decades. This, he said, would have a profound impact on the entire North African and Mediterranean economy, as well as on the African economies.

He also said that Libyan energy production could rise again substantially when an open, moderate system was restored to the country. He noted: “Libya produced 2.5-million barrels of oil a day under King Idris’ elected government. Today, Libya produces 1.4-million bpd.” He said that Libyan energy production should ultimately be ramped up to four- to five-million bpd. When asked whether there was an alternative government or leadership ready to replace Qadhafi, he said that he had seen numerous detailed plans for all aspects of national management, with competent Libyans ready to return to the country to help rehabilitate it. 

Prince Idris had, through his al-Taj Foundation, been working since the 1980s to promote moderation in Islam and to strengthen the ties between Islam and the West, in line with the teachings of the Sanusi movement.

He also said that, given the growing isolation of the Qadhafi Administration and the illness of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, even the Gadadfa tribe of Qadhafi supported moves to restore the country to democracy. “Moreover, it would not take a military invasion of Libya to remove Qadhafi,” Prince Idris said. “The Libyan people and the Libyan Armed Forces only need to know that external powers are not going to prop up Qadhafi. The Libyan people can make the change themselves if only the US can ensure that there would be no interference from vested external interests.”


July 12, 2002

Qadhafi Orders Killing of Occupants of Entire Libyan Army Base, Then Tells CNN He Opposes Terrorism

Exclusive. From GIS sources in Tripoli. Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, just before he left for the last Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Durban, South Africa, on July 6, 2002, ordered the destruction of a Libyan Army base and its occupants in the town of Gharyan, in the foothills of the Jebal Nefusa range of mountains, two hours’ drive due south of Tripoli.

He ordered a surprise rocket attack on the barracks, catching the occupants by surprise. It is known that six colonels were among those killed, and it was believed that the death toll was possibly in the hundreds. 

No reason was given for the attack, and its occurrence was not publicized or commented upon officially. 

There is some speculation that Col. Qadhafi undertook the attack in order to deter the threat of a coup by the Army while he was out of the country on a well-publicized visit to the OAU Summit. It would have been the logical time for any military action against him, particularly as it is well-known internally that he is in poor health and attempting to facilitate a transition of power to one of his son’s Saif al-Islam. 

One source within Col. Qadhafi’s entourage told GIS: “We do not know specifically why the Brother Colonel ordered the attack, but it was probable that he did not trust some of the people there. Such surprise attacks are not uncommon; they are used to keep potential enemies off-balance.” 

It was believed that the attack occurred about a week before Col. Qadhafi left for South Africa. After arriving in Durban, Col. Qadhafi gave an interview to the US television network, CNN, which published the report by CNN Johannesburg Bureau Chief Charlayne Hunter-Gault on its website on July 11, 2002. In it, Qadhafi — who had, in the previous two days, lambasted the US and its “war on terrorism” — said that Libya was in the forefront of the war against terrorism, and that there was no evidence that his country was engaged in terrorism or support for terrorism. This contradicts definitive reports by GIS regarding payments by Libya to al-Qaida organizations during the past 18 months, and the recruitment of al-Qaida personnel from Afghanistan and Pakistan into Saif al-Islam’s personal militia.

Despite this, CNN said:

Qadhafi referred to “a number of elements from Afghanistan” that he said infiltrated Libya and caused “quite a lot of trouble” — one of the reasons he would not harbor groups like Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida terrorist network or allow them to take refuge in Libya.

“Actually, we are not in need of bin Laden,” Qadhafi said. “We don’t need his money, we don’t need his protection, we don’t want to use him or be used by him. We just want to defend ourselves.”

If any members of al-Qaida are found in Libya, he said, “We shall arrest them and they shall be put on trial.”

Meanwhile, the Australian Government has re-established diplomatic links with Libya, and Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile arrived in Tripoli on July 11, 2002, on a four-day visit. The Libyan Government had indicated that it would open a “People’s Bureau” (Embassy) in Canberra, although for now Australia would handle its diplomatic links with Libya through its Embassy in Cairo. Vaile was accompanied by a big delegation, including Brendan Stewart, chairman of Australia’s wheat exporter AWB (the Australian Wheat Board). Libya imports up to 1.5-million tonnes of wheat a year. 

However, the major deal with Australia is over oil. Two major Australian oil exploration and production companies have already sewn up significant blocks of exploration territory, conscious of the fact that they would of necessity go against the US Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). The US State Department had reportedly encouraged Australia to normalize relations with Libya, despite the fact that the US Congress and White House had taken an opposing view on Libya to the State Department.

Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi was not likely to meet with the Australian delegation, however, despite assurances that he would be available for meetings. Instead, he was expected to pay a three-day visit to Swaziland after the OAU/AU summit, his first tour to the Kingdom. He had earlier offered support to King Mswati III of Swaziland, but the King was cautious in accepting any aid which could be construed as supporting Qadhafi in his campaign against South African Pres. Thabo Mbeki.

But typical of the contrary actions of the Colonel, on July 9, 2002, at the African Union (AU) launching conference, he seized a microphone to demand that Zimbabwe Pres. Robert Mugabe reconcile with the white community in his country, despite the fact that Libyan funds and security agents had been provided to help Mugabe in his campaign to seize white farms in Zimbabwe. 


May 17, 2002

New Round of Libya-US-UK Talks Getting Underway, But No Settlement Anticipated

Analysis. From GIS Stations. Reliable sources in London and Tripoli reported on May 16, 2002, that Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) chief Moussa Koussa had arrived in London in preparation for tripartite talks with the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the US Department of State. It was understood that US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, William Burns, was to head to the US delegation, and that US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officials would be present.

Libyan sources have said that the US continued to push for a compensation offer from Libya to the relatives of victims of those killed in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. However, Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi steadfastly refuses to acknowledge any responsibility for the terrorist bombing. Reports, leaked by lawyers for the victims’ families, had been published in Time magazine to the effect that the Qadhafi Administration was prepared to pay US$3.7-billion to the families. This was, at the time, completely discounted by Libyan sources.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, May 1, 2002: Libyan Sources Say Reports of Impending PA103 Pay-Offs Designed to Stave Off US Hostility.]

There appears to be something of a split within the Libyan leadership, among those advocating offering some kind of settlement to placate the US and British authorities, and those who absolutely reject any admission of guilt in the bombing. In any event, Col. Qadhafi continued to adamantly reject any admission of guilt. As a result of this the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) had drafted a document which was intended to address Libyan sensitivities on the issue, namely: Libya will not admit guilt in the PA103 bombing, and will not apologize for the incident. However, it was understood that at least some Libyan officials favored a payment of up $1-billion. 

US sources told GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on May 16, 2002, that (a) $1-billion would be insufficient compensation, and (b) no resolution of the matter would be agreed unless Libya acknowledged responsibility for the act and offered formal apologies. This was adamantly and specifically rejected by Libyan leaders around Col. Qadhafi.

Libyan sources within the Administration did not seem to believe — given the neglect which US intelligence services have paid to Libya in recent years — that the US or UK had sufficient intelligence penetration of Libya to be able to verify the claims by US Under-Secretary of State John Bolton in Washington, DC, on May 6, 2002, to the effect that Libya was continuing with its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) research and development (particularly in chemical and biological weapons), coupled with ballistic missile development. GIS sources, however, said that this did not take into account the degree of penetration of Libyan military and weapons facilities by Israeli intelligence.

Meanwhile, on May 11, 2002, the Pakistan Government handed over the relatives of al-Qaida members arrested in Pakistan to the Qadhafi Foundation of Saif al-Salam, son of Libyan President Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi. Six women and 14 children flew to Libya, accompanied by the foundation officials on the night of May 11, 2002. The husbands of four of the women were from Libya, while two were from Saudi Arabia. Following their arrests, Pakistan Government functionaries contacted their respective embassies and made them aware of the women and children. The Saudi Embassy refused to accept its people, while Libya agreed to take them all. The Qadhafi Foundation had earlier (as reported by GIS) taken 44 al-Qaida members back from Pakistan to Libya, where they were reportedly incorporated into Saif al-Islam’s private militia.


May 9, 2002

Saif al-Islam, in Bid to Move Into Libyan Decisionmaking, Focuses on Libyan al-Qaida Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay

The son of Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi who has been chosen to succeed his ailing father, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, on May 8, 2002, billed himself as a “charity leader” to call for international observers to check the wellbeing of three Libyan nationals — and members of the al-Qaida terrorist organization of Osama bin Laden — being detained by the United States at Camp X-Ray, at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Saif al-Islam maintains a substantial militia separately from the Libyan Armed Forces and had, during 2001-2002, built up that force by recruiting radical Islamist fighters, including al-Qaida terrorists.

Significantly, some news organizations, including United Press International (UPI), which is now Saudi-owned, ran the Saif al-Islam story, virtually as a press release, painting Saif al-Islam as a “charity leader”.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted on February 15, 2002:

The Libyan Government sent an aircraft to Pakistan to repatriate 44 Arab al-Qaida fighters who had been detained in Afghanistan, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the son of Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, said on February 13, 2002. Saif al-Islam, who heads the Qadhafi Foundation, said that the aircraft had left on February 12, 2002, for Pakistan to repatriate “44 Afghan Arabs, mainly Libyans”.  “For humanitarian reasons, the foundation has negotiated their repatriation and paid sums of money to the Afghan groups which were holding them,” Saif al-Islam said. He said that Libya had not informed the US of the move, but did not know whether the Pakistani Government had done so. Saif al-Islam refused to say how much had been paid to the Afghan groups to release the captives.

The Qadhafi International Foundation for Charity, al-Islam Qadhafi’s so-called charity, asked the International Committee of the Red Cross and human rights groups to ask US authorities to allow observers to go to Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo where al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners were being held. Significantly, the Qadhafi International Foundation for Charity was used to funnel money to al-Qaida and Taliban operations, inside Afghanistan and elsewhere, after the September 11, 2002, terrorist attacks on the US, and had also, in mid-2001 sent at least $25-million to an al-Qaida organization.

The organization, in a statement issued May 8, 2002, said: “It is a test of the world's conscience. We raise our voice to have the international community stand by the rules of justice and fairness in order to avoid a precedent in Guantanamo where suspicion of committing a crime would be considered a justification for violating human freedom and pride.”

US-led Coalition forces in Afghanistan have in captivity at least one Libyan senior al-Qaida member, and two lesser-ranking Libyans from the organization. Pakistan handed over Ibn al-Shaykh Libi — who ran paramilitary training for al-Qaida — to US forces in early 2002. 


May 8, 2002

US Now Focuses Attention on Libya as Hostile State, While Libya Moves Rapidly to Bolster Strategic Ties With Iran

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, GIS Editor. Libya continued in early May 2002 to rebuild its already strong strategic alliance with Iran, a matter which gained considerable urgency with the formal statement of US Under-Secretary of State John Bolton on May 6, 2002, that Libya — with Cuba and Syria — were now formally considered to be hostile states developing or acquiring chemical and/or biological weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. The addition of Libya to the list of targeted states was highly significant. The US Administration had earlier already indicated that Syria was on the list of states believed to be developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and harboring or sponsoring terrorists.

As well, given the emerging evidence of closeness between the Libya and Palestinian leaderships — which has waxed and waned over the years — it now seemed likely that any escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict would almost certainly include Israeli military strikes against Libyan strategic missile installations, from which NoDong-1 missiles with WMD warheads could reach Israeli targets. This could include air strikes, special operations raids and surface-to-surface missile strikes from one or more of the Israeli Navy (Heyl ha-Yam) three Eilat-class (Saar 5-class) FFLs (corvettes), which are almost certainly being fitted with the new Israeli land-attack cruise missiles also fitted to the three Dolpheen-class submarines operating in the Red Sea/Indian Ocean area.

At the same time, the Libyan Government of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi was working increasingly openly — once again — against the US, but, as reported consistently by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs, had been continuing its WMD and ballistic missile developments while also harboring and sponsoring terrorists, including al-Qaida members and al-Qaida organizations. However, what has become increasingly apparent is the Libya-Iran-Palestinian linkage. What had not been noted was the fact that the captain of the ship, the Karine-A, which was intercepted, laden with Iranian arms bound for the Palestinian Authority (PA), in the Red Sea by Israeli commandos on January 4, 2002, was a Palestinian living in Libya. Capt. Omar Akawi, who admitted that he was closely involved with PA Pres. Yasir Arafat’s Fatah movement, could not have undertaken the mission without the complicity of the Qadhafi Government in Libya. Capt. Akawi said the arms shipment had been overseen by Palestinian Authority official Adel Awadallah, and the PA confirmed that he was a middle ranking member of the PA’s naval unit. Capt. Akawi had been a member of Fatah since 1976, although he and his family were resident in Libya.

US Under- Secretary Bolton, in his May 6, 2002, speech entitled “Beyond the Axis of Evil”, said that the three nations (Libya, Syria and Cuba) could be grouped with other states which the US deemed hostile by attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction and/or for their support of terrorism: Iraq, Iran and North Korea (DPRK). He also warned that the US would take action.

In Washington, the International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA), which is associated with GIS, announced the formation of The Libya Policy Council, a specialist unit to study developments in Libya. The Council indicated on May 7, 2002, that the head of the principal Libyan Muslim sect, the moderate Sanusi or Sanusiyyah movement, Prince Idris al-Senussi, was gaining significant support within Libyan military and civil circles. There was concern within Libya over the illness which doctors have said would end Col. Qadhafi’s life within 18 months, raising fears of a fight for power. One of Col. Qadhafi’s sons, Saif al-Islam, who had a substantial militia which included a considerable number of former al-Qaida fighters, to press his claims for leadership. However, The Libya Policy Council said that only Prince Idris has widespread support within the Armed Forces and key elements of the civil population.

In Tehran on May 4, 2002, Libyan Ambassador to Iran Ali Mahmoud Maria met with Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karroubi and, in a statement issued immediately afterwards, Speaker Karroubi referred to the record of good relations between the two countries and noted: “We hope to witness further expansion of mutual relations relying on the two sides high potential in various fields.” It was highly important that Speaker Karroubi made this comment within a statement focused on the current regional and global situation being “a very significant factor in helping further consolidate and deepen ties among Islamic states, particularly those between Iran and Libya”.

Libyan Ambassador Ali Mahmoud Maria also referred to the level of Iran-Libya relations adding that the current situation in the region and the threats of US leaders against other countries had compelled them to collaborate and coordinate their actions. 

There were grounds to believe also that Iran and Libya were, in fact, coordinating their development activities on derivatives of the NoDong-1 strategic ballistic missiles. Libya and Iran had been buying the missiles at the same time in 2000. As well, US sources were well aware that the whole question of the PA103 terrorist bombing in 1988 principally involved Iran and Syria, with Libya playing only a supporting rôle. 

Making the US position clear in Washington, Under-Secretary of State Bolton said: “America is determined to prevent the next wave of terror. ... States that sponsor terror and pursue WMD (weapons of mass destruction) must stop. States that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part of our effort, but those that do not can expect to become our targets.”

The Bolton statement was a clear indication that the Department of State had now essentially abandoned its attempts to come to an agreement with Libyan leader Qadhafi over reparations for victims of the PA103 terrorist incident of 1988, and agreed with GIS assessments that fresh “leaks” of information via a Swiss lawyer to the effect that Libya would pay $3.7-billion in compensation to victims’ families was, in fact, a hoax designed to stave off US hostile actions against Qadhafi.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, May 1, 2002: Libyan Sources Say Reports of Impending PA103 Pay-Offs Designed to Stave Off US Hostility.]

Under-Secretary Bolton also said that Cuba’s threat to the US was consistently “underplayed”, noting: “[Cuba] has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort (and has) provided dual-use technology to other rogue states.”

Significantly, with regard to Libya, Egypt had for more than a decade undertaken to the US Government that it would “contain” Libyan activities, but had, in fact, worked with Libya on strategic ballistic missile programs, including the NoDong-1 procurements from the DPRK. On March 5, 2002, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, in an article entitled US Pressure Expected on Egyptian Pres. Mubarak Over Libya, WMD, noted that the US was displeased with Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak over his failure to contain Qadhafi. Pres. Mubarak subsequently visited Tripoli for talks with Col. Qadhafi, but only to ask for financial help in the wake of the refusal of the US to supplement its aid to Cairo. 

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, April 29, 2002: Mubarak Flies to Libya to Seek Funds from Qadhafi.]

At the same time, Libya, Egypt and Iran were now increasingly strengthening their military relationships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a move which gave all parties confidence that they could resist US pressures regarding terrorism. This trend was particularly noticeable following the recent visit to Libya and Iran by PRC Pres. Jiang Zemin. [Pres. Jiang’s April 8-22, 2002, visit took him to Germany, Nigeria and Tunisia, as well as to Libya and Iran.] 


April 29, 2002

Mubarak Flies to Libya to Seek Funds from Qadhafi

Analysis. With input from GIS station Tripoli. Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak on April 28, 2002, flew to Tripoli to meet with the increasingly ill Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi to seek Libyan financial support for what the Egyptian leader is clearly aware will be trying times ahead. Pres. Mubarak is preparing both for a reduction of US financial aid in the wake of his clear decision to distance himself from the US, while at the same time anticipating major reductions in foreign exchange earnings as the continuing conflict in the region stops tourism and potentially threatens to cut traffic through the Suez Canal.

As well, Egypt has been spending heavily to get the Armed Forces into shape for a possible new war with Israel. 

The visit has two additional strategic ramifications:

1. The move by Pres Mubarak to build warm relations with Col. Qadhafi further polarizes US-Egyptian relations, while at the same time heightening US suspicions of Col. Qadhafi; and

2. Potentially directly engages Libya in the new conflict between Israel and the Arab states.

Much of Libya’s ongoing work on assembling, developing and deploying the DPRK-supplied No Dong 1 theater ballistic missiles over the past two years has been at the behest of Egypt and Iraq. Egyptian engineers have been involved in the program. It is possible (although there is no direct evidence) that Egyptian scientists have also been working with Libya on the development of strategic payload packages for the No Dong 1s, which are already deployed with some kind of warheads. Libya has continued work on chemical and biological weapons, and Libyan work has almost certainly been geared to a marriage of these weapons with the theater-strategic missiles.

Sources in Tripoli indicated on April 28, 2002, that Pres. Mubarak promised Col. Qadhafi “unlimited protection” from Egypt if he provided the financial support requested.


March 27, 2002

Libya’s Saif al-Islam Admits Prospect of Assuming Leadership; Qadhafi Refuses to Participate in Arab League Summit

Analysis. From GIS Station Tripoli, and other sources. The second eldest son of Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam, has now said that he could become leader of the State in succession to his father, who is known to be seriously ill with cancer. “Obviously, I would be lying if I told you there was no chance I might become leader one day,” he said to a French journalist in March 2002.

However, in another interview he dismissed the possibility of his father being replaced by one of his four sons in a Syrian-style hereditary succession. “The regime in Libya is not hereditary and what happened in Syria will not happen in Libya,” Saif told Asharq al-Awsat on March 25, 2002. A Tripoli-based diplomat noted: “Saif is becoming a rising star and he is forcing diplomats, oilmen and other trade middlemen to pay attention to his rôle and views.”

The succession issue is pressing. Col. Qadhafi now works only about five hours a day because of his illness, and reports from usually reliable sources in Tripoli indicate that this was a key factor in his refusal to attend the March 27-28, 2002, Arab League summit in Beirut. Col. Qadhafi had dangled the prospect of attendance, only at the last minute appearing to “change his mind”, although sources said that there was never a real prospect of his personal participation. Some Libyan diplomats had, by March 26, 2002, arrived in Beirut for the summit.

Col. Qadhafi confirmed on March 25, 2002, that he would not attend the upcoming 14th Arab League summit. He told the Qatari-based satellite television Al-Jazeera that his refusal to travel to Beirut for the two-day summit was not motivated by a feud with Lebanon’s Shi’ites but by the failure of the previous summit in Amman to implement its resolutions. “If the summit does not respect its resolutions, then I will not attend it,” he said. Lebanese Pres. Emile Lahoud had said on March 23, 2002, that he would warmly welcome the attendance by Col. Qadhafi at the summit. Adm. Lahoud said that the participation in the summit by Qadhafi was of great importance for a successful convention of the annual but highly spectacular conference. Col. Qadhafi had earlier said in a letter delivered by Libyan diplomatic officials in Beirut to Adm. Lahoud that he would go to Beirut to participate in the summit. This followed a personal appeal for his attendance by Pres. Lahoud. Col. Qadhafi indicated that he was “touched” by Pres. Lahoud’s appeal by telephone on March 20, 2002, and “could create a surprise by going to Beirut”, he said. 

Meanwhile, on March 25, 2002, Saudi Arabia’s acting Foreign Minister Prince Turki Muhammad Bin Sa’ud, who was also the special envoy for Saudi Deputy Prime Minister: Crown Prince Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud, left Tripoli following a visit to Libya during which he handed over a message from the Crown Prince to Col. Qadhafi. In a press statement, the Saudi official underlined the importance of this visit and expressed his satisfaction over its results. 

GIS noted on March 15, 2002, the fact that Libyan relations with the US would polarize following the rejection of the appeal against his murder conviction by Libyan intelligence officer Abdelbaset al-Megrahi over the bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 in 1988.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, March 15, 2002: Libya Expected to Resume More Overtly Radical Approach With Rejection of al-Megrahi Appeal on PA103.]

The polarization of Libyan-US relations has, indeed, begun to occur, and the Libyan Administration was taking steps to avoid giving the US an excuse to target Libya in its “war on terrorism”. On March 19, 2002, the current Chairman of the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council, Hussein Aideed, accused Eritrea, Djibouti, and Libya of collaborating in the supply and delivery of armaments to groups in Somalia. The Libyan Foreign Minister however, denied any sponsoring of arms into Somalia. He told reporters that Libya was actually buying arms out of Somalia since there was too many there already. The Minister accused Aideed himself of requesting to be supplied with arms. However, as Defense & Foreign Affairs publications reported on numerous occasions that Libya had been a major supplier, through Eritrea, of weapons and training instructors, for Somali militant groups.

On March 15, 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell noted: “I'm concerned about the fact that as Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi is trying to show a more positive and benign face to the world, there is clear evidence that he has ambitions with respect to the development of weapons of mass destruction. I think it’s idiotic on his part. I don’t know why he continues to do it. But as long as he continues to do it, we will continue to watch carefully.”


March 15, 2002

Libya Expected to Resume More Overtly Radical Approach With Rejection of al-Megrahi Appeal on PA103

Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, with input from GIS stations. The failure of the appeal against his sentence for involvement in the bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 in 1988 of convicted Libyan intelligence officer Abdelbaset al-Megrahi on March 14, 2002, was expected to end any pretense by Libyan officials that the PA103 episode could be ended. Had al-Megrahi’s appeal been successful, Libya had hoped to have US unilateral sanctions removed and a new relationship built with the US and Britain. This is now unlikely to happen.

Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi had forcefully rejected suggestions during recent months that he would accept US demands for the payment of compensation to the families of the victims of the December 1988 bombing, knowing that such a payment would indicate an acceptance of responsibility. With the legal process now closed, and with al-Megrahi returned from the special Scottish court in the Netherlands to a prison cell in Scotland, there is now not even the pretense of hope for Col. Qadhafi to rehabilitate Libya’s position. This is all the more important in light of Col. Qadhafi’s poor health: he is not expected, because of his cancer, to live more than 18 months to two years.

It should now be expected that Libya will return to a more radical path vis-à-vis the US and UK, although with some caution. It is now becoming clear that the US Government is preparing to target Libya once again for the country’s involvement in terrorist matters and weapons of mass destruction (WDM), as noted earlier by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reports. Col. Qadhafi’s eldest son, Saif al-Islam, is expected, however, to continue working with radicals to build his power base in Libya to ensure that he has enough firepower to succeed his father. At present, Saif al-Islam is aware that he cannot rely on the Libyan Armed Forces, nor even the old guard of advisors around his father. Saif al-Islam, and his brothers and sister, have completely alienated virtually all of the old retainers around Col. Qadhafi. The Colonel has also expressed to numerous friends in recent months that he has been completely disappointed by his family, although he has little option but to support Saif al-Islam’s bid for succession. This, however, is almost certain to be challenged by others in the hierarchy after Col. Qadhafi’s death.

Meanwhile, it was now expected that Abdelbaset al-Megrahi will have few options to overturn or commute his 20-year sentence in Scotland, other than by cooperating with British authorities in divulging details of Libyan involvement in both the PA 103 affair and other terrorist activities. While his testimony at this stage would be dated, it could provide the political trigger to allow the US to target Col. Qadhafi’s Government. It is known from UK sources that al-Megrahi had suffered badly at the hands of other prisoners whilst in detention in Scotland during his appeal. He was thought ready to cooperate with UK intelligence authorities at that time but for the prospect that the Scottish court in the Netherlands — specially established at Camp Zeist, Holland, for his trial — might acquit him for the murder. Indeed, for a time, it seemed that this was very much an option which was possible.

The Libyan Government on March 14, 2002, condemned the rejection of his appeal as a “political verdict” handed down under pressure from Washington and London. The Libyan Government said that it was “absolutely convinced” of the innocence of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. Indeed, there are many in the US and British intelligence community who are also of the belief that the PA103 bombing was in fact the work of Iran and Syria, with Libya playing a secondary and supporting rôle, and that the bombing was in fact inspired by Iran in response to the US downing of an innocent Iran Air Airbus airliner, which was shot down by the USS Vincennes. [On July 3, 1988, the Tidconderoga-class Aegis-cruiser Vincennes shot down an Iranian Airbus passenger aircraft with 290 aboard, allegedly mistaking it for an Iranian F-14A Tomcat fighter. It was clear, however, that the US action was the fault of extremely poor framing of rules of engagement for US warships operating at that time in the Persian Gulf, and by hasty action on the part of the warship’s commander. Not surprisingly, however, the Iranian reaction to the event was at the core of much of the angst for later targeted Iranian terrorist activity against the US, possibly including support for the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, and later terrorist actions.]

Meanwhile, the President of the Libyan bar association, Hafid Jhoja, said the court which upheld the life sentence against Megrahi had been swayed by political influence. “The trial was a political matter, not a legal matter. There was no clear evidence, as the whole world knows. All the Libyan people, all the Arab people, are upset by this judgment,” he said. In London, British Home Secretary Jack Straw said he hoped the decision would bring “solace and comfort” to the families of the victims, and urged Col. Qadhafi to “fulfill his obligations”.

It is now expected, however, that Col. Qadhafi would return to his attention to other matters as a means of creating his legacy, realizing that now there was little hope in his lifetime of seeing the West accept him. 


March 11, 2002

Libya Continues to Escalate Anti-US, Anti-Israeli Stance Following Breakdown of Talks

From GIS Station Tripoli and other sources. Despite the ongoing illness of Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and the battle for succession by his eldest son, Saif al-Islam and other contenders, Libya has resumed its antagonism toward the US and Israel. It is now clear that Col. Qadhafi sees no value in waiting for the results of the Scottish court appeal by the convicted Libyan intelligence officer in the bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 in 1989, nor in the prospects of relief from US sanctions from the flurry of talks which began with the US State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in October 2001.

The Libyan National Popular Committee announced on March 9, 2002, announced a range of measures, including the donation of $50-million, to support the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel. The committee, which is the Libyan Cabinet and which does not act independently of Col. Qadhafi, denounced Israel's "unprecedented ... massacres" of Palestinians and committed resources to help the Palestinian cause, offering to pay the medical expenses of injured Palestinians and send medical equipment, food, clothes and blankets to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

As well, Libyan officials noted the reports in The Los Angeles Times on February 10, 2002, that the US Bush Administration had ordered the US military to prepare contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against at least seven countries, including Libya. Citing a classified US Defense Department report the newspaper also reported that the military was also directed to build smaller nuclear weapons for use in certain battlefield situations. The countries named in the secret report — provided to Congress on January 8, 2002 — were the People's Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Iraq, North Korea (DPRK), Iran, Libya and Syria. Significantly, the PRC and Russia were included in the new targeting planning because they had possession of major stockpiles of ICBMs and nuclear weapons, rather than because of any belief of any imminent intent to use them against the US. The other five states, however, were now clearly the focus of US pressure.

Libya was also sensitive over the fact that the breakdown in its talks with the State Department and CIA have been matched by a gradual increase in US coolness toward Libya in the public arena. On March 10, 2002, the Libyan Foreign Ministry dismissed as ridiculous a United States report which said Libya had a poor human rights record. A statement by the Foreign Ministry said the US State Department report was full of lies. According to the US report, Libyan authorities used summary justice to suppress local opposition, torture prisoners and arrest people arbitrarily. The Libyan statement said there was complete freedom in Libya, and accused the US of using human rights as an issue to put pressure on other countries.

At the same time, Libya has made it clear that it would not support any move within the Arab League to propose a peace accord with Israel on the basis of Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah's revival of a 30-year-old proposal to recognize Israel in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 war borders. Arab leaders will decide on whether to adopt a Saudi peace offer to Israel when they meet in Lebanon later in March 2002. Arab foreign ministers in closed-door talks on March 9, 2002, discussed the Saudi proposals to offer Israel peace and recognition in return for withdrawal from Arab lands it captured in the 1967 war. But Libyan African Affairs Minister Ali al-Traiki said that nothing would come from the Arab League talks unless its members challenge Israel like the "Palestinian people ... have done".

African leaders at a summit in Libya on March 7, 2002, had condemned Israel's "state terrorism" and pledged their support for Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat. The community of Sahel-Saharan states (COMESSA) in a final statement, said COMESSA "firmly condemns Israel's state terrorism and calls on the international community to take immediate measures to exert pressure on Israel and lift the blockade imposed on President Arafat".


March 5, 2002

US Pressure Expected on Egyptian Pres. Mubarak Over Libya, WMD

Analysis. By GIS Station, Washington DC. Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak on March 4, 2002, met with a polite but cool reception when he began meetings with US Administration officials in Washington DC during his working visit to the US. He was expected to face a cool reception on a number of issues when he meets with US Pres. George W. Bush in Washington DC on March 5, 2002. Despite careful Egyptian planning — including pre-visit interviews with The Washington Times, CNN and other US media before Pres. Mubarak's departure for the US — the White House said virtually nothing in advance of the visit.

The coolness from the US side is over the perception that Egypt is actively engaged in programs with the DPRK (North Korea) and Libya on developing weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological weapons) and strategic ballistic missiles. The US is also aware that Egypt had been a major source of weapons and ordnance for the Palestinian intifada, despite Pres. Mubarak's inference in his interview in The Washington Times that Egypt had itself attempted to curb this arms flow.

The Bush Administration will not, however, do anything which would signify any break in cordial bilateral relations. On the other hand, certain new weapons requests seem likely to be put on hold, such as the request for Harpoon II anti-shipping missiles.

On March 4, 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell called Pres. Mubarak's proposal to host a summit between Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Authority Pres. Yasir Arafat an "interesting idea". Sec. Powell, however, said a decision on a summit was ultimately up to Sharon and Arafat.

Sec. Powell, the most optimistic of the US strategic policy team, said that the Bush Administration was redoubling its efforts to halt Arab-Israeli violence, and that a peace proposal by Crown Prince Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud of Saudi Arabia was a positive development. Pres. Mubarak, however, has dismissed the Abdallah proposal as merely being a re-presentation of an idea floated decades earlier in the Arab League, and rejected by all parties as unworkable. The Abdallah proposal calls for a return by Israel to its pre-1967 borders, something which Israel cannot, strategically, afford to consider.

In any event, there are two principal factors weighing on this: firstly, the fact that, even apart from Pres. Mubarak's rejection of the Abdallah concept as being unworkable, Libya and the Iranian/Syrian-sponsored HizbAllah terrorist organization have unequivocally rejected the proposal; and secondly, the fact that Crown Prince Abdallah did not revive the proposal because he thought it would be accepted, but rather to revive US-Saudi relations and to force Israel to reject the idea. Significantly, the proposal did help rekindle some warmth between the US and Saudi Arabia — even though both sides saw the concept as unworkable — because it showed Saudi Arabia to be "working toward peace". But Israel also did not reject the proposal out of hand, instead Israeli Pres. Moshe Katsav said that he was willing to travel to Saudi Arabia to discuss a new peace plan put forward by Crown Prince Abdallah. Alternatively, Pres. Katsav' said that the Crown Prince could come to Jerusalem for talks with the Israeli Government.

The net result is that US-Saudi relations have begun to improve, the Saudi "peace proposal" is going nowhere, and the US has begun to escalate its pressure on Pres. Mubarak.

Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi , on March 2, 2002, meanwhile rejected the Saudi peace plan and threatened to withdraw from the Arab League over its apparent lack of support for his own peace initiative. "Saudi Arabia's proposals would change nothing because a recognition of Israel would bring nothing, but put Arabs at the mercy of Israelis," Qadhafi told a meeting of the General Peoples Congress in the Libyan city of Sirte. An Arab diplomat said that Col. Qadhafi's unexpected move showed that he was angered by some Arab countries' support for the Saudi plan while they ignored Libya's proposals initiated a year earlier. In the same speech on March 2, 2002, Col. Qadhafi urged the Palestinians and Israelis to form a new state called Sartine to end bloodshed in the Middle East. He also offered to give Libya's seat in the Arab League to Sartine if the proposed state was formed. 

He also, the same day at a rally in Sirte to mark the 25th anniversary of the creation of the Jamahiriya, called on Libya's Parliament — which has no authority — to examine Libya's pullout from the 22-member Arab League for its failure to fully support the Palestinians. "I ask the General People's Congress to examine Libya's pullout from the Arab League which has become a masquerade," over its failure to support the Palestinians. 

On March 1, 2002, HizbAllah rejected Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah's offer to trade full normalization of Arab relations with Israel for a total Israeli withdrawal from Arab land conquered in the 1967 Middle East war. HizbAllah's rejection statement was released in Beirut amid reports that Lebanon and Syria have taken cautious stand on the Saudi overture, hoping it would not be tabled before the upcoming Arab summit in Beirut for endorsement as a collective initiative.

The HizbAllah statement said: "The recovery of occupied Arab land can be attained without paying such a heavy price as normalization. The impact the Palestinian intifada is making on the Israeli society makes us certain of glorious victory."

The statement called for "caution and patience" plus redoubled support and assistance to the Palestinians and said the Palestinians were capable to repeat in Palestine what HizbAllah did to Israel in south Lebanon.

Mirroring the official stance of caution taken by Lebanon and Syria, Lebanon President Emil Lahoud said that any initiative to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict should clearly safeguard the right of diaspora Palestinians, including those in Lebanon, to return to their land.

The fact that Saudi Arabia's "peace initiative" was aimed primarily at Washington, rather than at the Israelis, was made clear by the significant upsurge in Saudi "public diplomacy" during late February 2002. In this, the rôle of Saudi Ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, was lower key than in the past, with other Saudis making the running. Two Saudi officials — Prince Turki Al Faisal, the former head of Saudi Intelligence, and Adel Al Jabir, the Saudi foreign policy adviser — spoke effectively on many US television programs, in flawless English explaining Saudi policy in general and US-Saudi ties, in particular. 

As well, there were a number of other Saudis who visited the US to present Riyadh's viewpoint. This is basically the first time that Saudi Arabia has engaged in such a broadly-based diplomatic effort. In the past it has relied heavily on the activities of its officials in meetings with US officials. Among the Saudis engaged in conferences and media activities in the US during February 2002 were Abdullah A.Y.Z. Alireza, Dr Abdulmohsin Alakkas, Lawyer Ziyad Al Sudairi; Dr Nourah Al Yousef, and Dr Haifa Gamalallay.

The Gulf Times, in Manama, Bahrain, said in an editorial: 

"One wonders why Saudi Arabia has been timid or reluctant in fielding these able, articulate and poised speakers to shield the kingdom or the faith it protects from the stabs of the American media slaughterhouse. There was an urgent need for an adequate and convincing Saudi response after it became apparent that the majority of the suicide bombers responsible for the horrendous events of last September here were youthful Saudis, casting an untoward image about their country and Islam."

"Doubtless, Saudi Arabia has been jolted by the understandable outcry here and consequently it has — five months later — engaged a top public relations firm to handle the bad press. But more importantly, it will be sending many delegations to tour the United States to engage various audiences about the all-important relationship between the two countries. But the smarter move has been the apparent decision to allow more American journalists into Saudi Arabia and, judging by the early reports, the returns have been satisfactory except for the pro-Israeli pundits in the media and think-tanks."

The Gulf Times believed that Crown Prince Abdallah's proposal had "pulled the rug from under the feet of Israeli hawks like Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his unwavering supporters", but this has not proven to be the case. The Abdallah proposal, while recognized as a gesture, only invited an Israeli response calling for substantive talks, and it was recognized as being an old, and demonstrably unworkable offer which had not even been dressed in new clothing. Indeed, the Israelis appear to have moved past the point where recognition from Saudi Arabia is a major goal.

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres had publicly welcomed the plan as "new, interesting and fascinating", but Israeli Cabinet Secretary Gideon Saar ruled out reverting to Israel's old borders. "It must be said that we're speaking of a positive trend," Mr Saar said, but "this does not mean that we agree to the demand for a return to the 1967 borders; it's clear that we won't agree to this."

The United States has also said that Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat must move first to make peace with Israel.

In Saudi Arabia, strong anti-Israeli sentiments were voiced during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and the Saudi Arabian Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh, in a sermon accused Israel of killing unarmed Palestinians.


February 19, 2002

Libya's Succession Preparations Continue as Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi Adds al-Qaida and Radicals to His Militia

Exclusive. From GIS Stations Tripoli and Benghazi, and other sources. Highly-reliable senior Libyan sources have indicated that the eldest son of Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has begun strengthening his own personal security forces to prepare for his succession to the national leadership. The sources indicated that most of the 44 al-Qaida terrorist/guerilla fighters Libya airlifted from Pakistan to Libya on around February 15, 2002, were destined to be merged with the militia of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the Libyan leader's eldest son and heir apparent. The al-Qaida members had been captured and detained by regional leaders in Afghanistan, before being moved to Pakistan. Saif al-Islam negotiated their release to Libya; most were Libyan nationals, although at least one was a Jordanian national whom Saif al-Islam indicated would be repatriated to his homeland.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 15, 2002: Libya Wins State Department Approval to Deal With US Oil Leases, and Then Takes in al-Qaida Captives.]

As well, some 1,200 or more radical Islamist fighters, who had been imprisoned by the Qadhafi Administration, were in recent months released to the care of Saif al-Islam, and it is understood that they had also been largely incorporated into Saif al-Islam's militia.

Based on what was known of Saif al-Islam's militia before this point, it is now believed that his unit could be at a force level of around 2,500. It is not yet known what the extent is of the unit's equipment. 

Saif al-Islam's militia was first brought to light in the Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report on January 7, 2002:

"Saif al-Islam maintains the most important militia unit, of around 1,000 men, and this unit, perhaps more than most, acts as the key mobile armed force designed to provide security for the administration, particularly against a possible military coup. What is significant about Saif al-Islam’s militia is that it is aggressively Wahabbist in style; that is, it is radical and bonded by an approach which, for example, favors the kind of activities undertaken by the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. This particularly sets it at odds with the overall Libyan community."

One younger brother of Saif al-Islam, Sa'adi al-Qadhafi, 28, also maintains his own militia, believed to number around 1,000 men. A third brother, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, had also, until the beginning of 2002, maintained another militia unit, but this was forcibly disbanded after a strong disagreement between Col. Qadhafi and Dr Moatasam, who now lives in exile in Egypt.

Both Saif al-Islam and Sa'adi have been increasing their profile in recent weeks and months. There is, at this stage, no known rivalry between the two, so it is assumed at Sa'adi al-Qadhafi is supporting the claim of Saif al-Islam to the leadership.

The who leadership question is now very much on the table: Col. Qadhafi's illness — advanced cancer in the throat area and leukemia — is such that he is not expected by his doctors to live for more than 18 months to two years. He is already working less and less each day. However, Qadhafi has expressed to a significant number of people who have met him recently that he was extremely disappointed in the way his family had turned out, implying that he may not necessarily support Saif al-Islam's quest for the succession. All of Qadhafi's children were known to have been at odds with the coterie of officials who have been around the Colonel for decades. [See earlier reports by this Service.]

What was emerging, however, was the fact that Libya was not moving further away from the sponsorship or harboring of terrorists, as Qadhafi had attempted to indicate to US and other Western officials dealing with him. And nor was Libya moving away from the development of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and ballistic missile delivery systems. GIS reports had noted the extensive redeployment of CBW research and operational facilities.

At the same time, the Qadhafi Administration was strenuously engaged in suppressing radical Islamist and other opposition forces. On February 18, 2002, the Libyan Islamic Group (LIG) said that two leaders of the banned Libyan Muslim Brotherhood had been sentenced to death and dozens of others to heavy jail terms. LIG said that the death sentences had been handed down on February 17, 2002, to Abdallah Ezzedin and Salem Abu Hanak, two academics teaching in Tripoli and Benghazi. Human Rights Solidarity (HRS), a group based in Geneva, confirmed the death sentences and added that "dozens of life terms" had also been handed down. HRS said that those convicted were arrested in 1998 for belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. 


February 15, 2002

Libya Wins State Department Approval to Deal With US Oil Leases, and Then Takes in al-Qaida Captives

Analysis. From GIS stations in Rome, Tripoli and elsewhere. Libya has continued its relationship with al-Qaida, the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization, by giving safe-haven to some of the group's fighters in Libya, despite a move by the US State Department to relax rules permitting some US oil companies to deal with the Libyan Administration. The US State Department had, on January 22, 2002, given four US oil companies permission to negotiate oilfield contracts with Libya. 

The Libyan Government sent an aircraft to Pakistan to repatriate 44 Arab al-Qaida fighters who had been detained in Afghanistan, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the son of Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, said on February 13, 2002. Saif al-Islam, who heads the Qadhafi Foundation, said that the aircraft had left on February 12, 2002, for Pakistan to repatriate "44 Afghan Arabs, mainly Libyans".  "For humanitarian reasons, the foundation has negotiated their repatriation and paid sums of money to the Afghan groups which were holding them," Saif al-Islam said. He said that Libya had not informed the US of the move, but did not know whether the Pakistani Government had done so. Saif al-Islam refused to say how much had been paid to the Afghan groups to release the captives.

The US State Department had given four companies permission to renegotiate oilfield contracts with Libya that have been frozen since the mid-1980s. Libya in 2001 warned Marathon Oil, Amerada, Conoco and Occidental — the "Oasis" group — that they could be stripped of their Libyan operating licenses unless they returned to the country. "The State Department has reaffirmed the past authority of the Oasis partners to discuss the terms under which we could return to Libyan properties," said a spokesman for Marathon Oil. The companies would not be able to return to Libya until the US dropped the sanctions, the Marathon spokesman added. Nonetheless, the move by the State Department was seen as a move which was supportive of Libya's objectives — the Qadhafi Administration had, in any event, been threatening the US oil companies for some two years — and one which moved around the strong pressures in the US Congress and much of the US Administration leadership to reject any compromise with Qadhafi. Indeed, the move came only a week before US Pres. George W. Bush specifically spoke of his opposition to countries which were developing weapons of mass destruction and harboring terrorists: a description which fitted Libya more closely than almost any other country.

Saif al-Islam, who spearheaded the latest move to retrieve the al-Qaida members, has been increasingly thrust into the limelight in Libya, and as a Libyan representative abroad, in a move to strengthen his credentials to assume the leadership after his father, Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, left office. This has taken on an increasingly active and urgent nature, given the advice from doctors who operated in late 2001 on Qadhafi that he may not live more than 18 months to two years, due to the advanced nature of his cancer. He was operated on around the neck and throat area by Egyptian and Lebanese doctors. Col. Qadhafi is also known to have had leukemia since the 1970s.

Despite Saif al-Islam's activities, neither he nor any of the other Qadhafi children were believed to have a sufficiently-developed power base to succeed their father. 

However, another son of Col. Qadhafi also attempted to move out of the shadows on February 13, 2002, when, in Italy, he slipped into a Juventus football club tracksuit and joined the squad for a workout. Al-Sa'adi al-Qadhafi, 28, was having lunch with Juventus chief executive Antonio Giraudo when he asked if he could join in a team practice. In January 2002, the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company, the financial arm of Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's Administration, announced that it had acquired a 5.3 percent stake, worth $20.5-million, in the Turin-based club, making it the No. 2 shareholder. Sa'adi al-Qadhafi maintains his own militia, believed to number no more than 1,000 men, which operates independently of the Armed Forces, and in support of his father. Sa'adi also met in Italy with Fiat chairman Gianni Agnelli.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, on February 4, 2002, in a report entitled Major Changes Continue to Move Libya Into the Forefront of Strategic Focus, noted:

"[W]hat is ... significant is that the paucity of US intelligence assets within the Libyan power structure has led the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to rely on the Italian SISMI (Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare) in Rome to feed material about Libya via the CIA's Rome Station. This has led to the provision of material known to be highly colored to support the Italian Government's position, and has included attempts to discredit, or undermine, the most significant contender to replace Qadhafi, Prince Idris al-Senussi, the leader of the Sanusi movement or sect of Islam which dominates in Libya. Prince Idris, who has considerable support within the US Congress and the Bush Administration, is thus seen as an obstacle to Libyan and French ambitions to dominate post-Qadhafi Libya, and as a result SISMI has been used to attempt to influence the US State Department and the CIA against him."

Meanwhile, the Pakistan Government had on February 14, 2002, rejected as "totally baseless" claims that alleged al-Qaida terrorists fleeing Afghanistan had found sanctuary in Pakistan. "It is totally unthinkable," Foreign Ministry spokesman Aziz Ahmed Khan said commenting on the claims made by Afghan Interior Minister Yunous Qanooni and the Iranian media. "We hope that such statements will gradually disappear," he said. However, it was clear at least some al-Qaida members were moving through Pakistan — perhaps under detention from Afghanistan — in order to be collected by the Libyan transport aircraft.

[The New York Times also said on February 14, 2002, that a young Palestinian who was claimed to personally know most of al-Qaida's recruits had become the terrorist group's new operations chief and was believed to be planning new attacks against the United States. Abu Zubaydah, was, the report said, trying to activate al-Qaida sleeper cells for new strikes against the United States and its allies.]

US State Dept. sources indicated that there was some hope that US-Libyan tensions would, in any event, subside following the issuance of a verdict in the appeal of the Libyan intelligence agent convicted for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, which could happen in March 2002, or shortly after. Presiding Judge William Cullen said the court would give seven days' notice to the parties involved in the appeal by Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, the families of those who died in the bombing of a US jetliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the press. This would not happen "before the beginning of March," he said on February 14, 2002. Megrahi's defense argued that his original conviction in January 2001 over the Lockerbie bombing which killed 270 people was a miscarriage of justice. The Scottish court of five judges on February 14, 2002, heard new evidence from defense witnesses about possible security breaches at London's Heathrow airport the night before PA103 took off on its final flight.

The defense sought to show that the suitcase containing the bomb that brought down the plane could have been smuggled into the Pan Am baggage handling area and loaded on to the Boeing 747 after a padlock securing the area at night was broken. The prosecution asserts that the suitcase was sent as unaccompanied luggage from Malta to London via Frankfurt before being put on the jet which exploded in a fireball over Lockerbie, killing all 259 people on board and 11 on the ground. Senior defense counsel William Taylor told the court it was "a matter of great regret" that the evidence about security was not available earlier. "My position is that this case represents a miscarriage of justice," he added, describing the new testimony as "important and reliable". Megrahi was sentenced to life imprisonment for planting the bomb but a second defendant, fellow Libyan Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah, was acquitted.

An acquittal for Megrahi would, some State Department officials believe, lead to the lifting of the unilateral US sanctions against Libya. Other US Administration officials believed, however, that new evidence of ongoing Libyan support for terrorism, and continued development of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, would, whether the sanctions were lifted or not, set the US on a collision course with Libya. 

Meanwhile, in other developments, the governments of Ukraine and Libya were to sign an agreement shortly on cooperation in the aircraft industry. The Ukrainian Government on February 13, 2002, authorized Minister of Industrial Policy Gureyev to sign the accord which  created a legal framework for cooperation between the two countries in the field of selling, repairing and joint production of civilian aircraft and training personnel. Libya has bought two An-124-100 transport aircraft from Ukraine and wants to buy new An-140 and An-74TK-300 transports.

In African issues, Libyan forces in the Central African Republic's capital were facing growing opposition from local residents who have said that they want the foreign troops to leave Bangui because the Libyans did not serve their interests. The troops were first deployed in Bangui to defend President Felix Patasse, following a failed coup attempt in May 2001. Libyan officials said that until a peacekeeping mission was deployed in the Central African Republic its troops would remain. "We want to improve the security in the country," says a Libyan embassy official in Bangui. "If we leave, there would be a coup tonight."


February 4, 2002

Major Changes Continue to Move Libya Into the Forefront of Strategic Focus

Exclusive. From GIS Stations in Tripoli, Rome and elsewhere. A number of highly-reliable, highly-placed sources have advised GIS that there is now considerable momentum being generated because of the probability of a change in the Libyan leadership within two years, largely due to the ill-health of Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi. Much of this activity has, or could have, significant strategic ramifications. Some of the key issues include:

1. Key officials surrounding Col. Qadhafi are now attempting to take steps to preserve their positions;

2. At least six initiatives were known to be underway to put a successor in place after Qadhafi, including several initiatives which involve his eldest son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi; some of these initiatives are being sponsored by foreign governments and/or foreign energy companies;

3. A major rift has occurred between Col. Qadhafi and his longtime head of strategic intelligence, Abdullah Senussi, the result of problems with Qadhafi's children and fueled by rivalries which other officials, such as intelligence chief Moussa Koussa (head of the Libyan External Security Organization; ESO), have had for the past two decades with Abdullah Senussi. 

4. A de facto collapse in meaningful negotiations between the US and Libya, despite hints, rumors and leaks from both the US State Department and sources paid-for or close to the Libyan Government that a "settlement" was likely soon between the US and Libya which would see the US lift its unilateral embargo of Libya.

5. The de facto and discreet withdrawal of support for Qadhafi by the Government of Saudi Arabia.

Along with these current factors, sources have reported that Libyan intelligence had recruited a paid agent within the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in around 1980. There was no indication as to whether the alleged agent was still active, or at what level he operated. However, the sources said that the claim of recruitment was made privately at the time by Abdullah Senussi, who for some time had been head of the Jamahiriyya Security Organization (JSO), the over-arching intelligence/security agency in the country which later became the ESO. Abdullah Senussi is a brother-in-law of Col. Qadhafi, having married the Colonel's wife's sister, and he has been unwaveringly loyal to the leader at all times, revering the Colonel as a father figure. [Abdullah Senussi was convicted in absentia by a French court in 1999 for his involvement in the terrorist bombing of UTA DC-10 over Chad in September 1989.]

It is understood that the rift with Col. Qadhafi — which was evident through much of January 2002 — occurred because Abdullah Senussi attempted to intervene with the leader over the inappropriate behavior of the Qadhafi children, all of whom have expressed dislike for Abdullah. Moreover, other officials, such as Moussa Koussa, have long had a rivalry with Abdullah Senussi, envious of his closeness with Qadhafi. 

Meanwhile, US State Department and US intelligence officials, who had been conducting discussions with Libyan officials (Moussa Koussa and others) since early October 2001, have reportedly been anxious to promote the concept that a deal with Qadhafi was feasible, including payment of compensation to the families of victims killed in the 1988 Pan Am PA103 bombing. However, the Bush Administration rejects the notion that any payment from Qadhafi had been agreed, and Col. Qadhafi himself in late January 2002 was understood to have firmly rejected the notion that he would pay compensation which would also connote acceptance of responsibility for the bombing. The leaks therefore appear more likely to have been a stalling mechanism on behalf of some within the US State Department, and possibly the CIA, to forestall a harder line (and confrontation) by the US Bush Administration with Qadhafi.

Even senior State Department officials, however, concede that success depends on Tripoli accepting responsibility for the 1988 bombing of PA103 and compensating the victims' families. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East William Burns said on January 30, 2002: "There are no shortcuts. If the Libyans meet their obligations, the door will start to open for a variety of international interactions with Libya."

However, the State of the Union speech by US President George W. Bush on January 29, 2002, clearly spelled an end to (or at least a limitation of) the "appeasement approach" by those State Department and CIA personnel who favored settling with Qadhafi. While considerable attention was given to Pres. Bush's remarks about the "axis of terror" (DPRK, Iran and Iraq), little attention focused on the fact that the US remained committed to the eradication of governments which continued to undertake the development of chemical, biological and nuclear "weapons of mass destruction". As GIS highlighted in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on November 8, 2001, Libya has persisted with its development of chemical and biological weapons, and continues to maintain a substantial force of deployed strategic ballistic missiles (No Dong-1s). [That report identified the new locations of stockpiles of weapons and materiel, as well as laboratories for the Libyan chemical and biological weapons programs.]

One key Libyan scientist involved in the chemical and biological weapons programs told a GIS source directly on January 22, 2002: "As of today, all the chemical and biological weapons and the laboratories remain in place." 

 The Bush State of the Union speech, therefore, gave the tacit go-ahead for a resumption of US pressure against Col. Qadhafi, and provided the rationale for maintaining the US sanctions in place.

In the meantime, however, Qadhafi's health problems — first alluded to by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily in 2001 — which have become significantly worse since October-November 2001, have given a sense of urgency to considerations of the "post-Qadhafi era". In this regard, however, the US has been less-well prepared than some others. The Italian Government, along with some key Italian companies (such as the oil companies ENI and Medoil, plus Fiat) have been pushed by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to prepare their own agenda to control the Libyan political situation post-Qadhafi. The Italian initiatives include support for former Libyan deputy leader, Major ‘Abd al-Salam Jallud, and Qadhafi's oldest son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. 

But what is perhaps more significant is that the paucity of US intelligence assets within the Libyan power structure has led the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to rely on the Italian SISMI (Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare) in Rome to feed material about Libya via the CIA's Rome Station. This has led to the provision of material known to be highly colored to support the Italian Government's position, and has included attempts to discredit, or undermine, the most significant contender to replace Qadhafi, Prince Idris al-Senussi, the leader of the Sanusi movement or sect of Islam which dominates in Libya. Prince Idris, who has considerable support within the US Congress and the Bush Administration, is thus seen as an obstacle to Libyan and French ambitions to dominate post-Qadhafi Libya, and as a result SISMI has been used to attempt to influence the US State Department and the CIA against him.

However, the situation now is that Libya is currently producing some 1.4-million barrels of oil per day (bpd), whereas production was at 2.5-million bpd at the time Qadhafi and his colleagues overthrew King Idris I in September 1969. The cost to modernize Libyan oil and gas production to reach the 2.5-million bpd level again is estimated at some $70-billion in infrastructural costs, something which could not be achieved by Italian and French investors. 

Given the strategic necessity for the West to significantly boost Libya's output and prosperity to replace or balance Arabian Peninsula supplies, only a level of national infrastructural development which could be afforded by the US energy industry would suffice. Significantly, much of the US support for Prince Idris as the leader of an interim Government to replace Qadhafi centers around his decades of experience, during his exile, in the international energy industry.

Saudi Arabia's apparent change of opinion about both Col. Qadhafi and Prince Idris are also not without foundation. Saudi leaders are conscious of the fact that it would be politically desirable for them if US forces currently stationed in Saudi Arabia could be gradually and discreetly removed, without bringing about a US-Saudi confrontation. Bringing Prince Idris to power in Libya would result in Libya offering, once again, the use of Wheelus Air Force Base to the US, giving the US a strategic base in the region outside of Saudi Arabia. Thus, the US would have Wheelus to cover North Africa, and would retain its basing in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, and access to facilities in Qatar and Oman. 

The discreet Saudi moves toward supporting (or at least accepting) Prince Idris mark a ceasefire in the major schism which has plagued Sunni Islam: the breach between the Saudi Wahabbists and the Sanusiyyah movement. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, February 1, 2002: The Sanusi and Wahhabi Movements of Islam: Born of the Same Man and Products of Their Culture.]

Despite this profound and strategically pivotal change which is occurring in and around Libya, US intelligence sources and the US State Department have failed to focus on understanding the Libyan situation. Policy-level decisions by the US Bush Administration, however, provide an indication that the "war on terrorism" could move, after Somalia, toward focus on Libya. Certainly, the US does not have the military intention to directly challenge the stated "axis of evil" states: North Korea, Iran and Iraq. However, while the Iranian public is given the support it has sought to move against the clerics, and while pressures are increased against the DPRK, some kind of escalated political and military pressure could well be expected against Libya.

Meanwhile, on January 31, 2002, Italian oil and gas giant ENI said that together with National Oil Corp. of Libya, it had awarded a EUR 1.2-billion contract to three engineering companies for the planning and construction of hydrocarbon treatment plants on the Libyan coast. Total investment is estimated at $4.6-billion, and would guarantee the production of about 98,000 barrels a day of liquid hydrocarbons and 10-billion cubic meters of gas each year, ENI said. Of that total, 2-billion cubic meters would be sold on the Libyan market, with the remaining 8-billion exported to Italy through a dedicated $1-billion transmission system. The system consists of a 32-inch 540 kilometer pipeline connecting the city of Mellitah on the Libyan coast to the Sicilian coast near the city of Gela, and a compression station of 170 megawatts. 


February 1, 2002

The Sanusi and Wahhabi Movements of Islam
Born of the Same Man and Products of Their Culture

Analysis. By Alia El Senussi. [see below]. The Sanusiyya and the Wahhabi movements of Islam developed along revivalist/reformist and even Puritanical lines. They grew out of a medieval ideology, that of Ibn Taymiyya, a man who lived in a time in which the “doors of interpretation” were closed. He believed in a traditional view, taqlid, and followed the Sunna and Koran strictly. He vehemently attacked Sufism, and in this, the aforementioned would show their differences. While both movements borrowed much from Taymiyya neither followed him exactly, with the Wahhabi using much of Hanbal’s doctrine and the Sanusi applying Sufi influences to their school. In the end, both religious movements were politicized to form modern Islam-legitimated monarchies. In this paper, I will discuss this development and attempt to explain the reasons and foundations of such movement.

The Sanusiyya movement of what came to be called Libya was the vision of one man: Sayyid Mohamed ibn Ali al-Sanusi, al-Sanusi al-Kabir. His position as a sharif, or descendant of the Prophet Mohamed, lent him standing as a dignitary in his region so to speak. Also, he was an extremely pious individual due to the childhood influences of his aunt, Fatima, who herself was a respected teacher of Islam. A connection between Sanusi and Sufism is made in all the books which I used for my research; undoubtedly there exists elements of the mystical tradition in Sanusi’s teaching but some authors emphasized this more than others leading me to believe that such a strong connection was not conclusive. For instance, Knut S. Vikor in his Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge is determined to make Sanusi a Sufi and sustains this thesis by making connections to it at every possible point, be they conclusive or not. He also discards other influences very easily such as those of Ibn Taymiyya and/or the Wahhabi movement. However, Vikor’s works serve to relay important facts of Sanusi’s life history and mode of thought. He illustrates Sanusi’s strengths/interests as neither a political thinker nor leader but primarily as a scholar of the religious crafts. Vikor also succeeds in pointing out the existence of “a certain number of conceptual polarities through which the development of al-Sanusi’s life may be seen”. They are the antagonism of the ideological/intellectual with the political, the theory of center-periphery, and the harmonious relationship of Sufi and scholar in Sanusi’s ideology.

The first will be very important later on when we examine the differences between Sanusi’s aim and that of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab but is also made particularly relevant through the later transformation of the Sanusi brotherhood (ikhwan) into a political and military movement. The issue of center-periphery deals more with Sanusi’s mindset than with his ideology. Sanusi tended to remain more on the outskirts of society; he enjoyed staying in the remote Bedouin areas but at the same time grew up intellectually in Fez, which is a religious center in its own right. Also, his experiences in Mecca, “center of the peripheries” of the Islamic world yet political vortex, are significant in illustrating the dichotomy that exists in his atmospheres. Vikor points out that we must “think in terms of multiple relationships (geographical relations and distinguish between them in terms of the intellectual, political and economic).” The latter I touched upon before, that Vikor is pre-disposed to draw the connection between Sufi and scholar, a combination often seen in today’s world as antagonistic in Islam. Vikor justifies this by saying Sanusi practiced a “scholarly Sufism” or “esoteric Law” and even questions this by asking “or were they divided into two discrete elements-that he brought Sufism closer to the sharia, that is to the world of the exoteric, non-mystical Islamic scholarship.”

    I stated previously that Sanusi grew up intellectually in Fez; this was documented not only in Vikor’s work but also in those of Nicola Ziadeh, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, et. al. Sanusi was in Fez around 1791 during the respective reigns of Sidi Mohamed and his son, Sulayman. While in Fez, Sanusi was exposed to works of the Hanbali school as well as the Maliki school, for Sidi Mohamed had claimed to be “a Maliki in Law and a Hanbali in doctrine”; he was capable of separating the metaphysical from the physical in law. This fusion of the two distinct orders in one scholarly center served to influence Sanusi in that he would be very open to other modes of thought as he himself described, as translated by Ziadeh in her Sanusiyah: A Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam:

“During travels which I had occasion to do…I had the opportunity of meeting a considerable number of illustrious men of sound knowledge and noble character, amongst whom there were great orators, imminent imams…some aspired to follow the road which will bring them as near as possible to the King of Kings; others wished simply to [study and] secure for themselves a license…I met them all over the country…During the various travels and through numerous conversations, with a language which the common people could not comprehend, where the essence of knowledge was discussed…all along I have met with honest groups.”

This honest and straightforward statement of Sanusi’s more than illustrates his desire to learn from all schools and all people. He is seemingly an open and tolerant religious scholar, solely seeking knowledge that will bring him to a better understanding of God and Islam.

In conclusion to this background information of the Sanusi I would like to point out that al-Sanusi al-Kabir was a unique scholar in that he was versed in the three branches/areas of Islam: shari’a, theology, and Sufism. He was never interested in politics as was Wahhab, whom I will talk about later. Rather, Sanusi was looking to preach Islam and spread his ideology to all those around him. This is interesting because his successors, beginning with his son, Mahdi, would end up the political rulers of an area three times the size of modern France. How well versed were those rulers that followed Mohamed in Islam? King Idris I was considered by all accounts an extremely pious and devout person who cared to keep to himself and left the day-to-day ruling to Prince Abdallah Abid. However, it was al-Mahdi who politicized the Sanusi, as did the ikhwan. They maintained the Sanusi ideology but were not desirous to achieve the same goals as those of the founder. The legacy that al-Sanusi has left is a country that would not have existed if not for the Sanusi order and a great-granddaughter that is hoping to learn about the impact he made on Islam and his people, both contemporary and future.

Mohamed b. Abd al-Wahhab was eulogized by Nasir al-Kubaybi as a “true renewer of Islam.” Wahhab strove to restore the “original form of Islam”, that of the Prophet and his contemporaries; for him, true Islam was only the Islam of Prophet Muhammad’s generation and because of that the Arabs could be designated as the only legitimate guardians of Islam. Wahhab only saw validity in what is positively stated in the Koran and the Sunna; this is equally true for Wahhab’s forerunner, Ibn Taymiyya, as well as for Sanusi. Wahhab was not a religious scholar in the same sense as was Sanusi for Wahhab’s movement was very quickly politicized while Sanusi’s wasn’t until after his death. However, I do not agree with the Orientalist (as Bassam Tibi describes him) R. Hartmann when he says:

“Wahhabi movement as a religious movement is nothing more than a natural reaction to the adaptation of Islam to complex cultural circumstances, which had clearly also led to a weakening of the core ideas of the religion’s founder and which denoted a process of Westernization- a reaction based on the most conservative of the four Sunni rites, that of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, that is to be understood in terms of the social conditions prevailing in Arabia, which had hardly altered in any substantial way since the time of the Prophet.”

This is an extremely simplistic notion of the Wahhabi movement, something I see as having complex workings and reasons for existence. It was not simply a reaction to the West but a product of the people’s desires of the time and of a reaction versus icon worshipping that was voiced by Wahhab. As Bassam Tibi states in his Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change, there were “systematic tendencies toward a revival of the “original” form of Islam of the Arabs before Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign and the ensuing monumental reforms of Muhammad Ali”; those tendencies were the movement of the Wahhabi that began in the mid-1700s. However, he goes on to condemn Wahhabism as archaic fundamentalism and it is no wonder that he places R. Hartmann prominently in his work because they both have the same mindset that the past was only a place for ‘bad’ thoughts and backwards modes of expression, products merely of Westernization rather than local culture.

Before reading this next sentence one must be aware that the author Tibi is inclined to find elements of Arab nationalism wherever he can and therefore might not always be accurate, rather, he has a pre-planned agenda and sorts his facts accordingly. Tibi goes on to explain: “[P]otentially nationalistic aspirations were directed against Ottoman foreign rule and found politico-religious expression in the Wahhabi movement.” One would never see such an adjective of “politico-religious” to describe the movement of al-Sanusi al-Kabir in its early days. Wahhab wanted to mobilize the Muslims for this “backward-looking utopia.” That Wahhab wanted to “mobilize” Muslims illustrates his militant tendencies. The mobilization that Wahhab desired was set upon the path to achievement through an alliance with the Banu Saud at its inception and reached its goal when Ibn Saud politically revived the Wahhabis in the 20th Century. Vikor, in a short summary of the Wahhabi movement astutely states “the political situation in Najd and the Hijaz area was conducive to the formation of a political alliance between Wahhab and Ibn Saud because each had his own strength,” respectively, religion and war. This entire theory of politics and religion in Wahhabism is further shown by the development of the paramilitary group, ikhwan, who both missionized and militarily settled the Arabian Desert. They elaborated the “Wahhabi religious dogma into an ideology of mobilization, by means of which they pacified rival tribes.” Gary Troeller agrees with this hypothesis in that he characterizes the ikhwan as a religio-military fundamentalist movement aimed at settling the nomadic Bedouin so as to subordinate them to central government authority. Tibi, however, believes that the ikhwan were traditionalists and not fundamentalists.

Tibi goes on to explain that Saudi Arabia is an Islam-legitimated monarchy. This means that the Al-Sauds were able to establish themselves as muluk through a claim that Islam wanted them that position in order to return to the Islam of the Prophet; their ‘stamp of approval’ from the Wahhabi lent them such a legitimacy in the eyes of the people and they were successful in taking control of what is today the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Tibi thinks that an “answer to the crisis of Islam — a return to the Ur-Islam of the Prophet — arose out of the desert from Wahhab calling for struggle versus the foreign domination of the Ottomans.” This statement is simplifying the Wahhabi movement once again. Tibi seeks to place Islam, as a religion in general, in a “crisis” situation while really it was only Wahhabi that saw this and who wanted to return to the Bedouin society of the Prophet.

Tibi places all of the credit (which sounds more like blame in some instances) on Wahhabi and his desire to preach his thinking. Rather, it was an alliance between the Wahhabi and the Al-Sauds that has brought Wahhabism to the masses and an appropriation by the Saudi Government to make Wahhabism their own. Majid Khadduri presents a very harsh description of the Wahhabi movement or “violent religious reform movement” as he calls it in his Origin and Development of Islamic Law. He summarizes that the aim of the Wahhabi was to “enforce Islamic law exclusively, to abolish the double system of administration of justice, and to outlaw customary and administrative law.” Khadduri seems to be judging the Wahhabi according to today’s standard rather than the contemporary social atmosphere. This is a novice mistake to make and as a result the Wahhabi are treated as backward fundamentalists of the late twentieth century, akin to the Taliban of Afghanistan, rather than a reform movement of the 20th Century.

One of the most important questions I will raise in this paper is just how similar are the foundations and the paths taken by the Sanusiyya and the Wahhabis. Both began with Ibn Taymiyya’s philosophy in mind but both diverged from this to develop distinct characteristics. The Sanusi were undoubtedly influenced by Sufism because al-Sanusi al-Kabir’s “most important influence was Moroccan mystic Ahmad Ibn Idris”, a renowned Sufi scholar. The Wahhabi tended to take a more puritanical and zealous view because they were not as exposed or inbred with a Western power as were the Sanusi with the Italians and the French. The Wahhabi were fighting an internal war while the Sanusi were fighting an external one.

Vikor tends to minimize the Wahhabi influence on the Sanusi and goes so far as to prove that the timelines do not concur. However, I see it as impossible that al-Sanusi al-Kabir was not exposed to the Arabian movement while in Mecca or the surrounding areas. Vikor states an “assumption sometimes made that drive to religious form in Morocco from Sultans and scholars in Fez was a result of the influence of the new reformist movement in Arabia — the Wahhabiya — yet the policies formulated by Sidi Mohamed from 1760-1790 cannot be from Wahhabi-time and influence did not allow it.” This is attempting to undermine the influence they had on Sanusi as his “intellectual upbringing” was in Fez. However, Vikor does say that some of Sanusi’s teachers were in contact with Wahhabis but that anti-Sufi Wahhabis were generally disliked. This shows that Vikor believes that only the ‘left-wing’ Wahhabi were influencing Sanusi and, therefore, can’t be classified as influences at all.

I see Vikor as being very assumptive in his dealings with Sufism and Sanusi. He states, “Whether or not Ibn Idris may be called a Neo-Sufi, a reformist or whatever, it is beyond a doubt that he was a Sufi first and foremost. Thus the Wahhabis acceptance of him means that they did not intend to stop Sufis from teaching.” I believe this to be an untrue statement because although the Wahhabi were unopposed to the Sanusi or Ibn Idris they did prove themselves to be very anti-Sufi and were adamant in their violent opposition to its presence on the Arabian Peninsula. E. E. Evans-Pritchard has a brilliant account of this symbiotic relationship as he says that “alone among the Sufi Orders, they [Wahhabi] have tolerated its [Sanusiyya] presence in the Hijaz.”

A study of Ibn Idris by Vikor and co-editors analyzes his doctrine with respect to the following aspects: his relation to Wahhabism and his attitude to Sufism. Ibn Idris saw the former as sound in its puritanical tendencies; however, he rejected the extremism that was inter-woven in the movement. He also accepted the sober Sufi tradition that is generally associated with Ghazzali. The latter is an interesting point because Ghazzali as well is a prominent influence upon Sanusi’s point-of-view. Ibn Idris also approved the pious dimension of Sufism (ie: the soul’s complete orientation on God) something Ibn Taymiyya rejected. This illustrates the different sources and ideologies that became part of one homogenized movement embodied by Sanusi. Ziadeh’s astute and well-researched work delves into this theme by saying Sanusiyya was a “revivalist movement in Islam within Islam alone. It accepted the pattern of Ibn Taymiyya and had it supplemented with teachings of Al-Ghazzali. In it there was no place for Muslim rationalistic schools of thought.” This tells of the Sanusiyya as a traditional and conventional group. Ziadeh also says: “The Sanusiyya grew out of a need, developed as a result of circumstances and became stronger under pressure.” This is an interesting statement, especially when one compares to the Wahhabi.

One could say that the Wahhabi too grew out of a need, but theirs was more calculated by one man. However, the manner in which they developed was not merely circumstance but due to a pre-arranged alliance and their strength grew out of their alliance with a politico-military power. The Wahhabi were a strictly religious group although theirs is a somewhat political history. I will delve into the religious aspect of it now, as it is more dealing with their perception of Islamic law and schools. Quamruddin Khan in his Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyah attributes Taymiya as the forerunner of the Wahhabi in saying “His works are regarded as having been greatly instrumental in the rise of Wahhabism and reformist movements [ie: Sanusiyya] in general in modern Islam.”  These works include a strong belief in the necessity of a united Muslim Ummah for the defense of Islam and the Muslims.  Also, he advocated Arabic as the lingua franca of the Muslim world, an idea we can see in Wahhabi’s ideology as well. Taymiyya also wanted to unite all Muslim nations in their beliefs and general aims, not necessarily their actual states.  This is a resounding idea with Sanusi in that he wanted to form one Muslim school in which all Muslims believed in the same rather than the “same difference”.

One can see the disillusionment of Khan with the direction of the Muslim state in his statement: “One great weakness was that he didn’t realize that religion was exploited and that it served only as a second fiddle to the state.”  This is an illustration of Khan’s understanding of the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance.  This was a relationship in which a religious movement was overtaken by a military power to further their political position rather than the religious intentions of the Wahhabi.  One can say that Taymiyya was the school that the Wahhabi followed at their inception but not that they grew into as a result of their alliance. In Khadduri’s treatise he discusses Taymiyya’s thoughts on the caliphate and the relationship that the caliph has with the sharia.

“Among the most vigorous critics of this doctrine [which amounted in effect to a complete divorce of the imamate from the sharia and the abandonment of the Law in favor of a secular absolutism] was Ibn Taymiyya, who in his effort to cleanse Islam of its accretions of heresy, deviations, and abuses, and to preach a return to the purity of early doctrine and practice, inevitably attacked the web of juristic argument regarding the caliphate. There is no obligation, he argued … upon all Muslims to recognize a single caliphate. The historic caliphate was a temporary institution.”

What the Wahhabi doctrine became as a result of their partnership with the Al-Saud was very much an antithesis of Taymiyya’s desire for such a school. He was advocating a temporary institution rather than a hereditary monarchy that used the religion to legitimate their rôle. However, Taymiyya’s school was not a thriving one and “from the 14th Century onwards seemed on the point of extinction, until the puritanical Wahhabi movement of the 18th Century, and especially the Wahhabi revival at the beginning of the present century, gave it a new lease on life … The Wahhabis have adopted the special doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya on Islamic theology and law.”

Sanusi too read and approved of Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas as proven by the long quotes in his works. The overlap between the reformist movements of the eighteenth century and present centuries is a foundation in the ideology of Ibn Taymiyya. Ziadeh discounts theories made by modern scholars who allege that the Sanusi were merely a copy of the Wahhabi. Rather, she states:

“Similarity of purpose rather than direct borrowing is to be discerned in the two movements. In each case the founder of the movement aimed at approval of the teachings of early Islam in his own times. From an historical, and possibly sociological point of view, it may be said that the founder of Wahhabism, as well as the founder of Sanusiyya, ignored the centuries that had elapsed between the advent of Islam and their own days. They seemed to think only in terms of the basic teachings of their faith.”

Ziadeh’s hypothesis astutely draws the two movements together without making them the same or one the “student” of the other. She does this understanding that the prototype for both movements was Ibn Taymiyya and that within his teachings was the pattern set for the revivalists. He was the one that started the puritan movement and provided the view that Muslims distinguished themselves by faith and their religious practices. Their purpose was the fulfillment of the will of God. These were the beliefs that Sanusi and Wahhab drew from to formulate their own ideas on what Islam should be and what needed to happen for it to attain such goals. King Idris I once told Knud Holmboe that “Senussi only aim at piety and nobility of heart”. This is an illustration of the aspirations of the revivalists in that they wished simply to lead lives according to God’s wishes However, as historians and analysts we must separate the desire from the reality and take an overview of what the two fully encompassed and the entire path taken by them.

Evans-Pritchard goes into great detail in alleging that the movements really weren’t similar except for some resemblance in their development from religious to political. However, nowhere does he mention Ibn Taymiyya or his ideology and thus I believe he was simply ignorant as to this philosophical link between the two. He states:

“[T]he grounds of like Puritanism, literalism and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. No great significance in such common characteristics. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their development from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples; the Ikhwan organization of the two have much in common and both ended in the formation of Emirates, or Islamic states.”

These “grounds” can all be substantiated in Taymiyya’s work as they are the similarities that Sanusi and Wahhab both took from Taymiyya, respectively. Both men were considered reformist in that they both felt the need to change the manner in which people were following Islam. They, especially Wahhab, felt that Muslims had been led astray and had fallen to worshipping icons and taken on other characteristics that were sinful according to his interpretation of Islam. Also, like Ibn Taymiyya both men believed in the supremacy of the Koran and the Sunna. This was not a ‘normal’ belief in their times and, therefore, can’t be seen as a coincidence. The trend that both share was an exposure to and a respect for the beliefs of Ibn Taymiyya. This was a respect that was carried over into each man’s ideology and movement.

“Both movements have created states based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have done only what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind.” (Evans-Pritchard) This quote allows me to connect the above discussion of religion with the modern trend of the state. Both the Sanusi and the Wahhabi movements were developed into state-sanctioned doctrine. The Sanusi became the monarchs of Libya although as Ziadeh points out “whatever political aspirations Sanusi had was a later development (beginning under Mahdi” although Sanusi did express the accepted view that Muslims had no business living under non-Muslim powers (an idea first expressed by ash-Shafi’I). The Wahhabi were enveloped into Saudi doctrine. Tibi, due to his pan-Arab tendencies, treats the movements as fundamentalist and regressive by stating “archaic direction taken by Wahhabi contributed to the formation of the Saudi state: in Libya the archaic Sanusiyya movement also led to the foundation of a state.” While he is rather harsh, Tibi highlights the similar paths of the movements. Both share a foundation and an ending although their body is somewhat different.

Ibn Saud once said: “We Muslims have the one, true faith, but Allah gave you [the West] the iron which is inanimate, amoral, neither prohibited nor mentioned in the Koran. We will use your iron but leave our faith alone.” The Sanusi and the Wahhabi both developed along similar lines although the Wahhabi were much more quickly engulfed in a political environment. “Saudis are a young dynasty whose kingdom was established through a union between the political and the sacral.” They did this from the instigation of the movement so it would survive. The reasons for this are the lack of Western presence on the Arabian Peninsula. As the Sanusi did have to contend with the Italians and the French, they were much more able to mobilize their people to fight the outsiders and so were in less need of another military power to aid them. The Wahhabi were more involved in tribal politics so were in need of an ally that could prove themselves militarily, and this is the beginning of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. As I have stated above, both movements borrowed heavily from Ibn Taymiyya, the Wahhabi more so than the Sanusi; such differences are due to the respective founders. The monarchies that resulted both embodied the desires of the founders, this is shown by the extreme piety of King Idris of Libya and the more nationalistic, although deeply religious, scope of the Al-Sauds.

Bibliography

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Black, Cyril, and L. Carl Brown, eds.  Modernization in the Middle East.  Princeton: Darwin Press, 1992.

Bogle, Emory C.  The Modern Middle East: From Imperialism to Freedom, 1800-1958.  New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996.

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Cooper, John, Ronald Nettler, and Mohamed Mahmoud, eds.  Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond. London: I.B.  Tauris, 1998.

Monshipuri, Mahmood.  Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East.  London: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

Von Grunebaum, G.E.  Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity.  Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962.

O’Kane, John, Bernd Radtke, Knut S. Vikor and R. S. O’Fahey. The Exoteric Ahmad Ibn Idris.  Boston: Brill, 2000.

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The Author:

1. Princess Alia El Senussi is a student in Brown University, in Providence, Rhode Island, USA. As the daughter of HRH Prince Idris El Senussi, the leader of the Sanusiyya movement, she has for most of her life been exposed to studies on the origins of the Sanusi movement and other movements within Islam.


January 24, 2002

False Reports of an Impending Libyan Deal to Compensate PA103 Victims Designed to Cool US Pressures on Qadhafi

Exclusive. From GIS resources in Tripoli and Washington DC. Highly-reliable sources within the entourage of Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi in Tripoli and senior US Government sources on January 23, 2002, vehemently denied that an accord had been tacitly agreed between Libya and the United States under which Libya would pay US$6-billion in compensation for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

The report was floated, citing an unnamed US senior official, in the newspaper USA Today on January 23, 2002. One source close to Qadhafi said that while discussion about compensation was being raised during ongoing US-Libyan diplomatic meetings, there was no question of Col. Qadhafi agreeing to any such payment, which would be tantamount to admitting guilt in the bombing incident. The newspaper report had said that a settlement would be announced after the appeal hearing by Libyan intelligence officer Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi, who had been convicted of complicity in the incident by a Scottish court. The outcome of the appeal is not expected for some months.

US intelligence sources speculated that the report may have been inspired by Libyan lobbyists in the US, or by political and/or oil circles keen to see momentum removed from current US Congressional and White House momentum which favors increased pressure on Col. Qadhafi. As well, informed US intelligence officials are aware that Libya was only part of the problem with the PA103 bombing: they want Qadhafi to acknowledge the Iranian and Syrian lead rôles in the incident.

In any event, Libyan sources note, Col. Qadhafi is personally unwilling to accept the concept of compensation for the PA103 victims because he believes that Libya is unjustly accused of the bombing. Despite this, a Libyan-appointed lawyer was meeting in January 2002 with victims' representatives in the US to discuss the concept of compensation. The move fuels the group within the US State Department which is attempting to force the White House and the Congress to accept a negotiated settlement of all accounts with Libya, and its removal from the terrorist list. Opponents of this State Department view in the White House and Congress argue that a settlement on PA103 still does not address other Libyan terrorist acts over the years, even though the State Department indicates that none of these, in the past decade, had been directed against US interests.


January 16, 2002

Qadhafi's Problems Persist, Fueling Belief That Compromise Solutions for the Future May be Possible

Exclusive. From GIS Correspondents in Benghazi, Tripoli and elsewhere. Reports from a number of reliable eye-witness reports have confirmed that Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has been increasingly suffering from poor health, although none of the new reports confirm the earlier reports in GIS to the effect that he could be suffering from leukemia. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, January 7, 2002: Libya at a Watershed as Qadhafi Attempts to Re-Define His Leadership.] As well, the Libyan leader has been increasingly frustrated by the activities of his children, who have now been reported to be quarreling and interfering with the activities of Qadhafi's traditionally most-important allies, including Minister for African Unity Ali Abdel-Salam al-Traiki.

GIS earlier also reported Col. Qadhafi's problems with one of his sons, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, who is in exile in Egypt. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, January 8, 2002: Reports of New Coup Attempt Against Qadhafi;  Militia of Qadhafi's Renegade Son Disbanded.]

Col. Qadhafi's health problems appear — apart from any suggestion that leukemia may be to blame — to be related to exhaustion. Instead of acting like a man in his early sixties, several sources have said that he seems more like a man in his late seventies. He has also mentioned his dissatisfaction with the behavior of his sons.

The reports fuel speculation that Col. Qadhafi may be closer to agreeing to a compromise solution which would allow him to retire from office with safety and dignity, possibly in the knowledge that none of his sons — even his eldest and nominated heir, Saif al-Islam — cannot expect to assume power fully in their own right. Increasingly, officials and military officers are claiming allegiance to Libya's traditional Muslim sect, the Sanussi, which places the effective leader of the Sanussiyah, Prince Idris al-Senussi, in a key position to work toward a peaceful transition of power from the Qadhafi era. Prince Idris, currently in Washington DC, has been undertaking a wide range of contacts with key US officials, despite the fact that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has — according to Libyan sources — been quietly supporting a military officer as a potential candidate for power.

The Saudi Government, which once had given extensive financial support to the opposition National Salvation Front, but had not done so for some years, especially since most of the Front's military members had been moved to exile in the US. However, in the past few months, the Saudi Government had apparently resumed some financing of the Front. Significantly, the Front has now become avowedly Sanussi in its orientation, and it was understood that the Saudi leadership (ie: those around Crown Prince Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud) had now moved toward support for Prince Idris al-Senussi as the next Libyan leader. 

At the same time, however, Qadhafi has expressed optimism that he is "making a breakthrough" in negotiations with the United States Government, despite the recent extension of the unilateral US embargo against Libya. And while he has claimed that the recent contacts with US officials represent progress, US officials, including the key State Department officer charged with overseeing the contacts, Assistant Secretary of State William Burns, have indicated that no progress was likely to be made on easing relations with Libya until the Libyan Government agreed on compensation for the victims of the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103.

Libya cannot afford, however, to make the compensation offer without implying acceptance of the charge that it was responsible for the PA103 bombing, and as yet it is not ready to give details — which Western officials know that it has — of the real sponsors of the PA103 bombing: Iran and Syria. Nonetheless, despite refraining from implicating Syria and Iran, Qadhafi's position among some Middle Eastern leaders is also suffering at present. Some Middle Eastern media reports — particularly in Al-Hayat newspaper — in mid-January 2002 indicated that Qadhafi would be "assassinated" if he visited Lebanon. There is particular vitriol among Shi'ites in Lebanon toward Qadhafi for his alleged involvement in the alleged assassination of a Lebanese Shi'ite cleric, Imam Musa al-Sadr, the founder of the AMAL militia, in 1978. [Musa al-Sadr disappeared during a visit to Libya, although Libyan authorities claim that he had, in fact, left for Lebanon, where he never arrived.]

This almost certainly accounted for the rationale behind the statement by Arab League Secretary General Amr Mousa on January 13, 2002, that a number of Arab countries had supported Libya's demand to hold the upcoming Arab League summit in Cairo instead of Beirut. He said Arab leaders were quietly consulting each other to resolve this issue. Mousa told reporters in Beirut that there was a consensus on holding the summit in March 2002 but the Libyans have "officially proposed moving the summit from Beirut to Cairo". Mousa said "some Arab countries have approved the Libyan point of view" but he refused to name them.

In other, related events, US Federal agents on January 9, 2002, arrested a German pilot accused of offering to buy military cargo aircraft and aircraft engines for Libya. Klaus Ernst Buhler of Dusseldorf, Germany, was taken into custody, according to a criminal complaint filed in federal court on January 10, 2002. Before his arrest, Buhler said his Libyan connections, including a best friend whom he described as a personal assistant to Qadhafi, offered to buy six CH-47C Chinook helicopter engines —  2,796-kW (3,750-shp) T55-L-11 turboshaft engines — and parts for $5.6-million. Libya's CH-47Cs are among the few in the world yet to be upgraded to CH-47D status. He said he also wanted two entire Lockheed Martin C-130 cargo aircraft and other parts in the future, although a price was not discussed. The Libyan Air Force currently operates seven Lockheed C-130H Hercules, two Lockheed L-100-20 Hercules, two Lockheed L-100-30 Hercules transports, and has had difficulty obtaining spares.


Libya is also suffering from significant economic problems following the protracted low price of oil. Libya's devaluation in early January 2002 of the dinar rate has made the purchase of consumer goods — all of which must be imported — considerably more difficult for Libyans. Libya confirmed that it had devalued the rate of the dinar by 51 percent to 1.3 dinars to the dollar, from 0.65 previously. The Central Bank has claimed that it undertook the devaluation to more realistically value the currency and to thereby undermine black market currency operators.


The arrival in Tripoli on January 11, 2002, of a Libyan envoy arrived in Islamabad, Pakistan, was ostensibly to convey Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's concern about the rising tensions between Pakistan and India. Envoy Salem Ibrahim Ben-Amer was to deliver the message for Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf on January 12, 2002, and was expected to convey Col. Qadhafi's concern at the build-up of troops on the Indo-Pakistani borders and to urge for a de-escalation of the tension. However, it was also known that Libya had been negotiating with Pakistan for the release of some Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida officials into Libyan custody.


January 8, 2002

Reports of New Coup Attempt Against Qadhafi;  Militia of Qadhafi's Renegade Son Disbanded

Exclusive. From GIS Station Benghazi and other sources. There were, at the beginning of January 2002, disturbances around Benghazi which the Government attributed to the disbanding of the 77th Militia, the group which was the private militia of Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's son, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, who is currently in exile in Egypt. The militia resisted break-up and had to be forcibly disbanded, which did, in fact, lead to the establishment of road blocks around Benghazi. However, at about the same time, and totally separately, a group in Benghazi reportedly attempted a coup against Qadhafi. This apparently occurred in early January 2002, and failed. Arrests were subsequently made in Benghazi, Tobruq, Misratah, Tripoli and Tarquna. No details as yet as to who may have initiated the coup, but the fact that it occurred from a Benghazi base indicates a Sanussiyyah connection.

There were also unsubstantiated reports in late December 2001 of another attempted assassination of Col. Qadhafi. This, however, may have been the same incident for which reports were received at the beginning of January 2002. While there may have been an attempt, it was clearly unsuccessful. Col. Qadhafi’s entire approach to leadership consists of relying to the least degree possible on personal trust of any officials, and on constantly re-structuring what has always been an amorphous and fluid form of government. His trust of family members is only marginally greater, in some instances, than his trust even of Gadadfa tribal loyalists. His mistrust has been well placed: In 1998 or 1999, one of his sons, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, reportedly attempted to kill him in an issue over a girl. Nonetheless, Dr Moatasam, currently residing in Egypt, had maintained his own militia (believed to be less than 1,000 men), originally devoted to protecting his father’s administration. This militia, known as the 77th Militia, was disbanded at the beginning of 2002, by order of Col. Qadhafi, although many members of the militia resisted the disbandment order.

Saif al-Islam — the eldest son of Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, and his nominated heir — maintains the most important militia unit, of around 1,000 men, and this unit, perhaps more than most, acts as the key mobile armed force designed to provide security for the administration, particularly against a possible military coup. What is significant about Saif al-Islam’s militia is that it is aggressively Wahabbist in style; that is, it is radical and bonded by an approach which, for example, favors the kind of activities undertaken by the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. This particularly sets it at odds with the overall Libyan community.

A third brother, Sa’adi, also maintains a militia believed to number no more than 1,000 men, also functioning to support his father.

A fourth brother, Engineer Mohammed, who is from a different mother to Saif al-Islam, Moatasam, Sa’adi, Hannibal and Aisha (whose mother, Safiya, comes from the key Bara’asa tribe, near Beida), is regarded as the most conservative of Qadhafi’s sons, and is understood not to control his own militia.

Hannibal, the youngest son of Qadhafi, does not maintain his own militia, but essentially works directly with Col. Qadhafi, maintaining control over his immediate security.

Aisha, Qadhafi’s daughter, is understood to have no direct rôle in the leadership.


January 7, 2002

Libya at a Watershed as Qadhafi Attempts to Re-Define His Leadership

Analysis. With input from GIS stations and sources in Tripoli and elsewhere. Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi undertook a number of key movements of key officials in the latter days of 2001, amid reports — disputed by some sources — that his health was now questionable. GIS undertook an overview study on the Libyan situation, now believed to be at a watershed, with a view to determining possible events in, and connected with, the country.

  1. Notes on Sources and Methods: This report was compiled in Washington DC. Extensive use was made of the GIS internal research files in Washington, accumulated from open and sensitive sources since 1972. Extensive use was also made of our Libyan network of regular informants and specialists, mostly Libyan citizens based inside the country but also using our own and other networks of Libyans controlled from outside the country. These include both dissidents and pro-leadership sources, including sources extremely close to the leadership. Senior officials of several other countries with close relations with Libya, and who have been known to us for many years, were also engaged for unwitting (ie: with no knowledge of purpose) input into the following distillation of information and analysis.

  1. Observations on the Current Libyan Situation: Libya’s current situation is not only extremely complex, but has, since in the latter part of 2001, entered a unique new phase which has exacerbated and further complicated the risk/opportunity equation. Control of the country is essentially a function of tribal balances, despite the fact that a coup d’etat by junior military officers in 1969 placed Qadhafi in power, replacing King Idris I. Suppression of the Libyan Armed Forces is, in many ways, as concerted as suppression of the Libyan population, which is why Qadhafi has never taken a rank higher than colonel, and has suppressed all formal systemic structures within the country as far as feasible.
  2. The fact that Qadhafi is known as "Brother Leader" or "Brother Colonel", and has eschewed any formal leadership titles, starts to give an indication of the combination of dictatorial and anarchic style — combining fear with uncertainty — with which Qadhafi controls Libya. The result is a situation of extreme fragility which has persisted and been exacerbated literally since the coup of 1969. The fact that the condition has endured for three decades does not diminish its essential fragility, but does help explain the gradual and — under present conditions — persistent decline in the efficiency of the country’s sole industry: the energy sector. Qadhafi essentially and deliberately, starting in the late 1970s, began a process of "dismantling the state", so that there is, in fact, no formal government, and it is this which makes systemic change difficult (given that there is no formal system other than the decrees of the Brother Leader). He created a new pseudo-concept for the country, that of what he called the Jamahiriyya, which is not to be confused with the Arabic word "Gomhouria", which sounds similar and means "republic". Jamahiriyya, the word created by Qadhafi, is meant to mean, essentially "rule of the masses", but in reality, in Libya, means the rule by fiat or whim of Qadhafi.

    On Revolution Day, September 1, 1988, Col. Qadhafi announced that the Army and Government bodies were to be dismantled. Instead of the traditional army, a voluntary "Jamahiri Guard" was to be installed by the people, a plan which met with problems. Likewise, the Government bodies would be replaced by organizations set up by the people. The "People’s Guard", as it is also known, consists of conscripted officers and the police, thus not affecting the top five positions of the Army, which sources state have remained the same. The Air Force and the Navy were to be exempt from the dismantling process due to the difficulty of training volunteers on a part-time basis. The Guard is employed on a voluntary basis, on full pay.

    Libya's General People’s Congress (parliament) on December 28, 2001, named Shokri Ghanem as the new Economy and Foreign Trade Minister, replacing Abdessalam Ejuweir. Shokri Ghanem had worked in recent years as director of research of OPEC at its headquarters in Vienna. The next day, an entirely new Cabinet was named, ostensibly by the People’s Congress, but in reality by Col. Qadhafi. It was listed as follows:

    Prime Minister: Mubarak al-Shamekh
    Deputy Prime Minister: Abdullah al-Badri
    Deputy Prime Minister for Production: Baghdadi Mahmudi
    Deputy Prime Minister for Services: Ammar Altaef
    Minister of Justice and General Security: Mohammed Mosrati
    Minister for African Unity: Ali Abdel-Salam al-Traiki
    Foreign Minister: Adel-Rahman Shalgam
    Finance Minister: Ajili Brini
    Minister of Economy and Trade: Shokri Mohammed Ghanem.

    The appointment of the new Finance Minister, Ajili Brini, was also significant. The new Minister earned his PhD in the United States, and his appointment is considered a gesture to the international investment community.

  3. National Underpinnings: Re-Emerging to Determine Future Shape. Libya is a Muslim country, but in its form of Islam is essentially and diametrically opposed to the form of Islamic practice of, for example, Saudi Arabia. Libya’s indigenous Senussi form of Islam is moderate, accommodating/tolerant and Sufic, deriving from the same origins as Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism; both sects sprang from the same concept of restoring Islamic legitimacy. However, Wahabbism evolved as extreme, intolerant, proselytizing and aggressive. The Saudi-Libyan connection today is critical, because of Col. Qadhafi’s essential opposition to, and suppression of, the Sanussiyyah, whose leadership (King Idris I; Idris al-Sanussi) he overthrew in 1969. Some imported "Islamist" (ie: essentially Wahabbist) militants who had mounted hostility toward Qadhafi, and had been implicated in some attempted assassinations of him, were briefly supported by some within the Sanussiyyah majority — particularly in the devout Eastern sector around Benghazi — only out of frustration with Qadhafi. However, Qadhafi had effectively in recent years paid off the Islamists (and continues to do so with financial support for al-Qaida-related groups through the end of 2001), leaving the Sanussiyyah continuing in their opposition quite separately from any taint of Islamism.
  4. The Sanussiyyah movement embraces virtually all the tribes of Libya, including the Gadadfa,1 the tribe of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi. Thus, the two critical elements underpinning the pivotal power struggles now underway in Libya are the Sanussiyyah and the tribes. The reasons for the resurgence of the power struggles are explained below. In essence, however, virtually all the tribes, including the Gadadfa (who have benefited significantly from their proximity to Qadhafi), are now ready to see Qadhafi removed under certain conditions (which vary from tribe to tribe), and there has been a concurrent and related rise in the authority of the Sanussiyyah movement, now led by a grand nephew of King Idris, Prince Idris al-Senussi,2 currently operating from exile. The inclusion now of the Gadadfa in the opposition to Qadhafi completes the jigsaw.

  5. Resurgent US Opposition to Qadhafi. The Government of the United States was seen as the spearhead of the international community’s move to contain and restrain Libya through United Nations-sponsored sanctions which resulted from Libyan involvement in international terrorism. This was correct, but in reality, other than maintaining the sanctions, the US did little to actually destabilize Qadhafi since the end of the Reagan Administration. However, it was the events during this period, specifically in 1986, which have a major bearing on oil and gas exploration and exploitation today in the Gulf of Sidra.
  6. Major events in Libya in 1986 involved a confrontation with the United States, which had branded Libya as a major supporter of international terrorism. In March, the US Sixth Fleet conducted maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra, deliberately violating Qadhafi’s "line of death" at 32 deg. 30 min. North, covered by three aircraft carriers, the Saratoga, Coral Sea, and America. When Libya fired surface-to-air missiles (including its newly-received SA-5s), US Navy aircraft hit the SA-5 base at Sirte and attacked Libyan naval vessels in the Gulf. The US exercise, code-named Prairie Fire, appeared to have been deliberately designed to provoke Libya. [This affair remains of pre-eminent importance to the Libyan oil and gas industry, as noted below in Point 10. The Libyan Oil and Gas Industry.]

    The March 1986 confrontations undoubtedly provoked a stepped-up Libyan campaign of subversion abroad; in any event, when evidence linked Libya to the bombing of a Berlin discotheque, which was patronized by US servicemen, the US struck back. On the night of April 14-15, US naval aircraft combined with Air Force F-111s staging out of the UK struck at Tripoli and Benghazi. Among the targets was the Bab al ‘Aziziyya barracks and Qadhafi’s headquarters, and the Libyan leader’s personal quarters were hit. The attack on Qadhafi’s home led to speculation that the US was trying to target the Libyan leader personally. In any event, Qadhafi retreated inland to Sebha and remained out of sight for most of the Summer, while the old Revolutionary Command Council survivors emerged again into prominence.

    The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) then supported the opposition National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), which it arranged to be financially supported by Saudi Arabia and then-ally Iraq. This armed movement was based in Chad. The Libyan National Army was largely moribund inside Chad until 1990, when a change of government in Chad meant that they were no longer welcome. They were airlifted out of Chad by the US Air Force, operating in support of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to Nigeria, then to Zaïre and then to Kenya, before finally being brought to the US for resettlement. Significantly, the NFSL, although re-settled in the US by the CIA, is no longer CIA-supported, and, under new leadership, has signified in late 2001 for the first time that it supports and is part of the Sanussiyyah opposition to Qadhafi, and supportive of Prince Idris al-Senussi.

    The UN sanctions against Libya were lifted in 1999, as the internal report correctly stated. However, unilateral US sanctions against Libya remained in place and were, in November 2001, reaffirmed by the US Bush Administration. The internal report said that the US in June 2000, under the Clinton Administration, reclassified Libya from "rogue state" to a "state of concern". This was an entirely semantic distinction, and did not alter US attitudes at all. The reaffirmation of the unilateral US sanctions in November 2001 is, however, highly significant and means that, despite the UN waiver, any firm doing business in Libya essentially cannot also do business in the US. The US position further hardened in November and December 2001, when key US officials, particularly Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, reiterated that Libya, as a state which harbored or sponsored terrorism, would be a target of the US in the "war on terrorism". Essentially, however, the attitude of the US Department of State and CIA remained one of "no action", despite the revival of strong and seemingly unequivocal rhetoric from the Bush Administration. State and CIA resisted any move to translate this into specific actions. That position, however, began to change in late December 2001, not because of any change of attitude in State or the CIA, but because the Administration had now become insistent.

    At the same time, Col. Qadhafi had been for some time attempting to find an intermediary who could help him have the US sanctions lifted. He sent a message of condolence to the US after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, and pushed through the Government of Nigeria to have direct meetings with US officials. US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East William Burns, as a result, met in London (along with British Secret Intelligence Service [SIS] and Foreign & Commonwealth Office [FCO] and US CIA officials) with Libyan intelligence chief Moussa Koussa3 in early October 2001. This meeting has variously been reported as a major breakthrough (by those in the US who want to see a normalization of bilateral relations so that US participation in the Libyan energy sector can resume), and as a disaster (by Assistant Secretary Burns, speaking privately). In any event, no substantive progress was made because the Libyans would not agree to compensation for the victims of Pan Am flight 103. Libya’s pending appeal against the conviction of one of its intelligence officials for complicity in the PA103 terrorist attack of 1988 meant that it could/would not discuss compensation which would be an admission of culpability. Without such a commitment, however, the US would not, in any event, lift the sanctions. Libyan officials saw the talks as a success simply because they happened, creating an opening for further discussion.

    Meanwhile, however, during the November 2001 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) emergency summit in Doha, Qadhafi, in a private gathering of delegates, said that Osama bin Laden was a hero for attacking the US, and essentially ensured through this that the US would not give him the benefit of the doubt.

    That is not to say that the US Government and the US oil and gas industry is not anxious for a resolution of the Libya problem. There is renewed concern within the Bush Administration over the potential for instability in Saudi Arabia which could jeopardize stability in energy markets. The major oilfields of Libya, Nigeria, Angola and Venezuela, and the lesser Atlantic producers, are now of prime concern to the US. The US oil infrastructure in Libya, virtually all mothballed when seized by Qadhafi, lies unproductive, and those concessions and the equipment associated with them cannot be exploited by Libya. Any foreign producer which takes over a US concession or US systems in Libya is subject to US legal remedies, which means that none of the majors currently working in Libya are prepared to access this important niche of the Libyan energy resources. The German producer, Wintershall, deeply involved in Libyan oil production, sought in 2001 to take over some of the US assets in Libya and was informed by the US Government that it would be sued for US$15-billion if it attempted to seize the assets which Washington still regarded as US property.

  7. The Health of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi. Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has for some years reportedly been suffering from what had been believed to have been an undiagnosed illness. In fact, it seems likely that the Colonel’s reported illness has been known for some time: Leukemia. The specific type of leukemia is, however, not known. He underwent a complete blood change in Germany in 1978, but has only in the past two years reportedly exhibited increasingly severe symptoms of the disease. He was reported to have suffered, during 2001, at least four or five major collapses, during which he went into comas lasting sometimes longer than five hours. During the latter months of 2001 he has been noticed by close family and colleagues to have been showing signs of constant fatigue, a symptom often associated with leukemia as white cell counts diminish energy levels. It has been reported that he faints regularly. His health outlook, based on these reports, seems at best uncertain, although he has gone to great lengths to disguise symptoms of his condition.
  8. However, equally highly-placed sources said at the end of December 2001 that they believed that Col. Qadhafi’s "illness" was, in fact, feigned, and that the reports of his illness had been leaked as part of a disinformation campaign. The purpose of such a disinformation campaign is uncertain, and, indeed, those well-placed sources who report noting symptoms of the alleged illness claim that the reports of a "disinformation campaign" were in fact disinformation, designed to discredit the reports of the illness. Clearly, however, questions have been raised as to Col. Qadhafi’s health.

    Meanwhile, secret British official papers from 1971, released on January 2, 2002, in London, showed that the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) thought that Col. Qadhafi had lost control of the Revolutionary Council in Tripoli in 1971 and was about to be overthrown. British diplomats reported that Qadhafi had twice been the target of assassination attempts, he had had a severe nervous breakdown, and had at one stage tried to kill himself. The files were released at the Public Record Office at Kew in south-west London. A 1971 Foreign Office file has reports from British diplomats that the colonel spent three weeks in a Cairo clinic, staffed by Belgian doctors, being treated for a complete breakdown, in February and March of that year. The Libyan people were told that he was in a remote area of Libya looking at farm projects.

  9. The Issue of Leadership Succession. Col. Qadhafi has said repeatedly during recent years that he wanted his eldest son, Saif al-Islam, to succeed him as Libyan leader. However, Col. Qadhafi has resisted giving Saif al-Islam significant leadership responsibility, and Saif al-Islam has equally demonstrated in some of his dealings that he lacked the leadership presence and strength of his father. Nonetheless, Saif al-Islam has been entrusted with diplomatic and political missions of increasing responsibility in late 2001. He was the key official engaged in actions in 2001 by Qadhafi to pay off key terrorist leaders, ostensibly for releasing kidnapped hostages in the Philippines (Abu Sayyaf: paid US$25-million) and Afghanistan (Taliban/al-Qaida). Qadhafi’s claims that he was using his good offices to resolve tense confrontations between terrorist groups and host or opposing governments has, however, been seen as merely providing another method in which Qadhafi could funnel monies to the terrorist groups. This has reinforced the belief that he has not abandoned his support for terrorist organizations. [Indeed, as late as July 2001, Qadhafi funneled US$25-million to an al-Qaida affiliated organization. In November 2001, he paid the Taliban (and/or al-Qaida; it remains unclear) substantial monies to release missionaries and others inside Afghanistan. Saif al-Islam undertook this mission ostensibly to help the German Government.]

Despite his growing activity, Saif al-Islam is aware that he lacks sufficient powerbase and parental support to take over the reins of leadership as long as his father wishes to remain in charge. He is known to wish to effect a change as soon as possible, and has entered into communications to that effect through Saudi Arabian and other conduits. He has signaled that he would entertain a partnership with Sanussiyyah leader Prince Idris al-Senussi, and although Prince Idris has not responded to this initiative, it is known that the Saudi Government (or at least part of it, under Crown Prince Abdullah, who now effectively represents the Saudi leadership) has acted to attempt to facilitate this. The three other sons of Qadhafi, discussed below [see: Domestic Security Issues, Point 7, below], basically have no real power base to enter the succession situation as things presently stand.

One of the things which has been discussed in some circles is some kind of condominium arrangement in which either Saif al-Islam becomes leader and Prince Idris becomes Prime Minister or some special portfolio holder; or in which Prince Idris succeeds to the Libyan throne and Saif al-Islam becomes Prime Minister. There is no indication that Prince Idris would accept either solution, and nor is there real expectation that Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi would accept such options, despite the fact that he has himself proposed Prince Idris’ return to head up a special portfolio designed to help restore Libyan acceptability internationally and to use Prince Idris’ special contacts with world oil companies to start bringing back US investment. Qadhafi has made comments from time to time indicating that he wanted Saif al-Islam to succeed him, but all close to Qadhafi note that he changes his mind with stunning rapidity and would likely repudiate any transfer of power, even to his son, even on his deathbed. Saif al-Islam is clearly (from his comments) aware of this and has hinted that he would be prepared to give a nudge to his father at the appropriate time.

"The appropriate time" may well be approaching, if reports of Col. Qadhafi’s deteriorating health prove to be correct.

Late December 2001 saw a number of key people connected with Libya scrambling to prepare for Qadhafi’s death or removal through ill health. It is generally conceded that Saif al-Islam could not retain power by himself, and there are few other candidates currently within the country who are known to be in a position to be acceptable to all factions. Prince Idris, by virtue of his leadership of the Sanussiyyah, has, over the past 20 years, built up the greatest consensus of support among the various tribes (including the Gadadfa), the Armed Forces, and the Libyan community. He is presently (December 27, 2001) in the United States, having moved from his Rome residence in November 2001 to work with US leaders to prepare for a possible opportunity in Libya.

Saif al-Islam was, as at December 24, 2001, in Pakistan, where he was working to press the Government of Pakistan to release to his care (for transport back to Libya) any al-Qaida members who had been detained crossing into the country.

The unknown factors include:

  • (i) The prospect of a middle-level or junior-level military coup if and when Qadhafi’s illness or death provides an opportunity. This would hold the most chance of success and durability, but may not have international acceptance, which may diminish its prospects;
  • (ii) The prospect of an attempted putsch by Saif al-Islam, perhaps in cooperation with one or more of his brothers, to pre-emptively retire Qadhafi before his illness removes their chances of succession;
  • (iii) The prospect that one or other military or family candidates could be assisted in forcing a transition (or capitalising on the death of Qadhafi) by the Government and Armed Forces of Egypt. Egypt [see: Egypt, below] remains a key factor in the Libyan situation, and the Egyptian Government is clearly aware of Qadhafi’s health condition and the possibility of imminent change;
  • (iv) The prospect that Qadhafi, resisting any erosion of his power (which is currently the case) would himself pre-emptively attempt to remove potential suitors for succession. Qadhafi has already, in November 2001, undertaken purges of officials — particularly those from Benghazi, in Cyrenaica, the hotbed of the Sanussiyyah — on a variety of pretexts, almost all usually involved allegations of "corruption";
  • (v) The prospect that, assuming Qadhafi retains control for a further six months to a year, the United States would undertake military strikes against Libya in a way which would affect the behavior of either Qadhafi or potential successors.
  1. Domestic Security Issues: There were unsubstantiated reports in late December 2001 of another attempted assassination of Col. Qadhafi. While there may have been an attempt, it was clearly unsuccessful. Col. Qadhafi’s entire approach to leadership consists of relying to the least degree possible on personal trust of any officials, and on constantly re-structuring what has always been an amorphous and fluid form of government. His trust of family members is only marginally greater, in some instances, than his trust even of Gadadfa tribal loyalists. His mistrust has been well placed: In 1998 or 1999, one of his sons, Dr Moatasam al-Qadhafi, reportedly attempted to kill him in an issue over a girl. Nonetheless, Dr Moatasam, currently residing in Egypt, maintains his own militia (believed to be less than 1,000 men), devoted to protecting his father’s administration.
  2. Saif al-Islam maintains the most important militia unit, of around 1,000 men, and this unit, perhaps more than most, acts as the key mobile armed force designed to provide security for the administration, particularly against a possible military coup. What is significant about Saif al-Islam’s militia is that it is aggressively Wahabbist in style; that is, it is radical and bonded by an approach which, for example, favors the kind of activities undertaken by the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. This particularly sets it at odds with the overall Libyan community.

    A third brother, Sa’adi, also maintains a militia believed to number no more than 1,000 men, also functioning to support his father.

    A fourth brother, Engineer Mohammed, who is from a different mother4 to Saif al-Islam, Moatasam, Sa’adi, Hannibal and Aisha (whose mother,5 Safiya, comes from the key Bara’asa tribe, near Beida), is regarded as the most conservative of Qadhafi’s sons, and is understood not to control his own militia.

    Hannibal, the youngest son of Qadhafi, does not maintain his own militia, but essentially works directly with Col. Qadhafi, maintaining control over his immediate security.

    Aisha, Qadhafi’s daughter, is understood to have no direct rôle in the leadership.

    Apart from the "family militias", the Armed Forces are effectively divided into units which have little more capability than militias. This accounts to a large extent for the poor performance of the Libyan Army in conflicts with Chad and Chadian-based rebels. However, such "divide and rule" policies tend to make it more difficult for the Armed Forces to stage a coup. It has been a long-standing practice to divide the military units not only from ammunition for their weapons, but also from any significant transport capability. By dividing troops from ammunition and mobility, their ability to stage a coup is minimized, but at the same time any effective suppression of uprisings is made more difficult.

    Qadhafi has attempted, where possible, to "buy off" opponents, constantly making offers to opponents in exile, even though by now it is apparent that he rarely intends any real rapprochement. Attempted encroachments by radical Islamists, who originally came in from Sudanese support bases (funded and trained, in many instances, by Iran), were ultimately minimized by Qadhafi’s ongoing payments to many of the groups (including al-Qaida), and a strong working relationship with the clerical leadership of Iran, with whom Qadhafi worked to assist in the destruction of Pan Am flight 103, among other things.

    However, despite (and because of) Qadhafi’s care in constantly shaking up and dividing the armed forces, he has built little or no loyalty in the Services. One of his sons, in 2001, in front of many officers, insulted one of the three Service chiefs and slapped his face.

    7(a) The NFSL. The National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), which was persuaded to leave Chad in 1990, has been regarded as no longer being a factor in Libyan internal security. However, this is a mistake. Many NFSL members, while now residing in the US, have maintained and strengthened their ties back into Libya, and effectively provide a network which links into the Armed Forces. The long-standing NFSL leader, Dr Mohamed Megariaf, retired in 2001, and was replaced by a more flexible leader, Ibrahim Sahad, a follower of the Sanussiyyah.

    7(b). The Position of Maj. ‘Abd al-Salam Jallud. The coup of 1969 put in place what seemed initially to be a duumvirate between Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi and ‘Abd al-Salam Jallud, although Jallud was seen in a secondary rôle (Qadhafi promoted himself to Colonel; Jallud to Major). Jallud, who was very close to the Italian leaderships and intelligence services for many years, was seen as fairly profligate (financially and to an even great extent than Qadhafi, sexually), was increasingly seen as a challenge to Qadhafi. Jallud’s tribe, the Megarha, felt that Jallud was being marginalised and, essentially, declared war on the Gadadfa tribe of Qadhafi in the 1980s. The result was that Jallud’s power eroded completely and he was confined under house arrest.

    There were indications in late 2001, however, that Maj. Jallud was again in a position of greater flexibility (ie: he may no longer be under house arrest), and attempting to restore some access to power. It may be that Qadhafi will entertain some greater rôle for Jallud in order to win support from the Megarha, but it is unlikely that he will ever regain any real power.

  3. International Security Issues: There is growing evidence to suggest that Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, starting in about October 2001, began using the Western preoccupation with the war against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan to redouble his overt and covert efforts to assume a position of strategic dominance in Africa and to a lesser extent in the Middle East.

Equally, there is evidence that he has not diminished his antagonism toward the United States and United Kingdom, despite overtures to both countries to support their "war on terrorism". As well, there is strong evidence to suggest that the Libyan chemical and biological warfare and ballistic missile programs have in no way been curtailed, but have, in fact, been re-located and expanded.6

High-level Libyan sources in Tripoli, Benghazi and elsewhere have also indicated that Col. Qadhafi believes that the US and UK now need him and will move toward a normalization of political, diplomatic and trade relations without Libya having to abandon its new political, intelligence and military penetrations of sub-Saharan Africa. While discussing with the US the prospect of bringing moderates into his Government, Col. Qadhafi has, the sources say, moved to expand the purge on potential adversaries, and particularly to imprison under a variety of charges officials from the Benghazi district of Cyrenaica region, traditionally the home of the moderate Sanussi Muslim movement and opponents of Qadhafi.

The Qadhafi Administration has for several years been attempting to reach out to the UK, US and European governments to devise a rapprochement, and at the same time had been making overtures to key opponents abroad, ostensibly for the same purpose. However, he has been actively involved, concurrently, in attempting to purge Libya of his opponents, often — as with the current case of his "anti-corruption" drive — under the guise of pursuing legality and honesty in government.7

During the first week of October 2001, the head of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO), Moussa Koussa3 and several other Libyan officials, met in London with US and British diplomatic and intelligence officials. [US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) officers were involved in the meetings.] The meetings, arranged partially through the communications good offices of a neutral African state, was ostensibly to discuss — according to the US State Department — "Libya’s response to the remaining requirements of the UN resolutions on Lockerbie, in particular to accept responsibility for the actions of its officials and to pay appropriate compensation". A UK Foreign Office spokeswoman described the meeting as "positive and constructive". However, the fundamental purpose of the meeting was, from the Libyan perspective, to ensure that the US and UK removed the last major barriers to normalization of relations, so that Libya could pursue major US oil company participation in the country.

Ostensibly, also, the Libyan delegation offered to supply intelligence to the US and UK on radical Islamist organizations, although what was offered or provided was carefully crafted to target those groups which had opposed Qadhafi himself, such as the Fighting Islamic Group (FIG), which claimed responsibility for two attempts on Col. Qadhafi’s life in 1995 and 1998. The UK-based newspaper, The Sunday Times, On October 7, 2001, said that "A Libyan intelligence official was welcomed in London last week by the Foreign Office as part of the coalition against terrorism. Moussa Koussa, head of Libya’s external security organization, held talks with MI6 and the Central Intelligence Agency. Mohammed Azwai, the Libyan ambassador in London, said Koussa had handed over a list of more than a dozen Libyans operating in Britain suspected of links to Osama Bin Laden." Significantly, however, as Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted on October 31, 2001, Col. Qadhafi had, in July 2001, still been sending payments to support the activities of affiliates of al-Qaida, the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization. At that time he sent $25-million.

At the same time, the Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report of October 31, 2001, said, Col. Qadhafi had told a private meeting of delegates to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Doha, on October 10, 2001, that he thought that Osama bin Laden had proven himself a "true hero" through his attacks on the US on September 11, 2001. He also told the OIC gathering in its private session — which he had requested — that the rest of the Muslim world should be ashamed of themselves for not having done something similar earlier.

The US, in its search to find new allies in the war against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida had, US sources confirmed, deliberately turned a blind eye to ongoing Libyan radical or terrorist-related activities around the world, and particularly in Africa. The US had, according to media reports (including a BBC report of October 31, 2001), been in high-level contact with officials from Syria and Sudan, as well as Libya, to seek their cooperation in the "war on terrorism".

Libya’s efforts have not been wasted. On November 5, 2001, a former senior US official, Robert Pelletreau, who was Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs from 1994 to 1997 and a former ambassador to Egypt and Tunisia, presumably acting on the basis of information received, indicated that the US could ease sanctions against Libya in 2002 as part of a broader effort to reform a unilateral sanctions policy and in return for recent cooperation against terrorism. Libya, he indicated, had provided intelligence on al-Qaida terrorist network to US Government officials and had cooperated with the UN in the Lockerbie [Pan Am 103 bombing] trial. "The stage seems set for further progress," Pelletreau said in remarks at the US-Africa Business Summit. US oil company executives’ hopes of meeting Libyan representatives at the African-US business summit were dashed because the US State Department did not allow Libyans to attend the summit. "An application was indeed made by the Libyans and was turned down by the State Department," Pelletreau said. Amb. Pelletreau, however, although a former career diplomat, was a Clinton Administration appointee and is clearly not representative of the current Bush Administration thinking [indeed, from conversations, he is clearly unaware of current White House thinking], although he does reflect some institutional attitudes within the Department of State.

Col. Qadhafi had, on October 23, 2001, described the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US as "horrifying" and called for an international conference to define terrorism and then fight it. "We must sit down at any level without emotions ... and after we define terrorism we agree on fighting terrorism," Qadhafi said in an interview with Qatar’s al-Jazeera television. He described the attacks as "horrifying, destructive" and said they had caused enormous loss of life and economic damage that had affected all countries. Qadhafi evaded answering direct questions on US military attacks on Afghanistan. Earlier, Col. Qadhafi had indicated that the US itself was a sponsor of terrorism.

The international diplomatic offensive by Qadhafi continued throughout Europe, in particular with France and Germany. On November 6, 2001, the chief aide of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder met with Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi in Berlin for talks on "consolidating the international coalition against terrorism". Saif al-Islam told Chancellery chief Frank-Walter Steinmeier that Libya condemned the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States and was ready to work together with the international community in the fight against terrorism. The meeting between the two men came ahead of a verdict expected on November 13, 2001, in the trial of five people charged for the bloody 1986 bombing of a Berlin discotheque. The prosecution has said that Libya was behind the anti-US attack.

Russia and Libya were also, in early November 2001, preparing a summit between Col. Qadhafi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, but had not finalized the details yet. The planned summit "is on the agenda of bilateral relations" and the sides "are working actively for the success of the meeting," Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov said on October 31, 2001, after conferring with his Libyan counterpart Abdel-Rahman Shalgam. Shalgam forecast that 2002 would witness a big leap in economic exchanges between Moscow and Tripoli. Despite that, however, very senior level Russian sources, within the National Security Council, have indicated that the Russian Government favors a situation which would transition Qadhafi out of power.

8(a). Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa

Libyan intelligence and front organizations have been active throughout Africa, on an increasing basis during 2000-2001. GIS is aware of the fact that numerous senior government and former government officials in many countries were, as at late 2001, receiving regular payments from the Libyan Government for unspecified activities.

As part of Libya’s overt activities in sub-Saharan Africa, Libya has throughout much of 2001 acted to support Central African Republic (CAR) Pres. Ange-Felix Patasse, who has faced two recent coup attempts. On November 6, 2001, as reported in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of November 7, 2001, Libyan-backed Government forces went on the offensive, attacking the barracks where the former Army chief, General François Bozize, was believed to be holed up on the fourth day of fighting in the CAR capital, Bangui. Libya already had 100 troops in Bangui, and a further 60 arrived on November 6, 2001. Libya now had strong influence in Chad and the CAR, and further south in Zimbabwe.

On December 25, 2001, Libyan Minister for African Unity Ali al-Traiki said that mediators were close to resolving tensions between Chad and the CAR. Speaking after meeting with Gabon's President Omar Bongo, Ali Traiki said: "We are headed towards a negotiated solution." Al-Traiki’s visit to Gabon came amid heightened tensions between Chad and the CAR, where Tripoli deployed some 200 troops in the wake of the failed November 2001 coup. As well, on December 25, 2001, the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) appealed to Libya, which is mediating between it and N’djamena, to "undertake all the measures needed to settle their dispute". MDJT is an armed movement led by Youssef Togoimi, a former Chadian Defense Minister, who has been fighting the Chadian Government since 1998 from bases inside Libya. MDJT seems likely to be a Libyan instrument designed to put pressure on the N’Djamena Government.

As part of Libya’s covert activities in sub-Saharan Africa, a unit of more than 20 senior Libyan intelligence officers arrived in Zimbabwe in mid-October 2001 to support President Robert Mugabe’s security and intelligence system as the nation moved towards the 2002 presidential election, only five months away. They were understood to be training Zimbabwean intelligence personnel and President Mugabe’s close security unit. As with the case of Pres. Patasse in CAR, Zimbabwe President Mugabe is wary over his security — and does not trust many of his own security personnel — in the event of losing the next election which pits his 38-year-old ZANU-PF party against the two-year-old opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). A British newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, said at the same time that "hundreds of Libyan troops", part of Qadhafi’s élite forces, "known for their terror tactics, were being housed in secret locations scattered across the country" [Zimbabwe]. The Daily Telegraph, quoting intelligence sources, said there was a growing number of intelligence officers turning against Mugabe, forcing him to turn elsewhere for protection. The Libyans were to be issued with Zimbabwean passports by the Registrar-General’s office to help Mugabe’s presidential election campaign, the newspaper said.

Libya has substantially escalated its activities in Zimbabwe since those reports, and South African President Thabo Mbeki has said privately in late December 2001 that he felt that Qadhafi was attempting to stimulate a civil war in Zimbabwe. This would almost certainly foster a strong revival of UK and US concern over Qadhafi, and would serve to hasten the prospect of direct military and political action against him. On December 20, 2001, Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe was in Libya for talks with Col. Qadhafi on possible further aid to help ease Zimbabwe's crippling fuel shortages. The Zimbabwean Energy Minister said that under a deal agreed earlier this year, Libya was supplying 70 percent of Zimbabwe's fuel requirements. Traditional suppliers such as Kuwait have cut off oil because of Zimbabwe's acute shortage of the hard currency needed to pay for it.

Other press reports from South Africa in mid-October 2001 suggested that PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), a Libyan-funded vigilante group which campaigns against drug lords in the Cape Town Flats, in South Africa, would be unleashed on Zimbabwean white commercial farmers in a terror campaign. At the same time, the Zimbabwe Government itself had become obligated to the Libyans after it sought a US$340-million loan to purchase fuel. The Independent, a Zimbabwe newspaper, reported in October 2001 that Libya was about to acquire major stakes in the country’s two financial institutions and a major hotel group in addition to receiving 8,000ha of land for industrial and farming purposes.

As part of Libya’s covert actions in sub-Saharan Africa, The Washington Post confirmed on November 3, 2001, that the terrorist network led by Osama bin Laden had reaped millions of dollars from the illicit sale of diamonds mined by rebels in Sierra Leone. The report quoted US and European intelligence officials. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was quoted by the newspaper as saying that key operatives in bin Laden’s al-Qaida network worked with diamond dealers to buy gems from Revolutionary United Front rebels and sell them for large profits in Europe. The diamond dealers were selected by Ibrahim Bah, a Libyan-trained former Senegalese rebel and the Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) principal diamond dealer. The report implicated Libya directly with the RUF, the Liberian Government of Charles Taylor, the Government of Burkina Faso, and others, in the illicit sale of "blood diamonds" as a transaction commodity to fund weapons and subversion.

8(b). Chemical and Biological Weapons Activities

Historic Development of Libyan CBW: Since seizing power in a military coup d’etat on September 1, 1969, Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has launched a relentless systematic campaign to produce biological and chemical weapons to help him in his undeclared war against the US and the West.

Libyan sources confirm that Qadhafi had begun planning, early in 1970, for the acquisition of a weapon with which to face the US and UK, as those powers were negotiating the conditions to leave their military bases in Libya. He initially planned on acquiring nuclear power and approached the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK: North Korea), India and Pakistan, in that order. He was harshly rebuffed and in many instances dismissively. During President Anwar as-Sadat’s term of office in Egypt, he turned to some former members of the Egyptian intelligence service (Mukhabarat el-Aama) who had served under President Sadat’s predecessor, President Gamal Abdel Nasser. These officers had been expelled by Pres. Sadat and instructed to stay away from Egyptian affairs. They subsequently went to work for Col. Qadhafi. Their advice to him was to stay away from nuclear power and concentrate instead on building a chemical and biological weapons arsenal, advising him that this was easier, cheaper, more accessible, and could be done without the knowledge of the US.

Qadhafi ordered the hiring of experts and scientists in this specialized field mainly from the Soviet bloc countries, but several others from Europe, the US, UK, and Canada. Additionally a team of about 450 specialists was sent to him by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. He formed a special task force in the Army to undertake the research and production of biological and chemical weapons. The task force was headed by two Army officers: Captain Noun Asyamen and Captain Gaith Ibrahim Aizawi. Large quantities of materials were bought directly from India, Russia, and the West. During the UN boycott, Qadhafi smuggled thousands of tons of chemical and biological materials and stored them all over Libya, particularly in: South-Western Tarhouna, south of Bani Walid; Al Sara military barracks; the Air Force base on the way to Otizou near Chad; storage in Am Ohazal near Tobruq; and a storage facility on kilometer 20 on the way to Ghadas. It is believed that Qadhafi produced over 84 different grades of chemical material and 43 different biological ingredients.

In 1972, the Qadhafi Administration initiated practical steps to produce chemical and biological weapons after it received reports about Israel’s ability to produce such weapons. These reports were delivered by Fathi El-Zeeb, Egypt’s then-President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s consultant at the time, and from the Palestinians. Large budgets were allocated in order to face Israel in the fields of biological, chemical and atomic warfare. The Arab Development Institute and the Atomic Energy Authority were established in Tripoli, in order to attract experts from the West and communist countries with a stress on those of Arab origin. Omar Muheishi, of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), was put in charge of those projects.

In July 1972, a committee called "The Commission For Chemical Support" was established within the Arms Department headed by Captain Gaith Ibrahim, who was aided by two Libyan officers, two Egyptian experts, a Pakistani, a Yugoslav, and an expert from South Africa residing in Monte Carlo.

From that time, serious efforts were undertaken to build an effective chemical weapons program to counterbalance what Israel was trying to do and in accordance with Col. Qadhafi’s plans. Manufacturing of chemical and biological weapons was done in parallel ways with more attention being paid to the chemical side. However, in 1982, chemical as well as biological manufacturing were given equal importance until today.

The famous Rabta plant was built in the south of Tripoli, and there large quantities of Mustard gas (or nerve gas as the Libyans called it) were produced. However, after the big international media uproar which engulfed the plant and the danger it posed to the Administration, and subsequent to the embargo directed by the United Nations Security Council, secrecy was strictly applied thereafter in the manufacturing of chemical and biological weapons. In early 1992, a larger number of experts in chemical and biological fields were contracted from Iraq after the second Gulf war, and from Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism, as well as from North Korea, Vietnam, and with Armenians from the remnants of the Soviet Army. In 1992, the chemical manufacturing units were transferred from the Rabta plant to the following locations:

    • In south-east Tarhunah in specially-designed underground bunkers still operating until some time in 2001;
    • The Jallo barracks in the area of the oilfields in Jallo city (where there is an important chemical weapons unit under the supervision of Captain-chemist Saeed Ibrahim Alzewi, who graduated from the School of Science Chemistry Department, before he joined the Military Officers College);
    • A secret location inside a farm south of Souk Al-Alalika in Sabrata operated by technicians brought in from the Abu Kammash Chemical Complex. This location also holds a special division for biological weapons and warehouses with operational equipment to store the products.

Other warehouses: There are other locations to store the products away from the manufacturing plants as follows:

    • Underground warehouse 45km south of Tarhunah (1,250 barrels, 200 liters capacity of chemical materials transferred from Rabta plant);
    • Adjacent warehouse to the main weapons storage in Jihanam, Sirte Province, which includes 1,300 barrels transferred from Rabta and Tarhunah. This warehouse also includes biological material of unknown quantity. Captain Massoud Khamis Abdel Salam Al-Qadhafi supervises this warehouse;
    • Warehouse in Al-Nawaqiyya district near Benghazi supervised by Captain Mohamed Muftah Al-Oraibi and includes 1,100 barrels of chemical materials;
    • Warehouse in Al-Kafra area on the road to Al-Sara military camp which includes 1,800 barrels of chemical material and other biological materials which was transferred from Rabta and Tarhunah;
    • Warehouse near Ain Ghazal town in Tobruq district which includes 1,350 barrels of chemical materials and other biological materials;
    • Warehouse near ‘Afiah region in Black mountains which includes 1,450 barrels transferred from the Rabta plant in 1992;
    • Warehouse in Ghat military camp containing 2,000 barrels;
    • Warehouse near Al-Kara military camp with 2,700 barrels.

The stored materials are made of different kinds of chemicals most importantly Mustard and Nerve gas (which may be the same thing, in Libyan parlance).

Research and studies are still underway to produce new kinds and develop existing chemicals. A central plant in the military farm near Tajoura’ is working closely with the Industrial and Agricultural Studies Centres and Chemical and Biology Departments at the College of Science, Tripoli University. The team of this center consists of 83 experts and analysts, helped by 91 technicians of different nationalities. All of those were contracted by the University to Tripoli, the Industrial and Agricultural Research Center, Abu Kammash Chemical complex, and the Ministries of Health and Agriculture as a cover for their actual mission for biological and chemical research.

There were special units for biological warfare operating in the following locations:

    • A centre adjacent to Beir Al-Sata Milad camp south-east of Tripoli;
    • Strategic Industries complex in Taminhint, east of Sabha. Products developed by this center were stored in weaponry warehouses in Jabat `Areef, north-west of Sabha;
    • Complex near Massah town north-west of Al-Baida city in the Green Mountain. A warehouse was annexed to this complex near Wadi Al-Koof main bridge.

Very large quantities of chemical and biological weapons were produced during the past 10 years and several plants were built to produce lethal biological materials. Raw materials were smuggled out of Italy, Germany, France, Spain, and Brazil. Others were imported from North Korea, Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan, and Ukraine. Experts came from Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, the former East Germany, North Korea, South Africa, Pakistan, and Nigeria.

Libyan military intelligence managed and arranged the transfer of chemical and biological materials to the following countries:

Jordan: In 1999 and 2000, Jordan received 45 barrels shipped under the disguise of car lubricants in empty containers which were returned to Jordan from Libya. A bribe was paid to some operators in ‘Aqaba port. These barrels which were carrying the symbol of Al-Buraiqa Company for Oil Marketing were stored in Jordan with Jordanian nationals of Palestinian origin, who work with Libyan Intelligence representatives.

Egypt: In 1998, the Egyptian Government approved the shipment of chemical material which was stored in a warehouse near Siwah district.

Sudan: In 1998, 1999 and 2000, the Sudan Government demanded and received 10 tons of Libyan chemical (and perhaps some biological) material, the last of which, two tons, was shipped by road to Al-Abiad city in the first week of August 2000.

Chad: In 1999, large quantities of chemical materials were shipped by road and stored near Mao city north of Chad. Other materials were shipped north of N’djamena and stored in a house owned by the Libyan Embassy. The operation was undertaken by Colonel Massoud Abdul Hafiz and the Libyan Qareen Saleh Qareen Alfeer in Chad and Mansour Bin Wadda’ah, a member of Libyan Intelligence. This quantity was estimated to be about 100 tons shipped from Al-Sara warehouse, and a military camp north of Ouzzo.

Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Liberia: Chemical materials were shipped in 1999 and 2000 to Burkina Faso for onward transfer to Liberia and Sierra Leone in cooperation with some diplomats and government employees from Ghana.

Central America: Five tons of chemical material and a number of cartons filled with biological complexes weighing 10kg were shipped by a Lebanese national to Belize and the Dominican Republic. The shipment was stored by some cooperatives of the Libyan Government of Indian origin.

Another Lebanese residing in Venezuela arranged to transfer chemical materials to the leftist insurgents in Colombia.

Subsequently, in late October 2001, this Service received information that the Libyan Government had moved its chemical and biological research and production facilities within the country to further cover their activities. As noted in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of October 31, 2001:

High-level and authoritative sources within the Libyan Government have told the Global Information System (GIS) that the Administration of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has now completed the re-location of the country’s chemical and biological weapons production plants, and had not dismantled his chemical and biological weapons production capabilities. As well, these sources reported, Libya had in 1999 moved much of its chemical (and possibly biological) weapons and materiel stockpiles out of the country to such places as Belize and numerous other locations.

… The chemical and biological weapons research and production facilities had previously been located in Az-Zawiyah, Sawfajjin, Sirte, Ajdabiya, Tobruq, Sabha, Ghadamis and Murzuq municipalities of Libya. They had now moved to Al-Jufrah municipality.

It was understood from the preliminary report from the GIS [Global Information System] sources — who had proven extremely reliable in the past — that a major chemical weapons facility had been moved to Hun, in northern al-Jufrah municipality. That facility was reportedly under the command of Adam Alkimawi, with other officers involved there being Col. Khaled Bayudh, Lt.-Col. Muftah Jaballah, and Maj. Mohammed Abdulfadil.

Another facility, involved in both chemical and biological weapons, had reportedly been moved to Sukna in al-Jufrah, not far from Hun. That facility was under the command of Col. Joni Mohammed Alghadi. [Note: all personnel names transliterated phonetically.]

A third chem. and bio. facility was reportedly sited in Sukna City proper and Ferjan in south-west Sukna, in al-Jufrah municipality. A fourth facility had been established in Hamam, in the north of Sukna, and a fifth reportedly in the Aafia Mountains.

Test Runs: In early 1980, Qadhafi needed to test his production of chemical and biological warfare, and had the opportunity for the first time during his war against Chad where whole villages were sprayed with chemical substances. The military campaign was led by his uncle, Colonel Hassan Ishkaal (died in December 1985), and Colonel Mufiah Asbieh (died during the war in Chad in 1987). Those two gave the orders to practically wipe out the inhabitants of several villages in Tisna and Zag in northern Chad, with a death toll of over 4,500 mostly children, women, and elderly.

Subsequently, Qadhafi used his stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons on his own people. In 1993 he sent his army to subdue the rebels in Soussa, about 200km East of Benghazi on the Mediterranean Sea. The rebels were bombarded from helicopters with sprays of nerve gas and mustard gas whose traces can still be detected today on trees and rocks in the area.

Chemical Weapons Gifts: Qadhafi has been generous in donating his chemical weapons production to many of his friends. He supplied all parties in the war in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In March 2000, he rewarded the new military Government of Gen. Robert Guei in Côte d’Ivoire, which had succeeded in overthrowing the previous Government, with a large shipment of chemical material. The shipment was smuggled through Mali and was delivered by Colonel Saeed Owaidat and Colonel Abou Bakr Ali Mohammed Qadhafi. The Sudanese Government also received Qadhafi’s gift of chemical materials in November of 1999. Five 20 ft. containers each were shipped to Sudan by road to help in its war against the South.

Somalia’s war Chief Ali Hussein Aideed was the recipient of some chemical and conventional weapons in 1998. They were smuggled through the Libyan Embassy in Zimbabwe by Captain Mohamed Ajaz and Captain Muttafi Dallhil Qadhafi.

In March 2001, the Zimbabwe Government also received some conventional weapons supplied with chemical warheads.

In June 2001, the Central African Republic received a shipment of concentrated chemicals.

Overseas Stockpiles: As part of his strategy to destabilize the US and create havoc, Qadhafi planned to store his weapons as close as possible to US land. He managed to hide large amounts of chemical and biological weapons in secret locations around the globe. It is a known fact that he controls storage tanks in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean countries, as noted above. The materials were smuggled with the help of individuals, organizations, and political parties that received substantial amount of financial assistance

Meanwhile, an unidentified Libyan chemist was implicated in preparations for bio-terrorist attacks planned by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida organization, the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera said on October 21, 2001. The man’s rôle came to light in a conversation between a Tunisian and another Libyan intercepted by Italy’s DIGOS anti-terror squad. The newspaper reported that the Tunisian, identified as Essid bin Khemais, had been held in April 2001 in Milan. The other person on the telephone, Libyan national Lased bin Heni, was arrested in mid-October 2001 in Munich. According to the newspaper, bin Khemais was heard saying: "The Libyan, a chemistry teacher ... has the formula ... they’ve found a way of mixing the product with explosive ... it’s easy."

Public Posture on CW: Libya’s public position on chemical weapons is far different from its private posture. On Saturday, December 22, 2001, Col. Qadhafi notified diplomats in the Netherlands that he was ready to sign an international treaty banning chemical weapons. Qadhafi's "decision" followed private consultations with intermediaries for the West. Among them were former South African President Nelson Mandela and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the US. Jose Bustani, the Brazilian diplomat charged with implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, said on December 22, 2001, from his headquarters at The Hague that he had received a private commitment from Libya that it would sign the accord in the coming weeks. Despite problems with South African President Thabo Mbeki, Qadhafi maintains close ties with Mandela. Similarly, the rôle of Saudi Arabia in attempting to "mend fences" between Qadhafi and the West — by helping bring about Libyan adoption of the Chemical Weapons Treaty — is highly significant.8

8(c). Ballistic Missile Developments

GIS sources confirmed that the attempts to develop derivatives of Scud rockets and ballistic missiles were still underway by the Libyan Government. The Libyan authorities had contracted with Iraqis, Russians, North Koreans, and Indians for this operation. The Libyan Government is focusing on buying spare parts and equipment from different sources in the black market at the highest prices. Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on November 8, 2000, carried the following report:

Highly-reliable sources confirmed that the Israeli national intelligence service, Mossad, on November 6, 2000, formally warned the states of southern Europe — Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey — that Libya recently deployed newly-acquired NoDong-1 SSMs in operational posture. These SSMs can now reach targets in these countries, as well as Israel.

The missiles are deployed in several sites along the Libyan coast controlled by a Central HQ in the Tripoli area. It is not clear whether this deployment is a part of the Arab military build-up against Israel, or Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s reaction to the French moves to indict him for the 1989 in-flight bombing of the UTA DC-10 over Niger, or both.The Libyan acquisition of NoDong-1 SSMs is the result of a joint Egyptian-Iraqi-Libyan crash program to overcome delays in production of indigenous SSMs. Initially, the Egyptians and the Iraqis wanted to expedite the production of their own missile in Libya. Cairo arranged for Tripoli to provide cover for the revival of the Bad’r/Condor program which could no longer take place in Iraq and now also not in Egypt because of the exposure by the US of the North Korean (DPRK) rôle and a consequent US pressure to stop the program. Therefore, the Libyans initiated their relations with the DPRK on behalf of Cairo and Baghdad.In early 1999, reliable sources confirmed that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had told Col. Qadhafi that Libya "owed Egypt" because of the decisive Egyptian contribution to the lifting of the sanctions on Libya. [In fact, it is not true that Egyptian pressures were influential in raising the Libyan sanctions.] However, as a result of the Mubarak pressure — and shortly after the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions imposed on Libya — Qadhafi, in April 1999, dispatched a high-ranking delegation from the Libyan Army’s procurement directorate to the DPRK. The delegation included Egyptian and Iraqi experts.

The joint delegation visited the Chongchengang Corporation — the "company" responsible for the DPRK’s weapons and technology exports — and negotiated a comprehensive deal for North Korean assistance in the ostensibly "Libyan" acquisition of NoDong-type SSMs. Comparable deals were concluded with other states. For example, in the Fall of 1999, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) agreed to build a hypersonic wind tunnel in Libya. The specifications of the wind tunnel ensured it could be used for missile design and flight. Several Libyan technicians (as well as Egyptian and Iraqi with Libyan documents) traveled to the PRC for missile-related technical training and engineering education.The DPRK, which had been a major contributor of technology and sub-systems to the Egyptian ballistic missile program, was to deliver key components to the reincarnated "Libyan" Bad’r/Condor program. This aspect of the program collapsed in the Summer of 1999 when Indian Customs authorities seized a North Korean ship with a concealed consignment of NoDong components, guidance and navigation systems. Initially, the Indians suspected that the shipment was destined for Pakistan, however subsequent investigation in cooperation with the US concluded that the cargo was on its way to Libya, via Malta.The failure of this procurement effort prompted a thorough re-evaluation of the Libya-based SSM program. The Egyptian and Iraqi program managers concluded that their cooperation with experts from Iran and Yugoslavia had so far failed to resolve the severe development problems. On top of this, Pyongyang reported it would take several months to replicate the special parts ordered by "Libya". Therefore, a few scientists from the former East Germany (GDR) were invited to Libya to audit the entire missile program. The Germans, all of them veterans of the Iraqi missile program, opined that it would take too long to revive the Bad’r/Condor to meet an urgent requirement for operational SSM for the anticipated crisis in the Middle East.Therefore, in the late Summer of 1999, Cairo and Baghdad urged Tripoli to purchase North Korean NoDong-1 SSMs on their behalf with the idea that Libya would keep a few of them for its own use. At the behest of Pres. Mubarak and Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein, Col. Qadhafi instructed General Abu-Bakr Jabir, the Libyan Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff — who also holds overall responsibility for the Libyan missile program — to personally devise a more direct way to acquire these missiles. Desperate for hard currency, Pyongyang expressed willingness to deliver numerous NoDong-1 SSMs the moment hard currency was delivered in a "safe laundered method". A North Korean delegation arrived in Tripoli to discuss the operational requirements and, in October 1999, General Abu-Bakr Jabir signed a deal with them for the supply of NoDong-1s and related technological expertise. In the Tripoli negotiations, the Libyans stressed the imperative to have the missiles deployed operationally immediately after their arrival in Libya.The eventual October 1999 deal was for the delivery of seven mobile launchers, 50 "missile systems" (each missile system includes several SSMs which can be carried on the support vehicles escorting the mobile launcher to a forward position), and related support vehicles. The North Koreans also agreed to construct the infrastructure required for the maintenance and storage of these missiles, as well as to train "Libyans" in all aspects of missile technology over a period of five years. The first consignment of missiles and launchers was to be delivered as soon as possible and the rest were to be delivered in three further consignments over the next two years.Pyongyang notified Tripoli that the missiles would be ready in the early Summer of 2000. The financial aspects of the deal were conducted by a Syrian arms merchant living in Marbella, Spain. Libyan agents paid him US$600-million (including a 15 percent commission). The money was laundered through banks in Madrid and Basle in Switzerland. The transaction was completed in Switzerland in July 2000.In August 2000, Libyan Il-76 transport aircraft delivered to Tripoli 36 NoDong-1 missiles, a few launchers and 11 North Korean experts. Two were senior officials overseeing the Libyan-North Korean cooperation and nine were missile engineers and technicians who will remain in Libya for two years in order to help bring the missiles to operational status as well as retain their operability.In late-September 2000, the first missiles and their launchers were deployed along the Mediterranean Sea coast. The location of these deployments and related targeting activities suggest they are pointed at NATO’s bases in southern Europe. Although Israel is within the NoDong-1’s range, little activity related to Israel was noticed. The NoDong-1 SSMs supplied to Libya can be equipped with both conventional and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) warheads. Although Libya has stocks of chemical and biological weapons hidden in underground stores in the desert, mainly the Sabha area, there is no indication that there are unconventional warheads with the SSMs.Meanwhile, the Libyans and their partners are most satisfied with the NoDong-1s and the North Korean support system. In late October 2000, Qadhafi initiated a new round of negotiations with Pyongyang for the acquisition of a larger number of SSMs, including newer models. Two Libyan envoys arrived in Marbella to conclude arrangements with the Syrian arms merchant for the laundering of additional funds. A Libyan official bragged that the new acquisition program would make Libya "one of the best-armed countries in the Mediterranean region".

8(d). The Special Relationship With Egypt: Egypt’s "special relationship" with Libya is worth noting, because it has been this which has contributed significantly to Egypt’s own "special relationship" with the United States. Apart from the Camp David-related aspects of the US-Egyptian alliance (which originated with the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel), it has been Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak’s commitment to the US to "keep Qadhafi under control" which has (a) helped maintain the ongoing defense supply relationship between the US and Egypt, and (b) helped keep US policymakers from taking aggressive action against Qadhafi.

Pres. Mubarak, at least once each six months, meets Qadhafi for what Egyptian officials privately call "attitude adjustment" sessions with the Libyan leader. Those meetings take place inside Egypt, mostly at Mersa Metruh, not far from where Qadhafi maintains extensive property holdings, including a large farm.

There is no question but that the Egyptian leadership feels that Libya falls under the Egyptian strategic umbrella. Libya has consistently over several decades provided an enormous employment zone for Egyptian nationals, and the Egyptian Government has strenuously resisted any US attempts or desires to replace Qadhafi, promising to "keep him under control".

Several factors now promise to affect this situation: (a) growing US disenchantment with Egyptian Pres. Mubarak, largely because of his "unproductive" rôle in the current Arab-Israeli dispute; (b) because of Pres. Mubarak’s insistence on placing his son in a position to succeed him in the Presidency; and (c) because of Egypt’s discreet strategic moves, using Libya as a conduit, to move outside the US-Egyptian military relationship by acquiring North Korean ballistic missile technology, among other things. The former US Clinton Administration paid little heed to these factors, but the new US Bush Administration is not taking the matters so lightly. This new situation will contribute in some way toward US policies vis-à-vis both Egypt and Libya.

  1. The Monarchy and the Sanussiyyah Movement: The Libyan monarchical movement centers around the al-Senussi family, which led the Sanussiyyah movement — sometimes known as the Senussi Brotherhood — in the fight to rid Libya of foreign occupation and create the federated state which today forms Libya. The leader of this movement at the time was King Idris I, whose Government was overthrown on September 1, 1969, by (then) Lt. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in a coup while the King was in Greece seeking medical attention. The leader now is the King’s great-nephew, Prince Idris al-Senussi. Another claimant to the throne, who has no following and lacks the support of the Sanussiyyah religious leaders, is Prince Mohammad, the London-based son of the late Crown Prince.
  2. The Sanussiyyah movement is an Islamic sect following a moderate line of the faith. The Senussi leaders, as descendants of the Prophet Mohammad, are Sharifs and, as such, command a considerable following through much of the Muslim world. The al-Senussi movement and the monarchy began, in 1990, to act as an umbrella for many of the opposition figures. Some 4-million Nigerians regard themselves as Sanussiyyah, for example, as do most of the Muslims in Niger, Chad and many others in the region.

    The movement aims to restore democratically-elected government to Libya, with the King as a constitutional monarch. It is committed to the restoration of a market economy in Libya, with safeguards for foreign investors. It is pledged to the dismantling of Libya’s chemical and biological weapons capacity and of its strategic ballistic missile forces.

    Structure: The movement is based around the leader, who is the claimaint to the Libyan throne. He is supported by an Advisory Council, in exile. The movement has links to several armed cells inside Libya, as well as to armed and non-armed opposition groups inside and outside Libya. The monarchy has retained military links inside the country since around 1970, when Prince Abdullah al-Senussi, the father of the present Heir Apparent, undertook the only credible military operation against Qadhafi inside Libya. The Italian Servizio Informazioni Difesa (Defense Information Service), which was privy to the plan, notified Qadhafi’s security services which in turn thwarted the bid.

    Key personnel: Leader: Prince Idris al-Senussi. Prince Idris, who is in his forties, has a considerable background in the oil and gas industry, and is close with many key Middle Eastern leaders. He is married to Princess Anna-Maria, of Spain; she is the cousin of King Juan Carlos. They have one son; Prince Idris has a daughter from an earlier marriage, Princess Alia al-Senussi attends university in the US.

  3. The Oil and Gas Industry. There is no doubting the centrality of the oil and gas industry to Libya’s economy. Oft-stated claims that Libya was moving toward diversifying the economy, particularly in agriculture, are largely rhetorical; little has been done, and, with the lack of any coherent organisational structure or power in the Government, it is likely that nothing will be done as long as Qadhafi remains in power. It is worth noting, however, that the $5,000 per capita oil and gas income for Libyans has not contributed to the strengthening of the national infrastructure. Much of this income has been diverted to the enhancement of Qadhafi’s foreign policy vision and military procurement, leaving both the national populace and the civil and energy infrastructure largely unimproved. Those areas of the energy infrastructure controlled by the Qadhafi Administration have been seriously neglected, and Libya’s current oil outflow of some 1.4-million bpd is about one-quarter of the national capacity. There has been a lag in exploration and exploitation of oil and gas reserves.
  4. Several European countries — principally Italy, France and Spain — dominate the Libyan energy exploitation arena, and these countries (particularly Italy) are sensitive to any threats to change the Libyan leadership. They are also less than enthusiastic about the restoration of normalized relations with the US, which would immediately revive and modernize its assets which had been mothballed in Libya, and which would immediately fund greater exploration.

    But the key outstanding issue is the question of sovereignty in the Gulf of Sidra. It will be recalled that Qadhafi had indicated in 1986 that a "line of death" at 32 deg. 30 min. North had been established across the Gulf of Sidra, indicating that the area below that was Libyan sovereign waters. The US then deliberately violated that "line of death" with its carriers to denote that these were international waters. This "line of death" extended more-or-less from the city of Benghazi (capital of Cyrenaica) in the East to Misrata on the Western shores of the Gulf. The Libyan Government has attempted since 1986, virtually unsuccessfully, to sell oil and gas exploration-exploitation concessions in the heart of the Gulf of Sidra. Not surprisingly, there is a significant question mark over Libya’s right, under international law, to sell such concessions in this area, known to be rich in, particularly, natural gas reserves.

    It is likely — even probable — that the US would help broker the inclusion of the Gulf of Sidra into Libyan sovereign territory should the bilateral relationship be satisfactorily restored (ie: following the end of the Qadhafi era).

    But the Gulf of Sidra is not the only major area of oil and gas territory remaining unexplored. The central strip of Libya, extending south from Misrata, remains untapped.

  5. Conclusions:
  1. A change of leadership can be expected in Libya within one to five years; possibly within one year, but almost certainly within five years.
  2. Any foreseen scenario for a change of leadership in Libya within the next five years is likely to occur with minimal, or contained, violence, with very little consequence for the energy infrastructure in the country. Some disruption to the movement of foreign nationals, to communications, shipping, air transport, etc. would be likely for a period of one to three months, depending on the nature of the change of power. For assets located outside the major cities (Tripoli, Benghazi, Sirte, etc.), it is likely that there would be only a slight direct effect, or no direct effect, other than the need, during a transition period, to keep expatriate employees contained.
  3. Given the possible (even probable) illness of Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, it is possible that the transfer of power in the country could occur suddenly, leaving a scramble for power. For this reason, the current feelers about a possible power-sharing arrangement between Saif al-Islam and Prince Idris al-Senussi are critical to a smooth transition. However, it is possible that several other pretenders for power could arise. The US Central Intelligence Agency had, in the past, promoted the interests of a former Libyan Army colonel, for example, and it is probable that some others will seek power if a vacuum appears. However, most contenders lack both adequate military resources and legitimacy to retain control of the country. It is likely that, assuming a Saif al-Islam/Idris Senussi combination comes to power, that a power struggle between them would occur within a very short period of time. In that event, the Sanussiyyah movement becomes critical.
  4. Any foreign investment in buying concessions from the Qadhafi Administration in the Gulf of Sidra — outside the 12 mile offshore sovereignty limit — would, at present, be of a high-risk nature, given the questionable sovereignty of Libya over this region at present. Such investment could be curtailed or disrupted at considerable cost to the investor.
  5. It is possible that, in the event that Qadhafi is not marginalised due to ill-health over the coming 12 months, that the US will escalate indirect political and covert action against him and his Administration as part of the "war on terrorism". This would initially take the form of steps to constrain Libya’s international freedom of action, through financial or banking measures, and then by other means. Further escalation by the US would be determined by Qadhafi’s reaction to initial steps. Such US pressures could also hasten a transition of some sorts by Qadhafi to Saif al-Islam. A variety of factors then comes into play, including the attractiveness of various "exit options" for Qadhafi. The prospect of escalated US political/covert action against Qadhafi in the coming 12 months is considered "High".
  6. It is possible that, in the event of Libyan resistance to US political pressures, Washington could again find a rationale to undertake direct military strikes against Libyan targets within 12 months to two years. The likelihood of such action must be considered "Medium-to-High". Such attacks, however, should also not target or directly affect energy industry infrastructure or personnel.

Footnotes:

1. Gadadfa, the tribe of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, alternately referred to, less correctly, as the Al-Qadhafa tribe or Qadhafiyyah peoples.

2. The Senussi name is transliterated variously — and all equally acceptably — as Sanusi, Sanussi, Senusi, Senussi, etc. Prince Idris, the current leader of the Sanussiyyah movement, uses the "Senussi" transliteration. GIS officials have had extensive knowledge of Prince Idris over some 20 years. See the section entitled The Monarchy and the Sanussiyyah Movement, below.

3. Alternately transliterated as Musa Kusa. Moussa Koussa, a long-standing intelligence leader for Qadhafi and head of the External Security Organization (ESO), was involved in the killing of a British policewoman in the 1980s, leading to the break in Libyan-UK relations. His return to the UK for the meetings was, therefore, of real significance. Moussa Koussa is not believed to have any independent power base within the security apparatus in Libya, and is totally dependent on Qadhafi for his authority.

4. Not long after the coup which put Qadhafi in power, Qadhafi forced the daughter of a key Royalist general, Kheidy Khaled, to marry him as a condition to release the general. This woman is the mother of Eng. Mohammed.

5. The mother of Saif al-Islam, Moatasam, Sa’adi, Hannibal and Aisha comes from the Bara’asa tribe, near Beida. This tribe was traditionally close to the late King Idris I. The sister of this key wife of Qadhafi is married to Abdullah Senussi, who had been a key advisor to Qadhafi. There was, however, in 2001 a significant falling out between Qadhafi and this formerly powerful advisor.

6. On missile issues, see Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily [published by the International Strategic Studies Association, in the US], November 8, 2000: Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel, and later reporting. On chemical and biological weapons, see Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, October 31, 2001: Qadhafi Continues Development of Chemical and Biological Weapons; Moves Production Facilities and Stockpiles; Praises Bin Laden. These reports are quoted below in this study.

 7. See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, November 7, 2001: Libyan Leader Undertakes New Purge of Officials.

8. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador to the US, has been trying to personally mend fences with Qadhafi. Under the US Clinton Administration, Bandar carried a message to Qadhafi that the US was interested in improving relations, but none of Clinton’s promises eventuated. Now, Bandar is also trying to ensure his usefulness to both the new US Administration and to mend fences with Qadhafi. Getting Qadhafi to sign the Chemical Weapons Treaty would be a sign that Libya was ingratiating itself with the West. In fact, however, there is little evidence that Libya would comply with the Treaty.


November 8, 2001

Libya's Qadhafi Seizes Opportunity to Move Out of Isolation While Expanding Radical Activities, Including CBW Development

Much of the following material has come from long-established Global Information System (GIS) direct sources.

Analysis. From GIS analysts and sources in Tripoli, Benghazi and elsewhere. There is growing evidence to suggest that Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi is using the current Western preoccupation with the war against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan to redouble his overt and covert efforts to assume a position of strategic dominance in Africa and to a lesser extent in the Middle East.

Equally, there is evidence that he has not diminished his antagonism toward the United States and United Kingdom, despite overtures to both countries to support their "war on terrorism". As well, there is strong evidence to suggest that the Libyan chemical and biological warfare and ballistic missile programs have in no way been curtailed, but have, in fact, been re-located and expanded. 

[On missile issues, see Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, November 8, 2000: Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel, and later reporting. On chemical and biological weapons, see Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, October 31, 2001: Qadhafi Continues Development of Chemical and Biological Weapons; Moves Production Facilities and Stockpiles; Praises Bin Laden]

High-level Libyan sources in Tripoli, Benghazi and elsewhere have also indicated that Col. Qadhafi believes that the US and UK now need him and will move toward a normalization of political, diplomatic and trade relations without Libya having to abandon its new political, intelligence and military penetrations of sub-Saharan Africa. While discussing with the US the prospect of bringing moderates into his Government, Col. Qadhafi has, the sources say, moved to expand the purge on potential adversaries, and particularly to imprison under a variety of charges officials from the Benghazi district of Cyrenaica region, traditionally the home of the moderate Sanussi Muslim movement and opponents of Qadhafi.

The Qadhafi Administration has for several year been attempting to reach out to the UK, US and European governments to devise a rapprochement, and at the same time had been making overtures to key opponents abroad, ostensibly for the same purpose. However, he has been actively involved, concurrently, in attempting to purge Libya of his opponents, often — as with the current case of his "anti-corruption" drive — under the guise of pursuing legality and honesty in government. 

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, November 7, 2001: Libyan Leader Undertakes New Purge of Officials.]

During the first week of October 2001, the head of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO), Musa Kusa and several other Libyan officials, met in London with US and British diplomatic and intelligence officials. [US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) officers were involved in the meetings.] The meetings, arranged partially through the communications good offices of a neutral African state, was ostensibly to discuss — according to the US State Department — "Libya's response to the remaining requirements of the UN resolutions on Lockerbie, in particular to accept responsibility for the actions of its officials and to pay appropriate compensation". A UK Foreign Office spokeswoman described the meeting as "positive and constructive". However, the fundamental purpose of the meeting was, from the Libyan perspective, to ensure that the US and UK removed the last major barriers to normalization of relations, so that Libya could pursue major US oil company participation in the country.

Ostensibly, also, the Libyan delegation offered to supply intelligence to the US and UK on radical Islamist organizations, although what was offered or provided was carefully crafted to target those groups which had opposed Qadhafi himself, such as the Fighting Islamic Group (FIG), which claimed responsibility for two attempts on Col. Qadhafi's life in 1995 and 1998. The UK-based newspaper, The Sunday Times, On October 7, 2001, said that "A Libyan intelligence official was welcomed in London last week by the Foreign Office as part of the coalition against terrorism. Musa Kusa, head of Libya's external security organization, held talks with MI6 and the Central Intelligence Agency. Mohammed Azwai, the Libyan ambassador in London, said Kusa had handed over a list of more than a dozen Libyans operating in Britain suspected of links to Osama Bin Laden." Significantly, however, as Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted on October 31, 2001, Col. Qadhafi had, in July 2001, still been sending payments to support the activities of affiliates al-Qaida, the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization. At that time he sent $25-million. 

At the same time, the Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily report of October 31, 2001, said, Col. Qadhafi had told a private meeting of delegates to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Doha, on October 10, 2001, that he thought that Osama bin Laden had proven himself a "true hero" through his attacks on the US on September 11, 2001. He also told the OIC gathering in its private session — which he had requested — that the rest of the Muslim would should be ashamed of themselves for not having done something similar earlier.

The US, in its search to find new allies in the war against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida had, US sources confirmed, deliberately turned a blind eye to ongoing Libyan radical or terrorist-related activities around the world, and particularly in Africa. The US had, according to media reports (including a BBC report of October 31, 2001), been in high-level contact with officials from Syria and Sudan, as well as Libya, to seek their cooperation in the "war on terrorism".

Libya's efforts have not been wasted. On November 5, 2001, a former senior US official, Robert Pelletreau, who was Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs from 1994 to 1997 and a former ambassador to Egypt and Tunisia, presumably acting on the basis of information received, indicated that the US could ease sanctions against Libya in 2002 as part of a broader effort to reform a unilateral sanctions policy and in return for recent cooperation against terrorism. Libya, he indicated, had provided intelligence on al-Qaida terrorist network to US Government officials and had cooperated with the UN in the Lockerbie [Pan Am 103 bombing] trial. "The stage seems set for further progress," Pelletreau said in remarks at the US-Africa Business Summit. US oil company executives' hopes of meeting Libyan representatives at the African-US business summit were dashed because the US State Department did not allow Libyans to attend the summit. "An application was indeed made by the Libyans and was turned down by the State Department," Robert Pelletreau said.

Col. Qadhafi had, on October 23, 2001, described the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US as "horrifying" and called for an international conference to define terrorism and then fight it. "We must sit down at any level without emotions ... and after we define terrorism we agree on fighting terrorism," Qadhafi said in an interview with Qatar's al-Jazeera television. He described the attacks as "horrifying, destructive" and said they had caused enormous loss of life and economic damage that had affected all countries. Qadhafi evaded answering direct questions on US military attacks on Afghanistan. Earlier, Col. Qadhafi had indicated that the US itself was a sponsor of terrorism. 

The international diplomatic offensive by Qadhafi continued throughout Europe, in particular with France and Germany. On November 6, 2001, the chief aide of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder met with the Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, a son of Col. Qadhafi, in Berlin for talks on "consolidating the international coalition against terrorism". Saif al-Islam told Chancellery chief Frank-Walter Steinmeier that Libya condemned the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States and was ready to work together with the international community in the fight against terrorism. The meeting between the two men came ahead of a verdict expected on November 13, 2001, in the trial of five people charged for the bloody 1986 bombing of a Berlin discotheque. The prosecution has said that Libya was behind the anti-US attack.

Russia and Libya were also, in early November 2001, preparing a summit between Col. Qadhafi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, but had not finalized the details yet. The planned summit "is on the agenda of bilateral relations" and the sides "are working actively for the success of the meeting," Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov said on October 31, 2001, after conferring with his Libyan counterpart Abdel-Rahman Shalgam. Shalgam forecast that 2002 would witness a big leap in economic exchanges between Moscow and Tripoli.

Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa

Libyan intelligence and front organizations are active throughout Africa, on an increasing basis during 2000-2001. GIS is aware of the fact that numerous senior government and former government officials in many countries were, as at late 2001, receiving regular payments from the Libyan Government for unspecified activities.

As part of Libya's overt activities in sub-Saharan Africa, Libya has throughout much of 2001 acted to support Central African Republic (CAR) Pres. Ange-Felix Patasse, who has faced two recent coup attempts. On November 6, 2001, as reported in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of November 7, 2001, Libyan-backed Government forces went on the offensive, attacking the barracks where the former Army chief, General François Bozize, was believed to be holed up on the fourth day of fighting in the central African capital, Bangui. Libya already had 100 troops in Bangui, and a further 60 arrived on November 6, 2001. Libya now had strong influence in Chad and the CAR, and further south in Zimbabwe.

As part of Libya's covert activities in sub-Saharan Africa, a unit of more than 20 senior Libyan intelligence officers arrived in mid-October 2001 to support President Robert Mugabe's security and intelligence system as the nation moved towards the 2002 presidential election, only five months away. They were understood to be training Zimbabwean intelligence personnel arid President Mugabe's close security unit. As with the case of Pres. Patasse in CAR, Zimbabwe President Mugabe is wary over his security — and does not trust many of his own security personnel — in the event of losing the next election which pits his 38-year-old ZANU-PF party against the two-year-old opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). A British newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, said at the same time that "hundreds of Libyan troops', part of Qadhafi's élite forces, "known for their terror tactics, were being housed in secret locations scattered across the country" [Zimbabwe]. The Daily Telegraph, quoting intelligence sources, said there was a growing number of intelligence officers turning against Mugabe, forcing him to turn elsewhere for protection. The Libyans were to be issued with Zimbabwean passports by the Registrar-General's office to help Mugabe's presidential election campaign, the newspaper said.

Other press reports from South Africa in mid-October suggested that PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), a Libyan-funded vigilante group which campaigns against drug lords in the Cape Town Flats, in South Africa, would be unleashed on Zimbabwean white commercial farmers in a terror campaign. At the same time, the Zimbabwe Government itself had become obligated to the Libyans after it sought a US$340-million loan to purchase fuel. The Independent, a Zimbabwe newspaper, reported in October 2001 that the Libyans were about to acquire major stakes in the country's two financial institutions and a major hotel group in addition to receiving 8,000ha of land for industrial and farming purposes.

As part of Libya's covert actions in sub-Saharan Africa, The Washington Post confirmed on November 3, 2001, that the terrorist network led by Osama bin Laden had reaped millions of dollars from the illicit sale of diamonds mined by rebels in Sierra Leone. The report quoted US and European intelligence officials. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was quoted by the newspaper as saying that key operatives in bin Laden's al-Qaida network worked with diamond dealers to buy gems from Revolutionary United Front rebels and sell them for large profits in Europe. The diamond dealers were selected by Ibrahim Bah, a Libyan-trained former Senegalese rebel and the Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) principal diamond dealer. The report implicated Libya directly with the RUF, the Liberian Government of Charles Taylor, the Government of Burkina Faso, and others, in the illicit sale of "blood diamonds" as a transaction commodity to fund weapons and subversion. 

Chemical and Biological Weapons Activities

Historic Development of Libyan CBW: Since seizing power in a military coup d'etat on September 1, 1969, Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has launched a relentless systematic campaign to produce biological and chemical weapons to help him in his undeclared war against the US and the West.  

Libyan sources confirm that Qadhafi had begun planning, early in 1970, for the acquisition of a weapon with which to face the US and UK, as those powers were negotiating the conditions to leave their military bases in Libya. He initially planned on acquiring nuclear power and approached the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK: North Korea), India and Pakistan, in that order. He was harshly rebuffed and in many instances dismissively. During President Anwar as-Sadat's term of office in Egypt, he turned to some former members of the Egyptian intelligence service (Mukhabarat el-Aama) who had served under President Sadat's predecessor, President Gamal Abdel Nasser. These officers had been expelled by Pres. Sadat and instructed to stay away from Egyptian affairs. They subsequently went to work for Col. Qadhafi. Their advice to him was to stay away from nuclear power and concentrate instead on building a chemical and biological weapons arsenal, advising him that this was easier, cheaper, more accessible, and could be done without the knowledge of the US.

Qadhafi ordered the hiring of experts and scientists in this specialized field mainly from the Soviet bloc countries, but several others from Europe, the US, UK, and Canada. Additionally a team of about 450 specialists was sent to him by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. He formed a special task force in the Army to undertake the research and production of biological and chemical weapons. The task force was headed by two Army officers: Captain Noun Asyamen and Captain Gaith Ibrahim Aizawi. Large quantities of materials were bought directly from India, Russia, and the West. During the UN boycott, Qadhafi smuggled thousands of tons of chemical and biological materials and stored them all over Libya, particularly in: South-Western Tarhouna South of Bani Walid, Al Sara military barracks, the Air Force base on the way to Otizou near Chad, storage in Am Ohazal near Tobruq, and a storage facility on kilometer 20 on the way to Ghadas. it is believed that Qadhafi produced over 84 different grades of chemical material and 43 different biological ingredients.

In 1972 the Qadhafi Administration initiated practical steps to produce chemical and biological weapons after it received reports about Israel's ability to produce such weapons. These reports were delivered by Fathi EI-Zeeb, President Gamal Abdel Nasser's consultant at the time, and from the Palestinians. Large budgets were allocated in order to face Israel in the fields of biological, chemical and atomic warfare. The Arab Development Institute and the Atomic Energy Authority were established in Tripoli, in order to attract experts from the West and communist countries with a stress on those of Arab origin. Omar Muheishi, of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), was put in charge of those projects.

In July 1972, a committee called "The Commission For Chemical Support" was established within the Arms Department headed by Captain Gaith Ibrahim, who was aided by two Libyan officers, two Egyptian experts, a Pakistani, a Yugoslav, and an expert from South Africa residing in Monte Carlo.

From that time, serious efforts were undertaken to build an effective chemical weapon program to counterbalance what Israel was trying to do and in accordance with Col. Qadhafi's plans. Manufacturing of chemical and biological weapons was done in parallel ways with more attention being paid to the chemical side. However, in 1982, chemical as well as biological manufacturing were given equal importance until today.

The famous Rabta plant was built in the south of Tripoli, and there large quantities of Mustard gas (or nerve gas as the Libyans called it) were produced. However, after the big international media uproar which engulfed the plant and the danger it posed to the Administration, and subsequent to the embargo directed by the United Nations Security Council, secrecy was strictly applied thereafter in the manufacturing of chemical and biological weapons. In early 1992, a larger number of experts in chemical and biological fields were contracted from Iraq after the second Gulf war, and from Eastern Europe after the collapse of the communism, as well as from North Korea, Vietnam, and with Armenians from the remnants of the Soviet Army. In 1992, the chemical manufacturing units were transferred from the Rabta plant to the following locations:

  • 1. In south-east Tarhunah in specially-designed underground bunkers still operating until some time in 2001;

  • 2. The Jallo barracks in the area of the oilfields in Jallo city (where there is an important chemical weapons unit under the supervision of Captain-chemist Saeed Ibrahim Alzewi, who graduated from the School of Science Chemistry Department, before he joined the Military Officers College);

  • 3. A secret location inside a farm south of Souk Al-Alalika in Sabrata operated by technicians brought in from the Abu Kammash Chemical Complex. This location also holds a special division for biological weapons and warehouses with operational equipment to store the products.

Other warehouses: There ertr other locations to store the products away from the manufacturing plants as follows:

  • Underground warehouse 45km south of Tarhunah (1,250 barrels, 200 liters capacity of chemical materials transferred from Rabta plant);

  • Adjacent warehouse to the main weapons storage in Jihanam, Sirte Province, which includes 1,300 barrels transferred from Rabta and Tarhunah. This warehouse also includes biological material of unknown quantity. Captain Massoud Khamis Abdel Salam Al-Qadhafi supervises this warehouse;

  • Warehouse in Al-Nawaqiyya district near Benghazi supervised by Captain Mohamed Muftah Al-Oraibi and includes 1,100 barrels of chemical materials;

  • Warehouse in Al-Kafra area on the road to Al-Sara military camp which includes 1,800 barrels of chemical material and other biological materials which was transferred from Rabta and Tarhunah;

  • Warehouse near Ain Ghazal town in Tobruq district which includes 1,350 barrels of chemical materials and other biological materials;

  • Warehouse near 'Afiah region in Black mountains which includes 1,450 barrels transferred from the Rabta plant in 1992;

  • Warehouse in Ghat military camp containing 2,000 barrels;

  • Warehouse near Al-Kara military camp with 2,700 barrels.

The stored materials are made of different kinds of chemicals most importantly Mustard and Nerve gas (which may be the same thing, in Libyan parlance).

Research and studies are still underway to produce new kinds and develop existing chemicals. A central plant in the military farm near Tajoura' is working closely with the Industrial and Agricultural Studies Centers and Chemical and Biology Departments at the College of Science, Tripoli University. The team of this center consists of 83 experts and analysts, helped by 91 technicians of different nationalities. All of those were contracted by the University to Tripoli, the Industrial and Agricultural Research Center, Abu Kammash Chemical complex, and the Ministries of Health and Agriculture as a cover for their actual mission for biological and chemical research.

There were special units for biological warfare operating in the following locations:

1. A Center adjacent to Beir Al-Sata Milad camp south-east of Tripoli;
2. Strategic Industries complex in Taminhint, east of Sabha. Products developed by this center were stored in weaponry warehouses in Jabat `Areef, north-west of Sabha;
3. Complex near Massah town north-west of Al-Baida city in the Green Mountain. A warehouse was annexed to this complex near Wadi Al-Koof main bridge.

Very large quantities of chemical and biological weapons were produced during the past 10 years and several plants were built to produce lethal biological materials. As the raw materials were smuggled out of Italy, Germany, France, Spain, and Brazil. Others were imported from North Korea, Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan, and Ukraine. Experts came from Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, the former East Germany, North Korea, South Africa, Pakistan, and Nigeria.

The Libyan military intelligence transferred chemical and biological materials to the following countries:

Jordan: In 1999 and 2000, Jordan received 45 barrels shipped under the disguise of car lubricants in empty containers which were returned to Jordan from Libya. A bribe was paid to some operators in Aqaba port. These barrels which were carrying the symbol of Al- Buraiqa Company for Oil Marketing were stored in Jordan with Jordanian nationals of Palestinian origin, who work with the Libyan Intelligence representatives.

Egypt: In 1998, the Egyptian Government approved the shipment of chemical material which was stored in a warehouse near Siwah district.

Sudan: In 1998, 1999 and 2000, the Sudan Government demanded and received 10 tons of Libyan chemical (and perhaps some biological) material, the last of which, two tons, was shipped by road to Al-Abiad city in the first week of August 2000.

Chad: In 1999, large quantities of chemical materials were shipped by road and stored near Mao city north of Chad. Other materials were shipped north of N'djamena) and stored in a house owned by the Libyan Embassy. The operation was undertaken by Colonel Massoud Abdul Hafiz and the Libyan Qareen Saleh Qareen Alfeer in Chad and Mansour Bin Wadda'ah, a member of Libyan Intelligence. This quantity was estimated to be about 100 tons shipped from Al-Sara warehouse, and a military camp north of Ouzzo.

Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Liberia: Chemical materials were shipped in 1999 and 2000 to Burkina Faso for onward transfer to Liberia and Sierra Leone in cooperation with some diplomats and government employees from Ghana.

Central America: Five tons of chemical material and a number of cartons filled with biological complexes weighing 10kg were shipped by a Lebanese national to Belize and the Dominican Republic. The shipment was stored by some cooperatives of the Libyan Government of Indian origin.

Another Lebanese residing in Venezuela arranged to transfer chemical materials to the leftist insurgents in Colombia.

Subsequently, in late October 2001, GIS received information that the Libyan Government had moved its chemical and biological research and production facilities within the country to further cover their activities. As noted in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily of October 31, 2001:

High-level and authoritative sources within the Libyan Government have told GIS that the Administration of Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has now completed the re-location of the country's chemical and biological weapons production plants, and had not dismantled his chemical and biological weapons production capabilities. As well, these sources reported, Libya had in 1999 moved much of its chemical (and possibly biological) weapons and materiel stockpiles out of the country to such places as Belize and numerous other locations. 

Furthermore, the sources said that Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi had been sending funds to the Osama bin Laden organization as recently as July 2001, when US$25-million was sent to support bin Laden's activities. Other sources, present at a closed-door session called by Qadhafi at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Doha, Qatar, in October 2001, said that Qadhafi had praised bin Laden as a "true hero", for his terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Only the Lebanese, Iranian and Syrian representatives at the meeting reportedly opposed Qadhafi for his remarks, with at least one leader reportedly calling him a coward for not having made his remarks in public.

The chemical and biological weapons research and production facilities had previously been located in Az-Zawiyah, Sawfajjin, Sirte, Ajdabiya, Tubruq, Sabha, Ghadamis and Murzuq municipalities of Libya. They had now moved to Al-Jufrah municipality. 

It was understood from the preliminary report from the GIS sources — who had proven extremely reliable in the past — that a major chemical weapons facility had been moved to Hun, in northern al-Jufrah municipality. That facility was reportedly under the command of Adam Alkimawi, with other officers involved there being Col. Khaled Bayudh, Lt.-Col. Muftah Jaballah, and Maj. Mohammed Abdulfadil.

Another facility, involved in both chemical and biological weapons, had reportedly been moved to Sukna in al-Jufrah, not far from Hun. That facility was under the command of Col. Joni Mohammed Alghadi. [Note: all personnel names transliterated phonetically.]

A third chem. and bio. facility was reportedly sited in Sukna City proper and Ferjan in south-west Sukna, in al-Jufrah municipality. A fourth facility had been established in Hamam, in the north of Sukna, and a fifth reportedly in the Aafia Mountains.

Test Runs: In early 1980, Qadhafi needed to test his production of chemical and biological warfare, and had the opportunity for the first time during his war against Chad where whole villages were sprayed with chemical substances. The military campaign was led by his uncle, Colonel Hassan Ishkaal (died in December 1935), and Colonel Mufiah Asbieh (died during the war in Chad in 1987). Those two gave the orders to practically wipe out the inhabitants of several villages in Tisna and Zag in northern Chad, with a death toll of over 4,500 mostly children, women, and elderly.

Subsequently, Qadhafi used his stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons on his own people. In 1993 he sent his army to subdue the rebels in Soussa, about 200km East of Benghazi on the Mediterranean Sea. The rebels were bombarded from helicopters with sprays of nerve gas and mustard gas whose traces can still be detected today on trees and rocks in the area.

Chemical Weapons Gifts: Qadhafi has been generous in donating his chemical weapons production to many of his friends. He supplied all parties in the war in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In March 2000, he rewarded the new military Government of Gen. Robert Guei in Côte d'Ivoire, which had succeeded in overthrowing the previous Government, with a large shipment of chemical material. The shipment was smuggled through Mali and was delivered by Colonel Saeed Owaidat and Colonel Abou Bakr Ali Mohammed Qadhafi. The Sudanese Government also received Qadhafi's gift of chemical materials in November of 1999. Five 20 ft. containers each were shipped to Sudan by road to help in its war against the South. 

Somalia's war Chief Ali Hussein Aideed was the recipient of some chemical and conventional weapons in 1998. They were smuggled through the Libyan Embassy in Zimbabwe by Captain Mohamed Ajaz and Captain Muttafi Dallhil Qadhafi. 

In March 2001, the Zimbabwe Government also received some conventional weapons supplied  with chemical warheads. 

In June 2001, the Central African Republic received a shipment of concentrated chemicals.

Overseas Stockpiles: As part of his strategy to destabilize the US and create havoc, Qadhafi planned to store his weapons as close as possible to US land. He managed to hide large amounts of chemical and biological weapons in secret locations around the globe. It is a known fact that he controls storage tanks in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean countries, as noted above. The materials were smuggled with the help of individuals, organizations, and political parties that received substantial amount of financial assistance

Meanwhile, an unidentified Libyan chemist was implicated in preparations for bio-terrorist attacks planned by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida organization, the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera said on October 21, 2001. The man's rôle came to light in a conversation between a Tunisian and another Libyan intercepted by Italy's DIGOS anti-terror squad. The newspaper reported that the Tunisian, identified as Essid bin Khemais, had been held in April 2001 in Milan. The other person on the telephone, Libyan national Lased bin Heni, was arrested in mid-October 2001 in Munich. According to the newspaper, bin Khemais was heard saying: "The Libyan, a chemistry teacher... has the formula ... they've found a way of mixing the product with explosive ... it's easy."

Ballistic Missile Developments

GIS sources confirmed that the attempts to develop derivatives of Scud rockets and ballistic missiles were still underway by the Government. The Libyan authorities had contracted with Iraqis, Russians, North Koreans, and Indians for this operation. The Libyan Government is focusing on buying spare parts and equipment from different sources in the black market at the highest prices. Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on November 8, 2000, carried the following report:

Highly-reliable sources confirmed that the Israeli national intelligence service, Mossad, on November 6, 2000, formally warned the states of southern Europe — Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey — that Libya recently deployed newly-acquired NoDong-1 SSMs in operational posture. These SSMs can now reach targets in these countries, as well as Israel.

The missiles are deployed in several sites along the Libyan coast controlled by a Central HQ in the Tripoli area. It is not clear whether this deployment is a part of the Arab military build-up against Israel, or Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's reaction to the French moves to indict him for the 1989 in-flight bombing of the UTA DC-10 over Niger, or both.

The Libyan acquisition of NoDong-1 SSMs is the result of a joint Egyptian-Iraqi-Libyan crash program to overcome delays in production of indigenous SSMs. Initially, the Egyptians and the Iraqis wanted to expedite the production of their own missile in Libya. Cairo arranged for Tripoli to provide cover for the revival of the Bad'r/Condor program which could no longer take place in Iraq and now also not in Egypt because of the exposure by the US of the North Korean (DPRK) rôle and a consequent US pressure to stop the program. Therefore, the Libyans initiated their relations with the DPRK on behalf of Cairo and Baghdad.

In early 1999, reliable sources confirmed that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had told Col. Qadhafi that Libya "owed Egypt" because of the decisive Egyptian contribution to the lifting of the sanctions on Libya. [In fact, it is not true that Egyptian pressures were influential in raising the Libyan sanctions.] However, as a result of the Mubarak pressure — and shortly after the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions imposed on Libya — Qadhafi, in April 1999, dispatched a high-ranking delegation from the Libyan Army's procurement directorate to the DPRK. The delegation included Egyptian and Iraqi experts. 

The joint delegation visited the Chongchengang Corporation — the "company" responsible for the DPRK's weapons and technology exports — and negotiated a comprehensive deal for North Korean assistance in the ostensibly "Libyan" acquisition of NoDong-type SSMs. Comparable deals were concluded with other states. For example, in the Fall of 1999, the People's Republic of China (PRC) agreed to build a hypersonic wind tunnel in Libya. The specifications of the wind tunnel ensured it could be used for missile design and flight. Several Libyan (as well as Egyptian and Iraqi with Libyan documents) technicians traveled to the PRC for missile-related technical training and engineering education.

The DPRK, which had been a major contributor of technology and sub-systems to the Egyptian ballistic missile program, was to deliver key components to the reincarnated "Libyan" Bad'r/Condor program. This aspect of the program collapsed in the Summer of 1999 when Indian Customs authorities seized a North Korean ship with a concealed consignment of NoDong components, guidance and navigation systems. Initially, the Indians suspected that the shipment was destined for Pakistan, however subsequent investigation in cooperation with the US concluded that the cargo was on its way to Libya, via Malta.

The failure of this procurement effort prompted a thorough re-evaluation of the Libya-based SSM program. The Egyptian and Iraqi program managers concluded that their cooperation with experts from Iran and Yugoslavia had so far failed to resolve the severe development problems. On top of this, Pyongyang reported it would take several month to replicate the special parts ordered by "Libya".
Therefore, a few scientists from the former East Germany (GDR) were invited to Libya to audit the entire missile program. The Germans, all of them veterans of the Iraqi missile program, opined that it would take too long to revive the Bad'r/Condor to meet urgent requirement for operational SSM for the anticipated crisis in the Middle East.

Therefore, in the late Summer of 1999, Cairo and Baghdad urged Tripoli to purchase North Korean NoDong-1 SSMs on their behalf with the idea that Libya would keep a few of them for its own use. At the behest of Pres. Mubarak and Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein, Col. Qadhafi instructed General Abu-Bakr Jabir, the Libyan Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff — who also holds overall responsibility for the Libyan missile program — to personally devise a more direct way to acquire these missiles. Desperate for hard currency, Pyongyang expressed willingness to deliver numerous NoDong-1 SSMs the moment hard currency was delivered in a "safe laundered method". A North Korean delegation arrived in Tripoli to discuss the operational requirements and, in October 1999, General Abu-Bakr Jabir signed a deal with them for the supply of NoDong-1s and related technological expertise. In the Tripoli negotiations, the Libyans stressed the imperative to have the missiles deployed operationally immediately after their arrival in Libya.

The eventual October 1999 deal was for the delivery of seven mobile launchers, 50 "missile systems" (each missile system includes several SSMs which can be carried on the support vehicles escorting the mobile launcher to a forward position), and related support vehicles. The North Koreans also agreed to construct the infrastructure required for the maintenance and storage of these missiles, as well as to train "Libyans" in all aspects of missile technology over a period of five years. The first consignment of missiles and launchers was to be delivered as soon as possible and the rest were to be delivered in three further consignments over the next two years.

Pyongyang notified Tripoli that the missiles would be ready in the early Summer of 2000. The financial aspects of the deal were conducted by a Syrian arms merchant living in Marbella, Spain. Libyan agents paid him US$600-million (including a 15 percent commission). The money was laundered through banks in Madrid and Basle in Switzerland. The transaction was completed in Switzerland in July 2000.

In August 2000, Libyan Il-76 transport aircraft delivered to Tripoli 36 NoDong-1 missiles, a few launchers and 11 North Korean experts. Two were senior officials overseeing the Libyan-North Korean cooperation and nine were missile engineers and technicians who will remain in Libya for two years in order to help bring the missiles to operational status as well as retain their operability.

In late-September 2000, the first missiles and their launchers were deployed along the Mediterranean Sea coast. The location of these deployments and related targeting activities suggest they are pointed at NATO's bases in southern Europe. Although Israel is within the NoDong-1's range, little activity related to Israel was noticed. The NoDong-1 SSMs supplied to Libya can be equipped with both conventional and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) warheads. Although Libya has stocks of chemical and biological weapons hidden in underground stores in the desert, mainly the Sabha area, there is no indication that there are unconventional warheads with the SSMs.

Meanwhile, the Libyans and their partners are most satisfied with the NoDong-1s and the North Korean support system. In late October 2000, Qadhafi initiated a new round of negotiations with Pyongyang for the acquisition of a larger number of SSMs, including newer models. Two Libyan envoys arrived in Marbella to conclude arrangements with the Syrian arms merchant for the laundering of additional funds. A Libyan official bragged that the new acquisition program would make Libya "one of the best-armed countries in the Mediterranean region".


January 12, 2001

Collapse of Lockerbie PA103 Case Changes Strategic Disposition of Libya

European Union governments and the United States incoming Bush Administration are facing uncertainty as to how to deal with the Libyan Government of Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi following the virtual collapse of the terrorism case against two Libyans who had been charged in connection with the bombing of Pan Am Flight PA103 over, Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988. The allegations of Libyan responsibility for the crime were the ostensible basis for Western trade and political embargoes against Libya for more than a decade.

Now, as Col. Qadhafi is once again engaging Libya in strategically significant defense arrangements with Iraq and other countries opposed to the US and EU states, the US and EU may be vulnerable to Libyan legal claims amounting many billions of dollars as a result of the economic damage done to Libya by the embargoes. This could significantly increase Libya's strategic capability and freedom at a time when — because of Libyan deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) targeting Southern Europe — there is growing, rather than declining, concern over Col. Qadhafi's intentions.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily exclusive of November 8, 2000: Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel.]

The Scottish judges hearing the case in the Netherlands against two Libyans suspected of the Lockerbie bombing have been told it would be "unreasonable and unsafe" to convict them, according to reports from the court on January 11, 2001. The two accused are Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi, 48, and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, 44. The accused have alleged that Palestinian terrorists carried out the bombing, and Bill Taylor QC (Queen's Counsel: a barrister, or trial lawyer), for the defense, said that the prosecution had failed to dismiss that possibility. Mr Taylor indicated that a cell of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) was likely to have been the responsible organizer of the bombing.

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs sources reported shortly after the bombing that Iranian-backed Syrian and Palestinian elements were involved in organizing the bombing and that the Libyans, if involved, were only marginally connected with the crime. Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie on December 21, 1988, killing all 259 people on board and another 11 on the ground. 

As he made his closing submission at Camp Zeist, in the Netherlands, the judge said that it would have been an "extraordinary coincidence" if Palestinian terrorists based in Germany had not planted the bomb which blew up Pan Am flight 103.

Mr Taylor, for the defense, said: "Whilst the defense cannot prove responsibility it can show the court that there is some relevant information which points away from the Crown [UK Government Prosecution] theory and the alleged guilt of the two accused. The PFLP-GC German terror cell had access to similar, but not identical, Toshiba radios which experts believed contained the Pan Am bomb, and a raid on their base discovered they had stocks of different kinds of trigger devices. There would still need to be an extraordinary coincidence that a group using such material in such a way in October 1988 in Germany was not responsible for the bombing of a flight which passed through Germany two months later."

Mr Taylor said that, before the court could find the two men guilty, it would need to dismiss that coincidence. He told the judges: "It would be unreasonable and unsafe to take that course."

Once Mr Taylor completes his case, Mr Richard Keen, QC, defending Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, will also insist his client is innocent and urge the judges to acquit.

On Tuesday, January 9, 2001, the Crown dropped two of the three charges faced by the Libyans. They had been initially charged with murder, conspiracy to murder and contravening the aviation security acts. Now they face one charge of mass murder. On Wednesday, January 10, 2001, prosecutors closed their case and said the evidence before the court demonstrated that the accused were responsible for the bombing. But the Crown case closed with an admission that it was not known how the suitcase containing the bomb which destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 was placed on board the Boeing 747.

Advocate deputy Alistair Campbell, QC, said it was not essential to say how the bomb had got on board.

The judges on the panel were expected to retire for about a week before delivering their verdict to the court at Camp Zeist.


December 10, 2001

Qadhafi’s Health at Issue as Libyan Future Debated

Exclusive. From GIS Correspondents in Tripoli, and elsewhere. Highly-reliable sources inside the Libyan leadership indicate that there are growing concerns over the health of Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi who has now undergone several collapses which have left him in comas lasting up to five hours. No medical explanations have yet been found for the illnesses. 

At the same time, Col. Qadhafi has embarked on a series of initiatives designed to overcome the re-imposition of US sanctions against Libya which, despite the lifting of the UN sanctions, penalizes European or other non-US companies from doing business in the US if they work with Qadhafi. But despite attempts to ingratiate himself with the West, Qadhafi has also embarked on a series of new initiatives in Southern Africa, where he has provided extensive funding and security support for embattled Zimbabwean Pres. Robert Mugabe, and launched initiatives to undermine South African Pres. Thabo Mbeki who “stole” the crown of being the founding President of the new African Union.

The Union will hold its first summit in early 2002 in South Africa, not Sirte, Libya, where Qadhafi had intended the first such summit should be.


November 8, 2000

Libyan NoDong SSMs Reported Targeting Southern NATO Sites and Israel

The following report includes material from GIS stations in various Middle Eastern states.

Exclusive. By Yossef Bodansky, GIS. Highly-reliable sources confirmed that the Israeli national intelligence service, Mossad, on November 6, 2000, formally warned the states of southern Europe — Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey — that Libya recently deployed newly- acquired NoDong-1 SSMs in operational posture. These SSMs can now reach targets in these countries, as well as Israel.

The missiles are deployed in several sites along the Libyan coast controlled by a Central HQ in the Tripoli area. It is not clear whether this deployment is a part of the Arab military build-up against Israel, or Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's reaction to the French moves to indict him for the 1989 in-flight bombing of the UTA DC-10 over Niger, or both.

The Libyan acquisition of NoDong-1 SSMs is the result of a joint Egyptian-Iraqi-Libyan crash program to overcome delays in production of indigenous SSMs. Initially, the Egyptians and the Iraqis wanted to expedite the production of their own missile in Libya. Cairo arranged for Tripoli to provide cover for the revival of the Bad'r/Condor program which could no longer take place in Iraq and now also not in Egypt because of the exposure by the US of the North Korean (DPRK) rôle and a consequent US pressure to stop the program. Therefore, the Libyans initiated their relations with the DPRK on behalf of Cairo and Baghdad.

In early 1999, reliable sources confirmed that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had told Col. Qadhafi that Libya "owed Egypt" because of the decisive Egyptian contribution to the lifting of the sanctions on Libya. [In fact, it is not true that Egyptian pressures were influential in raising the Libyan sanctions.] However, as a result of the Mubarak pressure — and shortly after the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions imposed on Libya — Qadhafi, in April 1999, dispatched a high-ranking delegation from the Libyan Army's procurement directorate to the DPRK. The delegation included Egyptian and Iraqi experts. 

The joint delegation visited the Chongchengang Corporation — the "company" responsible for the DPRK's weapons and technology exports — and negotiated a comprehensive deal for North Korean assistance in the ostensibly "Libyan" acquisition of NoDong-type SSMs. Comparable deals were concluded with other states. For example, in the Fall of 1999, the People's Republic of China ( PRC) agreed to build a hypersonic wind tunnel in Libya. The specifications of the wind tunnel ensured it could be used for missile design and flight. Several Libyan (as well as Egyptian and Iraqi with Libyan documents) technicians traveled to the PRC for missile-related technical training and engineering education.

The DPRK, which had been a major contributor of technology and sub-systems to the Egyptian ballistic missile program, was to deliver key components to the reincarnated "Libyan" Bad'r/Condor program. This aspect of the program collapsed in the Summer of 1999 when Indian Customs authorities seized a North Korean ship with a concealed consignment of NoDong components, guidance and navigation systems. Initially, the Indians suspected that the shipment was destined for Pakistan, however subsequent investigation in cooperation with the US concluded that the cargo was on its way to Libya, via Malta.

The failure of this procurement effort prompted a thorough re-evaluation of the Libya-based SSM program. The Egyptian and Iraqi program managers concluded that their cooperation with experts from Iran and Yugoslavia had so far failed to resolve the severe development problems. On top of this, Pyongyang reported it would take several month to replicate the special parts ordered by "Libya". Therefore, a few scientists from the former East Germany (GDR) were invited to Libya to audit the entire missile program. The Germans, all of them veterans of the Iraqi missile program, opined that it would take too long to revive the Bad'r/Condor to meet urgent requirement for operational SSM for the anticipated crisis in the Middle East.

Therefore, in the late Summer of 1999, Cairo and Baghdad urged Tripoli to purchase North Korean NoDong-1 SSMs on their behalf with the idea that Libya would keep a few of them for its own use. At the behest of Pres. Mubarak and Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein, Col. Qadhafi instructed General Abu-Bakr Jabir, the Libyan Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff — who also holds overall responsibility for the Libyan missile program — to personally devise a more direct way to acquire these missiles. Desperate for hard currency, Pyongyang expressed willingness to deliver numerous NoDong-1 SSMs the moment hard currency was delivered in a "safe laundered method". A North Korean delegation arrived in Tripoli to discuss the operational requirements and, in October 1999, General Abu-Bakr Jabir signed a deal with them for the supply of NoDong-1s and related technological expertise. In the Tripoli negotiations, the Libyans stressed the imperative to have the missiles deployed operationally immediately after their arrival in Libya.

The eventual October 1999 deal was for the delivery of seven mobile launchers, 50 "missile systems" (each missile system includes several SSMs which can be carried on the support vehicles escorting the mobile launcher to a forward position), and related support vehicles. The North Koreans also agreed to construct the infrastructure required for the maintenance and storage of these missiles, as well as to train "Libyans" in all aspects of missile technology over a period of five years. The first consignment of missiles and launchers was to be delivered as soon as possible and the rest were to be delivered in three further consignments over the next two years.

Pyongyang notified Tripoli that the missiles would be ready in the early Summer of 2000. The financial aspects of the deal were conducted by a Syrian arms merchant living in Marbella, Spain. Libyan agents paid him US$600-million (including a 15 percent commission). The money was laundered through banks in Madrid and Basle in Switzerland. The transaction was completed in Switzerland in July 2000.

In August 2000, Libyan Il-76 transport aircraft delivered to Tripoli 36 NoDong-1 missiles, a few launchers and 11 North Korean experts. Two were senior officials overseeing the Libyan-North Korean cooperation and nine were missile engineers and technicians who will remain in Libya for two years in order to help bring the missiles to operational status as well as retain their operability.

In late-September 2000, the first missiles and their launchers were deployed along the Mediterranean Sea coast. The location of these deployments and related targeting activities suggest they are pointed at NATO's bases in southern Europe. Although Israel is within the NoDong-1's range, little activity related to Israel was noticed. The NoDong-1 SSMs supplied to Libya can be equipped with both conventional and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) warheads. Although Libya has stocks of chemical and biological weapons hidden in underground stores in the desert, mainly the Sabha area, there is no indication that there are unconventional warheads with the SSMs.

Meanwhile, the Libyans and their partners are most satisfied with the NoDong-1s and the North Korean support system. In late October 2000, Qadhafi initiated a new round of negotiations with Pyongyang for the acquisition of a larger number of SSMs, including newer models. Two Libyan envoys arrived in Marbella to conclude arrangements with the Syrian arms merchant for the laundering of additional funds. A Libyan official bragged that the new acquisition program would make Libya "one of the best-armed countries in the Mediterranean region".


May 1, 2000

An Unstable Qadhafi Seen Ready to Use Window to Pursue Strategic Agenda

EXCLUSIVE. A new report, completed on April 30, 2000, by the Global Information System (GIS), indicates that Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi is marshaling his forces as rapidly as possible to resume an offensive strategic agenda, inimical to Western and moderate African and Middle Eastern states, within the next six to 12 months.

The report, produced below but sanitized of references to sensitive sources, indicates that Col. Qadhafi is also suffering from severe psychological problems, which he has acknowledged, and for which he is receiving medical treatment. It also highlights the fact that Col. Qadhafi has committed the newly-available and much-increased oil revenue of Libya to reviving his overall strategic weapons programs which include: longer-range ballistic missiles to replace or upgrade his Scud-B fleet, new biological and chemical weapons, and a revived nuclear weapons program.

The report shows that Col. Qadhafi has also expanded his acquisition program for conventional weapons, and is using them as aid as part of his revived strategic diplomacy program.

The report highlights the involvement of the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Iraq, as well as other states, in helping with the strategic weapons program, as part of an increasingly-formal alliance of anti-Western states supported by Beijing.

The text of the report, minus sourcing and sensitive material, is as follows:

"Indicators and Strategic Ramifications of the Growing Instability in Libyan Affairs

April 30, 2000

Overview: Libya’s Renewed Development of Strategic Weapons Combine With Qadhafi’s Erratic Medical Condition to Create Regional Instability

    1. Numerous, detailed intelligence reports from a variety of sources have confirmed that the Libyan Administration of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has, since mid-1999, significantly escalated its focus on the development of deliverable chemical weapons and the creation of a significant medium-range ballistic missile capability. It is also known that the Libyan Administration has also resumed work on the development of deployable biological weapons to be used in conjunction with ballistic missile delivery systems based on a significant evolution of the former Soviet-designed Scud family of theater ballistic missiles. The extent of revived Libyan interest in nuclear weapons development is as yet unknown, other than the fact that it has once again resumed.

    2. Libyan leader Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi is known to be suffering from, and is being medically treated for, a psychological disorder which involves significant mood swings from severe depression to great excitability.

    3. There is evidence of the involvement of a number of major foreign partners in the development of the Scud-derived ballistic missiles, particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iraq. There is also evidence of the involvement of other supporting partners which cannot be disclosed here, both in the missile and in the weapons development arenas. Libya has, in the past, used extensive foreign assistance, particularly from Germany and Croatia, in its chemical and nuclear weapons programs.

    4. There is documented evidence of Libyan involvement during 1999 and 2000 in major programs to enhance its conventional weapons inventory, and to procure new conventional weapons systems to be used to assist client states and organizations, such as Eritrea and certain Somali clans (but also others) in Africa.

    5. The renewed involvement of Germany, Croatia and Iraq in the revived Libyan strategic weapons programs was an anticipated development. The renewed involvement of the PRC and DPRK, however, in the face of strenuous US warnings to those states against such activities, indicates a renewed attempt by Beijing to bring Libya into the increasingly formal alliance of anti-Western states which Beijing is fostering. This comes at a time when Libya has successfully worked to reduce the international embargoes which had for many years kept the country in isolation, making its access to weapons technology and expertise more difficult and its access to trade and investment revenues equally problematic. Now, Libya’s freedom to move strategically has been enhanced; and Western hostility and caution with regard to the Qadhafi Administration has, in large part, declined. More specifically, foreign power (US, European) interest in a Libyan threat has declined due to preoccupation with other problems. There is no evidence, however, that Col. Qadhafi’s strategic ambitions have in any way lessened, as a result of his superficial rapprochement with the international community, other than the fact that he now appears to be more oriented toward Africa than toward the Middle East. However, it should be stressed that his significant commitment to securing a position in the Red Sea littoral (by working with Eritrea and the Somali clans) indicates an ongoing commitment — very much in evidence since the 1970s, and articulated by Col. Qadhafi — to controlling Red Sea/Suez maritime trade. This, de facto, maintains Libya’s rôle in Middle Eastern politics, as does his current relationship with Iraq over the mutual development of strategic weapons.

    6. There is a credible body of evidence which suggests that the PRC, DPRK and Libyan administrations feel that they have the greatest scope to expand their strategic activities during the period of the Clinton Administration in the United States, and that the next US Administration, which takes office in January 2001, would be less likely to give either (PRC or Libyan) leadership as much leeway. This means that the PRC Government, for example, is likely to seriously consider any moves it is likely to make against Taiwan, militarily, before the change of US Administration. If, as now seems certain, there is the belief in Tripoli that the West’s ability to contain Libya is on the wane, and that the West will be preoccupied with the China-Taiwan strategic issue, Colonel Qadhafi is likely to attempt to consolidate his position which ultimately would be, once again, anti-Western and destabilizing to moderate interests in Africa (and the Red Sea).

    7. The fact that such an alliance of anti-Western states, led by the PRC, is once again evolving, means that the flow of technology to Libya will equally benefit the Iraqi Government of President Saddam Hussein. Essentially, some aspects of the strategic weapons program of Iraq are, in fact, being conducted in Libya, where Iraqi engineers and scientists are now known to be working. Although there is some strategic common ground between Libya, Iraq and the PRC with radical Islamist causes and states (and particularly Iran), there is a different, core bond between the three: fear of radical Islamism.

    8. The extent of the geo-strategic ramifications of the current developments cannot be fully assessed even by the protagonist states: the PRC, Iraq and Libya. However, it is feasible that the ramifications could easily involve a renewed, consolidated schism over the coming months between the anti-Western states and the moderate states in Africa and the Middle East, extending into Turkey and Turkic areas. This will be particularly clearly defined if the PRC-US confrontation polarizes, as expected, before the end of 2000. Even without such a confrontational polarization, it is clear that Libya is quietly becoming a key component of the anti-Western alliance, even though the source of Libya’s flexibility — its revenue base — is oil sales to Western clients. Given its renewed access to revenues, particularly with the now-open ability to sell oil internationally, coupled with the significant escalation of oil prices, Libya has once again become a major strategic player in the region. What is equally clear is the fact that Col. Qadhafi’s ambitions and enmities have remained unchanged: he is committed to a radical course of action which aligns with the PRC’s global agenda, and against that of the West and the moderate African and Middle Eastern states.

    9. Japan’s decision in late April 2000 to un-freeze Libyan assets and to resume normal trade relations was a further significant step in enhancing Libya’s ability to fund its strategic ambitions. Visits in April and May 2000 by senior French and British officials are also likely to expand Libya’s freedom of movement in the strategic arena.

Aspects and Ramifications of Libya’s Strategic and Conventional Weapons Expansion

    1. Libya’s revived efforts to develop longer-range variants of the Soviet-designed Scud theater surface-to-surface missile (SSM) have been noted publicly during 2000. Twice thus far in 2000, the Libyan Government has been accused of trying to smuggle Scud missile parts through Europe. On April 13, 2000, Swiss authorities found alleged missile components in the luggage of a 44-year-old Taiwanese man at Zurich airport. The man was arrested after authorities received a tip he was headed for Libya via Hong Kong and Switzerland. Earlier in 2000, British authorities seized suspected missile parts from a British Airways aircraft which had traveled as far as Malta before they were detected. A significant volume of additional trade in missile technology to Libya has gone unreported and unchecked.

    2. On April 13, 2000, the United States Defense Department went public in noting that Libya was seeking help from "Asian and other countries" to develop a longer-range ballistic missile, but it would not confirm a published report that the PRC had provided such assistance. The Washington Times reported on April 13, 2000, that the PRC had been providing Libya with missile technology since March 1999. The newspaper said that Lt.-Gen. Michael Hayden, director of the National Security Agency (NSA), had outlined the technology transfer in a classified US Government report dated March 2, 2000. Kenneth Bacon, chief spokesman for US Defense Secretary William Cohen, said when asked about The Washington Times report that it was well known Libya wanted to build missiles of longer range than the Scud-B missiles it currently has. "They do not have the indigenous technological capability to do that, so they have been trying to work with other countries in the world in order to gain that capability," Bacon said. "And beyond that, I’m not going to comment on specific intelligence reports, but those countries are in Asia and other parts of the world." The PRC is not a party to the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which limits transfers of missile-building technology and components, but Bacon said that the PRC had pledged not to provide other countries with finished missiles.

    3. Libya has in the past been involved in programs to extend the capacity of the Scud-B, and this has, since the earlier Libyan programs, now become relatively well-known technology. The involvement of the PRC and the DPRK, as well as Iraq, means that the critical aspect will involve actual production development of Scud-based Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) of the No-Dong variety. Extending the existing 800km range of Libyan missiles is now well within Qadhafi’s grasp, with the probability — given the new ease of moving shipments into post-embargo Libya — that such an initial capability could be achieved before the end of 2000. The demonstration of this capacity would significantly escalate Libya’s political leverage in the region.

    4. There is no strategic viability in a major commitment to the development of a new MRBM capability without matching the missiles to strategic weapons. This means that the new missiles would be devoted to biological or nuclear weapons, or at least chemical weapons. It is important to note, however, that biological or nuclear weapons would make the most cost-effective use of an expensive long-range missile system. Given that the Libyan nuclear program is believed to be less well-advanced than the missile program, it is likely that biological and chemical weapons are the main initial priority. However, the technology would also be available to other allied states, such as Iraq, which would also use the missile capability for strategic weapons.

    5. There is evidence, which cannot be fully addressed in this paper, that the Libyan Administration has begun work, once again, on biological weapons, apart from its already sophisticated work on certain chemical weapons. It is known that work is now being conducted in Libya, with the help of Iraqi scientists, on yeast and bacteria cultures for the development of weaponized forms of:

  1. Anthrax;

  2. Botulinum toxins;

  3. Aflatoxins; and

  4. Smallpox (with privately-recruited Russian scientists).

    1. There is widespread evidence of the revived procurement by Libya of conventional Eastern European weapons systems, particularly from Bulgaria, and routed via Burkina Faso. This has meant that Libya could modernize its existing systems, while dispensing used and some new equipment to its client states in the region, particularly Eritrea and Somalia. This has been extensively documented during the past six months, and is an indication of the commitment by Qadhafi to a revival of his power projection ambitions. The new acquisitions include, among other things, heavy towed artillery systems and small arms and ammunition. As a result, there has been a transshipment of weapons from Libya to Eritrea and on to Somalia. It must be expected that, as part of this process, Libya has also benefited from the major influx of new, sophisticated weapons directly into Eritrea. It is probable that some of the funding of Eritrea’s new weapons also came from Libya, and that some systems and spares will have been passed on to Libya from Eritrea.

 The Impact of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s Psychological Condition and the State of Libyan Society and Systems

    1. Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s personal condition has been observed during recent months to be erratic and unstable. Wide mood swings have been observed, affecting his decisionmaking. He fluctuates from periods of depression to exuberant excitability. The subject knows that this is not a short-term or passing phenomenon himself. He has voluntarily enlisted medical help to treat the depression. A Rome-based psychiatrist, Dr Koukopoloulos Atanasios, of Via Crescenzio 42, Rome [tel. 06-6874475], is currently treating Col. Qadhafi for this condition. The doctor has prescribed medication to treat the condition.

    2. It is not known whether Col. Qadhafi’s current mental condition is connected with (ie: was triggered by) the assassination attempt on him in the Cyrenaica region during 1999, when it was reported that he had suffered some personal injuries plus the loss of one or more close bodyguards. Given that the psychological instability was not reported before that incident, it is possible that a connection exists.

    3. Fundamental profiling of Col. Qadhafi, based on observations of his behavior and recent Libyan strategic actions which could only have been undertaken at his instigation, at this point reveals within him:

  1. Renewed enthusiasm for high-risk strategic enterprises, designed to involve him in the manipulation of regional affairs, despite the fact that these efforts previously resulted in his isolation and confrontation with major Western powers;

  2. Continued and very deliberate opposition to the major Western powers, but now more carefully disguised than in the past;

  3. Continued distrust of subordinates;

  4. A belief that he has defeated and survived his major Western detractors, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, and that their leaders no longer posed a serious threat to him;

  5. A belief that Egypt no longer poses a threat to him;

  6. A belief that, within Africa, he has an innate superiority in dealing with other African leaders, whom he believes must now regard him as their natural leader. This has been particularly evident in his recent public dealings with the Sierra Leonean and Rwandan situations. For this reason, he has become increasingly involved in African affairs, rather than Middle Eastern mainline issues, given that Middle Eastern political success has constantly eluded him and fundamentally embarrassed him. This dichotomy — a feeling of success in African issues and a feeling of frustration in Middle Eastern issues — is likely to dictate near-term actions: a desire to achieve signal success in some African enterprises, coupled with a desire to punish or show his importance to Middle Eastern leaders. How this will be exhibited remains open to opportunity and will be equally influenced by his increasingly erratic approach.

    1. All indications are that Col. Qadhafi will, within the coming 12 months, initiate actions which will be destabilizing to a number of African states, and will continue to be involved in the escalation of military activities in the Horn of Africa (in support of Eritrea and current Somali allies). Almost certainly, Col. Qadhafi will attempt to utilize the time between now and the end of the Clinton Administration in the US in January 2001 to make significant and irreversible strategic headway. Among the probable initiatives which he is expected to undertake, in addition to the Eritrean and Somali ongoing ventures, are the following:

  1. Sierra Leone: Involvement in the Sierra Leone civil war which is expected, quite apart from any Libyan aspect, to regain momentum during the latter part of 2000. However, with Libyan intervention it is expected to escalate more than would otherwise be the case. However, the manner of the Libyan involvement is now unpredictable, given the fact that the relationship with former ally Foday Sankoh of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has broken down. It is possible that Qadhafi could favor incumbent President Ahmed Tejan Kabba, or, more likely, forces around former RUF field commander Sam Bockerie.

  2. Côte d’Ivoire: Involvement with current military leader Gen. Robert Guei, leading to a refusal by that leader to move toward elected government in Côte d’Ivoire. Qadhafi on April 19, 2000, offered Gen. Guei [then in Tripoli for a two-day visit] financial aid during the "transition" to democracy, but the aid provides the Ivoirian leader with a strong alternative to dependence on Nigeria during this period. Apart from the example of defiance which this would set to regional leader Nigeria, such an act would also move Côte d’Ivoire for the first time into a position of increasing isolation and radicalization from the moderate world community, which could be remedied only by a French-led or French-sanctioned military operation to reverse the present military leadership. Such a move, while possibly one of the few viable options if Gen. Guei stays firm in an alliance with Qadhafi, would further polarize the political environment in West Africa.

  3. Rwanda: There is likely to be Libyan support for the otherwise increasingly isolated Kagame Administration, further polarizing the domestic situation in the country and further increasing the likelihood of a resumed civil war. This, coupled with the situation in the Eastern areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), means that the entire regional situation from Uganda to the Atlantic will remain unstable, with consequences for all regional players from the Southern Africa Development Council (SADC) region as well as for Uganda’s own stability.

  4. Kenya: Libyan support for the Somali clans is already destabilizing for Kenya, given the weapons and guerilla force movements across Kenyan borders. This relates to the Libyan-Eritrean-Somali actions against Ethiopia as well as to the intra-Somali conflict. Destabilization of Kenya, even without other Libyan hostility, has significant ramifications for the region, including the conflict within the Sudan, the Ethiopian situation, and other issues.

  5. Western Sahara: Libya is expected to become actively involved in the Western Sahara issue, particularly if current negotiations moving toward a resolution do not meet with Qadhafi’s expectations.

There are a wide range of other significant issues in which Qadhafi will feel either compelled to become involved, or which he feels are part of his mission. The above are cited merely as examples. Qadhafi’s relationship with Egypt will be significant, but at present this does not appear to be a primary focus, largely because Egypt and Libya share a common threat in the radical Islamist forces.

    1. New Libyan Irregular Warfare Approaches: It is known that Qadhafi has personally overseen the development of 72 élite combatants who have been conditioned to a level of obsessive hatred of the United States and the West. They have been issued with a variety of passports, and one of their principal weapons is chemical incapacitants which can be delivered by aerosol spray.

    2. Col. Qadhafi’s attitudes have alienated a growing sector of the Libyan population, according to a range of reports received. This has been particularly the case since the recent changes in the General People’s Congress, and the fact that, despite the recent opening of the country in the wake of the removal of international embargoes, there has been no improvement in the situation of the average Libyan, either economically or in terms of personal liberties. The changed situation has, however, brought about a renewed restlessness which has been further spurred by the insurrection of some radical Islamists in the normally religiously moderate Cyrenaica region. There has been a growing perception within many sectors of the Armed Forces and public that the time has come for major change. Coupled with this has been the general breakdown in State institutions. Some sources have indicated that a total collapse of the system is possible even without external intervention, but this could — if allowed to occur —result in the seizure of power by other radical forces, including Islamists. There has, as a result, been an increasing amount of contact from Libyan Armed Forces personnel who feel that the time is right for strong action by more nationalist Libyan forces, supporting the restoration of traditional leadership in the form of the Senussiyah leadership. Without going into detail, the level of commitment by many members of the Armed Forces at all ranks to the restoration of Senussi leadership, under Prince Idris el-Senussi, is now at its highest level. As well, key individuals close to Qadhafi have indicated to this Service their readiness to work with Prince Idris.

  1. Conclusions and Recommendations

    1. It is evident that Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi is moving as quickly as he feasibly can to regain the momentum of his strategic power projection position which was lost during the years of international isolation under the UN embargo. There is every indication that Qadhafi’s strategic posture remains unchanged from the pre-embargo period:

  1. He remains hostile to the West, and particularly the United States;

  2. He remains committed to strategic weapons development and the acquisition of an arsenal disproportionate to any normal requirement for Libyan defense;

  3. He remains committed to the use of weapons as part of a tool to develop strong control or influence over client states;

  4. He remains committed to obtaining a position of influence over strategic Red Sea/Suez Canal traffic, only now the level of Egyptian fear of this position has subsided, or has been lulled to sleep;

  5. He remains committed to involvement with and influence over radical African movements and governments;

  6. He remains concerned over the spread of radical Islamism, but finds himself, as before, in alliance with radical Islamists in certain areas;

  7. He has revived his program of strategic weapons cooperation with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

    1. There is now an urgency in the nature of the escalation of Col. Qadhafi’s strategic plans, perhaps to make up for the time lost during the embargo era, but perhaps also due to the nature of his psychological problems. There is also evidence that the "window of opportunity" which he and his allies see in the remaining tenure of the US Clinton Administration is a factor in the urgency of his actions. And while the psychological issue makes Qadhafi presently unpredictable, his unpredictability extends only to where and how he will act against moderate interests. His mercurial nature, partly attributable to his disorder, seems unlikely to include any transformation of his objectives to include, for example, a true rapprochement with the West or moderate African or Middle Eastern states.

    2. Libya’s new "respectability", caused by the diplomatic efforts which ended the international embargo of the country, coupled with the significant increase in oil prices, have given Libya a momentum which it has not seen for perhaps two decades. At the same time, the coincidence of global affairs have made Libya a significant ally for the People’s Republic of China and Iraq at this time. There is no doubt that the PRC will exploit Libya to help consolidate an anti-Western position in Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, particularly over the coming six months.

    3. Libya will develop as a major threat to the stability of parts of Africa, the Red Sea/Suez sea lanes and to parts of the Middle East, if it is allowed to consolidate along the lines Qadhafi envisages over the coming six to 12 months. It will, as part of this, almost certainly resume the funding and support of international terrorist movements, aimed at moderate African states, the Middle East (including Israel and Egypt), and the West, largely because this is one of the avenues which Qadhafi can pursue with relative immunity and without direct confrontation of the West. Unless Qadhafi is removed from office within the coming six to 12 months, it seems likely that Libya will become a major strategic factor again, and with Qadhafi’s position once again assured.

    4. The US Clinton Administration and the US Congress are clearly not in ignorance of the evolving nature of the Libyan situation, but, given the difficulty for the US Administration to move directly during an election year, would clearly support a change in Libya should it be able to be brought about by other means. There seems to be a belief in the Qadhafi Administration that the US has dropped its guard with regard to Libya, and that it would not support an attempt to remove Qadhafi. And while the US Administration and Congress have indeed been preoccupied with other issues, it is not true to assess them as being disinterested.

    5. There is a distinct possibility that, unless action is taken rapidly, Libyan popular discontent, coupled with the collapse of the normal working infrastructure of the State, could lead to a chaotic situation in the country. This would, unless urgent preventative measures are taken, benefit only radical Islamist forces which could result in a situation which is as destabilizing to the region as the present Qadhafi Administration. It is also possible that a major strategic thrust by Qadhafi to achieve his regional ambitions could, in fact, be the trigger for a final collapse of the domestic infrastructure, leading immediately to both regional and domestic chaos, with long-term entrenched difficulties as a result.

    6. The only option readily available and viable to replace Qadhafi, with popular and Armed Forces support, is the Senussi leadership under Prince Idris el-Senussi. That option has been in development for many years and is clearly ready to move, provided it has sufficient external support."


September 8, 1999

Libyan Leader, 30 Years Into His Rule, is Given New Lease of Life

By Gregory R. Copley, Editor: The lifting this year of most international sanctions against Libya has re-launched Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi onto the Middle East and African stage with a vengeance. Col. Qadhafi had spent many of the years since the international embargoes were arranged, in 1988, promised almost any diplomat who would listen that he had reformed, and that he would no longer back “international terrorism”. But when the time came for the sanctions to be lifted, Qadhafi reverted to his traditional strategic line: a mixture of diplomacy and coercion.

This week he hosted a Pan-African celebration of the 30th anniversary of his coming to power. More than two dozen heads of state looked on as soldiers from countries which have been involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) conflict joined a contingent of women fighters from Eritrea. The two conflicts — the DRC war and the Eritrea-Ethiopia war — were highly symbolic: in both wars Qadhafi is intimately involved.

Despite Qadhafi’s renewed involvement in African military affairs, often as a provocateur, Britain restored diplomatic ties with Libya in July after he surrendered two Libyan suspects in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland. Qadhafi, who toppled King Idris I on September 1, 1969, staged this week’s celebration on the eve of a special Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit to discuss his vision of a United States of Africa.

Predictably, the OAU event was an opportunity for Qadhafi to re-assert his newly-rediscovered “legitimacy”, but the new energy — and the new sophistication — of his regional proselytization belies the fact that many of his neightbors view his return with caution. Many of the governments who this week sent delegates, or heads of government, to the Libyan OAU summit privately express concern over Qadhafi’s new activities in funding DRC President Laurent Kabila and Eritrean President Isayas Afewerke’s war against Ethiopia. There is concern, too, that Qadfhafi is interfering, with funds and weapons, in other African conflicts.

The Libyan opposition, too, is beginning to re-group, and the major world powers, while honoring commitments to drop embargoes because of the release of the two low-level suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing, are almost in harmony as to their wish to see the Qadhafi era come to an end. But, for the moment, Qadhafi has a free hand.

Libyan officials said this week’s military parade, grouping soldiers from more than 20 African countries, was unprecedented on the continent. Among those watching were the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia, who have still to resolve their war. Congo's President Laurent Kabila and the presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Namibia, all of whom have troops in the Congo, were also present.

Qadhafi himself sat between Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the current OAU chairman, and Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema. Africa's longest serving leader and the millennium OAU chairman. South African President Thabo Mbeki sat with them.
Missiles, rocket-launchers and a range of armored vehicles were on parade. Libyan Air Force fighters demonstrated that the years of parts denial had not affected their operational readiness, at least to a degree. Naval patrol craft and a single Libyan submarine stood offshore.

Qadhafi proposed the two-day special OAU summit — scheduled to start today, September 8, 1999 — in his home town of Sirte, saying African countries had to unite if they were to survive in an increasingly globalized world.
Liberian President Charles Taylor — wo has had close ties with Qadhafi during Taylor’s long guerilla war to seize power — yesterday decided to attend the OAU meeting and traveled there on Tuesday, September 7, 1999. Taylor had decided on Sunday not to go because of continued fighting in the north of Liberia and sent his vice-president, Enoch Dogolea, instead. Dogolea has subsequently been recalled.

The OAU meeting on September 8 and 9 was officially called by Qadhafi to examine ways of forging greater unity among the 53 OAU member states.

Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika also left Algiers for Libya on Tuesday, September 7, 1999. Col. Qadhafi on Monday, September 6, 1999, called for the establishment of an African union modeled after the United States, the former Soviet Union or the European Union. “I've been impatiently waiting for this day,” Qadhafi told African foreign ministers at the opening session of the four-day extraordinary gathering. “We have no future without unity.” Qadhafi called for the extraordinary summit in July at the OAU's annual meeting which was held in Algeria to discuss a long-overdue restructuring of the organization's charter.

Gambia's foreign minister, Mohamed Sedat Jobe, said Africans would like to reconstruct the OAU charter”`to make it a much more functional charter that would reflect the strengths of the continent.” Indeed, the proposal is one which finds considerable support among African leaders.

Qadhafi said he found the 1991 Abuja Treaty, which called for the setting up of an African economic community by 2025, to include all elements of unity, such as the establishment of an African congress, a bank and a court. Abuja is the headquarters of what could be considered a pilot project for the scheme, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has successfully deployed combined armed forces to stop regional conflicts, as well as helping regulate economic and financial matters between member states.

“There's Europe uniting under a treaty similar to the Abuja Treaty,” said Qadhafi. “The Abuja Treaty is so complete I couldn't find anything to add to it.”

The OAU meeting is the first such summit to be held in Libya. In the early 1980s, Libya hosted two attempts at an annual OAU summit. They both failed because not enough heads of state arrived to reach a quorum.


   
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