East Asian Monarchy

Why did the Chinese monarchy, which lasted more than 4,000 years, become a republic?
Analyzing the survival of monarchy through the Chinese and Japanese cases

By Quinn A. Marschik

Research Associate, The Center for the Study of Monarchy, Traditional Governance, and Sovereignty

Introduction

China’s Qing Dynasty fell in 1911 to reform-minded revolutionaries, thereby ending two thousand years of imperial rule in China. The revolutionaries, many of whom would go on to found the Chinese Nationalist Party, decided to replace China’s monarchy, a native institution with a three thousand year history, with a republic, a foreign form of government. Just across the East China Sea in Japan, nationalist reformers led a successful campaign, as well as won a civil war, to change the Japanese government and ultimately chose to keep their native institution of monarchy. In both countries, monarchy was not simply a native form of government, but heavily tied to native philosophies and religions.

The similarities in Japan and China (powerful nationalist reform movements that instituted political change and native monarchies with solid grounding in native religion and political philosophy) and differences in outcomes (China’s nationalists adopted a republic, a foreign type of government, while Japanese nationalists maintained the monarchy) beg the question: Why was the Chinese monarchy left to the dustbin of history by the nationalist revolutionaries and replaced by a foreign type of government, while the Japanese nationalists maintained their native monarchical form of government? This question leads the causal question of what
made the nationalists get rid of the monarchy in China, but keep the monarchy in Japan?

In this paper, I attempt to resolve this question and determine why the Chinese monarchy failed using theories regarding the survival of monarchies. I argue that the Chinese monarchy ultimately failed because it did not fit existing theory on the survival of monarchies, specifically as it lost its representativeness of China. First, I will review some relevant literature on the fall of the Qing Dynasty, using it as a proxy for the fall of the Chinese monarchy, to ascertain some control variables as to why, in the specific Chinese case, the monarchy failed. After deriving my control variables, I will review the theories on the survival of monarchies and develop my hypothesis. Next, I shall lay out my data and methods, using these to analyze the Qing and Meiji Japan cases. Finally, I will discuss my results and conclude.

Reviewing the Relevant Literature and Hypothesis

Scholars know a great deal about how the Qing Dynasty fell, but little attention is paid to the failure of the Chinese monarchy and its inability to continue as a viable form of government in China. First, I shall review some important literature on the downfall of the Qing Dynasty, specifically focusing on the twentieth century, using it as a proxy for why monarchy did not survive in the Chinese case. Next, I will review literature on the survival of monarchies as institutions in an attempt to provide a theory for my hypothesis. Finally, I will state my hypothesis to be tested.

Fall of the Qing

The literature regarding the demise of the Qing Dynasty tends to focus on two variables: the failure of legal and political reforms and the role of traditional
thought. Below, I review literature concerning these two variables, using them as independent variables for my analysis.

In a work by Ai (2004), Ai conducts a comparative study between Japan and China concerning legal reforms and outlines why Japan was successful and why China failed. He touches upon the conservatism and Confucian entrenchment surrounding the monarchy as hindering legal reforms. It is heavily implied that failure to modernize the legal system was a cause for the fall of the Qing and the success of modernization in Japan allowed it to continue without drastic regime change, meaning the monarchy could continue. However, Ai does place a great deal of blame on the Manchu leaders, noting their corruption and refusal to be more inclusive of Han Chinese in governing the country (70-1). Despite this, he does not go a step further and consider them as a cause for the fall of the Qing, or even as to why the Chinese monarchy was completely discarded. Rather, his study leaves the door open for those interested in studying the fall of the monarchy as an institution and provides some grounds for looking at the Manchu dominance of power and the failure to provide representation of Hans as factors as to why the monarchy failed.

Bodde and Morris (1967), who conducted an earlier study on the failure of Qing legal reforms, argue that the legal system brought down the Chinese monarchy and made a republic inevitable (160). Thus, the authors exhibit a similar finding to Ai and actually elicit a causal mechanism for the fall of the Chinese monarchy and why it did not continue to be an option as a suitable form of government. However, the authors seem to discount monarchy, and even what became the Republic of China, as legitimate forms of government due to their revolutionary bias, making their finding somewhat questionable. Furthermore, they do not address the fact that the Chinese monarchy and government was tilted in favor of Manchu dominance over Han representation, making this factor worth studying.
Some of the Machu-Han power disparity and lack of Han representativeness is discussed in yet another work regarding the Chinese legal system. In this work, Gao, Zhan, and Wei (2015) study China’s path of developing the rule of law, tracing the history of the Chinese legal system from the Qing Dynasty to the present. When discussing legal and political reforms during the late Qing, the authors place the blame of reform on the Qing imperial clan and the Manchu ruling elite, both in terms of actual reform and practice (10-1). However, the failure of legal and political reform is pegged as the main causal factor in the downfall of the Chinese monarchy, yet again echoing the findings of Ai (2004) and Bodde and Morris (1967). Despite this, Gao et al. state that “[h]ad the Qing royal family been a Han Chinese one, then the constitutional movement would have a chance”, thus the monarchy would have possibly survived, pointing to the possibility that a monarchy that represented the majority ethnic group and culture of China may have survived, making it worth studying (11).

Going back to the role of tradition in the failure of the Qing Dynasty, Terrill (2010) discusses regime failure in China, in general, from the Qing to the present. He argues that the mass disillusionment with Confucianism was a cause for the failure of the Qing. This could, in part, explain the failure of monarchy, coinciding with the scholars above, but monarchy exists as an institution outside of Confucianism, so it should be looked at outside of the strict Confucian context, with the lack of Han representation during the twentieth century reform period as a potential cause.

Overall, the literature identifies political and legal reform failures and traditional Chinese thought as the main factors in the demise of the Qing Dynasty. The literature does, however, leave out a potential causal factor, representativeness of the Chinese monarchy, which in this case would be the representativeness of the
Qing Dynasty of the Chinese nation. Such a factor is touched upon in survival of monarchy literature, making it worth testing and analyzing in the Chinese case.

**Survival of Monarchies**

As with the literature on the Qing’s demise, there is a wealth of literature on how monarchies can survive as institutions. Here, I will review the findings on monarchical survival to provide the theoretical foundation for my hypothesis.

In one of the first rigorous studies of monarchical regimes, Huntington (1966) sought to understand if monarchies can survive political modernization, which means a transition to democracy. He specifically focused on the interactions between the monarch and the legislature and found that, while political parties and parliamentary representation may form, the monarch will do all he or she can to resist modernization, even if that means using coercive methods in the parliament or suppressing the parliament itself.

Numerous historical examples exist to support Huntington’s claims: Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and King Louis XVI of France. However, many monarchies have been modernizing, and have survived. The United Kingdom and Japan both have long histories of political modernization, which has proven quite successful, as both monarchies exist today. An even more recent example exists in Spain. King Juan Carlos I did not rule in the autocratic ways of Generalissimo Francisco Franco. Instead, the Spanish king led the charge for democratization and even quelled a coup that would upset the democratic order. This, it so happens, appears to be what the Qing royals put into practice. However, despite implementing a great many reforms, the monarchy fell before it could modernize completely.

In spite of Huntington’s findings, several studies (Przeworski, Asadurian, and Bohlken 2012; Rose & Kavanagh 1976), instead of focusing on what actions
of monarchs lead to the “death” of monarchies, attempt to determine which actions can allow monarchies to survive.

Przeworski *et al.* are concerned with charting the history of parliamentary responsibility. Like Huntington, they study the relationship between the monarch and the legislature, finding that monarchs will survive if they give in to the demands of the legislature. Similarly, Rose and Kavanagh find that monarchs who relinquish their powers and cease involvement with political life keep their throne. Thus, to survive, a monarch must “keep up with the times,” or adapt to various political and social changes. The studies by Przeworski *et al.* and Rose and Kavanagh both conclude that monarchies can survive if they are willing to relinquish significant political power and national governance for existence as an institution, a finding that is barely touched upon by Huntington. Thus, monarchies must modernize and democratize in order to survive, which involves giving up absolute power, most likely through a constitution. So, if the Qing, thereby the Chinese monarchy, was able to modernize, it should have had a good chance of surviving.

However, in spite of the findings that monarchies can survive what can be called democratization, the literature above does not detail the power of a monarch, both real and symbolic. Contrasting with the three previous studies, Lawrence (2014) finds that monarchies are able to survive by using their position wisely.

Lawrence’s study primarily focuses on the institution of monarchy in response to public protests advocating for democracy. She finds that monarchies are resilient due to their legitimacy, ability to be flexible, and cultural appeal, as opposed to having immense wealth, foreign backing, and a leadership style that can thwart opposition. Therefore, monarchies are resilient because they are able to maintain a sense of representativeness of the nations in which they are present.
Monarchies are able to transform into constitutional monarchies, which leads to a reduction in anti-regime sentiments. Transformation is possible as citizens desire democracy, but also want political stability, which can be provided through a constitutional monarchy. Essentially, Lawrence states that citizens look to the monarch to enact modernization reforms in exchange for the people supporting the monarchy. This finding is very similar to the example of King Juan Carlos’ democratic reforms in Spain. The dual finding, of maintaining representativeness of the nation and political modernization, allows monarchies to survive.

In contrast, the Qing monarchy did not fit the model described by Lawrence. It did not appear to be representative of China, as it was a foreign Manchu dynasty ruling over native Hans. The Hans outnumbered the Manchu and the Manchu elite imposed many Manchu cultural values upon the Hans, thereby giving the Qing less cultural authority. Furthermore, based on their history of reform, the Manchus were not so flexible, given that they tried to continuously monopolize power. Thus, it seems like the Chinese monarchy, towards the end of the Qing, was not acting as a representative institution of China. Therefore, through the above theorization, I can develop my hypothesis.

Hypothesis

The literature on the Qing’s demise does not adequately concern the variable of the Chinese monarchy’s representativeness of the Chinese nation. Additionally, the literature on the survival of monarchies fits, to a degree, the Qing case, in that the monarchy made attempts to modernize its political institutions and legal system, but failed to remain representative of China. Thus, I argue that by the Qing failing to include Han elites in the modernizing government, the monarchy became a
tainted institution, seen as unrepresentative of China, that was unsuitable for China moving forward.

Data and Methods

For my analysis, I will be using the comparative method and utilize data from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In order to capture why the Chinese monarchy fell and was not considered as a potential form of government by the revolutionaries after the fall of the Qing, I will be comparing twentieth century Qing China with Meiji Restoration Japan from inception to implementation of the Meiji Constitution in 1880. To make the comparison, I will be using Mill’s method of most similar cases with different outcomes and analyze the policies of reform, role of tradition, and representativeness in both countries.

As previously noted, Japan and China both had similar monarchical cultures in that monarchy is heavily rooted in their native religions and political philosophies, in addition to monarchy having a largely uninterrupted history for over a thousand years in the case of Japan and around three thousand years in the case of China. Beyond sharing similar cultures of monarchy, both shared similar power structures before political reforms.

Japan and China both had similar structures of power prior to political reforms. In China, the foreign Manchus, heavily outnumbered by native Hans, held the reins of power and imposed some of their cultural values upon the Hans, forcing them to give up parts of their native and traditional culture. In Japan, the *fudai* (insider) daimyo monopolized power during the Edo period and largely excluded the *tozama* (outsider) daimyo from government. During the period of political reform in both countries is where the countries diverge.
Political reforms undertaken by China and Japan occurred after the influx of immense influence from the Western imperial powers. Additionally, both sets of reforms were undertaken under pressure from nationalist groups. The outcome of the political reforms is where both countries take different paths. In Japan, political reform was largely successful and transformed the Japanese government into one that was more inclusive of Japanese elites, with both former tozama and fudai daimyo having a stake in government. Even after being excluded from power by the fudai under the authority of the Japanese emperor during the Edo era, the tozama opted to keep the monarchy under a new and more representative system of government. To Japan’s West, China also conducted its own political and legal reforms with different outcomes. While the Qing initiated and established, in theory, a government that was supposed to be more representative and allow power sharing between Manchus and Hans, the Qing was unable to completely share power with native Han elites and remain representative of China. The result was that the Qing Dynasty fell and the monarchy with fell with it. Thus, by comparing the government policies of Meiji Restoration Japan and twentieth century Qing Dynasty China, as well as using survival of monarchy theory to guide my analysis, I will be able to explain the divergence of the survival of monarchy in both countries.

Consequently, political modernization (political and legal reforms) and representativeness are my main independent variables, which are critical to monarchy survival theory. Furthermore, I will control for the role of traditional Chinese thought in both cases, as it is a variable identified by scholars as a cause of the fall of the Qing, thereby the Chinese monarchy. I expect my data and methods will lead me to the conclusion that the inability of the Qing to remain representative of China, by not sharing power with Han elites in spite of political modernization, tarnished the monarchy as a viable institution for China’s future.
Analysis of China

As stated in the literature review, two major arguments for the demise of the Qing Dynasty, thus the Chinese monarchy, are the failure of legal and political reforms and Chinese traditional thought. Additionally, survival of monarchy theories argues that monarchies must modernize and have a degree of representativeness of the countries they reign in order to survive. In this section, I will refute the arguments that China was unable to politically modernize and too rooted in Confucianism and show that the failure of the monarchy was due to it being far too affiliated with the Manchu to be considered representative of China as a whole, serving to test survival of monarchy theories.

Political and Legal Reforms

During the early twentieth century, the Qing Dynasty began an enterprise to undertake massive political and legal reforms. These reforms extended from creating civil and commercial law to establishing constitutionalism (Reynolds 1993, 179-80). Real legal reforms were instituted, albeit near the end of the dynasty. In 1911 a new criminal code was promulgated, reversing harsh punishments for acts considered to be un-Confucian, a huge reform given Confucianism’s position as state orthodoxy (183). Civil and commercial law reforms were in the process of being developed in 1910 and 1911 respectively, largely based on Western laws (184-5). These Qing legal reforms either formed the basis of the Republic of China’s legal reforms (criminal code), or remained unchanged from the Qing (civil code), showing the success of the Qing in reforming the Chinese legal system, at least in terms of value to the Republic. Due to the success of Qing legal reforms, as late as it was, the argument that the fall of the monarchy as an institution due to its inability to result in successful legal reforms is false. The same goes for political reforms.
The Qing had been heavily engaged in political reforms after 1901 when Empress Dowager Cixi instituted the New Policy edict (Horowitz 2003, 775). In the process of the New Policy reforms, a Government Reform Commission studied foreign governments from 1905-06, resulting in the conclusion that China needed a constitutional monarchy rooted in Western principles (776, 796-7). A constitutional document was actually written and issued in 1908, called the *Outline of Constitution Compiled by Imperial Order*, which was to be fully implemented over a period of nine years (Weatherly 2014, 53). The constitution called for a constitutional monarch with substantial executive authority, largely based on the powers of the emperor in the Meiji Constitution (54). While a powerful, but constitutional monarch may not seem very different from the system already in place, it still made the Qing emperor beholden to the constitution, an improvement over being beholden to nothing at all. Furthermore, Qing political reforms included national and local parliaments, which were implemented in 1910 and 1909 respectively. The national parliament was made up of 200 representatives, 100 of which were elected by the provincial parliaments (not unlike Article I, Section 3, Clause 1 of the *Constitution of the United States* where senators were elected by state legislatures until 1913), while the other 100 were appointed by the emperor (which is comparable to how upper houses in monarchies, like Great Britain, were composed). Provincial parliament sizes varied and were composed of indirectly elected representatives. Local parliaments were to be implemented before 1918, but the Qing fell before this could happen. However, 1,843 local parliaments were established by May 1911, showing the willingness of the Qing to make good on establishing legislatures at all levels of government (Ibid). The similarity of the Qing national and provincial parliaments to Western legislatures, like the United States Senate and the British House of Lords, as well as its constitutional monarchy being based on the Japanese
model shows that the Qing was creating political reforms meant to last. More so, the fact that the Qing actually implemented its national and provincial parliaments, in addition to creating nearly 2,000 local parliaments, exhibits the Qing’s willingness to implement political reforms. Thus, given the time frame in which the Qing created and implemented political reforms, the reforms were largely successful and probably would have continued to be if the revolution had not occurred, showing that the Qing was in the process of political modernization.

By looking at the success of the Qing in reforming its laws and government based on Western and Japanese models, one can say that the fall of the monarchy and its failure to be considered as a possible institution in the future was not due to the failure of Qing political and legal reforms. In fact, the Qing was attempting to modernize its legal and political systems, a key component in monarchy survival theory. Similarly, the control variable of tradition as another major argument for the failure of the monarchy will be shown to be false.

**Tradition**

Tradition, or more specifically Confucianism, is argued by some to be the cause of the downfall of the Qing and the Chinese monarchy. This argument is easily debunked by referring to the Qing’s political and legal reforms. First of all, if tradition was the major cause in the fall of the Qing and the monarchy as an institution, then tradition would have largely prevented the Qing from engaging in serious political and legal reforms. Secondly, as previously stated above, the Qing purged many harsh punishments in their criminal code that corresponded to crimes considered to be anti-Confucian, removing the influence of Confucianism from the legal system. More importantly, the Qing abolished the imperial examination system in 1905 (Franke 1960, 1). The imperial examination system was the institution
that reinforced Confucianism as the state ideology. Through its elimination, the Qing effectively renounced Confucianism as state orthodoxy and showing a desire to move beyond it, or at least incorporate other views and traditions into the Chinese government.

Since the Qing actually attempted and succeeded, for a short time, political and legal reforms that were not based in Chinese traditions, tradition cannot be said to be the actual factor in the Qing’s downfall and the failure of the Chinese monarchy. Additionally, the Qing abolished the imperial examination system, effectively ending Confucianism’s role as the state philosophy. The Qing was attempting to put the Confucian foundations of the Chinese monarchy in the past. So, what is the real reason why the revolutionaries did not consider keeping the institution of monarchy? The answer is because it was tainted due to its unrepresentativeness.

Representativeness

The causal factor for the Chinese monarchy’s failure to continue after the fall of the Qing Dynasty is due to its association with the Manchu and their monopoly on political power, even in the face of legal and political reforms, depriving it of representative value. To the revolutionaries, the monarchy served as a symbol of Han oppression and inability to rule themselves, making a non-monarchical form of government their only option for China’s future.

Despite the successful political and legal reforms implemented by the Qing, the Qing was not necessarily enthusiastic about the reforms. While a semi-constitutional monarchy moving towards full constitutional monarchy with a national and local legislatures were implemented, in addition to overhauling Qing legal codes to adopt more Western commercial, civil, and criminal laws, the Qing imperial clan, a Manchu family, were very reluctant to even implement reforms in
the first place (Gao et al 2015, 9-10). Additionally, Manchu elites did not enthusiastically back the reforms (10). The lack of support from the Manchu royalty and elites in aiding political and legal reform efforts no doubt made monarchy appear to be an institution resistant to change. As stated in the theory section of this paper, monarchies must modernize or democratize to survive. While the Qing was in the process of modernizing and democratizing, the appearance of resistance would give doubts to the sincerity of political reform, making it less likely to be used as a potential form of government in the future, especially as it would be associated with the Manchu minority reluctantly giving away their monopoly on power and sharing it with the Han majority, serving as a reminder of a Manchu minority attempting to represent a Han majority.

Outside of a reluctance to support reforms, the Manchu remained in dominant control of the reins of power even after political reforms, making them not necessarily conducive to more Han representation in government. During the twentieth century reforms, the Qing court remained dominated by the Manchu (Zarrow 2004, 82) and high positions were specifically reserved for them (Reynold 1993, 191), despite the fact Hans outnumbered them throughout the country. Even though Manchus and Hans were supposed to be treated equally, the Manchus held seven posts in the new cabinet government, while Hans held four (11). Moreover, a Mongolian and a naturalized Manchu of Han ethnicity held the other two seats, further marginalizing the Hans in power and giving the cabinet the nickname “royal family cabinet”, a moniker of ridicule (Ibid). On the military side of reforms, leadership of the New Army was transferred from Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong, both Hans, to Tie Liang, a Manchu, in 1907. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense was completely staffed by Manchu, eliminating Han control from the military (Ibid).
According to Lawrence, part of a monarchy’s ability to survive is due to its representativeness of the country where it exists. Manchu dominance of government, notwithstanding the decree of equality between Hans and Manchu, gave the monarchy a smaller chance of survival as an institution, as it was not representative of the majority ethnicity of China, nor was it willing to cede equal power to the Han majority, rejecting Han representation. More so, Manchu dominance of the military leadership would serve to ensure that Manchus remained in power and prevent Hans from using military or armed force to implement change, further symbolizing the Manchu as the conqueror ruling the conquered Han. Thus, monarchy could be seen as being and unrepresentative institution that could not exhibit Han power, making a republic more suitable for the nationalist revolutionaries.

As a consequence of Manchu action during and after twentieth century political reforms, the Chinese monarchy was unsuitable for the nationalist revolutionaries to maintain, even if the Qing was replaced with an ethnic Han dynasty. Simply, since Manchu elites and the Qing royal family were reluctant to support political and legal reforms, dominated the government, and controlled the military with token or little Han involvement, the Chinese monarchy transformed from an institution developed by Hans to one that became extremely associated with the Manchu. At the end of the Qing, Hans had enough of their Manchu conquerors and could not continue to use monarchy as a form of government since it became a symbol of Manchu oppression, exhibiting survival of monarchy theory requiring monarchies to both modernize and remain representative.

Analysis of Japan

In this section, I look at Japan in a similar fashion to how I look at China. I analyze Japan’s successful political and legal reforms and respect for tradition with
regards to the Japanese monarchy during the Meiji Restoration period. Additionally, I analyze how the monarchy remained representative of Japanese elites, as both former and new elites were incorporated into the new monarchical government, unlike the Manchus and Hans in China, thus showing that Japan fulfilled the requirements of monarchy survival theory.

**Political and Legal Reforms**

During the years following the Meiji Restoration, as in China during the New Policy reform period, Japan initiated major political and legal reforms. Two major political reforms were the creation of a constitutional monarchy in 1868 and the elimination of the military government in 1871 (Tipton 2016, 48). The Japanese preliminary constitution, the *Charter Oath*, was a massive political reform, overhauling hundreds of years of military rule and placing power in the hands of a constitutional monarch (Ibid, Buruma 2003, 37). Immense powers were to be given to the emperor and an elected parliament was to be created, largely based upon the Prussian constitution, and would later serve as a model for the Qing *Outline of Constitution Compiled by Imperial Order*. Eventually, these measures were put into place, showing the ability of genuine political reform under a monarchy and following theories of monarchical survival through modernization. Beyond political reform, Japan, as seen later in the Qing, commenced legal reforms based upon Western laws, extending from civil law to commercial law, which would serve as a foundation for later Qing legal reforms (Weatherly 1993, 184-5). So, before the Qing embarked on their path of reform, Japan completed and succeeded in extremely similar reforms with the monarchy still intact. These reforms even came about under the mantle of tradition and Confucianism.
Tradition

Confucianism was a trait held in common by the three major leaders (Okubo Toshimichi, Kido Takayoshi, and Saigo Takamori) of the Meiji Restoration (Tipton 2016, 44). While all three had studied Western subjects, they were also educated in Confucianism (Ibid). The Meiji Restoration itself was heralded as a return to tradition, “restor[ing] the ancient form of Japanese imperial rule” (Buruma 2003, 35). Confucianism, no doubt, influenced the Meiji Restoration’s leader’s action, thereby positively contributing to Japanese political and legal reforms, thus the survival of the monarchy. Additionally, hailing the Meiji Restoration as a return to tradition when the emperor had a more active role in government further shows that tradition does not necessarily hinder reforms and it clearly bolstered the monarchy as a sticky institution. Thus, tradition played no role in the fall of the monarchy in Japan. The monarchy was made further resolute by its ability to remain representative, a key theoretical principle of the survival of monarchies.

Representativeness

Unlike the Qing, Meiji Japan was able to maintain the representativeness of the monarchy throughout the period of reforms. The major way the monarchy was able to remain representative of Japan was through coopting the daimyo. After the Meiji Restoration, the former daimyo, both tozama and fudai, were made governors, albeit without hereditary succession, allowing them to maintain a degree of regional power that they held under the Tokugawa (Brezinger 2006, 79). Furthermore, they were able to keep “one-tenth of their former tax revenues for household expenses” (Ibid). Not only were the daimyo allowed to retain a degree of local control, but they were also allowed keep a portion of their privileges enjoyed during
the Edo era, further incorporating them under the new monarchy, making it more representative of both former and new Japanese elites.

Beyond the local level, former daimyo were also incorporated into the central government in both honorific and real positions of power (Jansen and Rozman 1988, 87-8). Thus, by co-opting the former elites, the modernizing government gave the old elites an incentive to support the system, seeing as it was recognizing their former status, power, and abilities, making the monarch representative of their interests. In addition to the former daimyo, the Tokugawa family, the clan that provided the shogun before the Meiji Restoration, was also brought into the new system of monarchical government.

The Tokugawa family was immensely important in Japan up until the Meiji Restoration. They were the symbols of the old order. Ushering them into the new system of government would be a major coup and serve as a sign of unity between the new and old elites. To do this, once the Meiji Constitution came into being in 1880, the head of the Tokugawa family was granted the highest rank in the new Japanese peerage and became the president of the new House of Peers, the upper chamber of the new Imperial Diet (Jansen and Rozman 1988, 11). By making the Tokugawa family essentially the chief noble family after the Imperial House, the new monarchy was able to incorporate the leadership of the old elite. If the Meiji monarchy could benefit and empower the Tokugawa family and the former daimyo, then it could serve to represent their interests, making its overthrow undesirable, for a newer system could throw everything into jeopardy, risking elite power. Thus, the Meiji monarchy was able to maintain its representative nature after the Meiji Restoration, following survival of monarchy theory, contributing to its survival as an institution.
Discussion and Conclusion

Through analyzing the government policies of and the role of tradition in the Qing Dynasty during the twentieth century and Meiji Japan from the Meiji Restoration to the implementation of the Meiji Constitution a few trends appear. First, both the Qing Dynasty and Meiji Japan were on the path of modernization and democratization. The Qing was preparing to implement a constitutional monarchy, had already begun forming parliaments, and reformed the legal system to follow more Western theories of law. Japan was also modernizing, outlining, then implementing a constitutional monarchy, eliminating the military government, and reforming the legal system along Western lines. Thus, as both countries were modernizing, they met the first criteria of the theory of survival of monarchies, as well as dispelling the argument that lack of political and legal reforms was a factor in bringing down the Chinese monarchy.

Second, while Qing China began removing its traditional Confucian elements from the law and government, Confucianism and tradition crept to power in Meiji Japan, showing that neither tradition nor lack thereof led to the fall of the monarchy in both countries.

Finally, by analyzing how the Qing and Meiji Japan were able to prove representative, I find that the Chinese monarchy was unable to remain representative of China as a whole, as Han elites became marginalized while the Manchu monopolized power, thus the Chinese monarchy was unable to meet the representativeness criteria of the theory of monarchy survival, thereby explaining why the Chinese monarchy did not survive. With regards to Meiji Japan, under the monarchy, the old Edo era elites were coopted, integrating them into the system and allowing the monarchy to represent Japan, spanning the old and the new, fulfilling the repre-
sentative criteria of monarchy survival theory, exemplifying the need for a monarchy to be representative of the nation, in addition to political modernization, to survive.

As a result of this study, I have explained that the Chinese monarchy failed due to its inability to remain representative of the Chinese nation, despite its efforts to modernize. By using the case of Meiji Japan, I was able to control for a successful case, giving credence to the argument that monarchies need to be representative of the country in which they are active and modernize. This study has implications for the world’s remaining monarchies, both absolute and constitutional. Absolute monarchies should want modernization and attempt to improve their symbolic representativeness if they want to survive in the long term, while constitutional monarchies should focus on their representative abilities, as they have already achieved modernization and democratization. Future research could look into how contemporary monarchies are changing in order to survive and see if the monarchy survival theory needs updating for the information age.
Bibliography


Bodde, Derk and Clarence Morris. 1967. Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch’ing Dynasty Cases (Translated from Hsing-an hui-lan), With Historical, Social, and Juridical Comentaries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


