The Head of State Effect:

Discovering the Rôle of the Head of State in Cabinet Longevity

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Introduction

A cabinet, or government, is a governmental institution that consists of individuals, commonly known as ministers, who conduct the affairs of government. Cabinet durations can vary. So, why do some cabinets fall in a few months, while others survive for years? Commonsense tells us that a cabinet that lasts longer has a greater ability to develop and implement policy, as well as address problems. Modern political science has delved deeply into many factors that determine the longevity of cabinets in parliamentary systems. Some of these factors concern whether a cabinet is made up of a coalition or a single party, whether a minority government exists, and others like war or scandal. Surprisingly, the effect of a head of state on cabinet longevity is rarely tested or considered as a variable. This has led to a lack of knowledge about the role a head of state plays in a key aspect of government: cabinet stability.

The head of state is a fundamental institution in parliamentary systems and in most regime types. A head of state is the individual that embodies the state, serves as the legal representative of a country in the international arena, and carries out constitutional or other legally designated duties. Often a head of state in parliamentary systems performs ceremonial functions, such as receiving foreign dignitaries, awarding citizens for notable acts, and opening legislatures. He or she can also serve as a representative of national unity, acting as the commander-in-chief of the nation's armed forces or addressing the nation in times of crisis. For example, the United Kingdom's Queen Elizabeth II's role as commander-in-chief requires all members of the army and air force to swear allegiance to her, not Parliament or the nation (Promissory Oaths Act of 1868). On occasion, these roles may directly impact the workings of a nation, like foreign policy and societal stability. King Juan Carlos I of Spain was able to use his

role as head of state to denounce and delegitimize a coup d'état, ensuring Spain's status as a democratic country after the downfall of the Franco regime (Cemlyn-Jones 1981). The various roles heads of state play and their potential impact are prime reasons as to why a study of their effect on cabinet longevity is necessary.

Cabinet longevity is influenced by many factors, positively or negatively. What can be said is that cabinet longevity is an important concern for those interested in the functioning of parliamentary regimes. Cabinets that are in power for longer periods of time have the ability to devote sufficient attention to national issues, as they have the time needed to consider a variety of policy options, paying close attention to costs and benefits, whereas a cabinet in existence for a shorter period of time may be unable to develop a wide range of policies, or even none at all (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo 2004). In conjunction with the ability to better deal with issues of national importance, longer lasting cabinets have the benefit of experience. Experience allows leaders to better gauge which policies work and which policies fail, as they will have had the time to actually test policies or conduct better analysis of policies. Cabinet longevity can also serve as a symbol of societal stability. Numerous cabinets rising and falling in short succession do not allow a cabinet to govern, evidencing many societal problems such as rampant crime or the inability to manage an epidemic (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo).

In this paper, I investigate the relationship between the type of head of state in parliamentary systems and cabinet longevity, specifically in Western Europe where democracies are more mature. In particular, I compare cabinet stability under three types of parliamentary heads of state – indirectly elected presidents, directly elected presidents, and constitutional monarchs. Indirectly elected presidents are heads of state that are nominated and elected by a nation's legislature or some other electoral institution, such as an electoral college. In these cases,

the general population of a nation does not cast a vote for president, leaving that job to members of other political institutions. On the other hand, directly elected presidents are heads of state that are voted into office directly by the citizens of a given country. Differing from indirectly and directly elected presidents are constitutional monarchs. Constitutional monarchs are unelected heads of state that often rule for life and pass down the position of head of state to their descendants.

I will argue that the type of head of state in parliamentary systems has a positive effect on the duration of cabinets. I contend that the presence of a constitutional monarch allows a cabinet to last longer; the presence of an indirectly elected and directly president leads to cabinets ending earlier, and that both of these expectations are based on the presupposition that, when a head of state wields substantial powers or is a divisive figure, a cabinet has a higher chance of ending. I base my expectations on the argument that monarchs provide a greater sense of continuity, legitimacy, and stability than presidents and that these traits transfer to cabinet longevity. My argument will be fleshed out in later sections where I can show how my proposed answers to the question of the effect of the type of head of state on cabinet longevity have theoretical and empirical support.

Before I provide support for my arguments, I survey the relevant literature and demonstrate that political scientists know a great deal about cabinet longevity in parliamentary systems, but have not yet adequately addressed the role of the head of state in cabinet longevity. I will also show how there are conflicting studies on head of state type and government stability in general. After concluding my review of relevant literature, I discuss the theory of my argument and formulate three hypotheses. Next, I provide an explanation about the data I use and the analyses I conduct. My results demonstrate that the head of state does indeed influence

cabinet longevity. Finally, I discuss the importance of my findings, as well as briefly comment on the implications of the type of head of state on cabinet longevity.

Reviewing the Relevant Literature

Survival of Monarchs

In one of the first rigorous studies of monarchical regimes, Huntington (1966) sought to understand if monarchies can survive political modernization, which means a transition to democracy. He specifically focused on the interactions between the monarch and the legislature and found that, while political parties and parliamentary representation may form, the monarch will do all he or she can to resist modernization, even if that means using coercive methods in the parliament or suppressing the parliament itself.

Numerous historical examples exist to support Huntington's claims: Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and King Louis XVI of France. However, many monarchies have been modernizing, and have survived. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands both have long histories of political modernization, which has proven quite successful, as both monarchies exist today. An even more recent example exists in Spain. King Juan Carlos I did not rule in the autocratic ways of Generalissimo Francisco Franco. Instead, the Spanish king led the charge for democratization and even quelled a coup that would upset the democratic order. Several studies (Przeworski, Asadurian, & Bohlken 2012; Rose & Kavanagh 1976), instead of focusing on what actions of monarchs lead to the "death" of the monarchies, attempt to determine which actions can allow monarchies to survive.

Przeworski et al. are concerned with charting the history of parliamentary responsibility. Like Huntington, they study the relationship between the monarch and the legislature, finding that monarchs will survive if they give in to the demands of the legislature. Similarly, Rose and Kavanagh find that monarchs who relinquish their powers and cease involvement with political life keep their throne. Thus, to survive, a monarch must "keep up with the times," or adapt to various political and social changes. The studies by Przeworski et al. and Rose and Kavanagh both conclude that monarchies can survive if they are willing to relinquish significant political power and national governance for existence as an institution, a finding that is barely touched upon by Huntington.

However, in spite of the findings that monarchies can survive what can be called democratization, the literature above does not detail the power of a monarch, both real and symbolic. Contrasting with the three previous studies, Lawrence (2014) finds that monarchies are able to survive by using their position wisely.

Lawrence's study primarily focuses on the institution of monarchy in response to public protests advocating for democracy. She finds that monarchies are resilient due to their legitimacy, ability to be flexible, and cultural appeal, as opposed to having immense wealth, foreign backing, and a leadership style that can thwart opposition. Monarchies are able to transform into constitutional monarchies, which leads to a reduction in anti-regime sentiments. Transformation is possible as citizens desire democracy, but also want political stability, which can be provided through a constitutional monarchy. Essentially, Lawrence states that citizens look to the monarch to enact democratic reforms in exchange for the people supporting the monarchy. This finding is very similar to the example of King Juan Carlos' democratic reforms in Spain. Lawrence is able to find a counter explanation of monarchy to Huntington's, as well as provide a model for

Przeworski, et al. and Rose and Kavanagh's findings that show monarchies can survive political modernization and, through special legitimacy and symbolism, provide political stability.

Cabinet Longevity

The literature on cabinet longevity is numerous and conflicting. There are competing studies of cabinet longevity. These studies can be placed into two groups: 1. cabinets end due to random and unpredictable external factors that shock the cabinet and lead to their dissolution, and 2. cabinets end due to systematic factors such as institutions and partisan preferences.

Browne, Frendreis, and Gleiber's (1986) study forms the foundation of the first group of cabinet longevity studies. Their approach focuses on "crisis events", like economic disasters and war, which are largely random and unpredictable. By looking at cabinets of Western parliamentary democracy, they find that crisis events do, indeed, play a role in whether or not a cabinet ends before the next scheduled election. Robertson (1984) provides another example of this approach. He considers the effects of events such as change in unemployment and inflation on the duration of cabinets. As in the Browne, Frendreis, and Gleiber study, Western parliamentary democracies serve as the basis of Robertson's analysis. He finds that unemployment and inflation, two factors that would be considered crisis events, negatively contribute to the longevity of cabinets.

In contrast to crisis event analysis of cabinet longevity are studies that focus on variables that systematically affect, and therefore allow one to predict, the longevity of cabinets. Lupia and Strom (1995) form the foundation of the second group of cabinet longevity studies. In their study, they reexamine why cabinets actually end, looking at cabinet longevity as a result of bargaining based on specific attributes of the broader political system and not simply a result of

unpredictable events. The authors find that the end of a cabinet is not necessarily determined by positive electoral gains, but that the party with these positive gains can use this result to negotiate a better coalition composition or preserve the current cabinet, or face new elections. They also find that crisis events at any given time do not prematurely end cabinets; the impact of a crisis will depend upon the time in which it occurs during the election cycle. Not only do Lupia and Strom disagree with Browne, Frendreis, and Gleider and Robertson, but also provide support for an alternative model to look at cabinet longevity. Both models serve as a focal point for Diermeier and Stevenson's (2000) analysis of cabinet longevity in an attempt to combine the models to better determine cabinet longevity.

As they attempt to somewhat reconcile Lupia and Strom and Browne, Frendreis, and Gleisder's models of determining cabinet longevity, Diermeier and Stevenson find that cabinets tend to end closer to the date of the next scheduled election. They also find the results of their study reject Browne, Frendreis, and Gleisder's model of cabinet longevity studies and support Lupia and Strom's model. This further shows that not only a conflict in the literature exists, but a gap also exists, as Diermeier and Stevenson state that a more strategic model that includes more variables would be ideal and serve as a better predictor of cabinet longevity.

The disagreement over cabinet longevity continues to be found in the work of Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009). In an attempt to determine the risks of cabinet termination between government systems, the scholars find that the presence of a constitution that restricts the ability of the legislature to call for a vote of no confidence and restricts the power of the head of government to dissolve government unilaterally, as well as the presence of a one-chamber legislature, increases the chances of government stability. While they briefly discuss the role a constitutional monarch may play in cabinet survival, emphasizing that it can only use its powers

at the advice of the government, they mostly ignore any actual role the monarch may play in government, while maintaining their focus on the institutional variables model of cabinet longevity. Ignoring the role one of the three types of head of state in cabinet longevity further shows the gap in the literature.

In keeping with the institutional variable model of cabinet longevity, Zimmerman (1988), in an attempt to discover the cabinet stability of nations between World Wars I and II, finds that cabinets last longer when they are made up of members of one political party, politically united, and not radical in political viewpoint. He also finds that cabinets last longer when the number of seats won by the ruling party is high, especially when that party makes the largest absolute gains. Even Zimmerman admits that more factors should be tested in order to better determine the stability of cabinets, showing agreement with Diermeier and Stevenson, thus highlighting the gap in cabinet longevity studies regarding the head of state.

Quite astutely, Diermeier and Stevenson and Zimmerman pointed to the improved accuracy of cabinet longevity models with the inclusion of more variables that help determine cabinet longevity. As pointed out above, a variable that has been left out of the discourse on cabinet longevity is that of the head of state. The reason for that may well be due to the seeming lack of power or influence over modern cabinet formation and dissolution that monarchs in Western European democracies have. This is especially true in parliamentary democracies, which serve as the foundation of cabinet longevity studies.

Easily enough, one can see that there are various disputes in the literature regarding the determinants of cabinet longevity. More importantly, the literature does not adequately consider the role for the head of state in determining if a cabinet survives or ends prematurely. Constitutional monarchs, as seen in the literature, can and have survived democratization,

showing them to be resilient actors doing what they can to keep their thrones for themselves and their families. They have shown to be willing to give up political power, or at least explicit uses of political power, so that they remain with a crown atop their heads instead of replaced by a president. The discovery of the role that monarchs play in cabinet longevity will be a unique addition to the study of democracies.

The Theory of the Head of State Effect on Cabinet Longevity and Hypotheses

Theory

Heads of state are the representatives of a country, not only to the world, but to the people within the country they represent. It is unthinkable that a head of state is completely absent from cabinet affairs, especially when some heads of state in parliamentary democracies have the constitutional and legal authority to determine the beginning and the end of a cabinet. At the end of the day, heads of state have goals they wish to accomplish and ideals they hope to embody. The workings of the cabinet may conflict with the interests of the head of state. National legitimacy, sometimes even national popular legitimacy, accompanies the position of head of state. This legitimacy can help a head of state make the decision to intervene in cabinet formation and dissolution in order to meet their personal goals. Historically, this has been a common action of monarchs. As previously stated, I argue that monarchs generate more stability than presidents and pass this greater stability onto cabinets.

Monarchs establish greater continuity than presidents, in that the public know where their head of state has come from (individually and as part of a distinct lineage) and know who their future heads of state will be, giving the public peace of mind. In the present day, monarchs not only have the support of the public and the legislature, but they also have the power of history to create a greater sense of legitimacy. Theoretically, they have also been trained from birth to learn the monarchical tools of the trade, allowing them to do a better job. The education factor also ties into the monarch's ability to generate a better sense of stability than presidents. In addition, monarchs are unaffiliated with any political group, thus they are able to stand above politics and provide neutral perspectives on national crises and serve as more powerful symbols of national unity. Finally, in actuality, monarchs do not individually use the powers that are constitutionally prescribed to them. Instead, they are truly enacted by the head of government, the cabinet, or some other body responsible to the public, making the monarch immune from responsibility for any instances of instability that may result from use of their powers. Monarchs do not wield their powers unilaterally, as they understand that they may be replaced by a president if they use their powers without the consent of those beholden to the public (Przeworski, Asadurian, & Bohlken 2012; Rose & Kavanagh 1976).

On the other hand, future presidents are unpredictable and lead to a degree of future political uncertainty. While they may be elected by the voting public or an electoral institution, presidents are not usually backed by a national history that is represented in their blood, losing a historical sense of legitimacy that can prove helpful in certain situations. They are also not theoretically educated from birth to do the job of a president. This factor may be apparent during a president's duration in office, reflected by their overall quality of work, possibly creating a situation of government instability. Presidents are also either politically affiliated or are beholden

to an electoral institution, which may require political bargaining to even be elected, producing a situation in which the representative of the nation is inherently divisive along political lines. People will be able to find political disagreement with the head of state, leading to a lack of national unity. Lastly, presidents have a type of national electoral legitimacy that differs from the legislature. Should the interests of the president and the legislature clash, a president may be more willing to use his or her powers, potentially leading to the dissolution of a cabinet or the legislature itself.

Hypotheses

Thusly, based on the above arguments, I formulate three hypotheses that will form the crux of this paper. 1. Cabinets last longer when they have constitutional monarchs, as opposed to directly and indirectly elected presidents. 2. Indirectly elected presidents produce greater cabinet longevity than directly elected presidents, as they are more closely related to monarchs in that they are often less political. 3. I contend that less powerful heads of state are more likely to increase the chance of cabinet survival, due to their relative inability to interfere in cabinet matters, as opposed to more powerful heads of state

Data and Methodology

The primary datasets I will be using to conduct research and data analysis come from ParlGov.org, Rulers.org, the Comparative Constitutions Project, and Prof. Jose Cheibub[1]. These

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[1] ParlGov.org data set: http://www.parlgov.org/data/table/view_party/, Rulers.org data: http://rulers.org/, Comparative Constitutions Project data set: http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/download-data/ (Phase III: Characteristics of National Constitutions, Version 2.0)

datasets concern characteristics of post-World War II cabinets and their prime ministers, constitutional powers of government bodies and rights of citizens, as well as information on the ideology of political parties. My level of measurement for the dependent variable will be continuous–interval, as I will be attempting to determine the length of cabinets under constitutional parliamentary monarchies and parliamentary republics, which will obviously vary in length. My unit of analysis is country-cabinet, meaning that each country will be divided up into different cabinet terms.

Dependent and Primary Independent Variables

Like many studies focusing on cabinet longevity, my dependent variable is cabinet longevity in months. In my sample, the shortest cabinet lasted less than a month, and therefore is coded 0 for duration (France in 1950) and the longest lasted 64 months (Luxembourg from 1969-1974).

My primary independent variables are indicators for type of the head of state: monarchs, indirectly elected presidents, and directly elected presidents. A monarch in parliamentary democracies is a hereditary leader granted specific powers and roles by a constitution. An indirectly elected president is an individual who is elected by a legislature, an electoral college, or some other electoral institution popularly constituted with the purpose of choosing the head of state. In contrast, a directly elected president is a leader who is chosen through a popular election, without the need for approval by a separate electoral or any other institution. These variables are coded 1 for the cabinets to which they apply, 0 otherwise.

Control Variables

I use the study by Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) as a baseline model for my own analysis. Their model includes an indicator for the presence of a coalition cabinet, a minority cabinet, a bicameral legislature, an investiture system, the head of state's party in the cabinet, powers regarding who can dismiss the cabinet and the legislature, as well as how fragmented a legislature is. To these I add the ideology of the head of government's party in the cabinet, the amount of time a head of state has been in office at the start of a new cabinet, whether a scandal involving the head of state has occurred, and the head of state's power to issue decrees.

Coalition cabinets are cabinet governments made up of more than one party. Minority cabinets are cabinets composed of one or more parties that together do not control more than 50% of seats in parliament. A bicameral legislature is a legislature that contains two distinct houses, often denoted as an upper and lower house. An investiture system is a system that requires a cabinet be approved by the legislature before it can fully come to power. These variables are coded 1 for when they are present and 0 for when they are not present. The presence of the head of state's party in the cabinet is an indicator variable coded 1 when the head of state has a political party and that party holds cabinet positions. This variable is always coded 0 for monarchies. Fragmentation of the legislature is the effective number of parties holding seats. Ideology of the head of government's party in the cabinet is based on the head of government's party's position on the left/right axis based on data from ParlGov.org. A party's ideology is calculated on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being the most left in ideology, while 10 is the most right in ideology.

The amount of time a head of state has been in office at the start of a new cabinet is defined by the number of months a head of state has been in office at the start of a new cabinet.

A head of state who has reigned for a long period of time may better serve as a symbol of longevity and stability, thereby encouraging a cabinet to survive.

The occurrence of a scandal involving the head of state is based on whether events such as bribery or sexual affairs occur during a given cabinet. This variable was coded as an indicator, taking the value of 1 when a scandal involving the head of state occurs during a given cabinet, while a 0 indicates that no scandals occurred during a given cabinet. This value is only counted when news of a scandal is publicly made during the tenure of a head of state. A scandal may cause such public relations and institutional damage that a cabinet may be forced to dissolve. The head of state's constitutional powers were measured through two indicator variables: one for when the head of state can dismiss the cabinet and another when the head of state can dismiss the legislature. Finally, regarding other constitutional powers granted to the head of state, I consider the head of state's ability to issue decrees. I expect that heads of state with decree powers will negatively impact cabinet longevity, as a head of state with decree powers may act unilaterally potentially causing disagreement with the actions of the government. Cabinets may dissolve due to such a disagreement.

Empirical Design

Based on previous studies of cabinet longevity, I employ the Cox proportional hazards model. This model is the most commonly used statistical model in survival analysis studies. It is the same model used by Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) in their study of cabinet longevity, upon which the baseline model of my study is based. The advantage of the Cox model is that it does not assume any functional form for the hazard rate.

Analysis[2]

Baseline Model

Observations	Number
Total Number of Observations	292
Total Number of Failures	288

Table I: Baseline Model Test Results

Variables	Hazard Rate	Standard Error	P-Value
Head of State Power to Dismiss the Legislature	-47.30%	0.081	0***
Head of State Power to Dismiss the Cabinet	-38.20%	0.09	0.001***
Minority Cabinet	64.40%	0.202	0.042**
Legislative Fragmentation	88.70%	0.054	0.027**
Bicameral Legislature	72.60%	0.187	0.099*
Head of State Party in the Cabinet	46.40%	0.217	0.002**
Coalition Cabinet	-7.10%	0.147	0.642
Investiture System	-4.10%	0.289	0.889
Ideology of the Head of Government's Party in the Cabinet	-2.50%	0.043	0.572

I begin my analysis by simply conducting a test showing what the baseline model already tells us about the variables that impact cabinet longevity without looking at the head of state type variables. So we know that the ability of the head of state to dismiss the legislature and the cabinet increases the chance of cabinet survival by 47.3% and 38.2% respectively, while minority cabinets, fragmentation of the legislature, a bicameral legislature, and the presence of the head of state's party in the cabinet decrease the chance of cabinet survival by 64.4%, 88.7%, 72.6%, and 46.4% correspondingly. Coalition cabinets, the presence of an investiture system,

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[2] Note: Statistical significance is denoted as * (p-value less than or equal to .1), ** (p-value less than or equal to .05), and *** (p-value less than or equal to .001)

and the ideology of the head of government's party in the cabinet have no effect on cabinet survival. Next, I look solely the impact of monarchs and directly elected presidents, with respect to indirectly elected presidents, to see their impact on cabinet longevity.

Head of State Variables

Observations	Number
Total Number of Observations	496
Total Number of Failures	491

Table II: Head of State Variables Test Results

Variables	Hazard Rate	Standard Error	P-Value
Monarch	-37.50%	0.068	0***
Directly Elected President	-21.70%	0.095	0.045**

When looking singly at the monarch and directly elected heads of state, with respect to indirectly elected heads of state, I find that monarchs increase the chance of cabinet longevity by 37.5%. Directly elected presidents also increase cabinet longevity, but at a smaller rate of 21.7%. Keep in mind, this test does not include the baseline variables and other controls. Thus, while I have established that monarchs generate more cabinet stability than directly elected and indirectly elected presidents, I need to include the variables in the baseline model, as well as add additional controls.

Baseline Model and Head of State Variables

Observations	Number
Total Number of Observations	292
Total Number of Failures	288

Table III: Baseline Model and Head of State Test Results

Variables	Hazard Rate	Standard Error	P-Value
Monarch	-61.70%	0.079	0***
Directly Elected President	-55.40%	0.082	0***
Head of State Power to Dismiss the Legislature	-60%	0.065	0***
Head of State Power to Dismiss the Cabinet	-30%	0.103	0.016**
Minority Cabinet	51.60%	0.226	0.01**
Legislative Fragmentation	93.90%	0.056	0.255
Bicameral Legislature	65.70%	0.201	0.049**
Head of State Party in the Cabinet	92.80%	0.191	0.696
Coalition Cabinet	-13.30%	0.14	0.375
Investiture System	100%	0.301	0.999
Ideology of the Head of Government's Party in the Cabinet	99.80%	0.044	0.955

By looking at the baseline mode with the head of state variables, I find that the presence of a minority cabinet, the head of state's authority to dismiss a cabinet, the presence of a bicameral legislature, and the head of state to dismiss the legislature, along with the head of state variables, impact cabinet stability. While minority cabinets and bicameral parliaments increase the chance of cabinet failure, the head of state variables and cabinet and legislature dismissal variables increase the chance of cabinet survival. Specifically, with respect to indirectly elected presidents, directly elected presidents increase cabinet survival by 55.4%, while monarchs increase cabinet survival by 61.7%. This indicates that parliamentary monarchies increase cabinet survival more so than parliamentary republics. Surprisingly, the power of a head of state to dismiss a cabinet positively impact cabinet survival by 29.7%. Additionally, the power of a head of state to dismiss the legislature increases the chance of cabinet survival by 60%. Again, I find that monarchs increase the chance of cabinet survival more so than directly and indirectly elected presidents. However, I want to go beyond the baseline model and see if other variables change or eliminate the effect of the heads of state on cabinet longevity, so I add scandals

involving the head of state, the length of time a head of state has been in office at the start of a new cabinet, and head of state decree powers.

Controlling for Scandal

Observations	Number
Total Number of Observations	496
Total Number of Failures	491

Table IV: Controlling for Scandal Test Results

Variables	Hazard Rate	Standard Error	P-Value
Monarch	-35.70%	0.074	0***
Directly Elected President	-23.60%	0.096	0.032**
Scandals Involving the Head of State	-40%	0.175	0.08*
Scandals Involving the Monarch	-17.60%	0.306	0.602
Scandals Involving the Directly Elected President	-26.80%	0.43	0.596

Controlling for the presence of scandals, I find that scandals involving the heads of state actually increase the chance of cabinet survival. However, I discover that scandals involving just the monarch and just the directly elected president have no effect, making the effect of scandals on those two heads of state disappear. Keeping in line with my previous tests, monarchs continue to increase the chance of cabinet longevity by 35.7%, while directly elected presidents increase the chance of cabinet longevity at a lower rate of 23.6%. To really see how scandal impacts the head of state effect on cabinet longevity, I further break down my analysis by looking solely at monarchs and scandals and directly elected presidents and scandals.

Observations	Number
Total Number of Observations	496
Total Number of Failures	491

Table V: Controlling for Scandals Involving Monarchs Test Results

Variable	Hazard Rate	Standard Error	P-Value
Monarch	-25.50%	0.071	0.002**
Scandals Involving the Head of State	-41.30%	0.147	0.034**
Scandals Involving the Monarch	-15.60%	0.287	0.617

Table VI: Controlling for Scandals Involving Directly Elected Presidents Test Results

Variable	Hazard Rate	Standard Error	P-Value
Directly Elected President	97.70%	0.107	0.826
Scandals Involving the Head of State	-47.80%	0.094	0***
Scandals Involving the Directly Elected President	-15.10%	0.458	0.761

As I look at the individual effect of scandals on monarchs and directly elected presidents, I continue to see that scandals do not have an effect on either head of state type. However, the positive effect of directly elected presidents on cabinet longevity goes away. It neither increases nor decreases the chance of cabinet longevity. Contrary to this result, monarchs continue to increase the chance of cabinet survival by a rate of 25.5%.

Controlling for Head of State Time in Office at the Start of a New Cabinet

Observations	Number
Total Number of Observations	292
Total Number of Failures	288

Table VII: Controlling for Head of State Time in Office at the Start of a New Cabinet Test Results

Variables	Hazard Rate	Standard Error	P-Value
Monarch	-33%	0.089	.003**
Directly Elected President	-20.50%	0.097	.061*
Head of State Time in Office at the Start of a New Cabinet	-0.10%	0	0.369

I conduct further tests to control for the amount of time a head of state has been office at the start of a new cabinet. This variable appears to have no effect on cabinet stability and I continue to find that monarchs increase the chance of cabinet stability more so than directly and indirectly elected presidents, with monarchs increasing the chance of cabinet stability by 33% and directly elected presidents increasing the chance of cabinet stability by 20.5%. As a final control test, I examine the effect of head of state decree powers on cabinet longevity. I exclude the monarch as a variable, as monarchs do not use their powers without the advice and consent of the government.

Controlling for Head of State Decree Powers

Observations	Number
Total Number of Observations	250
Total Number of Failures	247

Table VIII: Tests Controlling for Head of State Decree Powers Results

Variables	Hazard Rate	Standard Error	P-Value
Directly Elected President	86.80%	0.201	0.485
Indirectly Elected President	13.60%	0.452	0***
Head of State Decree Powers	-7.30%	0.144	0.625

When controlling for head of state decree powers, I find that decree powers do not have an effect on cabinet survival. Directly elected presidents also do not seem to have an effect on cabinet survival. Surprisingly, indirectly elected presidents actually increase the chance of

cabinet failure by a rate of 13.6%. As a final test, I combine all of my control variables with the baseline model and head of state variables to truly see if heads of state have an effect on cabinet survival.

Baseline Model with Head of State and Control Variables

Observations	Number
Total Number of Observations	292
Total Number of Failures	288

Table IX: Baseline Model with Head of State (with Respect to Indirectly Elected Presidents) and Additional Control Variables Test Results

Variables	Hazard Rate	Standard Error	P-Value
Monarch	-57.60%	0.107	.001***
Directly Elected President	-55.90%	0.085	0***
Scandals Involving the Head of State	-47.40%	0.19	.075*
Scandals Involving the Monarch	-38.30%	0.282	0.29
Scandals Involving the Directly Elected President	-17.40%	0.526	0.764
Head of State Time in Office at the Start of a New Cabinet	100%	0.001	0.677
Head of State Power to Dismiss the Legislature	-61.30%	0.065	0***
Head of State Power to Dismiss the Cabinet	-42.50%	0.093	.001***
Minority Cabinet	59%	0.213	.023**
Legislative Fragmentation	88.90%	0.061	.055*
Bicameral Legislature	64.50%	0.21	.049**
Head of State Party in the Cabinet	88%	0.199	0.522
Coalition Cabinet	-24.20%	0.124	.091*
Investiture System	-11.40%	0.278	0.699
Ideology of the Head of Government's Party in the Cabinet	-0.10%	0.045	0.975

After looking at the entirety of the additional control variables, head of state variables, and the baseline model, the results largely appear to be the same. Monarchs decrease the chance of cabinet dissolution by 57.6%, while directly elected presidents decrease the chance of cabinet failure by 55.9%. The ability of the head of state to dismiss the legislature and the cabinet also

continues to decrease the chance of cabinet failure by 61.3% and 42.5% respectively. As in prior

tests, the control variables do not have any effect on cabinet longevity. In addition to the final

test with monarchs, I conduct a final test with indirectly elected presidents.

Observations	Number
Total Number of Observations	250
Total Number of Failures	247

Table X: Baseline Model with Head of State (with Respect to Monarchs) and Control

Variables Test Results

| Variables	Hazard Rate	Standard Error	P-Value
Indirectly Elected President	98.80%	0.767	.001***
Directly Elected President	85%	0.32	0.615
Scandals Involving the Head of State	-63.50%	0.126	.004**
Scandals Involving the Indirectly Elected President	59.60%	0.767	0.534
Scandals Involving the Directly Elected President	64.80%	0.961	0.671
Head of State Time in Office at the Start of a New Cabinet	99.90%	0.001	0.174
Head of State Power to Dismiss the Legislature	-63%	0.079	0***
Head of State Power to Dismiss the Cabinet	-48.90%	0.186	.065*
Minority Cabinet	45.30%	0.29	.020**
Legislative Fragmentation	93.20%	0.063	0.269
Bicameral Legislature	84.80%	0.238	0.493
Head of State Party in the Cabinet	58.90%	0.306	0.112
Coalition Cabinet	-21.40%	0.157	0.229
Investiture System	-12.10%	0.303	0.708
Ideology of the Head of Government's Party in the Cabinet	97.10%	0.05	0.561

My final test also proves to coincide with prior tests. With respect to monarchs, indirectly

elected presidents increase the chance of cabinet failure by 98.8%, while directly elected

presidents have no effect. The control variables also continue to have no effect, while the head of

state powers to dismiss the cabinet and the legislature increase the chance of cabinet survival by

48.9% and 63%. Ultimately, these results continue to show that monarchs increase the chance of

cabinet survival more so than indirectly and directly elected presidents, but that heads of state that have the powers to dismiss the legislature and the cabinet also increase the chance of cabinet survival.

Concluding Analysis

Based on these tests, I can conclude that indirectly elected presidents increase the chance of cabinet failure in Western European parliamentary democracies, while constitutional monarchies provide MORE CABINET STABILITY than parliamentary republics in Western Europe. The fact that indirectly elected presidents are the most unstable is puzzling. This may possibly be due to presence of endogeneity in these countries, however, that is beyond the scope of this work. However, while monarchs may increase cabinet stability more so than any other head of state type in parliamentary democracies, the rate of increase is relatively small compared to directly elected presidents. This means that monarchs are doing just as well as directly elected presidents at providing cabinet stability in democracies.

Graph I[3]

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
[3] Monarchies have a high chance of cabinet survival at the outset and decreases to 0% at around 65 months over a gradual period of time.

Graph II[4]

Cabinet Survival Rate of Directly Elected Presidents Over Time

Graph III[5]

Cabinet Survival Rate of Indirectly Elected Presidents Over Time

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
[4] Directly elected presidential parliamentary republics have a higher chance of cabinet survival, but less so than monarchies and with a more dramatic decrease in survival rate.

[5] Most surprisingly, indirectly elected presidential parliamentary republics have a lower chance of cabinet survival at the outset than directly elected presidential republics. The survival rate also decreases faster over time than in constitutional monarchies and other parliamentary republics.

While my hypothesis regarding monarchs appears to be confirmed, my results show that, with regards to the ability of the head of state to dismiss cabinets and the legislature, my hypothesis involving powerful heads of state appears to be invalid. Both variables actually increase the chance of cabinet survival. Perhaps this is due to the inability of prime ministers or other government and politically related groups from dismissing the cabinet and the legislature. These groups would be more than likely to dismiss the cabinet or the legislature if they had something to gain, such as a better coalition deal or a legislature that is more favorable to a specific party. A head of state would have little interest in using their dismissal powers, as he or she would have little to gain. Thus, cabinets are forced, more often than not, to remain as they are, only dissolving when a coalition naturally falls apart or a new election occurs.

Conclusion

Based upon previous scholarship, cabinet longevity is influenced by institutional variables that serve as predictors of cabinet failure and unpredictable crisis events. These studies have largely excluded the head of state as a variable of interest and have completely disregarded the monarch even when focusing on the head of state's involvement in cabinet longevity. In addition to these studies, literature concerning the survival of monarchies has shown that monarchs who resist democratization and use executive authority are replaced by presidents. However, these studies have also shown that monarchs are political survivors and are willing to democratize so long as they can keep their thrones.

In my study, we can see the interaction between the monarch and other heads of state in the democratic processes, specifically cabinet stability. Based on the characteristics of

legislatures and constitutions of post-World War II Western parliamentary democracies, through the usage of the Cox proportional hazards model, I find that monarchs increase the chance of cabinet survival more so than directly elected presidents. In turn, directly elected presidents increase the chance of cabinet survival more so than indirectly elected presidents, which actually decrease the chance of cabinet survival. These results are found through multiple tests using a baseline model based on the model used in Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) and controlling for the head of state decree powers, the amount of time a head of state has been in office at the start of a new cabinet, and scandals involving a head of state. These additional controls consist of both institutional and crisis event variables that have been shown to influence cabinet stability.

While my hypothesis regarding constitutional monarchs increasing the chance of cabinet survival more than directly and indirectly elected presidents proved true, my remaining hypotheses appear to be false. Directly elected presidents actually increase the chance of cabinet survival and indirectly elected presidents decrease the chance of cabinet survival. Additionally, heads of state with the powers to dismiss the legislature and the cabinet increase the chance of cabinet survival, denoting that more powerful heads of state actually increase the chance of cabinet longevity.

These findings have implications for constitutional design, as well as for current political actors. Developing countries and those that are democratizing or seeking to democratize can use this work to develop more stable regimes. Countries that have experienced high levels of internal unrest and instability may seek to adopt constitutional monarchies with dismissal powers, in order to allow cabinets to survive for long enough periods so that policy making and governing can be effective. Current parliamentary democracies may also desire to desire to recognize the powers of the head of state to independently dismiss the cabinet and the legislature, as opposed

to using those very powers through a secondary individual or body, whether it be the prime minister or something else, so as to ensure that their governments can more effectively govern, instead of risking a state of governmental flux which has affected countries in the recent past.

In order to conduct future research and better these results, scholars can expand the baseline model and include more institutional variables, especially characteristics regarding the head of government. Political history such as number of past regimes, or a history of instability may also prove beneficial. Including more crisis events, such as war or economic downturn, would also serve to better control the study and ascertain whether heads of state truly have an impact on cabinet survival.

Regardless, this paper has pointed out that the elephant variable in the room of cabinet longevity studies, the head of state, does, in fact, play a material role in cabinet survival. Not only does the head of state play a role, but the type of head of state matters in a way that can lead to increases and decreases in cabinet stability. It is now safe to say that types of heads of state can be used in future research of cabinet longevity.

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