



The King is Dead? Not by a Long Shot

The usurpation of monarchical governance has been widely promoted as an inexorable trend, but it is a trend now facing reversal in many areas of the world. This report looks at the rôle of monarchies in recent world history, and how, as an example, they play a rôle in securing the future. Here we focus on, among other things, the case of Australia.

US PRES. DONALD TRUMP, in his second address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 2018, made a strenuous case for the doctrine and concept of sovereignty, not just for the US but also as a right for all nation-states.

It is highly significant that few people today even comprehend the concept of sovereignty, and the confused media coverage of his speech reflected that. Sovereignty has been erased from our lexicon of the past seven decades. However, Pres. Trump's reiteration of the US case was an indication of the global momentum toward sovereignty and against the 70-year or more tide we have witnessed of the erosion of the sovereign rights and duties of nation-states.

This was a vital message to Australia, a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary element in both major political parties committed — despite polling indicating an opposite desire among voters — to attempting to transform the state into a republic.²

Despite being swamped by an antagonistic media misinterpretation, the Trump speech continued to highlight the rising global tide favoring the restoration of strong sovereignty for societies, and for the reiteration of their traditional identities, values, and hier-

archies. It is important to understand that this is not a “Trump agenda” any more than the Brexit vote in the UK in 2016 was a phenomenon driven by UK politicians Boris Johnson (Conservative) or Nigel Farage (UK Independence Party). It is, in fact, a return to an age of geopolitics and an end of the brief age of anti-nationalist globalism.

This tide is a reflection of how societies globally move — and have historically moved, usually in cyclical patterns — to adapt to new threats, opportunities, and realities. What we are witnessing is a natural phenomenon as the global strategic architecture undergoes profound change.

THE CYCLICAL MOVES between globalism and nationalism — often expressed in different words at different times — reflect history's unrelenting pattern; the pendulum of its grandfather clock. It has kept perfect time for ten-thousand years.

The current move of societies back

toward the protection of the familiar identity and association of their clans, hierarchies, and lands, has essentially created a schism between the urban globalists, who wish to retain the anti-sovereignty movement which briefly gained traction since World War II, and those who see the urgent need to rebuild their nation-state frameworks.

It is an appropriate time, then, to ask where Australia would be today, without the enduring presence of the Crown — the nation's most visible icon of sovereignty and unity — in Australian life. The Crown has been with Australians since the start of their identity as a modern society. It is equally appropriate to ask how Australia could successfully navigate its future *without* the Crown as the world enters an age of profound global strategic transformation.

Most Australians either take the Australian Crown for granted as an enduring, subliminal, and inspirational presence in their lives, or — lacking any detailed education or understanding on the topic — think that the Crown is irrelevant to their currently materialistic and short-focus lifestyles. Most of us, busy with our lives wherever we live in the world, fail to under-

¹ This report is based on an address given by the author at the introduction of his new book, *Sovereignty in the 21st Century and the Crisis for Identity, Cultures, Nation-States, and Civilizations*, at the annual conference of Australians for Constitutional Monarchy held at the New South Wales Parliament, Sydney, Australia, on October 3, 2018. Gregory Copley is also President of the Zahedi Center for the Study of Monarchy, Traditional Governance, and Sovereignty at the International Strategic Studies Association in the Washington, DC, area. The report also draws on some material published earlier in this journal by this author.

² A national referendum in Australia on November 6, 1999, was to determine whether Australia would change its form of governance to a republic. The proposal was defeated 54.8 percent to the 45.13 percent in favor of a republic. At that time, significantly, the Australian monarchy was at a low ebb of public support, and has, in subsequent years, markedly improved its favorability rating in polling. Despite this, politician-led initiatives aimed at creating a political presidency of a republic continue to be proposed by senior politicians.

stand how the core framework of our societies so vitally depends on deeply-ingrained, enduring symbols of identity to deliver the basis for ongoing prosperity, generation after generation.

IT IS EASY TO THINK of the 20th Century as the period which saw the decline of monarchical states around the world, and the rise of republicanism.

We tended to think of that process as one which delivered the unprecedented growth in human societies' numbers, wealth, and health. But the great wealth which enabled the dynamism of the 20th Century was largely brought about by the monarchical states, as well as by the United States.

As an aside, I could argue that the US was also at that time, in much of the 20th Century, a form of monarchy, with its crown — like Australia's today — very much an abstract and symbolic one. For the US, *its* "crown" was built around its flag, Constitution, Bill of Rights, and Declaration of Independence. And, as with the Emperors after the collapse of the Roman Republic, US Presidents have always had to deny that their state had become a monarchy, like the one they rejected in 1776.

But the United States merely elected its monarch — literally its emperor — every four years and gave its elected president more power than almost any monarch in the world has had over the past few hundred years.

It was the monarchical states which delivered great wealth and accomplishment during the industrial revolution and later. But it was their brief exhaustion which led to a collapse into a century of two world wars, several profound or revolutionary transformations of societies, and the creation of a hundred or more new, artificially contrived nation-states. Most of these new nation-states, however, were not built around the identities of their inhabitants. The colonial agglomerations which were created often gathered peoples into a forced marriage between different historically-rooted societies and into artificial and indefensible borders, and given the names of new nation-states by their colonial

overlords.

And so we are starting to reap the whirlwind our ancestors sowed.

Now, the 21st Century promises to be an age of even more profound upheaval. This century will be the counterweight to the 20th Century. It will be that predictable pendulum swing; a natural course correction by human nature. What this means is that there is today a profound *tsunami* building which will be seen as the rush back toward sovereignty, because societies always make the flight to the safety of their own lands, peoples, and beliefs when massive change threatens them.

And that change we're seeing is neither merely the strategic rise of the People's Republic of China, nor the decline of the US; nor even the impact of technology. Of course all these things are important. The massive change is being brought about by the end of the age of growth. The unfettered growth in everything since the end of World War II is now peaking, and we will now see the zig-zagging decline in overall human numbers.

This has already begun to compound as a new strategic phenomenon. Urbanization and trans-national migration accelerated as a direct result of the loss (or burying) of deep human identity frameworks of so many societies, including our own. For the past seven decades we replaced deep and enduring social values and identity with the promise of immediate material gratification.

The rise of politically-driven social management, which is the hallmark of modern republic-style governance, is characterized by the transactional promises of immediate material gratification in exchange for votes. It was that transformation of the concept of democracy from the social bargain — the social contract — of the past to the immediate material transactionalism of today which gained great traction in the post-World War II era to the detriment of enduring, core societal values and identity.

In the 21st Century, as a corollary to this, we are heading toward a precipitous decline in global human numbers within the coming decade or two, camouflaged by massive population movements from rural to urban, country to

country. This is what is leading us to a totally transformed economic framework for most of the world. As a result, we are already beginning to see the signs of alarm, even panic, in many parts of the world.

The Washington, DC-based International Strategic Studies Association, has been studying global strategic trends for almost a half-century, and, in order to focus on the phenomenon — this "rush toward sovereignty" — it identified, created, a couple of years ago the Zahedi Center for the Study of Monarchy, Traditional Governance, and Sovereignty. The Center's new study, *Sovereignty in the 21st Century*, attempts to explain where the world is heading. And it's heading to an age when sovereignty will again become the most profound motivating force in global human organization. Despite this, hardly anyone has stopped, this past century or so, to think what sovereignty means, or exactly what forms of governance and organization are available to us. Still less do people understand what constitutes a monarchy or a republic. Neither do they grasp the intrinsic relationship of sovereignty to democracy.

Sovereignty in the 21st Century not only addresses that, but also addresses the intrinsic links between the essential driving or motivating elements of human societies. It attempts to explain why enduring forms of natural human hierarchy will continue to guide us into the future.

THE COLLAPSE OF many monarchies in the 20th Century was the precursor of today's global framework.

It led us to a global strategic framework which was inherently fragile. Think how the collapse of monarchies shaped our current world. That is not to say that some countries with monarchies did not make errors of judgment, or that some were tired and in need of restructuring. But the net outcome was that the destruction of the immature German monarchy as a result of the German defeat in World War I led to the rise of nazism.

That in itself began the bipolarization of the world into two camps,

each led by strongly anti-monarchical governments: the Soviets — created or enabled by World War I — and the US.

The collapse of the Italian monarchy with World War II was also a key design of Stalin as well as, perhaps unconsciously or viscerally, of the US. And as that was happening, my late colleague, the great strategic philosopher Dr Stefan Possony, saw that a perpetuation of this trend would lead to disastrous consequences if it was allowed to continue and be applied to the Empire of Japan. We had already seen the chaos which had been caused by the collapse of the Chinese Imperial state in 1911.

It was Possony's strenuous advice which ultimately caused US Pres. Harry Truman, and General Douglas MacArthur, to agree that the Japanese Imperial Crown should be sustained after the Japanese defeat. The result was that Japan retained its dignity and sense of historical self, and did not fall under Soviet influence, as Stalin sought desperately to achieve. This was the great setback for the USSR to the point that Moscow never agreed to the end of the war with Japan.

The post-Soviet Russian Federation still has not been able to fully resolve this situation because of the divergent geopolitical interests which arose from the Soviet occupation of the Kuril Islands north of Japan.

HAD STALIN SUCCEEDED in turning Japan into a communist, or even leftist republic, then the results would have been profoundly tragic for the world because it would have compounded the effects of the massive Japanese assaults on China, Korea, and Mongolia during the 1930s and through World War II. That gave us a half century of communism in China and North Korea.

So think about the impact on much of the world if nazism had never flourished in Germany, or if fascism in Italy had not eroded the moral authority of the Italian Crown. Think about how different the world would have been if Japan had not helped destroy the Chinese Imperial crown in the late 19th and 20th centuries. And then think

about the prospects if Japan had been allowed to fall into a Soviet-led republicanism with the end of World War II.

World War I caused a social dislocation in Russia, leading to an urban-globalist (read utopian marxist) *putsch* — not a revolution — which curtailed what was, until World War I, the most rapidly-growing economy in Europe. That had almost as much global impact in dislocating societies as did the later spread of Western wealth. Perhaps more: we see today urban populations, disconnected from everything except short-term materialism, echoing the same utopianist demands made by the bolsheviks of 1917.

Republicanism, as *Sovereignty in the 21st Century* explains, tends to be more materialistic, transactional, and short-term than deeply-rooted traditional society.

We saw the 1911 Xinhai revolution in China led by Sun Yat-sen not only euthanize an already disconnected Qing Imperial dynasty; it opened the country to civil war, facilitating what began as an opportunistic new set of Japanese incursions beginning in 1931. But because of the civil war, China could not adequately respond to increasingly rapacious Japanese assaults on the country. It was no surprise that the Chinese communist forces under Mao Zedong left most of the fighting against the invading Japanese to the Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek, ultimately leaving the Nationalists weakened and easy prey for the communists. Similarly, in Yugoslavia, the communist partisans under Josip Broz “Tito” left the real fighting against the invading German forces to the monarchist Četniks under the great General “Draža” Mihailović, whose forces were so weakened by 1945 that the partisans ensured that the Yugoslav Crown did not regain office.

Again, I do not say that monarchies, even in the most democratic of societies, necessarily always sway history along lines beneficial to all. But what is clear is that the primary duties of sovereignty — and therefore of the sovereign and the sovereign's government — must be to the security and welfare of that sovereign's own kingdom or empire, not to others. The monarchies of Britain, France, Germany, Italy,

Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Japan, and Russia imposed their power over the past 200 or so years on societies in Africa, the Middle East, the Americas, and Asia, and thereby subjugated the identity and sovereignty of others. This had many negative consequences for the subject peoples. But the republican governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, and so on, equally practiced imperial dominance and suzerain manipulation on smaller states.

But look at the loss of the national harmony which had been achieved by neutral monarchies in Libya and Iraq when those monarchies were usurped by coups which installed “republican” leaders who represented the interests of either one tribe, or one religious faction. Political leaders can rarely represent the totality of national diversity.

What is important now, though, is to recognize that both republics and monarchical states prosper most when they consider the sovereign prestige of their own societies. But it is most evident, however, that republican societies tend to be driven by more short-term and material tangibles, while monarchical societies tend to be driven more by deep, enduring core identity.

There is no doubt that urban materialism has, by prospering so dramatically in the seven decades since World War II, driven feelings of core identity into the deep recesses of the minds of most people. This has very much been a factor in most of the great industrial societies, where urban populations have come to dominate political life. The world's population is now 54 percent urbanized. [By 2017, 89.68 percent of Australia's population lived in urban settings.]

The bottom line is that urban people, while their wealth continues to grow, do not need to think about sovereignty and about the intrinsic link which all species have with their land: their geographical context; their geopolitics. But when that wealth begins to evaporate, and threats emerge, then people once again begin to think about how they may return to the safety of their clans and lands.

A year before his September 25, 2018, address to the UN, Donald Trump had invoked the word “sovereignty” 19 times in his inaugural

speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 19, 2017.³ His theme was the reclamation of US sovereignty, and he showed absolute commitment to that theme when he spoke again at the UN on September 25, 2018. Trump's predecessor, Pres. Barack Obama, in his final speech to the UN General Assembly on September 20, 2016, devoted the entirety of his talk, in contradistinction, to stressing the need for globalism, and for a repudiation of sovereignty.

Nothing could have contrasted the fundamental difference between those successive US leaders more profoundly, nor the different ages they represented. Yet the importance of these stark, mutually hostile views of where the US and the world should travel went unremarked by the urban media.

It is worth repeating that these diverging views represented different ages, it is important to note that the revival and assertion of the need for sovereignty is very much the *new* age; the age of our immediate future. The age of globalism — anti-sovereignty — is the age of our immediate past.

Whether we like it or not.

That is not to say that the age of globalism will not come again; it will. All patterns of human social behavior are cyclical. But now we are moving to an age in which many human societies demand a reinforcement of sovereignty. This is because a reversion to social identity — based around history and geography — is a normal reaction to chaos, uncertainty, and threat.

Most Australians feel only the most vague stirring of a perception of a threat to their way of life. They, like most urban people in wealthy societies, keep thinking that they need only to hold the line, and insist that their entitlements be sustained, to weather what they believe to be a temporary storm.

It is not a temporary storm.

The world is changing.

The world is moving back to a new — or old — set of national identities. Australia's strategic context is chang-

ing as a result. Its economy will change. It already has, just since the last recession began in the PRC. But the emerging global strategic context is by no means fixed in concrete, other than the reality of that jagged pattern of declining population levels and continued mass population movements, in turn transforming economic patterns.

Certainly, there is and will be an increasing rush toward nationalism; toward identity-driven divisions and schisms in societies. This means greater bilateralism of trade, and so on. There is no certainty as to the futures of the current great powers. The PRC has its problems, as has the US. So, of course, does the European Union. But within this pattern we see how poorly Australia itself has fared in recent decades compared with its immediate region.

And Australia's relative economic position seems set, unless it reverts to a cohesive national identity, to continue to erode in comparison to its neighbors. This is particularly the case with India, Australia's main rival for influence in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asian region, where we are witnessing a reversal of the trajectory of the past century.

Australia's GDP in 1978, was \$118.309-billion, India's \$136.469-billion (only 15 percent more than Australia's). By 2016, Australia's GDP was \$1.205-trillion; India's was \$2.264-trillion (almost double Australia's). In 1978, Indonesia's GDP was about 43 percent of Australia's. By 2016, it was more than 77 percent of Australia's.

The People's Republic of China's GDP in 1978 was \$218.5-billion (176 percent of Australia's), but in 2016 it was \$11.191-trillion (some 930 percent greater than Australia's).

What was Australia's national identity in that period when it was able to so readily perform above the global average? Some of it, of course, reflected a less productive global context. But Australian productivity was centered around its identity as a cohesive society based on assimilating peoples into a culture which had common themes

of communication — including language — and a common respect for its hierarchy as a constitutional monarchy. It had, in short, a sense that it was a sovereign nation-state, and that it had a common identity, even if it found it difficult to articulate that identity.

That is not to say that Australians did not have much work to do to preserve, protect, and respect the place of Australia's constituent societies. We failed, for example, to fully understand Australia's original communities in part because they themselves were unable to express their own identities in ways which permitted their preservation, a problem compounded by the reality that they had not developed or communicated a defensible geopolitical concept of their own. Today, all Australian communities should be better able to articulate their rôles in a greater or overarching continental polity, *if Australians choose even to discuss sovereignty.*

Sovereignty and prestige are integrally related. Possony said: "Prestige is the credit rating of nations."

Of course there is much more to this discussion as to where Australia is going, and where the world is going, and why. However, what is clear is that if Australia is to survive as a sovereign nation-state with its values, language, and over-arching identity intact, then it has no better organizational model than that which centers around its Crown.

Must Australia continue to Australianize its Crown? Almost certainly. I made several proposals about how to achieve that in *Australia 2050*, in 2007.⁴ But at that time Australians were all too content in their wealth and the unshakeable belief that *this* time, for the first time in all human history, *their* economic boom would last forever.

The Australian example translates to other nation-states which are poised — often whether they recognize it or not — at the brink of change, and therefore at the brink of choice.

Nothing lasts forever except the possibility of our identity, and it is that which we have neglected so badly. ★

3 See, for example, Copley, Gregory: *Sovereignty in the 21st Century and the Crisis for Identity, Cultures, Nation-States, and Civilizations*; Alexandria 2018, the International Strategic Studies Association. And, by the same author: "The Inevitable Return of Sovereignty" in *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, 9-2018 (also in *Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis*, September 10, 2018).

4 Copley, Gregory R.; Pickford, Andrew: *Australia 2050, An Examination of Australia's Condition, Outlook, and Options for the First Half of the 21st Century*. Melbourne, 2007: SidHarta Publishers. ISBN: 978-1921206832.